Contents

Foreword
Avant-propos

We are pleased to present the eighth edition of the Centre for International Policy Studies' graduate student journal, *Potentia: Journal of Public and International Affairs*.

This year's theme "International Security" emerged from discussions we had in the fall of 2016 on how to capture the various changes that have occurred in the landscape of global security over the course of the last few years. Indeed, the field of international security, traditionally linked to the geopolitical relations between states, has faced new challenges in light of current dynamics of insecurity, including the emergence of new non-state terrorist actors and forms of threats, new war tactics (such as hybrid warfare and disinformation), recent uses of chemical weapons, contested post-conflict stabilization, etc.

The variety of topics discussed by this year's contributors is a testament of the aforementioned shifts and trends in the field of international security. The contributors have tackled issues ranging from Turkey's strategic participation in the face of asymmetric threat from Russia to the impact of international greenlighting on peacebuilding efforts in Rwanda. We would like to thank them for contributing to this year's edition of Potentia, and ensuring that the issues addressed are diverse and relevant.

Additionally, we would like to thank our editorial board, who were an integral part of this process. Their hard work and dedication allowed us to produce a quality publication. Xavier,

Nous avons le plaisir de présenter la huitième édition de la revue étudiante du Centre d'études en politiques internationales, *Potentia : Revue des affaires publiques et internationales*.

Le thème de la présente édition, « la sécurité internationale », est né de discussions que nous avons eues à l'automne 2016 au sujet des nombreux changements marquants qu'a connus la sécurité mondiale au cours des dernières années. En effet, le domaine de la sécurité internationale, qui est traditionnellement concerné par les relations géopolitiques entre les États, a dû relever de nouveaux défis en raison des présentes dynamiques d'insécurité, y compris l'émergence de nouveaux groupes terroristes non étatiques, de nouvelles formes de menace, les tactiques de combat modernes (telles que la « guerre hybride » et la désinformation), l'utilisation récente d'armes chimiques, la contestation des efforts de stabilisation d'après-conflit, etc.

La variété des sujets qui font l'objet des articles inclus dans la présente édition témoigne de ces changements et de ces nouvelles tendances dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale. Les auteurs ont abordé diverses questions allant de la participation stratégique adoptée par la Turquie face à la menace russe à l'impact de l'approbation tacite de la communauté internationale sur les efforts de consolidation de la paix au Rwanda. Nous tenons à remercier les auteurs d'avoir contribué à la présente édition de *Potentia* et pour nous avoir

Editorial Team
L'équipe de rédaction

Anushua Nag est candidate à la maîtrise à l'École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa (ÉSAPI). Elle détient un baccalauréat en droit de l'Université de Montréal et un *juris doctor* de l'Osgoode Hall Law School. Après avoir pratiqué le droit en pratique privée, Anushua s'est tournée vers les études supérieures pour explorer davantage ses intérêts de recherche, soit les droits et libertés fondamentaux dans les domaines de l'immigration et du droit criminel. Dans son projet de maîtrise, elle s'attarde à l'interprétation adoptée par la Cour suprême du Canada de la liberté religieuse en milieu scolaire dans l'objectif de déterminer comment cette interprétation se distingue ou se rapproche de celle avancée dans la théorie du pluralisme culturel.

Kamiliya Akkouche holds an Honour's Bachelor's in International Development and Globalization from the University of Ottawa (Summa Cum Laude). Kamiliya has lived in Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and Algeria. She has also studied and worked in France, Turkey and both coasts of Canada, allowing her to nurture an avid interest and passion for diplomacy and international security issues, particularly at the nexus of Russia and the Middle East. She has held various positions with the Canadian government, including most recently as Policy Analyst at Global Affairs Canada, in foreign policy planning. In addition to her work, Kamiliya was recently named a Global Shaper of the World Economic Forum.

Xavier Léger Guest is a Master's Candidate at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Originally from Montreal, Xavier has lived abroad for a number of years, including in the US and in Tunisia. His research interests include Middle East and North African politics, Canadian Immigration policy, and post-colonial movements.

Anna Gruszewski est candidate à la maîtrise à l'École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa. Née à Fredericton au Nouveau Brunswick, elle a déménagé à Ottawa pour compléter des études en éthique à l'Université d'Ottawa et pour agir à titre de page à la Chambre des communes. Elle a passé plusieurs années à travailler au sein du parlement canadien. Cette expérience explique son intérêt pour les politiques fédérale et internationale. En ce qui concerne ses intérêts de recherche, Ania se penche sur les grandes questions philosophiques et politiques de nos temps, telles que la question des réfugiés et de l'engagement démocratique.

Daniel Jeang is a Master's Candidate at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Prior to starting the program and moving to Ottawa, he worked odd jobs for four years while also trying to explore as much of the world as possible. He is looking forward to graduating soon so he can continue where he left off. His hobbies include reading fiction, eating McDonald's fries, and playing with his Alaskan Malamute puppy. Daniel's main interest however is in international development and how to enhance Canada's role in it.

Sacha Lavoie-Guilini est candidat à la maîtrise à l'École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa (ÉSAPI). Il détient un baccalauréat spécialisé approfondi en Science Politique avec mineure en Criminologie de l'Université d'Ottawa. Au cours de ses études supérieures, il a complété un échange à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris (IEP) ainsi qu'un cours d'été à l'université hébraïque de Jérusalem pour approfondir ses connaissances sur ses intérêts de recherches. Ceux-ci portent majoritairement sur le terrorisme international, la sécurité aux frontières et les études islamiques.

Sheila Mandegar is a second-year Master's Candidate at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Carleton University. Her theoretical research interests lie in critical securitization studies and post-colonial theory. Her upcoming thesis focuses on the Islamic State, the impact of irregular armed forces, and their spatial patterns of political violence; to question how its state-building project challenges traditional understandings of sovereignty and what these shifting territorial patterns of violence mean for conceptualizing the notion of the state and insecurity.

Turkish Strategic Participation: Counteracting Asymmetric Threat with Asymmetric Coalition-Building

S. B. AUBREY[*]

Abstract — This paper argues that Turkey's current hard power participation in its region can be understood as "Strategic Participation." It posits this approach is a shift in strategy, not goals from the "zero problems with neighbours" policy piloted by former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. It applies this argument to the case of increasing Russian regional intervention, and argues that Turkey's response to Russia is in line with the goal of Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth doctrine of leveraging historical identity and diversifying strategic relationships. It combines the "principal-agent" and "concordance" civil–military relations theories of Feaver and Schiff to clarify the AKP's role in foreign policy and employ's Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory to assess the Russian threat. It argues that civil–military relations after the Ergenekon and Bayloz trials enabled Strategic Depth to become established in the AKP, and that Turkish concerns over NATO commitment have created a security deficit that exacerbates the

Résumé — Cet article avance que la puissance coercitive exercée par la Turquie dans sa région est une forme de « participation stratégique ». Cette approche représente un changement des objectifs, mais non des tactiques en place depuis la politique « zéro problème avec les voisins » proposée par l'ancien premier ministre turc, Ahmet Davutoğlu. L'article évalue cette proposition dans le contexte des interventions russes dans la région. De plus, l'article soutient que la réponse de la Turquie à la menace russe suit la doctrine de la « profondeur stratégique » de Davutoğlu. Suivant cette doctrine, la Turquie doit tirer profit de son identité historique et diversifier ses relations stratégiques. L'article combine les théories des relations civil–militaire de Feaver et de Schiff — c'est-à-dire la théorie de « l'agent principal » (*principal-agent*) et celle de « la concordance » respectivement — pour établir le rôle de l'AKP dans la politique étrangère de la Turque. De plus, l'article fait appel à la théorie de Walt, soit celle de « l'équilibre de la menace » pour

asymmetric Russian threat. It then surveys Turkish relations with four states — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Iraq — along three indicators: shared threat; military co-operation; and economic dependence. It concludes that Turkey is working to bolster co-operation with key regional states to compensate for the perceived "security deficit" in the face of asymmetric threat from Russia, in line with the strategic diversification objectives required under Strategic Participation.

Keywords: Turkey; asymmetry; balance of threat; grand strategy; security deficit; foreign policy; civil–military relations; Ahmet Davutoğlu; Strategic Depth.

évaluer la nature de la menace russe. Cet article soutient que la nature des relations civil–militaire turques post-procès d'Ergenekon et de Bayloz rend possible l'intégration de la profondeur stratégique dans la politique étrangère de l'AKP. De plus, les craintes de la Turquie quant aux engagements de l'OTAN ont créé un déficit sécuritaire qui amplifie l'asymétrie existant entre la Turquie et la Russie. Enfin, l'article examine les relations de la Turquie avec quatre autres pays — l'Azerbaïdjan, la Géorgie, l'Ukraine et l'Irak — utilisant trois variables : les menaces partagées, la coopération militaire et la dépendance économique. L'article conclut que la Turquie tente de renforcer sa coopération avec certains pays régionaux pour contrebalancer le « déficit sécuritaire » ressenti dû à la menace asymétrique posée par la Russie. Ces tentatives concordent avec les objectifs de la diversification stratégique requise par la théorie de la « participation stratégique ».

Mots-clés : Turquie ; asymétrie ; équilibre de menace ; grande stratégie ; déficit sécuritaire ; politique étrangère ; relations civil–militaire ; Ahmet Davutoğlu ; Profondeur stratégique.

Introduction

This paper proposes that the Turkish response to Russian intervention in Syria can be described as Strategic Participation. This model suggests that, contrary to popular analysis, the Davutoğlu-era doctrine of Strategic Depth has not disappeared from Turkish foreign policy, and remains in a new, increasingly reactive and defensive form. This paper argues that this new approach developed over the course of 2015, and became particularly intense following the September beginning of Russian intervention in Syria. This Russian threat pushed Turkey to retrench former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's strategic concepts, and engage in asymmetric balancing to hedge against the Russian threat.

The paper argues that Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth concept has one primary goal — the development of Turkey into a "central" transnational strategic actor — and two primary methods: (1) leveraging historical identity and (2) diversifying strategic relationships. Since at least 2009, Turkish foreign policy has followed these basic approaches. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has heavily engaged in the first of these domestically, most notably in garnering popular support to suppress the influence of non-party sources, like the pre-2009 Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The second, however, makes up the bulk of this paper's analysis. Turkey has preferred to bolster its relationship with weaker states, those with which it has an asymmetric advantage, to manage its relationship with its significantly more powerful neighbour, Russia, rather than rely on a

relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the AKP increasingly sees as unreliable.

This paper is divided into six sections: (1) an overview of Strategic Depth and its implementation in Turkish foreign policy; (2) a theoretical outline of Strategic Participation, and the theoretical tools that will be used to assess it; (3) an assessment of Turkish civil–military relations (CMR), and the effect it has had on solidifying Strategic Depth in Turkish policy; (4) an assessment of the form of Russian threat to Turkey and the impact of NATO "estrangement" on creating a security deficit; (5) an overview of Turkish asymmetric balancing [1] against this threat with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq; and (6) concluding remarks.

Evolution of Strategic Depth

The Strategic Depth doctrine was a grand strategy concept advocated by former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. He originally outlined the concept in his 2001 book *Stratejik Derinlik* (*Strategic Depth*), and his thinking was central to Turkish foreign policy from 2003 to 2015, most famously under the motto "zero problems with neighbours." At its core, this policy has aimed to bolster Turkey's ability to shape regional politics through two primary methods: (1) domestic consolidation of Turkey's "historical identity" and (2) strategic diversification of economic and political relations towards non-traditional partners — that is, reducing the Cold War dependency of Turkey on a Western-oriented policy.

Stratejik Derinlik argues that Turkey's geopolitical situation as a trans-regional power with its historical Ottoman–Turkish legacy place it in a strategic basin between the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans. This position provides Turkey with unique potential, and make a peripheral geopolitical position for Turkey impossible (Walker, 2011, pp. 7–8). Davutoğlu's argument is highly critical of the inward-looking foreign policy of the "Kemalist century," arguing instead that Turkey should leverage its position and history to make it a "central" actor in trans-regional affairs, rather than act as a geopolitical bridge.

Davutoğlu was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009, but acted as now-President Erdoğan's chief foreign policy advisor since 2003 (Aras, 2009, pp. 128–129). He had consistently called for the end to Turkish "alienation" with its neighbours that stemmed from negative perceptions of Turkey under the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, outlining his conception of foreign policy in an article in *Foreign Policy* magazine (Davutoğlu, 2010). This "zero problems with neighbours" approach aimed to improve Turkish soft power leadership by downplaying regional disputes, and is founded on the idea that Turkey's historical conflicts with its neighbours wasted resources and effort.

For the AKP, zero problems meant two things: (1) consolidation and expansion of the neoliberal policies that overturned the economic instability of the 1990s, and (2) the

---

[1]　"Asymmetric balancing" simply refers to traditional balancing behaviour against a threat that is geared exclusively towards less powerful partners. It is behaviour aimed at ensuring a more reliable coalition for the threatened state by ensuring that its role is top-of-mind for the security of participating states.

maintenance of co-operative relations with neighbours to allow the expansion of trade to make Turkey a regional mediator. The AKP used policy to secure itself against the traditional Kemalist centre-right of Turkish politics that dominated the military, which in 1997 used the Erbakan government's Islamist ideology and a deteriorating economy to justify intervention. Neoliberal policies consistently increased the AKP's vote share by directly associating it with Turkey's strong economic performance. The economic crises of 2001 and 2008 played directly into support for the AKP's "regulatory neo-liberalism," which zero problems was designed to augment (Öniş, 2012, 145). Critics have called this approach an economic policy disguised as a foreign policy, geared towards domestic audiences (Yavus, 2009, pp. 135–136).

The use of trade as a foreign policy tool was vigorously pursued by the AKP once it gained its majority in 2002 (Hale, 2013, pp. 253–255). Davutoğlu's conception of Turkey as a central power was tied to its ability to develop economic and diplomatic connections with its surrounding regions, and economic factors took precedence after 2008 financial crisis. That year, Turkish exports shrank by 5% and its imports by a full 14.3%, EU accession talks ground to a halt over the Cyprus question, and the Turkish Industry and Business Association began to criticize AKP governance (World Bank, 2017; Öniş, 2012, pp. 143–145). Trade came to dominate Turkey's method of both improving domestic support for its Islamic-democratic conception of Turkish identity and expanding foreign relations (Kutlay, 2011, pp. 78–79).

The 2011 Arab Uprisings radically shifted Turkish policy away from this economically oriented foreign policy. Calls across the Arab world for democratization and dignity opened speculation on the exportation of the "Turkish model," combining Islam, democracy and economic growth (Tuğal, 2016, 175). Turkey initially attempted to retain its zero problems approach, resisting calls for international intervention. However, with NATO intervention in Libya and the success of a Turkish model-friendly party in the Egyptian Brotherhood, Turkish policy shifted (Hale, 2013, pp. 242–245). The economically focused zero problems strategy was no longer the path to trans-regional centrality; Turkey would link its soft power to the Turkish model, fostering a friendlier region that might look to Turkey for leadership.

By 2015, however, hope for the success of the model had faded. Many authors began announcing the "end" or "fall" of the Turkish model, arguing that increasingly authoritarian tendencies in the AKP after the 2014 Gezi Park protests, corruption scandals, and the failure of foreign attempts to implement the model in Egypt and Tunisia made it unworkable (Taspinar, 2014, pp. 50–56). Any possibilities for the Turkish model approach were put to rest in the summer and fall of 2015.

The June 2015 resumption of conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) caused a shift in Turkish policy. While it had watched the successes of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria with concern for some time, its links to the PKK changed the equation entirely. While Turkey still hoped that rebel forces in Syria could bring down Assad and permit the exportation of a Turkish model to Syria, it became focused on preventing the PYD from "seizing" northern Syria (Pamuk, 2015).

The final blow to the Turkish model came at the end of September 2015. After the 2013 fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the 2014 electoral defeat of Ennahda in Tunisia, and the collapse of Libya and Yemen to civil war, Syria was the last site of a movement that might advance the Turkish model. After months of losing ground to rebel forces, and unable to muster the manpower to launch an offensive, the Syrian government appeared weak. However, Russian military intervention in September rapidly reversed the regime's fortunes. Turkey's focus shifted away from Assad as it became clear toppling Damascus would bring Turkey into conflict with Russia (Humud, Blanchard, & Nikitin, 2017, pp. 7–8). As Erdoğan asserted in October 2015:

All [the PYD] want[s] is to seize northern Syria entirely … We will under no circumstances allow northern Syria to become a victim of their scheming. Because this constitutes a threat for us, and it is not possible for us as Turkey to say "yes" to this threat. (Pamuk, 2015).

In August 2016, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) into Syrian territory. This intervention was not concerned with the departure of Assad, over which Turkey recognized it had little influence. Instead, it appeared designed to counteract the military gains of the PYD's Personal Protection Units (YPG), arrest Islamic State (IS) cross-border activity, and allow for greater control of refugee flows (Zanotti & Thomas, 2017, pp. 3–4).

This policy is a dramatic change from Turkey's previous approach. However, it does not necessarily throw out the precepts of Strategic Depth despite reversing the tactics of the zero problems and Turkish model approaches.

Strategic Participation

Strategic participation is remains a vital strategic interest for future Turkish growth. The current policy is a response to the crises of 2015, when Russian intervention into Syria ended the final hope for the Turkish model. It aims to retain or regain as much of Turkey's 2003–2011 AKP foreign policy success as possible. Regarding relations with Russia, it argues that despite apparent recent improvements in relations between Turkey and Russia, Ankara remains deeply concerned with the Russian threat. While the Syrian Kurdish question has taken centre stage with Turkey's Operation Euphrates Shield that brought Turkish military forces into northern Syria, Turkish foreign policy remains notably geared toward the Russian question.

As outlined in *Fig. 1*, Strategic Participation is an adaptive, not paradigmatic, policy shift. A changed security environment shifted Turkish foreign policy toward eliminating domestic threats perceived as more pressing. Turkish strategic diversification has shifted towards engagement with new strategic partners, emphasizing shared security interests over ideological solidarity.

Most notably, Turkish policy orientation has ceased being offensive — that is, it is no longer the proactive foreign policy heralded on the appointment of Davutoğlu to the Foreign Ministry. Instead, the difficulties encountered in the previous approaches have

fostered an approach to foreign policy that is more reactive. Along with this shift in intention, Turkey increasingly relied on hard power tools to accomplish its objectives. While these tools were pioneered under the Turkish model period, particularly with the arming of Syrian rebel groups, they dominated Turkish policy towards the region from 2015 onward.

Changes in Strategic Depth

Objective	Trans-Regional "Centrality"		
Policy	Zero Problems (2009–2011)	Turkish Model (2011–2015)	Strategic Participation (2015–2017)
Historical Identity	Economic hub of "post-Ottoman space."[2]	Development model for the Muslim world.	Elimination of perceived domestic threats.
Strategic Diversification	Expanded trade with non-traditional partners.	Political support of friendly sub-state actors.	Engage with potential strategic partners.
Orientation	Offensive	Offensive	Defensive
Employed Power Type	Soft Power	Soft Power Some Hard Power	Hard Power

Figure 1. Different policy implementations of Strategic Depth.

The broad goals of Strategic Participation, then, are the same as in each of the others: leverage historical identity and diversify strategic partners. The first of these is primarily a domestic issue, and will only be briefly assessed in this paper. However, it is important, as Strategic Participation is not possible without the AKP's conception of Islamic democratic nationalism. Assessing this element — leveraging historical identity — requires an assessment of shifting CMR in Turkey using the concordance game model. Concepts employed by a former Prime Minister only remain relevant because of the uniquely powerful role he played in formulating contemporary Turkish foreign policy, enabled by fall of military tutelage.

The second element will take up the bulk of this paper. It concerns the Turkish response to Russian regional activism. A notable element of this policy has also included reaching out to partners over which Turkey has asymmetric leverage, outside of traditional allies in NATO, which it can use to counteract threat from Russia on its own. This paper assesses the form of the Russian threat to Turkey and the Turkish response using Walt's balance-of-threat theory.

---

[2]   This phrase is not used by government sources for diplomatic and political reasons, but is outlined conceptually throughout *Strategik Derinlik* (Davutoğlu, 2001, 22–23) and by observers noting the emphasis on shared historical and cultural relations in the policy.

Concordance Game

The concordance game attempts to directly incorporate balance-of-power analysis in CMR theory. A shift in power is essential to this analysis, as the TSK historically exerted substantial control on policy, directly through coups or indirectly through political pressure and links to civil society. Strategic Depth was only enabled by the removal of this obstacle and its absence allows Strategic Depth to influence post-Davutoğlu policy.

This paper employs Schiff's concordance theory, modified to incorporate a concept of balance-of-power. Schiff's model argues that likelihood of military intervention is determined by the ability of three partners — the military, political elite and citizenry — to reach "concordance," defined as agreement on four indicators: the composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style (Schiff, 2009, p. 43). Discordance on any indicator increases intervention likelihood. To understand this in a balance-of-power context, two issues must be resolved: (1) Schiff's actors are heterogeneous, but treated as unitary in agreement, and (2) she lacks a mechanism to identify concordance.

Nye's conception of soft power resolves the first issue. He conceptualizes power as the ability to either alter behaviour through coercion or persuasion by employing a resource — hard or soft power (Nye, 2004, 8) [3] In this context, the more heterogeneous a concordance partner is, the less able it will be to convert power resources, and the less powerful it will be.

For the second issue, Feaver's principal-agent theory is used (Feaver, 2005, p. 5). He argues CMR is a game between civilian principal and military agent. The principal punishes or rewards the agent, who "works" or "shirks" based on the cost/benefit of pursuing its interests versus the principal's punishments and rewards. In the concordance game model, this becomes a three player "game" to explain concordance outcomes, but not decisions. See the game in *Fig*. 2.

---

[3]   This means that resources themselves are not defined as power until they are used to influence behavior.

Concordance Indicator Game including 'Balance-of-Power' Concept

			Citizenry			
			Decision based on interests and available information.			
			Support		Fail to Support	
			Political Elite		Political Elite	
			Decision based on available information of military's relative power.		Decision based on available information of military & citizenry's relative power.	
			Reward	Punish	Reward	Punish
Military	Decision based on available info. of elite & citizenry relative power.	Work	Full concordance	'Coercive concordance'	Elite-military concordance.	Elite-military 'coercive concordance'
		Shirk	Appeased discordance	Coerced discordance	Appeased citizenry-military discordance	Coerced citizenry-military discordance

Figure 2. The Concordance Game Model.

This game is played out across Schiff's four indicators, which are then assessed in sum to determine whether concordance exists, and to what degree. However, for the purposes of this paper — foreign policy analysis — only political decision-making will be assessed. This paper will briefly use this model to show that modern Turkish CMR should be considered as a coerced concordance under this model, where the political elite under AKP leadership are dominant.

Balance-of-Threat Theory

Stephen Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory emerged from his 1987 study of alliance patterns in the Cold War Middle East, *The Origins of Alliances*. He argued that, rather than aligning purely against power, states factor in numerous other elements when determining their alignment. He cites four main sources of threat: (1) aggregate power, defined by traditionally neorealist methods; (2) geographic proximity; (3) offensive power, defined as the proportion of aggregate power most capable of being used offensively against the aligning state; and (4) aggressive intentions, defined as the aligning states perception of others' intentions (Walt, 1987, p. 22). His inclusion of these additional factors was intended to account for alignments which could not be accounted for under the traditional balance-of-power model.

The model is well suited to the Turkish case. Turkish foreign policy has historically fluctuated between concentration on the threat of the Soviet Union and smaller, more pressing threats, such as Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, and Kurdish separatism. It seems reasonable that Walt's model would be relatively effective at charting the course of Turkish policy under the current threat environment with Russia. Turkish balancing policies are designed to increase the cost of attacks through internal balancing and assertive efforts to prevent a threat from taking any additional ground while finding more reliable partners for case-specific issues.

Consequently, this paper assesses the threat of Russia, in the context of declining Turkey–NATO relations, along Walt's four indicators. It then expands this assessment to Turkish relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, and Iraq in the form of the KRG. This section assesses Turkey's employment of asymmetric balancing along three issues — shared threat, military co-operation, and economic dependence — to assess how recent developments fit into the Strategic Participation concept.

Turkish CMR and AKP Foreign Policy

This section deals with the recent history of Turkish CMR in a cursory fashion. It is merely sufficient to explain that near-exclusive civilian–AKP control over foreign policy has only recently become a feature of Turkish government. It explains this with reference to the Concordance Game model described above in section 3.1. While this explanation is brief, it is necessary to explain how Davutoğlu is relevant to current policy.

Concordance Game and AKP–TSK relations

While AKP–TSK relations were terse from its 2002 election, when the AKP came to power, it actively pursued EU membership with military approval. This included reforms that dismantled the TSK's relationship with civil society that had been central to the success of the 1997 coup that removed the AKP's predecessor party, Refah, including the civilianization of the National Security Council (Tezcür, 2009, pp. 321–324).

In the 2007 presidential election, the AKP chose Abdullah Gül, the AKP's deputy PM and a former Refah Party member of the Grand National Assembly, as its candidate. The military, which preferred the presidency to be pro-Kemalist, was deeply concerned. However, because polls had unusually favourable margins for the AKP and the military lacked the soft power to boost popular support, the military decided against intervention (Ahmad, 2014, p. 204).

This shifted Turkish CMR to its current status: coerced concordance. The military co-operated only under the threat of publicly supported government punishment. The Ergenekon and Bayloz trials served to remove officers suspected of involvement with the "deep state," a civil–military–criminal triad that purportedly controlled Turkish affairs prior to the trials.[4] The military replaced the removed Kemalist officers with those more amenable to the AKP's conception of Islamic nationalism, and who would accept the new balance-of-power that favoured the civilian government.[5]

---

[4] Most officers arrested and convicted during these trials were later released, with numerous allegations of court bias and AKP overreach (BBC, 2016).

[5] Notable is that the AKP government's current official position on these proceedings is that they were "sham trials," orchestrated by followers of Fetullah Gülen that had infiltrated the judiciary and law enforcement and fabricated most of the evidence. Similarly, many of the new officers brought in following the Ergenekon trials have been accused of being Gülenists responsible by for the July 2016 coup attempt.

The 2016 July coup then shifted the control of the political elite into the hands of the AK Party. While the true nature of events is not clear, the coup-plotters do not appear to be those "missed" by the previous trials. Instead, the government has blamed followers of Fetullah Gülen, a preacher located in Pennsylvania, claiming Gülen used his previously close relationship with the AKP and his religious schools to build a "parallel state" in Turkey (Zanotti & Thomas, 2017, 6–7). Whatever the coup-plotters affiliation, the post-coup crackdown highlights the AKP's successful use of punishment techniques against the military, shifting the balance-of-power firmly in the AKP's favour and defining current Turkish CMR as coerced concordance.

Implications for AKP Foreign Policy

Without the removal of the Kemalist military oversight, it is not clear that Strategic Depth could have been implemented as it was in 2009. The military historically has intervened in domestic politics when it perceived the government was in crisis, or being reckless in foreign relations. This tutelary role has resulted in at least four coups, depending on definitions.

Removing this tutelage has been essential for Davutoğlu's ideas to become entrenched in Turkish policy. He was central in shaping the international approach of now-President Erdoğan, despite their 2016 conflict that led to Davutoğlu's resignation from AKP leadership and the Prime Ministership. Davutoğlu was the pioneer of the first truly civilian foreign policy of the AKP. This "first-to-bat" role has meant that his broad objectives remained within the AKP.

Erdoğan's increasingly tight grip on the foreign policy of Turkey has, counterintuitively, increased the role of Strategic Depth. Davutoğlu's concepts have been derided by some in the foreign policy establishment too removed from foreign policy reality to function (Çandar, 2016). However, the apparent weakening influence of these elements over the President means AKP priorities remain Turkish foreign policy priorities.[6]

Russia and the Security Deficit

This section outlines the manner of threat posed to Turkey by Russia, and the implications it has for the strategic diversification element of Strategic Depth policy. It employs a balance-of-threat analysis to establish that Russia constitutes a sufficiently asymmetric threat that it should be balanced by a Turkish government operating under Strategic Participation. It outlines the threat in aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions, noting that Russia poses some form of threat in all

---

[6]   The Turkish foreign policy establishment has been historically closely linked with the military. While this connection has weakened after the Ergenekon and Bayloz trials, the bureaucracy cannot yet considered to be entirely in line with the AKP. With Erdoğan increasingly taking a personal hand in issues of foreign policy, however, the AKP–bureaucracy distinction is decreasingly relevant. See Hale, 2013, 246–248.

categories. The section ends by briefly assessing deteriorating relations between Turkey and NATO, and the impact this has on Russo–Turkish asymmetry.

It should be noted that the consequence of balance-of-threat analysis is an emphasis on Russo–Turkish enmity. This section does not describe the relationship in its entirety, instead focusing on elements that are relevant to the Russian threat to Turkey. The two states have significant economic and cultural relations, with Russia being the third largest origin for Turkish imports in 2015, with imports worth USD 12.1 billion (Simoes & Hildalgo, 2017). Turkey also relies on Russia for its energy supply. However, threat is a factor of any international relationship, and is the issue relevant to this study.

Aggregate Power

Russian power remains substantially greater than Turkey's. While Turkey remains economically and militarily potent, the Russian Federation outmatches it by most measures. The Russo–Turkish relationship has been asymmetric since the latter days of the Ottoman Empire, and there is no significant shift in this respect.

However, as France and Britain intervened in the Sublime Porte's favour during the Crimean War, so now does the West make up the power deficit. Turkish interest in military alignment with the West emerged immediately following the conclusion of WWII, when Soviet power was extended to the western Turkish border. While Turkish entry into NATO was complicated — and sealed only when Turkey threatened neutrality in a Soviet–US war — it institutionalized Turkey's relationship with the West against Russia (Ahmad, 2014, pp. 106–107).

As *Fig. 3* shows, while Russo–Turkish relationship is highly asymmetric, the power of NATO shifts the balance of aggregate power firmly in Turkey's favour. Despite this, the sum power of NATO would not be deployed to Turkey in the case of a NATO–Russia conflict, and balancing is only as effective as alliance support is credible. Due to recent tensions, Turkey appears to be increasingly doubtful about whether it can rely on NATO for its defence. Consequently, for matters of aggregate power, Turkey must assess its security along the single, asymmetric dyad between itself and Russia, without fully relying on NATO.

2015 Turkish and Russian Aggregate Power				
Country	Population (millions)	GDP (billions current USD)	Active personnel (thousands)*	Defense spending (billions current USD)
Russia	142.4	1,270	771.0	66.1
Turkey	81.6	718	510.6	12.0
USA	323.9	18,600	1,433.1	590
NATO**	923.9	36,211	3,192	891.7

* Paramilitary personnel excluded.
** NATO data from NATO and World Bank
Data taken from The Military Balance, 2015 and 2017. NATO data from the NATO database and the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

Figure 3. Russo–Turkish Balance of Aggregate Power.

Geographic Proximity

Russia has been the predominant geographic threat to Turkey since the birth of the Republic in 1923. Soviet–Turkish relations followed a period of intense competition between both regimes' imperial predecessors that saw Imperial Russia consistently undermine or annex Ottoman territories in the Caucasus and the Balkans. While the Soviet Union appeared more amenable to Turkish interests, and even supplied materiel during Turkey's Civil War after the 1921 Treaty of Moscow, Turkish policy-makers consistently feared communist invasion or subversion (Ahmad, 2014, 100). Since the USSR's collapse, Turkey and Russia have significantly improved their ability to co-operate on issues of transnational crime and security.[7] However, the geographic proximity of both nations' least stable regions creates a mutual threat.

For instance, during Turkey's conflict with the PKK in the 1990s, Moscow appeared to be leaning toward allowing the opening of a Kurdish House in Moscow, attended by the PKK. Conversely, Turkey reportedly rendered material assistance of USD 20 million to Turkish Chechen volunteers fighting the Russians in 1994. While urgent diplomatic efforts by both parties eventually allowed both to come to accord in February 1995,[8] travel across the Black Sea or over the Caucasus provides a bridge between the most unstable regions of Russia and Turkey. This bridge is central to Turkish and Russian mutual security concerns.

Further, Russian Black Sea trade and naval vessels must pass through the Turkish-controlled Bosporus and Dardanelles. There is currently no real threat of Russia pushing for control of these straits as there was during the imperial and post-WWII period; the 1936 Montreaux Convention effectively regulates passage through the straits in a manner agreeable to both parties (Köknar, 2003, pp. 100–101). However, Turkey remains concerned about Russia attempting to dominate Black Sea security, with Erdoğan warning NATO that refusal to step up its activity in the region could make the sea a "Russian lake" (Jones & Hille, 2016). Particularly with the 2015 Russian Maritime Doctrine calling for significantly increased participation in the region, the Black Sea links Turco–Russian security interests more closely than physical distance would indicate.

Russian intervention in Syria has only exacerbated this threat, as attested by the repeated Russian breaches of Turkish airspace between October and November 2015 that culminated in the downing of a Russian warplane (BBC, 2015). With both states deeply interested in different outcomes in Syria, the proximity of Turkish and Russian military forces significantly raises the potential for misunderstandings in the regions surrounding OES and Idlib. Russian forces are deployed in the PYD-held Afrin canton and Russian-

---

[7] Notably, including the development of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization that benefitted both nations significantly. See Öniş & Yılmaz, 2015, pp. 79–80.

[8] The agreement saw Turkey cease weapons sales, halt volunteer travel, and place political pressure to negotiate on the Chechen President in exchange for Russia rejecting the Kurdish House and preventing activities in Russia directed against Turkey. See Olson, 1998.

backed Syrian forces form a barrier between Turkish forces and the PYD-backed Manbij Military Council.[9] The Russian presence makes any Turkish misstep notably more risky.

Offensive Power

Direct offensive power is the least concerning factor of the Russian threat towards Turkey. There is very little likelihood that tensions between Turkey and Russia will escalate into full scale conflict. However, the disparity is still relevant for Turkish security.

There are five Russian airbases within 400 kilometres of Turkey's eastern border. One of these is located in Armenia, and Russian forces are deployed in Armenia to ensure its borders against Turkey, with Russia's strategically located 102 Gyumri Base less than 10 kilometres from the Turkish border (Janes IHS, 2017). Russia similarly has military bases in the Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Together, these bases place 18 Russian aircraft immediately proximate to the Turkish border. Furthermore, Russian forward deployments are such that even short-range missile launchers like the SS-21 Scarab can theoretically reach eastern Turkish towns like Kars, while medium-range missiles would be within reach of Trabzon on Turkey's northeastern coast (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017). These locations also provide logistical points from which Russian military equipment could theoretically enter Turkey, and are situated in territories that would make Turkish retaliation politically complicated.

Russia also is deployed in Syria, but can only be effectively supplied with adherence to the Montreaux convention. Consequently, these forces do not constitute a significant component of Russia's offensive power against Turkey. While offensive power should not be overstated in describing the Russian threat, Turkey is far less capable than Russia of responding to any threat in the Caucasus, and its closest military base in Erzurum is over 170 kilometres from the nearest point on its northeastern border. While not a major concern, this feeds into Russo–Turkish asymmetry.

Aggressive Intentions

Aggressive intentions are significantly more difficult to assess than any other factor of the Russo–Turkish balance-of-threat. Lacking confidential information, it is not possible to fully ascertain whether Russian intentions in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood should be considered aggressive under Walt's model. However, its intentions absolutely run counter to Turkish aspirations for Strategic Depth. Consequently, Russian intentions should be considered at least partially aggressive under Walt's model.

In June 2016, Erdoğan apologized for the downing of Russia's jet in October the previous year, and in the following month detained those responsible, asserting they were linked to Fetullah Gülen.[10] While a potential détente between Russia and Turkey in Syria has been widely discussed, the extent of co-operation is unclear. There has been significant

---

[9]   The deal between the Syrian forces and Mabij was reportedly sponsored by the Russian Defence Ministry. See Sputnik, 2017.

[10]   This claim did not occur until after the July coup attempt. See Al Jazeera, 2016a.

contact between the military and intelligence infrastructures of both countries over the Syrian question, which President Putin hailed as "efficient and close" (Deutsche Welle, 2017). In October 2017, Putin and Erdoğan met personally in Moscow, and in the ensuing press conference, at which Erdoğan stated that the two countries were in "full cooperation" militarily (Dyomkin & Gumrukcu, 2017). The two also managed — without American input — to broker a deal with Syrian rebels — on evacuating civilians from Aleppo.

Russia's primary interest appears to be in enhancing its reputation as a regional deal-maker. While the West is sidelined, Russia can dominate the course of the Syrian war. Its prime interest is in appearing to be the power that directly oversees the war's end. Current Turkish interests, which have shifted towards pushing the YPG and its affiliates back from its border and from linking up with other Kurdish Cantons in Afrin, may not be compatible with this end-state. Turkey appears to hope that co-operation with Russia and the Assad regime may lead to future co-operation against the PYD in Rojava.[11] However, this would be enormously costly for the Assad regime to accomplish, given the entrenched position of PYD-affiliated fighting forces and Syria's limited manpower, heavy reliance on militias, Hezbollah, and Russian and Iranian aid (Samaan & Barnard, 2015).

Even a deal that does manage to get Turkey onside places it in a significant strategic dilemma. Its efforts must then focus increasingly on the domestic PKK, providing Russia and Iran functionally free reign in Syria, with only some Turkish-backed militias in and around Idlib providing Turkish influence in the country. Russian dominance in Syria means that Turkey will have limited means by which to bring Syria into accord with its positions on Rojava or Iran, making it highly unlikely that the post-war regime in Syria — whatever form it takes — will turn to Turkey as a broker. While Turkey may accept this, it constitutes a significant threat to Strategic Depth and will likely harm the AKP's domestic popularity given its dedication since 2011 to remove the Assad regime.

NATO and the "Security Deficit"

Turkey's current co-operation with Russia on the question of Syria should not be surprising. NATO allies, particularly the United States, have been decreasingly focused on protecting Turkish regional interests, despite continued rhetorical support for the Turkish alliance. While this is clearly not solely the fault of the West, it has made NATO protection less credible in the eyes of the AKP.[12] This creates a security deficit in terms of aggregate power that exacerbates the asymmetry between Russia and Turkey, making staunch Turkish opposition to Russia strategically problematic.

Post–Cold War Turkish–American relations have remained relatively strained. The 2003 parliamentary rejection of a bill to allow the US to open a separate front against Iraq

---

[11]   An unnamed senior Turkish official reportedly told Reuters that Turkey's priority was no longer to remove Assad, but to end terrorism. He hoped that Russia would help Turkey against the "PKK in Syria." See Osborn & Coskun, 2016.

[12]   NATO governments' support of the YPG is the dominant issue in this regard. Erdoğan considers arming the organization of the NATO treaty, remarking that the treaty should be revised if the US would act against Turkey's interests. See Hürriyet 2017.

showed the US it could not fully depend on its legacy of co-operation with the TSK in a post-Soviet world.[13] The rejection was due in part to a sentiment of "estrangement" in Turkey, that the US employed strong alliance rhetoric towards Turkey but was restrained in political and military support after the Soviet collapse (Uslu, 2003, pp. 290–291).

The July coup attempt exacerbated this estrangement. It took the United States three hours to denounce the coup, and notably only did so after General Çolak of the First Army denounced the coup and stated the putschists were only a small faction in the military (Reuters, 2016). The post-coup response from the West was equally troubling to Turkey, with the US State Department and many European governments cautioning or criticizing the Turkish crackdown in the coup's aftermath (Karadeniz & Pamuk, 2016). These responses have been sharply criticized by the AKP government, with Erdoğan accusing them as "taking sides" with the coup (Al Jazeera, 2016b).

Equally problematic is the Turkish perception that the West does not see Turkey as "the West." The EU Parliament passed a symbolic vote to suspend EU accession talks in the November following the coup attempt, but it only formalized an already faltering process (Kanter, 2016). While major moves were made earlier under the AKP, current efforts have slowed, especially over EU political criteria and Cyprus. [14] The AKP leadership is increasingly disinterested in the deal, and there has even been limited discussion that Turkey may seek a referendum to end the accession process (Tokabay, Gumrukcu, & Tattersall, 2016).

Finally, regional security interests have increasingly diverged. Most significant is the United States reliance on the PYD, a policy that directly contradicts Turkish security interests. US involvement in Rojava, which included the deployment of US Special Forces to Manbij, has severely harmed Turkey's perception that it can rely on the US for its own security interests. The overwhelming focus on defeating IS has made Turkish security a side issue for most NATO members involved in the coalition.

While these issues do not threaten continued NATO–Turkish co-operation, they mean that Turkey must strategically diversify to gain support on a case-by-case basis to make up the "security deficit." Turkish relations with smaller powers are not a replacement for NATO, but provide a mechanism for Turkey to more gather the support for its initiatives that is noticeably lacking in among its traditional allies.

Asymmetric Balancing

The most important element of Strategic Depth is strategic diversification. In the face of a potential Russian threat, Turkey would need to expand relations with other actors beyond the mediating role advocated under zero problems. If Strategic Participation reflects current Turkish strategy, it should not attempt to restore relations with traditional partners,

---

[13]   This bill was voted down by about 100 AKP members, against the will of the party leadership. The TSK, on the other hand, opposed allowing the US to use Turkish territory. See Cagaptay & Parris, 2003.

[14]   The majority of the problems cited in the 2016 progress report focused on Turkey's difficulty with the political criteria. See European Commission, 2016.

preferring instead smaller actors. This targeted focus is what is meant by "asymmetric balancing."

The following section assesses Turkish relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and the KRG in Iraq. It attempts to establish the presence of Turkish asymmetric balancing against Russia in each of these cases. It assesses the relationship with each state along three indicators: (1) shared threat; (2) military co-operation; and (3) economic dependence. Each section closes each analysis with an overall assessment of Strategic Participation in these countries,

Azerbaijan

In the aftermath of the Soviet breakup, the Azeri–Armenian conflict posed Turkey with a serious challenge. Turkish public sentiment was fully in support of Azerbaijan, but Turkey initially attempted a mediating approach to preserve relations with NATO and Russia. This approach repeatedly alienated the Azeri administration. In fact, when President Ilham Aliyev assumed power in 2003, it was widely viewed as a Russian success (Aydin, 2010, pp. 767–770). Azeri–Turkish relations remained frosty under the AKP, which worked towards normalization of relations with Armenia even before 2009. The zero problems approach was equally troubling for Aliyev (Murinson, 2010, pp. 120–121).

Shared threat: Russia and Azerbaijan have a long-lasting, but complicated security relationship. Russia–Armenia ties make the potential threat of Russia — that is, what its end position will be — deeply problematic to Azerbaijan. While it has historically attempted to balance Turkish and Russian influence, in 2008, Azerbaijan asserted that Russia was involved in extensive arms transfers to Armenia. These allegations were denied, though the Azeri Defence Minister has claimed that his Russian counterpart admitted to the transfers during a visit to Moscow (Guardian, 2010). Continued and expanding Russia–Armenia security ties and intensifying Russian involvement in Georgia and Ukraine has made distinct the possibility that Russia might increase its involvement in the Azeri–Armenian contest over the Nagorno-Karabakh region on the Armenian side.

Military co-operation: Turkish–Azeri military relations have existed since 1992, but in 2010 the two states signed a Strategic Partnership agreement that included USD 200 million in military assistance to Baku and a security guarantee (Janes IHS, 2017b).[15] Particularly since 2015, these relations have expanded, with two major joint military exercises, TurAz Qartali and TurAz Shahini being held as part of a bilateral defence review in 2015 and 2016 (AzerNews, 2016). Expanded exercises are anticipated and will likely include Georgian participation. Turkey also appears to be working towards a full trilateral military co-operation agreement with the two states (Hürriyet, 2016). These moves are in line with strategic diversification balancing behaviour.

Economic dependence: Turkish–Azeri co-operation in economic affairs is extensive, particularly regarding energy. The largest Turkish public investor in Azerbaijan is the state

---

[15]   Notably, shortly following this agreement, Russia and Armenia signed an extension of their defence agreement. See O'Rourke, 2010.

energy company, TPAO, with investment of over USD 3.4 billion (Ibrahimov, 2015, pp. 84–87). Azerbaijan's SOCAR is similarly involved in Turkey. Azerbaijan is also central to Turkey's efforts to diversify its energy suppliers and increase energy corridors from Central Asia through Turkey, particularly since the 2006 and 2007 completions of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipelines (Ibrahimov, 2015, p. 89). These relations have intensified in recent years, with construction starting on the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline in 2015 and Turkey stating that it hoped to more than triple its trade from 2014, worth USD 4 billion, by 2023 (Hürriyet, 2015).

Assessment: The Turkish–Azeri relationship has undergone significant improvements since Azerbaijan began to consider in 2008 that it may not be able to prevent Russian involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict alone. Significant post-2015 expansion of military co-operation and high levels of economic dependence make Azerbaijan the most prominent example of strategic diversification. While relations began before implementation of Strategic Depth, they have intensified since 2015, when Turkey began to abandon its soft power approach.

Georgia

Turkey was the first state to recognize Georgia, doing so one month after it recognized Azerbaijan. It has been relatively supportive of Georgian territorial integrity over the questions of the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia provinces, but has attempted, ineffectually, to act as a mediator. The 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia made it increasingly clear that mediation was not a viable strategy for Turkey. Turkey attempted to respond to the crisis with a "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform," which rapidly petered out and left room for France to step in and resolve the crisis (Balci, 2014, pp. 50–51). Turkey's significant asymmetric weaknesses highlighted the challenges of the zero problems approach to taking a leading role during crises, particularly when stronger actors became involved.

Shared threat: Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia fundamentally reshaped Georgian–Russian relations. Russian support for Abkhazia and South Ossetian secessionists had characterized the relationship since the dissolution of the USSR, but Tbilisi and Moscow had reached a near-stable peacekeeping arrangement in 2004 (Aydin, 2010, pp. 777–780). After the invasion, it was no longer a question; Russia could not be relied on to preserve Georgian integrity. Georgia currently considers Russia to be illegally occupying its territory since it recognized the two breakaway regions as states in August 2008 (RFE, 2008).

Military co-operation: The Substantial NATO–Georgia Package offered to Georgia in 2015 provides significantly expanded opportunities for Turkish–Georgian military co-operation, including eventual membership in the alliance (NATO, 2016). However, in line with Strategic Participation, these efforts are being combined with the expansion of bilateral security relations. Turkey is actively working towards entrenching trilateral military co-operation between itself, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Waller, 2016).

Economic dependence: Turkey is Georgia's largest trade partner with USD 1.33 billion in trade as of 2016 (MFA, 2016). For Georgia, developing export access in Turkey is especially important. This has historically forced Georgia to turn a blind eye to the trade relations that Turkey has cultivated with Georgia's breakaway region, Abkhazia, to counterbalance Russian influence (Kapanadze, 2014). Like Azerbaijan, a cornerstone of the Turkey–Georgia trade relationship is energy, with each of the major pipelines through Azerbaijan and Turkey being bridged through Georgia. This makes Georgia a state of fundamental strategic importance to Turkey and forces Georgia to protect its relations with the two Turkic states it neighbours.

Assessment: Georgia is an essential counterbalance to Russian regional influence for Turkey. It is highly dependent on Turkey for its economic and military security, both of which have significantly expanded in recent years. While it is difficult to label relations with Georgia as strategic diversification given the long history of security co-operation, the inclusion of Tbilisi in trilateral military co-operation with Ankara and Baku indicates asymmetric balancing.

Ukraine

Turkish economic volatility prior to 2002 made the development of strategic relations between it and Ukraine difficult. Ukraine was significantly more interested in managing the balance between Russian and European influence than fostering relations on the other side of the Black Sea (Yülek & Yatsenko, 2013, pp. 75–76). However, in 2003, Turkey identified Ukraine as a priority country, and has since made efforts to improve relations. These efforts include the 2011 creation of a High-Level Strategic Council and the expansion of human rights co-operation over Turkic Crimean Tatars (MFA, 2013).

Shared threat: The overthrow of President Victor Yanukovych in 2014 during the Euromaidan revolt shifted Russo–Ukrainian relations from highly co-operative to deeply antagonistic. In March, a month after Yanukovych's removal, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. It then began to support rebel movements in Luhansk and Donetsk by late summer, placing Ukraine and Russia deeply at odds. While the Minsk ceasefire agreements brought a halt to most serious fighting, Russia is aiming towards constitutional protection of Russians in Ukraine. Such constitutional protection could provide it with significant leverage over Ukraine, making Russia a significant threat (Loshkariov & Sushentsov, 2016, p. 86).

Military co-operation: Less than a year following the Russian intervention in Syria, Turkey and Ukraine signed a military co-operation agreement in May 2016 that will last until 2020 (Interfax-Ukraine, 2016). The agreement followed on the January visit of Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksandr Turchynov to the Turkish National Security Council and an April visit of two Turkish frigates to Odessa (Wahbi, 2016). While there has been notable discussion that strategic ties would peter out following the Russia–Turkish reset, military relations have remained (Balcer, 2016). Ukrainian News reported in December 2016 that the Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey oversaw a deal in which Turkey would allocate USD 3 million annually to purchase military equipment for the Ukrainian military (Ukrainian News, 2017).

Economic dependence: Turkish–Ukrainian economic relations are not yet at the level of dependence, but have significantly expanded in recent years. In 2016, Turkey was the second largest destination of Ukrainian exports, worth USD 2.5 billion, and Turkish investments in Ukraine amounted to USD 260 million (DEIK, 2017). Notably, Turkey offered Ukraine a USD 50 million loan to cover its deficit in 2015, alongside a USD 10 million package for humanitarian assistance (Zinets & Prentice, 2015).

Assessment: Turkish–Ukrainian relations significantly expanded following Russia's 2014 intervention in Crimea and Donbass, particularly in the realm of military affairs. Popular concerns that a cooling of Turkish–Ukrainian relationship would be central to Russian demands in the post–July coup Russo–Turkish détente do not appear to have manifested. Co-operation with Ukraine provides Turkey with much needed leverage vis-à-vis Russia, and recent improvements will not likely be abandoned.

Iraq (KRG)

The central theatre for Turkish co-operation in Iraq is not with the Iraqi state at all. In fact, Iraqi–Russian relations are largely positive, and are characterized by a close intelligence relationship in operations against IS (Khan, 2015). Instead, Turkey's asymmetric partner in Iraq is the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with which Ankara has developed extremely close relations. While the KRG is distant from Russian intervention in the region, it is also concerned over developments in Syria as they relate to the Assad regime and the PYD in Rojava.

Shared threat: For the KRG, the major Russian threat is the lack of clarity about the position it will take between the KRG and the Baghdad government. The KRG appears concerned that Iranian involvement in Iraq will see it leverage its relationship with Baghdad to stop any future moves by the KRG towards independence or increased autonomy (Zaman, 2016). Iranian connections with the PKK and the Patriotic Union Party (PUK), both rivals to the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), are deeply concerning Erbil, whose institution-building efforts are hampered by the presence of PKK affiliates and a discontent PUK (Wahab, 2017). Russian intervention in Syria raises the possibility that it may choose to back Iran and the Baghdad government over KRG autonomy as well, despite expanding joint energy development between the KRG and Russia's Gazprom and Rosneft Corporations (Iraq Business News, 2016; 2017).

Military co-operation: Turkey's shift to Strategic Participation initially strained relations with the KRG. Turkish airstrikes hit numerous PKK targets in northern Iraq in summer 2015 elicited condemnation from the KDP (Al Jazeera, 2015). However, in the ensuing months, the KRG began to take an increasingly hard position on the PKK, and has deployed elements of its Peshmerga fighting forces to counteract PKK influence in northern Iraq. The PKK has condemned economic relations between Turkey and the KRG, and is serving as a jumping off point for increasing Turkish–KRG military co-operation (Natali, 2017). Turkey has deployed approximately 2,000 soldiers to the KRG, serving largely in a training and advisory role, and called for Turkish participation in the Mosul Operation against IS (Idiz, 2016). However, this does not appear to have come to fruition.

Economic dependence: Economic relations are the cornerstone of the Turkey–KRG relationship. Turkey is highly dependent on Russia and Iran for gas and oil, but the increasing autonomy of the KRG to conduct trade deals has made it highly valuable for Turkish energy security. It became deeply concerned in 2009 that KRG energy exports would go through Syria, and lobbied strongly for a northern route through Turkey.[16] After the outbreak of the Syrian war, the Syria route became nearly impossible, making Turkey the only viable option for KRG exports westward (Romano, 2015, p. 96). Turkey has also become the largest investor in the region with annual trade at over USD 8 billion, and the KRG selected the Turkish state bank, Halkbank, to open its energy revenue-sharing account against Baghdad's protests (Özdemir & Raszewski, 2016, pp. 131–133).

Assessment: Turkish–KRG relations are more heavily predicated on the question of the PKK and energy trade, but it still constitutes an element in Turkey asymmetric balancing. The PKK is heavily dependent on Turkey for its economic security, and it is concerned that Russia might join Iranian overtures to its rivals in Baghdad, the PUK and the PYD. For Turkey, this dependence and concern provide it with a mechanism by which to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, a key element of diversification under Strategic Participation.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that current Turkish foreign policy towards Russia is explainable in terms of a continuation of Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth. It has shifted from the zero problems conception towards a more reactive, more security-oriented policy of Strategic Participation. That being said, Turkish foreign policy remains in line with two elements that define Strategic Depth: (1) leveraging the historical identity and (2) diversifying strategic relations.

This paper has further argued that in the face of highly asymmetric threat from Russia, and given a perceived lack of NATO support, Turkey has significantly expanded its relations with smaller states. Turkey possesses far more leverage over these states, and sees them as a valuable element of strategic diversification. While Turkey certainly has no plans to replace NATO with smaller state coalitions, these states provide valuable leverage for Turkey in its relations with Russia, and do not lack commitment as Turkey perceives the US does.

This paper's argument has significant limitations. Most significant is the attempt to draw a connection between Davutoğlu and current Turkish foreign relations. Many commentators have pronounced the death of his foreign policy, and with good reason. The zero problems approach failed spectacularly in the face of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, and after Davutoğlu resigned as PM, he is no longer a prominent player in AKP decision-making. However, this misses the influence of Davutoğlu that goes beyond soft power and

---

[16] Turkey also advocated that the KRG should have autonomy over its exports at this time, as it was growing increasingly concerned about the influence that Iran might have over then–Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Iranian–Syria relations made Iranian lobbying for a Syria pipeline a distinct possibility. See Romano, 2015, pp. 93–94.

zero problems. Strategic Depth is more than one foreign policy. It is grand strategy, which definitionally has multiple paths to realization.

Second, the balance-of-threat framework that forms the bulk of my analysis has its own problems. Like most analyses drawn from neorealist sources, the approach overemphasizes threat, missing the smaller scale elements of diplomacy and culture that impact strategic relations. It treats Turkey and each of the four countries examined as part of asymmetric balancing as unitary entities, with direct and identifiable security interests.

Third, the case study size is limited. Because of the nature of this project, the case study analysis had to be limited to only the four relationships most relevant to the Russian question. Consequently, this analysis misses important improving relations with states like Israel, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. It limits itself to the Russian threat, and underemphasizes other sources of threat like the PKK and Greece. Further research is necessary to investigate whether the Strategic Participation hypothesis holds in more distant states or regarding threats other than Russia.

Despite these challenges, strategic diversification is still a priority for the AKP. Turkey no longer feels that the relationship with the US and NATO are sufficient for its security interests as it did during the height of military tutelage in the Cold War, and continues to look for ways to ensure it can better harness leverage towards its own security.

References

Ahmad, F. (2014). *Turkey: The quest for identity* (rev. ed.). London, England: Oneworld.

Al Jazeera. (2015, July 26). Kurds condemn Turkish air strikes inside Iraq. *Al Jazeera News*. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/iraqi-kurds-pkk-condemn-turkish-air-strikes-iraq-150725155340811.html.

Al Jazeera. (2016a, July 19). Turkish pilots who downed Russian jet detained. *Al Jazeera News*. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/turkish-pilots-downed-russian-jet-detained-160719132950496.html.

Al Jazeera. (2016b, August 2) Turkey's Erdogan: The West is taking sides with coup. *Al Jazeera News*. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/turkey-erdogan-west-sides-coups-160802141241644.html.

Aras, B. (2009). The Davutoglu era in Turkish foreign policy. *Insight Turkey, 11*(3), 127–142.

Aydin, M. (2010). Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. In B. Oran (Ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919–2006* (M. Aksin, Trans.) (pp. 750–816). Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press.

AzerNews. (2016, March 7). Azerbaijan, Turkey start joint military exercises. *AzerNews*. http://www.azernews.az/nation/93749.html.

Balcer, A. (2016, September 19). Turkey and Ukraine. The end of the love affair? *New Eastern Europe*. http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/2124-turkey-and-ukraine-the-end-of-the-love-affair.

Balci, B. (2014). Strengths and constraints of Turkish policy in the South Caucasus. *Insight Turkey, 16*(2), 43–52.

BBC. (2015, December 1). Turkey's downing of Russian warplane — what we know. *BBC News*. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581.

BBC. (2016, April 21). Turkey Ergenekon: Court quashes "coup plot" convictions. *BBC News*. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36099889.

Cagaptay, S., & Parris, M. (2003). Turkey after the Iraq War: Still a U.S. ally? *Washington Institute Policy Analysis*. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-after-the-iraq-war-still-a-u.s.-ally.

Çandar, C. (2016, May 3). The Davutoglu era is over. *Al-Monitor*. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-erdogan-time-of-davutoglu-over.html.

Davutoğlu, A. (2010). Turkey's zero-problems foreign policy. *Foreign Policy*. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy.

DEIK. (2017, March 15). New period in Turkey–Ukraine economic relations. *Turkish Foreign and Economic Relations Board* [Press Release]. https://www.deik.org.tr/press-releases-new-period-in-turkey-ukraine-economic-relations.

Deutsche Welle. (2017). Putin, Erdogan working "in full cooperation" in Syria. *Deutche Welle*. http://www.dw.com/en/putin-erdogan-working-in-full-cooperation-in-syria/a-37893156.

Dyomkin, D., & Gumrukcu, T. (2017, March 10). Turkey seeks to build Syrian military cooperation with Russia. *Reuters*. http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idINKBN16H0SF.

European Commission. (2016). *Turkey 2016 Report*. Brussels, Belgium: Commission Staff Working Document to the European Parliament.

Feaver, P. (2003). *Armed servants: Agency oversight and civil-military relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Guardian. (2010, December 1). Embassy cables: Truth about Putin and Medvedev — over a bottle of vodka. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/us-embassy-cables-documents/197735.

Hale, W. (2013). *Turkish foreign policy since 1774*. London, England: Routledge.

Humud, C., Blanchard C., & Nikitin, M. B. (2017). *Armed conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. response*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Hürriyet. (2015, May 13). Azeri oil firm to invest $10 billion in Turkey's Petkim. *Hürriyet Daily*. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/azeri-oil-firm-to-invest-10-billion-in-turkeys-petkim.aspx?pageID=238&nID=82352&NewsCatID=348.

Hürriyet. (2016, May 16). Azerbaijani, Georgian, Turkish military agreement 'on the agenda'. *Hürriyet Daily*. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/azerbaijani-georgian-turkish-military-agreement-on-the-agenda-aspx?pageID= 238&nID=99246&NewsCatID=510.

Hürriyet. (2017, June 25). Turkey to US: Providing arms to YPG violation of NATO rules. *Hürriyet Daily*. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-us-providing-arms-to-ypg-violation-of-nato-rules.aspx?PageID=238&NID=114724& NewsCatID=510.

Ibrahimov, R. (2015). Turkish–Azerbaijani energy relations: Significant leverage in the implementation of the foreign policy interests of both countries. *Insight Turkey, 17*(2), 83–100.

Idiz, S. (2016, October 25). Why KRG will remain Turkey's main ally in Iraq. *Al-Monitor*. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-iraq-kurdistan-regional-government-main-ally.html.

Interfax-Ukraine. (2016, May 16). Ukraine, Turkey armies sign military cooperation roadmap until 2020. *Kyiv Post*. https://www.kyivpost.com/ article/content/ukraine-politics/ukraine-turkey-armies-sign-military-cooperation-roadmap-until-2020-413826.html.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2015). *The military balance*. London, England: Institute for Strategic Studies.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2017). *The military balance*. London, England: Institute for Strategic Studies.

Iraq Business News. (2016, March 18). Gazprom takes over as operator of Garmian Block. *Iraq Business News*. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2016/03/18/gazprom-takes-over-as-operator-of-garmian-block.

Iraq Business News. (2017, February). Rosneft and KRG sign oil deal. *Iraq Business News*. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2017/02/22/rosneft-and-krg-sign-oil-deal.

Janes IHS. (2017a). Russian Federation Army. *Information Handling Services — Jane's*. https://janes.ihs.com/WorldArmies/Display/1319294.

Janes IHS. (2017b). Turkey — External Affairs. *Information Handling Services — Jane's*. https://janes.ihs.com/EasternMediterranean/Display/1303426# (Relations with Azerbaijan).

Jones, S. and K. Hille. (2016, May 13). Russia's military ambitions make waves in the Black Sea. *Financial Times*. https://www.ft.com/content/1b9c24d8-1819-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.

Kanter, J. (2016, November 24). European Parliament votes to suspend talks with Turkey on E.U. membership. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/europe/european-parliament-turkey-eu-membership.html.

Kapanadze, S. (2014, December 27). Turkish trade with Abkhazia: An apple of discord for Georgia. *Hürriyet Daily*. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ turkish-trade-with-abkhazia-an-apple-of-discord-for-georgia.aspx?pageID=449&nID =76148&NewsCatID=396.

Karadeniz, T., & Pamuk, H. (2016, July 29). Turkey's Erdogan slams West for failure to show solidarity over coup attempt. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN10912T.

Khan, I. (2015, September 27). Iraq, Russia, Iran and Syria coordinate against ISIL. *Al Jazeera*. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/iraq-russia-iran-syria-coordinate-isil-150927125919507.html.

Köknar, A. M. (2003). Turkey and the Caucasus: Security and military challenges. In M. S. Radu (Ed.), *Dangerous Neighbourhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Kutlay, M. (2011). Economy as the "practical hand of 'new' Turkish foreign policy": A political economy explanation. *Insight Turkey, 13*(1), 67–88.

Loshkariov, I. D., & Sushentsov, A. A. (2016). Radicalization of Russian is Ukraine: From "accidental" diaspora to rebel movement. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16*(1), 71–90.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Relations between Turkey and Ukraine*. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ukraine.en.mfa.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). *Economic relations between Turkey and Georgia*. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-relations-between-turkey-and-georgia.en.mfa.

Murinson, A. (2010). Turkey's entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State identity in the Middle East and Caucasus. London, England: Routledge.

Natali, D. (2017, January 3). Is Iraqi Kurdistan heading toward civil war? *Al-Monitor*. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/kurdistan-civil-war-iraq-krg-sulaimaniya-pkk-mosul-kurds.html.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2016, February). *Substantial NATO–Georgia package factsheet*. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_12/20151209_151209-factsheet-nato-georgia-package.pdf.

Nye Jr. J. S. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in World Politics*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

Olson, R. (1998). Turkish and Russian foreign policies, 1991–1997: The Kurdish and Chechnya Questions. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18*(2), 209–227.

Öniş, Z. (2012). The Triumph of conservative globalism: The political economy of the AKP era. *Turkish Studies, 13*(2), 135–152.

Öniş, Z., & Yılmaz, Ş. (2015). Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: Cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region. *Third World Quarterly, 37*(1), 71–95.

O'Rourke, B. (2010, August 20). Armenia, Russia sign extended defense pact. *Radio Free Europe*. http://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_President_Medvedev_To_Visit_Armenia/2131915.html.

Osborn, A., & Coskun, O. (2016, December 28). Russia, Turkey, Iran eye dicing Syria into zones of influence. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-deal-idUSKBN14H12V.

Özdemir, V., & Raszewski, S. (2016). State and substate oil trade: The Turkey–KRG deal. *Middle East Policy, 23*(1), 125–135.

Pamuk, H. (2015, October 24). Erdogan says Turkey won't let Kurds "seize" northern Syria. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us–mideast-crisis-turkey-erdogan-idUSKCN0SI0IZ20151024.

Reuters. (2016, July 15). Timeline — Turkey's attempted coup. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-security-timeline idUSL8N1A158X.

RFE. (2008, August 26). Russia recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia. *Radio Free Europe*. http://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html.

Romano, D. (2015). Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage? *Middle East Policy, 22*(1), 89–101.

Samaan, M., & Barnard, A. (2015, July). Assad, in rare admission, says Syria's army lacks manpower. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/middleeast/assad-in-rare-admission-says-syrias-army-lacks-manpower.html.

Schiff, R. (2009). The military and domestic politics: A concordance theory of civil–military relations. London, England: Routledge.

Simoes, A., & Hildago, C.A. (2011). The economic complexity observatory: An analytical tool for understanding the dynamics of economic development. *Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 39–42. https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAAIW11/paper/view/3948.

Sputnik. (2017, March 4). Syrian army creates buffer zone between Kurds and Turkish military. *Sputnik International*. https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201703041051265010-syria-army-kurds-manbij.

Taspinar, O. (2014). The end of the Turkish model. *Survival, 56*(2), 49–64.

Tezcür, G. M. (2009). Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case. *Law and Society Review, 43*(2), 305–336.

Tokabay, E., Gumrukcu, T., & Tattersall, N. (2016, November 14). Turkey could put EU talks to a referendum next year: Erdogan. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-erdogan-idUSKBN1391H4.

Tuğal, C. (2016). The fall of the Turkish model: How the Arab uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism. London, England: Verso.

Ukrainian News. (2017, February 28). Turkey to assign USD 3.1 million yearly for needs of Ukrainian army till 2022. *Ukrainian News Agency*. http://ukranews.com/en/news/482221-turkey-to-assign-usd-31-million-yearly-for-needs-of-ukrainian-army-till-2022.

Uslu, Nasuh. (2003). The Turkish–American relationship between 1947 and 2003: The history of a distinctive alliance. New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers.

Wahab, B. (2017). Iran's warming relations with the PKK could destabilize the KRG. *Washington Institute Policy Analysis*. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-warming-relations-with-the-pkk-could-destabilize-the-krg.

Wahbi, L. (2016, May 26). Turkey and Ukraine teaming up: How the new alliance is combatting Russian aggression. *NATO Association of Canada*. http://natoassociation.ca/turkey-and-ukraine-teaming-up-how-the-new-alliance-is-combatting-the-russian-aggression/.

Walker, J. W. (2011). Introduction: The sources of Turkish grand strategy —

"Strategic depth" and "zero-problems" in context. In N. Kitchen (Ed.), *Turkey's Global Strategy*. (pp. 6–12). LSE IDEAS Special Report: London.

Waller, N. (2016, May 16). Georgia to hold joint military exercises with Turkey, Azerbaijan. *Georgia Today*. http://georgiatoday.ge/news/3799/Georgia-To-Hold-Joint-Military-Exercises-wi.

Walt, S. M. (1987). *The origins of alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

World Bank. (2017). *World development indicators dataset* [Data file]. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Yavus, M. H. (2009). *Secularism and Muslim democracy in Turkey*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Yülek, M., & Yatsenko, O. (2015). Globalization, Crises and Policy Reform: Lessons from the Turkish Experience. *International Economic Policy, 23*(2), 73–101.

Zaman, A. (2016, December 15). KRG PM: Talk of Iraqi Kurdish independence red line for Iran, but not Turkey. *Al-Monitor*. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/krg-iraq-kurdistan-region-nechirvan-barzani-iran-turkey.html.

Zanotti, J., & Thomas, C. (2017). *Turkey: Background and U.S. relations in brief*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Zinets, N., & Prentice, A. (2015, March 20). Turkey offers Ukraine $50 mln loan: Ukraine's Poroshenko. *Reuters*. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-turkey-loans-idUSKBN0MG1XT20150320.

Investigating What and Why: A Critical Review of the Literature on Terrorism

JANESSA MANN* & COLTON BRYDGES*

Abstract — This article critically examines the literature on terrorism, identifying a distinction between the research methods that were common before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. We argue that pre-9/11 methods were more concerned with understanding individual and group motivations for participating in terrorism. This approach is still visible in the fields of political psychology and gender and sexuality studies on terrorism. In contrast, post-9/11 research methods are more concerned with identifying country-level variables associated with terrorism using regression analysis and econometrics. Post-9/11 research on terrorism has often been focused on two debates: the role of democracy in fostering or preventing

Résumé — Cet article offre une analyse critique des recherches universitaires sur le terrorisme. Nous discutons également d'une distinction constatée entre les méthodes de recherches courantes avant et après l'attentat du 11 Septembre 2001. Nous postulons que les méthodes utilisées avant l'attentat étaient davantage préoccupées avec les motivations des individus et des groupes participant à l'activité terroriste. Encore aujourd'hui, cette approche est présente dans les domaines de la psychologie politique et des études du genre et de la sexualité en ce qui concerne le terrorisme. Par contre, les méthodes de recherche utilisées après l'attentat du 11 Septembre sont davantage préoccupées avec les variables se

* Janessa Mann is a Master's candidate at the University of Ottawa's School of International Development and Global Studies, where she is focusing on Indigenous Canadian maternal healthcare policies. Her undergraduate degree is from the University of Waterloo in English Literature and Peace & Conflict Studies. She has worked on policy with Mennonite Central Committee, Oxfam Canada, and Library and Archives Canada.

* Janessa Mann est candidate à la maitrise à l'École de développement international et mondialisation à l'Université d'Ottawa. Janessa s'intéresse principalement aux politiques publiques relatives à la santé maternelle chez les Autochtones au Canada. Elle détient un baccalauréat en littérature anglaise et en études de paix et de conflit de l'Université de Waterloo. Elle a travaillé dans le domaine des politiques publiques, notamment au sein du Mennonite Central Committee, d'Oxfam Canada et de la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada.

* Colton Brydges is a Master's candidate at the University of Ottawa's School of International Development and Global Studies, and holds a Bachelor's degree in Public Affairs and Policy Management from Carleton University. Colton's primary research interests lie in Africa and international development, with a specific interest in disability and conflict. Colton's research on disability and education in Lagos, Nigeria has recently been published in the *International Journal of Disability, Development and Education*. His upcoming thesis research will examine the intersection of disability, poverty and conflict in Gulu, Uganda and the implications for development practitioners.

* Colton Brydges est candidat à la maitrise à l'École de développement international et mondialisation à l'Université d'Ottawa. Il détient un baccalauréat en affaires publiques et gestion des politiques de l'Université Carleton. Colton s'intéresse principalement à l'Afrique et au développement international, particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux personnes handicapées et au conflit. Sa recherche sur le handicap et l'éducation à Lagos au Nigeria a été récemment publiée dans la revue *International Journal of Disability, Development and Education*. Dans son travail de maîtrise, Colton examinera l'intersection entre le handicap, la pauvreté et le conflit à Gulu en Ouganda et les implications pour les professionnels du développement international.

terrorism, and the relationship between development and terrorism. This shift in methodology reflects a more positivist ontology, and is also undoubtedly intended to meet the needs of policy-makers pursuing the War on Terror. We argue that a well-informed approach to addressing the threat of terrorism must draw from both perspectives; otherwise, there is a strong risk of ignoring crucial variables at different levels of analysis.

rattachant à l'État. Ces méthodes font appel à l'analyse de régression et à l'économétrie. La recherche postérieure à l'attentat du 11 Septembre se concentre souvent sur deux débats académiques : le rôle de la démocratie (soit encourager ou prévenir le terrorisme) et les relations entre le développement et le terrorisme. Ce changement dans la méthodologie adoptée démontre une ontologie positiviste et aussi l'intention d'adresser les besoins des décideurs pendant la guerre contre le terrorisme. Nous soutenons l'étude éclairée du terrorisme requiert l'adoption d'une approche qui considère les deux perspectives; autrement, des variables importantes aux différents niveaux d'analyse risquent d'être négligées.

Introduction

Few academics would dispute that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a significant impact on the study of terrorism. It is quite challenging to find any literature on terrorism published after 2001 which does not contain at least a cursory mention of 9/11. Crenshaw (2000) argues that the United States government became fixated on analyzing and developing counter-terrorism strategies throughout the 1990s, and a number of government offices became concerned with terrorism. Stern (2016) notes that after 9/11, the funding for terrorism studies increased substantially, and these new studies were supported by a number of large, sophisticated databases, like the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database. This literature review takes its lead from Crenshaw's (2000) argument about the nature of terrorism studies. She argues that the study of terrorism is inherently event driven, looking at far-left nationalist terrorists in the 1970s into the 1980s, before moving to an increased focus on far-right nationalist terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. Crenshaw (2000) pointed to the literature's preoccupation with "new terrorism" which, much like Kaldor's (2012) theory of "new wars" emphasizes the ultraviolent, apolitical, and decentralized nature of terrorism in the late 20th century. While the language of "old" and "new" is no longer evident in the academic literature, popular understandings of terrorism, especially Islamic terrorism, continue to emphasize its barbarity and its association with failed states (see, for example, Mallaby 2002).

Stern (2016) argues that the expansion of terrorism studies has seen a shift towards large cross-country regression studies, with very little attention being paid to the individual-level motivations for participating in terrorist violence. Indeed, a positivist ontology has been fundamental to terrorism studies post-9/11, with a focus on identifying which countries are predisposed to terror. There has also been an emphasis on identifying causes of international terror incidents, in spite of the fact that over 85% of terrorist incidents worldwide from 1970–2007 were domestic (Kis-Katos, Liebert, & Schulze,

2011). This is undoubtedly a result of the policy demands coming from the United States during its War on Terror. The event-driven nature of terrorism, largely driven by the demands of policy-makers, has detracted from the legitimacy of terrorism studies and undermined its ability to look at historical trends in context (Crenshaw, 2000). It has long been evident that "Instead of trying to explain terrorism it tries to explain the terrorists" (Sprinzak, 1991, 68).

This literature review will argue that terrorism studies post-9/11 have been fixated on the question of "what causes terrorism?" while those studies we regard as pre-9/11 have been more concerned with the question of "why does terrorism occur?" Arguably, this is merely a rephrasing of the exact same question, but we argue that the distinction between "what" and "why" is indicative of the positivist ontology that has pervaded post-9/11 terrorism studies, with a clear emphasis on state-level variables identified through large cross-country regressions. Pre-9/11 studies were not devoid of positivism, and indeed some psychological research demonstrates a fixation on portraying terrorism as being pathological (Crenshaw, 2000). However, pre-9/11 studies more typically look at individual or group level motivations to understand the social processes that lead to terrorism. While we identify 9/11 as the juncture point in terrorism studies, the division between the two is far from perfect. Indeed, "pre-9/11" methods have certainly persisted in the field of political psychology, and are also evident with the growing body of intersectional work that addresses the role of gender in terrorism. While the publication date may not be pre-9/11, their methods are more closely associated with a social constructionist ontology.

This literature review will then proceed to discuss the literature on terrorism based on our pre- and post-9/11 distinction. Within the category of pre-9/11 studies, we look at contributions from the realm of political psychology, as well as those looking at group dynamics and, more recently, gender studies. Within post-9/11 literature, we explore two important debates: the question of *how* democracy influences terrorism, and the relationship *between* development and terrorism. We conclude that the excessive focus on state-level variables in post-9/11 terrorism studies provides an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon, and a policy perspective that incorporates group and individual-level motivations as well will be far more effective in preventing terrorism.

Defining Terrorism

Twenty years ago, Laqueuer (1996) argued that "Current definitions of terrorism fail to capture the magnitude of the problem worldwide," (p. 24) and the case is still the same today. The challenge raised by most terrorist theorists is that there is no common definition with which to function, and this affects the ability to study factors and outcomes of terrorism (Fortna, 2015; Phillips, 2015). Research into "terrorism" has usually investigated transnational terrorism, obscuring the fact that most terrorist violence occurs domestically (Kis-Katos et al., 2011). This approach leaves a large sample of terrorist activity un-investigated, which impedes counter-terrorist activities. The most common thread in terrorist theories is the premeditated use or threat of violence (Blomberg 2011; Kis-Katos et al. 2011;) and its typically symbolic nature (Crenshaw, 1981). From there, motivations, political situations, size of terrorist cells, and many more factors affect the definition.

Pre-9/11 Terrorism Studies

Pre-9/11 terrorism studies were concerned with the question of "why does terrorism occur," at a more individual level than a macro-level. These studies constitute more psychological studies considering individual and group motivations for participating in terrorism, studies of group dynamics, and the impact of gender and sexuality on terrorism. Although the separation of pre- and post-9/11 studies is presented in a chronological fashion, it is rather a thematic separation, to differentiate between the two schools of thought. Earlier studies examining the motivations behind terrorism have looked at vengeance and even "abnormal" psychology. However, presenting terrorists as deviants simplifies complicated personal and group contexts for policy purposes. More modern psychological studies consider the impacts and factors of radicalization, as well as the impact of media. Research into group dynamics has shown that political frustrations can lead to terrorism as an outlet for grievances. Group politics can encourage individuals to act more aggressively than may have been typical for them, due to pressures and groupthink. Terrorism studies rarely focuses on an individual as a terrorist cell — we see this when an attack happens, the media immediately seeks to find who the attackers are connected to. This was evident after the club shooting in Orlando in 2016. Finally, economics can be a strong motivational factor for terrorist groups, to redistribute wealth and control, and connect supply chains.

Most of the research on gendered experiences of terrorism, or the "queering" of terrorism is more recent, but it speaks to motivations that are more personal for engaging in terrorism. Traditionally, violence and war is linked to the "masculine," therefore the traditional terrorist is a man. This patriarchal norm has entrenched a system of toxic masculinity, which is valuable in recruiting more male terrorists. However, it does not speak to the experiences of women who become terrorists for various reasons, including revenge or their own radical martyrdom. Another non-dominant discourse is that of "queering" terrorism. Theorists have begun to consider why terrorist groups are positioned as "perverse" sexually to demonize them, as well as the presence of institutionalized homophobia in security policies. Interestingly, there is no data on people who identify as LGBTQ+ (or queer) and if they engage in terrorism, or how it affects them. Of course, this self-identification would make them especially vulnerable considering the prevalence of homophobia in various settings.

Political Psychology

Psychology and political psychology have been prominent in the literature on terrorism, with Crenshaw's (1981) article on "The Causes of Terrorism" being widely cited. Crenshaw pointed to vengeance, guilt, and self-sacrifice as possible motivations for participating in terrorism. While her analysis primarily examines individual motivations, other elements like social pressures and group dynamics are certainly prominent. The focus on the individual psychology of terrorists has not been without problems. Silke (1998) points to an extensive body of literature that portrays terrorists as paranoid, narcissists, or psychopaths, putting a clear emphasis on the deviancy and abnormality of terrorists. While this line of reasoning is attractive, in reality terrorist groups will arguably avoid recruiting thrill seekers and deviants who would endanger the security of the group (Crenshaw, 1981). Arguably, this desire to reduce terrorism to a personality disorder is driven by the demands

of policy-makers seeking a "typical profile" for terrorists, one that can be easily identified and contained (Crenshaw, 2000).

Indeed, the evidence for terrorist abnormality is largely absent. Silke (1998) argues that much of the early research that supported this line of reasoning was fundamentally weak. Many such studies were based on secondary sources, like biographies of famous terrorists, and the limited primary research with terrorists was rife with methodological errors. Silke argues that there is a much more substantial and reputable body of literature that highlights the normality of terrorists, with mental illness being no more common amongst terrorist group members than the general population. While many foundational works were published in the pre-9/11 era, the political psychology of terrorism has continued to be an important area of study, especially given the rising concern of "homegrown terrorism" and radicalization. Stern (2016) argues that an individual's psychology or history can play a role in determining their participation in terrorist activities, along with group dynamics and prevailing social conditions. Similarly, Kruglanksi et al. (2014) argue that motivation, ideology, and social processes are the key ingredients to radicalization. These authors recognize that the choice to participate in terrorism is a product of individual, local group and societal factors, a nuanced approach with multiple levels of analysis.

There is no single pathway to terrorism, and indeed within a given group there can be a variety of motivations for joining (Crenshaw, 1981). For example, Cronin (2015) argues that the messaging used by ISIS recruiters is tailored to different groups, such as young men and women. Groups like ISIS can offer personal power, a sense of community, religious righteousness, and the opportunity to participate in violence (Cronin, 2015). Kruglanksi et al. (2014) argue that the fundamental motivating factor for terrorists, and indeed for people in general, is a quest for significance: the fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, and to have respect. Given this perspective, we can understand why Stern (2016) argues that ISIS appeals to disenfranchised Sunni Muslims, offering an escape from oppression and humiliation elsewhere in addition to material benefits like higher salaries and physical protection.

While there has been extensive research on why individuals choose to participate in terrorism, there has also been inquiry into the psychological impacts of terrorism and counterterrorism. For example, Rehman et al. (2017) use economic methods to assess the effectiveness of Pakistani counterterrorism, noting the "vengeance effect" whereby collateral damage from counterterrorism can increase the future number of terrorist attacks. Psychological considerations are important to terrorist groups, who seek to create a climate of fear and paralysis in order to coerce action or inaction from a given regime (Bjørgo, 2016). One of the main methods of creating this fear is through media attention. Fischer et al. (2011) found that one-sided media coverage of terrorism that does not engage with the motives of perpetrators ultimately leads to an increase in public fear. The importance of the media is further supported by Asal and Hoffman's (2016) study on the impact of press freedom and attention on terrorist attacks. They argue that terrorists are inherently media conscious, concluding that "there is an inverse relationship between international press attention [for a given country] and the probability of terrorist organizations engaging in foreign terrorism" (Asal & Hoffman, 2016, pg. 394). Psychology and political psychology

have been crucial in identifying the individual, social and societal variables that contribute to terrorism and individual radicalization. The emphasis has rather shifted to social processes that reflect the social constructionist mode of inquiry, in contrast to earlier studies that have tried to identify personality disorders and has become fundamental to this body of literature.

Group Dynamics

The research on political psychology and terrorism has also been complimented by a great deal of inquiry into the role of group dynamics in terrorism. These studies have examined how terrorist groups operate, and how social processes can drive individuals to participate in terrorism. Small groups are crucial for moving from grievances to terrorism. These groups rely on an atmosphere of mutual reassurance, solidarity, and comradeship (Crenshaw, 1981). While groups can provide a permissive atmosphere that encourages terrorist violence, they can also be coercive. Kruglanksi et al. (2014) argue that humiliation has been a motivating factor for groups ranging from Japanese kamikaze bombers to Palestinian and Chechen terrorists and even the Boston Marathon bombers. Real or anticipated humiliation can be a dangerous motivating factor within small groups, but even within larger social groupings, considering increasingly violent responses to Islamophobia in the Global North (Kruglanski et al., 2014).

Some of this work succumbs to the event-driven nature of terrorism studies. For example, Weinberg and Eubank (1990) argued that left-wing extremist political parties are frequently the source of terrorist groups, especially when they fail to gain political traction. Similarly, Sprinzak (1991) argued that most terrorist groups are splinters of earlier radical political movements, and that adopting terrorism was a gradual process. Sprinzak's (1991) arguments appear to be the more plausible of the two today; for example, Nigeria's Boko Haram started as a relatively peaceful political movement before state repression pushed them towards terrorism (Higazi, 2013). Weinberg and Eubank's (1990) work already appeared dated by the mid-1990s, when Laqueur (1996) argued that "most international and domestic terrorism these days, however, is neither left nor right, but ethnic-separatist in inspiration" (p. 25). It is interesting to note that terrorism is often viewed in terms of groups. Phillips (2015) believes that the rise of the internet and "lone wolf" terrorists has made it more challenging to define groups. However, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) argue that individual radicalization by personal grievance is unlikely without identifying with a larger ideology, and indeed this is often the result of mental illness. They argue that, while radicalization can occur at the individual, group, or mass level, terrorism is made possible by bringing individuals into small groups (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

As previously mentioned, groups are composed of individuals with diverse motivations. Drawing from feminist scholarship, Sjoberg (2009) argues that terrorism is perceived and understood differently based on lived experience. This is evident in Stern's (2016) analysis of ISIS, where individual members may be driven by financial gain, personal prestige, or religious piety. Pilat (2009) also notes that the impacts of globalization, rapid modernization and socio-economic and cultural disruptions have all been linked with terrorism, but none provides a perfect explanation for the phenomenon. There is also diversity between groups: Blomberg et al. (2011) find that terrorist groups in

the Middle East and North Africa tend to remain active for longer periods compared to groups from elsewhere. While this may be indicative of the strength of those groups, we must also keep in mind McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) arguments about the role of macro conditions in supporting terrorism.

While the study of groups has typically focused on their role in fostering terrorism, terrorist groups also provide an interesting study in resource management and economics. Romaniuk (2014) points to an increasing focus on studying terrorist financing in the post-9/11 era, with efforts being made to understand how these groups generate, manage, and consume resources. While terrorist groups may have grand political goals, they still need to provide material benefits to maintain their membership (Stern, 2016). At the time of writing, Lister (2014) noted that "ISIS has had the capacity to earn as much as $2 million per day through the sale of oil and agricultural produce, not to mention additional income derived from its still-extensive extortion networks, internal taxation systems, and activities on the regional black market" (p. 90). The sophisticated financing systems of some terrorist groups are certainly of interest to policy-makers in counterterrorism, and while this field of study diverges from our characterization of "pre-9/11" methods, the emphasis on groups as the engine of terrorist remains common throughout the literature.

Gender

When studying terrorism, the experiences associated with different genders and sexualities is an important variable to consider. Gender and sexuality fall into the pre-9/11 category because they answer, "why does terrorism occur" by looking at the intersection of violence, gender, and/or sexuality. It is often focused more on internal motivations within individuals or groups, as opposed to a macro-level approach. Sex is a biological category, usually presented in most cultures as a binary of "male" and "female." Gender is a cultural construct on a spectrum of masculinity and femininity, again often more rigidly defined as "man" or "woman." Sexuality is related to a person's sexual interests or activities. According to Auchter (2012), consistently linking terrorism to men further entrenches the "patriarchal system of violence" (p. 126) although this systematic understanding would be more of a post-9/11 understanding. Previously, the experiences of women and terrorism were not discussed, which meant that theorists and policy-makers were underestimating the complexity of the phenomenon (Sjoberg, 2009). Enloe (1990) was one of the first theorists to question, "Where are the women," within conflict, and promoted the benefits of a gendered analysis of conflict.

From this, theories in security were developed which demonstrated that women were the primary victims of terrorism and violence, which meant that aid work could be specifically targeted to women in conflict areas as well as situations more dominated by terrorism (Cook, 2005; Sajid Haider, Heredero, Ahmed, & Dustgeer, 2015). Recently, however, academics are noticing that women are becoming involved in conflicts as terrorists for a variety of reasons. Sjoberg (2009) writes that "'terrorism' discourse does not pay enough attention to women *as* terrorists," and that more research must be done from the bottom-up to understand their intentions (p. 70). One suggested reason that women would participate in terrorism is as a response to the death of men in their families. Auchter (2012) outlines the theory that people perceived women as seeking to avenge the

deaths of loved ones, but otherwise would refuse violence. Auchter (2012) disagrees with this, because it focuses on a narrow gender dichotomy, which presents violence as a male endeavour (Crenshaw, 2000). This theory also ignores women's agency as terrorists and being able to defend their political views (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2014). Cook (2005) has also studied the radicalization of Muslim women, who are entering terrorist groups in order to participate in martyrdom, showing that they, too, believe in the radical messages. Women's rights to join men in Islamic terrorism shows a radicalization in Islam to include women, although theorists like Cook (2005) surmise that women are useful because they are unexpected terrorists. These practices play upon gender stereotypes.

Some scholars have found that gender equality has a negative impact on terrorism. Salman (2015) writes, "women's actual advancement and equality in higher education, jobs, and political representation are more effective in reducing terrorism than cultural attitudes supporting these rights" (p. 281). As mentioned previously, when theorists link terrorism and violence to men, it reinforces patriarchal structures which victimize women and overlook their perspectives (Auchter 2012; Sjoberg 2009). It is vital to discuss that men can also be victimized by terrorism (Sjoberg, 2015). This follows the discourse in development theory, where first people studied "where are the women," and the impact development projects had on them, but then noticed that not all men were affected in the same way, just like not all women were impacted in the same way. Adherence to the study of women only leaves out important perspectives on the causes and effects of terrorism. The theories outlined in the psychology section above are generally focused on men's experience of terrorism, which demonstrates why a gendered lens on terrorism is necessary. Men often participate in terrorism when they are disillusioned and desire to gain power (Haider, 2016). Recruitment of young men is often targeted within schools or at disenfranchised young men (Schneckener, 2004). Masculinity is also largely shaped by cultural norms that emphasize men as strong defenders, and apt to violence. Not only should more research be done into women and terrorism, but academics should continue to develop the narrative of terrorism and the toxicity of masculinity.

Sexuality

An important critique of mainstream terrorism studies is the lack of attention it gives to non-heteronormative actors, or the representation of them in conflict. Recently, some academics have begun to apply queer theory to the study of terrorism as well as global politics (Sjoberg, 2015), although there is not much research published. Sjoberg (2015) writes that the goal of terrorist theory is to understand the position of those who are queer within terrorism, as well as homoeroticisms within military organizations. As mentioned in the above section on abnormal psychology, homosexuality has been used to "other" the enemy, and de-masculinize.

Two interesting schools in terrorism study the homophobia present in anti-terrorist policies as well as terrorist groups. Haider and Puar (2016; 2006) write that anti-terrorist narratives often frame terrorist groups as queer, in order to position it as negative. Schotten writes that from a post-9/11 context, Arabs have been sexualized perversely, or "queered," in the figure of the "'terrorist,' a figure of monstrosity, excess, savagery, and perversion" (Schotten, 2015, p. 79). This paradigm of toxic masculinity presents homosexuality as an

"underlying ailment" which must be eradicated. The messages encouraging the queering of terrorists must be changed because of the adverse effects that harm individuals negatively. In contrast, Haider and Puar's (2016) article also examines toxic masculinity, which positioned the shooting at the Orlando club as homophobic terrorism. They say that by framing homophobia as the cause of the shooting, one can question the constructions of violence and hegemonic patriarchy. The interesting distinction between these articles is that the narratives they analyze both present gay men (or the idea of them) as deviant and weak. The narrative which Schotten uses is used to perpetuate homophobia in institutional policies and unite conservative members of a state (Mason, 2013).

Post 9/11 Terrorism Studies

As previously mentioned, terrorism studies garnered more attention in the post-9/11 period. Academic research was increasingly geared towards supporting the War on Terror, which changed the way terrorism studies was approached. Econometrics, which became more popular in conflict studies the early 2000s with the works of Collier and Hoeffler (see, for example, Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2002), became prominent in terrorism studies as well. These works examined state-level variables across countries, seeking a correlation between certain state characteristics and the incidence of terrorism. The policy implications of these findings are very clear, as Boutton and Carter (2014) found in their study that US foreign aid flows during the War on Terror were concentrated where transnational terrorist threats originated.

There are two debates that are prominent within this post-9/11 body of literature. The first pertains to the role of democracy in enabling or preventing terrorism. Piazza (2007) differentiates between the two bodies of literature through two schools of thought: the access school and the strategic school. Scholars associated with the access school claim that democracy provides multiple legal avenues for political expression, meaning that there is less incentive for resorting to terrorist violence. Put simply, for the access school, more democracy equals less terrorism. In contrast, the strategic school argues that more democracy equals more terrorism, since democracies are more respectful of civil liberties and less likely to dispose of terrorist groups with force. The second prominent debate in the post-9/11 terrorism literature focuses upon the role of weak or failed states in generating terrorism. Particularly given the War on Terror's focus on combatting transnational terrorist groups, the perception that failed states provide a safe haven for terrorists has remained prevalent. In contrast, an increasing number of scholars have argued that terrorism is more likely to originate from the developed world, echoing elements of the strategic school.

The Strategic School

The notion that democracy could enable terrorism was alluded to in Crenshaw (1981), where she argued that a government's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism could serve as a permissive factor. Weinberg and Eubank (1994) are far more explicit, stating that "it seems clear that terrorist organizations tend to appear in democratic settings" (p. 433). In a later work, Weinberg and Eubank (2001) find that terrorist events were more prevalent in democratic settings than autocratic ones in the 1980s, and that the victims and

perpetrators were more likely to be citizens of stable, democratic countries. Weinberg and Eubank (2001) proposed that the democracy-terrorism relationship could be a result of the ease of travel and communication in developed countries. Indeed, Richards (2015) proposes that the decentralization of ideas in democracies makes counterterrorism increasingly difficult. However, other scholars have focused more on state capacity and civil liberties as permissive factors. For example, Bakker et al. (2016) find that civil liberties, as well as political participation and contestation, are positively correlated with terror attacks. Looking at the Middle East, Piazza (2007) finds that more liberal states are more susceptible to terrorism than dictatorial regimes. Kis-Katos et al. (2011) echo these findings, arguing that "only the states that have no respect of human, civil and political rights can crush terrorism more effectively than other states through repressive means" (p. 525).

Of course, not all democracies are created equal and many authors have sought to qualify the conclusions of the strategic school. Kis-Katos et al. (2011) argue that while there is strong support for the strategic school, they concede that their results were dichotomous: only authoritarian states can truly prevent terrorism, and there is no spectrum where more democracy equals more terrorism. Ghatak and Prins (2016) find that homegrown terrorism is most common in democracies, but this finding is primarily driven by emerging or underdeveloped democratic states. This reveals the complex interplay between democracy and development and the implications for terrorism. Bueno De Mesquita and Dickson (2007) also allude to the role of state capacity and development, focusing on the role of negative externalities from indiscriminate counterterrorism. They argue that terrorist conflict is most likely where states are unable to pursue targeted counterterrorism policies without creating these negative externalities, creating a more permissive environment for terrorism. At face value, the conclusions of the strategic school seem to diminish the importance of political expression and participation. However, Fortna (2015) argues that, while terrorism may be more common in democracies, terrorist groups in democratic states are no more likely to see their objectives realized. Therefore, "terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win" (Fortna, 2015, p. 519). The conclusions of the strategic school must also be set alongside the debate surrounding weak states and terrorism, given the oft-debated relationship between democracy and development.

The Access School

The opposing school of thought from the strategic school is the access school. According to Piazza (2007), the access school says that democracies encourage peaceful political participation, and therefore have less terrorist activity. Because there are more legal channels to pursue political or cultural change, there are fewer chances at engaging in terrorism. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) write that political rights ensure that citizens will participate in government, and pursue legitimate opposition of the government. Democracies are also more likely to accept opposing ideas. Kaldor (2005) has written that rebuilding political legitimacy is the key to ending "new wars," through popular democratization, although this argument ignores contexts where liberal democratization can be "too much, too soon," like in Afghanistan.

Along the lines of a democratic government, Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) theorize that law and order, and the absence of human rights abuses are associated with less terrorism. Their research shows that the lack of economic opportunity is a larger driver in terrorist activities than a lack of material resources. Therefore, countries that restrict economic freedom experience more terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). Countries that have stronger and more impartial judicial systems, as well as those who respect physical integrity rights, are associated with low levels of terrorism (Asal and Hoffman, 2016). On the other hand, government coercion stimulates terror attacks (Bakker et al., 2016). Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) write, "Systematic violations of these three rights [political, personal security, human needs] in tandem, are likely causes for terrorist activity, particularly if these violations are sustained over a long period of time" (p. 682). In other words, when there are legal channels to critique the state and challenge the status quo, terrorism is less likely to happen. Policy-wise, to limit terrorism from the perspective of the access school, states must promote liberal democracy. However, as mentioned previously, democratization is not the solution to stability in every situation. It is more important to address human rights issues which reflect contexts, and encourage locally based solutions, than to promote liberal democracy.

Do Developed States Generate Terrorism?

Contrary to the belief that liberal democracy is the solution for "fragile" or "failing" states, some theorists suggest that more "developed" states harbour terrorism. These academics suggest that democratic institutions actually extend the abilities and lifetimes of terrorist groups (S. B. Blomberg et al., 2011) and that higher human development actually increases the risk of terrorism (Coggins, 2015). A policy problem that Bjørgo (2016) suggests is that in many democratic societies, counter-terrorism is "almost exclusively about crime prevention," which makes policy very narrow, and limits its effectiveness (p. 25). Within this line of reasoning, states that have large cities are at a higher risk, because terrorist organizations have more access to finances and goods in urban areas (Kis-Katos et al. 2011). Kis-Katos et al. (2011) write that terrorism is more likely to originate from "richer and more urbanized countries than from poorer countries," which are more likely to participate in international, rather than national, terrorism (p. 524). Cities can also offer a great opportunity for recruiting (Crenshaw, 1981). Crenshaw (1981) also takes the opportunity to suggest that terrorism may be "a sign of a stable society rather than a symptom of fragility…" and that terrorism may happen when society's elite wish to change the status quo, like in Western Europe (p. 384). This theory would need to be tested in a post-9/11 frame to see if elite terrorism is more or less common.

Even in more developed states, there are still groups which are excluded for various reasons. Ghatak and Prins (2016) write that "the risk of domestic terrorism is higher in stronger states when segments of minority populations suffer from political exclusion from the state power" (p. 23). Their evidence shows that it is stronger states who experience more domestic terrorism when there is more discrimination present in society. A certain amount of stability and education or political engagement is necessary for terrorist groups to function). Schneckener (2004) explains that when states are more developed, there is an improved infrastructure, and therefore an improved supply chain for the terrorists. This is also true in situations of rapid socioeconomic change, which can exacerbate turmoil (Gurr,

1986). An interesting idea presented by Brockhoff et al. (2015) is that education levels may facilitate mobilization by "amplifying feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement," although higher education in richer countries may reduce risk (p. 1207). Weinberg and Eubank (1994) also say that terrorist groups may emerge in states that have more political engagement, and have "attentive publics that are alert to important social and political developments" (p. 433). Therefore, states that are more developed may harbour terrorism because groups have more access to infrastructure, goods, and more educated and possibly frustrated citizens.

Do Weak States Generate Terrorism?

There is a common argument, exemplified by Mallaby (2002), that weak states are safe havens for transnational terrorist and criminal organizations. The most prominent targets in the War on Terror have been weak or failed states like Afghanistan and post-invasion Iraq, with Somalia, Mali and Nigeria also serving as high-profile producers of terrorist groups. A great deal of academic literature has also supported the relationship between weak states and terrorism. Some have focused on the criminality and lawlessness in weak states that permits terrorism, while others have focused on issues of underdevelopment, political weakness, and uneven territorial control.

The literature on terrorism and state fragility or weakness ranges from the sophisticated to the sensationalist. On the latter end of the spectrum, Pilat (2009) argues that "today, one of the greatest dangers we confront comes from failed states, and the sub-national and transnational terrorism that they breed and harbour" (p. 180). Authors like Piazza (2007) and Tikuisis (2009) have drawn empirical links between state weakness and failure and fatal terrorism. Ghatak and Prins (2015) found that weak and corrupt states experience a higher incidence of domestic terrorism than stronger states. Kis-Katos et al. (2011) also find that "Domestic conflicts and anarchy are hotbeds for domestic and international terror alike" (p. 529).

Linking weak or failed states, a categorization that is contested, to terrorism is not without its issues. Rotberg (2002) focuses on the economic (e.g., corruption, clientelism) and political (e.g., civil society curtailed, no independent judiciary) conditions that contribute to state failure. He argues that a loss of fundamental legitimacy and breakdown of the social contract contribute to the rising risk of terrorism. The importance of political legitimacy is also evident in Esfandiary and Tabatabai's (2015) analysis of Iran's strategic approach to terrorism, which notes that ethnic fractionalization and the pseudo-state capacity of ISIS pose fundamental risks to the stability of the Iranian state. The question of legitimacy, as well as political capacity, is evident in a thread of literature that emphasizes the risk of violence and terrorism during political transitions. Weinberg and Eubank (1990), focusing on the possibility of political parties radicalizing, argue that regime transformation obscures the rules of the political game and makes terrorism more likely to occur. These findings have been echoed in subsequent research. For example, while dismissing the correlation between state weakness and terrorism, Coggins (2015) argues that states suffering political collapse are more likely to experience terrorism. Akhmat et al. (2014) find that "the fragility of relatively young political systems and

nascent democracies has also generated a permissive environment for the use of political violence" in South Asia (p. 3066).

While general political collapse has been proposed as a cause of terrorism, the absence of state institutions in particular regions has also received attention. Schneckener (2004) argues that transnational terrorists are not likely to base themselves in weak states, but notes that areas where state authority is absent can be useful for conducting training or withdrawing from combat, citing specific regions of Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines as examples. Territory and the absence of the central state are important considerations in Lister's (2014) analysis of ISIS and other terrorist groups in the region, as he argues that "Iraq and especially Syria will continue to represent relative safehavens for jihadist militants for many years to come" (p. 107). According to Lister, the retreat of the state in these regions has been vital to the success of terrorist groups, as territorial rule is crucial for ISIS' military, financial and religious strategy. ISIS has expended considerable resources on providing public services to the people living in their territory, gaining a manner of legitimacy at the expense of the retreating state (Lister, 2014).

State weakness can certainly be expressed in terms of political control and capacity, but safeguarding human security is another essential function of the modern state (Coggins, 2015). Given the supposed correlation between human security and political legitimacy, a number of authors have drawn links between development failure and terrorism incidence. Drawing on the work of Urdal (2006), who found a link between youth bulges and conflict, Caruso and Gavrilova (2012) find a significant positive relationship between male youth unemployment and terrorism in Palestine. Blomberg et al. (2011) point to the uneven economic growth associated with commodity export dependence as limiting the capacity of states like Nigeria to prevent the conditions for terrorism from arising. Clearly much has been written in support of the notion that weak states create terrorism, through either a lack of political capacity, a lack of territorial control, or a failure to foster adequate human development. Viewed alongside the conclusions of the strategic school, these authors would seem to argue that building state capacity is essential for preventing terrorism.

Conclusion

Like conflict, state failure and fragility, terrorism is not an easily explained phenomenon, nor is it clearly defined. The proposed causes include individual grievances, group marginalization, regime type, and economic development, amongst a host of others. Previously understudied variables, like the social construction of masculinity, are now being acknowledged as part of the diverse set of factors that would motivate individuals to participate in terrorism. This literature review is not intended to "explain terrorism," or indeed to advocate for one methodology or the other, but rather to demonstrate the ways in which evolving academic research has approached the subject. The events of September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent war on terror, have had a significant impact on the study of terrorism. Academic research has shifted towards the use of regression analysis with a specific focus on country level variables as means to identify which countries are prone to terrorism. This approach has arguably been motivated by the attention and funding made available during the United States' War on Terror. The result has been a focus on answering

the "what" by identifying state-level variables correlated with terrorism, rather than engaging with the question of "why" individuals choose to engage in terrorism.

Methods that we classify as pre-9/11 have persisted, most notably in the fields of political psychology and increasingly in gender studies. This research has focused more on individual and group motivations for engaging in terrorism. While primary research with terrorists or those who have experienced radicalization remains limited, these authors have provided useful insights into the phenomenon of terrorism.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Pre 9/11 –      ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│    Why           │      • Political Psychology          │    │
│  terrorism?  ⎰   │       • Group Dynamics               │    │
│                  │    • Gender and Sexuality            │    │
│                  └──────────────────────────────────────┘    │
│                                                               │
│                                                               │
│  Post 9/11 –     ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  What causes ⎰   │    • Access vs. strategic school      │   │
│  terrorism?      │  • Developed states vs. weak states   │   │
│                  └──────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 1. Approaches in the study of terrorism.

A more sophisticated approach is necessary for various reasons. If indeed the countries of the Global North, and specifically the United States, intend to fight a War on Terror, they must acknowledge the complexity of their target. Kaldor (2005) has suggested that the United States has approached the War on Terror as if it was an "Old War," pitting ideals of freedom against totalitarianism. She argues that the United States has attempted to fight an asymmetrical "New War" using "Old War" tactics, the result of which will be further state disintegration. In contrast, Cronin (2015) argues that the rise of a pseudo-state like ISIS that actually commands a conventional army will render existing counterterrorism strategies obsolete. There is also the question of whether the fight against terrorism has led to an overemphasis on security in the foreign policies of Global North countries. Beall et al. (2006) argue that the "failure to achieve significant long-term development can end up undermining security anyway" (p. 63). With ongoing debates over the role of economic development in terrorism, the question of how to improve human wellbeing, whether it is discussed in terms of security or development, remains unanswered.

It is evident that addressing terrorism and the threats it poses to human security in the Global South and Global North necessitates a multi-dimensional analysis at multiple levels. While econometric methods can identify country-level variables associated with terrorism, a sub-national level of analysis is equally important to identify the pathways to radicalization and the group dynamics that sustain political violence. This is more important when domestic terrorism in the Global North is attracting increasing attention from policymakers. Put as simply as possible, terrorism is a response to a problem: that problem may be social or economic marginalization, state fragility, or a host of other issues.

Academic research must strive to adopt multiple perspectives and approaches to understand that problem to inform effective and responsive counterterrorism policies.

References

Akhmat, G., Zaman, K., Shukui, T., & Sajjad, F. (2014). Exploring the root causes of terrorism in South Asia: Everybody should be concerned. *Quality & Quantity*, *48*(6), 3065–3079.

Asal, V., & Hoffman, A. M. (2016). Media effects: Do terrorist organizations launch foreign attacks in response to levels of press freedom or press attention? *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *33*(4), 381–399.

Auchter, J. (2012). Gendering terror. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, *14*(1), 121–139.

Bakker, R., Hill, D. W., & Moore, W. H. (2016). How much terror? Dissidents, governments, institutions, and the cross-national study of terror attacks. *Journal of Peace Research*, *53*(5), 711–726.

Beall, J., Goodfellow, T., & Putzel, J. (2006). Introductory article: on the discourse of terrorism, security and development. *Journal of International Development*, *18*(1), 51–67.

Bjørgo, T. (2016). Counter-terrorism as crime prevention: a holistic approach. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *8*(1), 25–44.

Blomberg, S. B., Broussard, N. H., & Hess, G. D. (2011). New wine in old wineskins? Growth, terrorism and the resource curse in sub-Saharan Africa. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *27*, S50–S63.

Blomberg, S., Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2011). Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations. *Public Choice*, *149*(3–4), 441–463.

Boutton, A., & Carter, D. (2014). Fair-weather allies? Terrorism and the allocation of US foreign aid. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *58*(7), 1144–1173.

Brockhoff, S., Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2015). Great expectations and hard times: The (nontrivial) impact of education on domestic terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(7), 1186–1215.

Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Dickson, E. S. (2007). The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science*, *51*(2), 364–381.

Callaway, R., & Harrelson-Stephens, J. (2006). Toward a theory of terrorism: Human security as a determinant of terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *29*(7), 679–702.

Caruso, R., & Gavrilova, E. (2012). Youth unemployment, terrorism and political violence, evidence from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, *18*(2).

Coggins, B. L. (2015). Does state failure cause terrorism? An empirical analysis (1999–2008). *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(3), 455–483.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, *50*(4), 563–573.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers, 56*, 564–595.

Cook, D. (2005). Women fighting in jihad? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *28*(5), 375–384.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, *13*(4), 379–399.

Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, *21*(2), 405–420.

Cronin, A. K. (2015). ISIS is not a terrorist group: Why counterterrorism won't stop the latest jihadist threat. *Foreign Affairs*, *94*(2), 87–98.

Enloe, C. H. (1990). Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (Second edition). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Esfandiary, D., & Tabatabai, A. (2015). Iran's ISIS policy. *International Affairs*, *91*(1), 1–15.

Eubank, W., and Weinberg, L. (1990). Political parties and the formation of terrorist groups. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *2*(2), 125–144.

Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (1994). Does democracy encourage terrorism? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *6*(4), 417–435.

Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *13*(1), 155–164.

Fischer, P., Postmes, T., Koeppl, J., Conway, L., & Fredriksson, T. (2011). The meaning of collective terrorist threat: Understanding the subjective causes of terrorism reduces its negative psychological impact. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *26*(7), 1432–1445.

Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do terrorists win? Rebels' use of terrorism and civil war outcomes. *International Organization*, *69*(3), 519–556.

Gassebner, M., & Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, stock, and barrel: a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of terror. *Public Choice*, *149*(3/4), 235.

Ghatak, S., & Prins, B. C. (2016). The homegrown threat: State strength, grievance, and domestic terrorism. *International Interactions*, 1–31.

Gurr, T. (1986). Tyrants and terrorists. *Society*, *23*(6), 81–84.

Haider, S. (2016). The shooting in Orlando, terrorism or toxic masculinity (or both?). *Men and Masculinities*, *19*(5), 555–565.

Haider, S., Heredero, C. de P., Ahmed, M., & Dustgeer, S. (2015). Identifying causes of terrorism in Pakistan (Report), *The Dialogue, 10*(3), 220–236.

Higazi, A. (2013). The origins and transformation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern-Nigeria. *Politique africaine*, *130*, 137–164.

Kaldor, M. (2005). Old wars, cold wars, new wars, and the War on Terror. *International Politics; Basingstoke*, *42*(4), 491–498.

Kaldor, M. (2012). New and old wars: organized violence in a global era. (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Kis-Katos, K., Liebert, H., & Schulze, G. G. (2011). On the origin of domestic and international terrorism. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *27*, S17–S36.

Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism. *Political Psychology*, *35*, 69–93.

Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, *75*(5), 24–36.

Lister, C. (2014). Assessing Syria's jihad. *Survival*, *56*(6), 87–112.

Mallaby, S. (2002). The reluctant imperialist: Terrorism, failed states, and the case for American empire. F*oreign Affairs*, *81*(2), 2–7.

Mason, C. (2013). Perpetual states of emergency: The sexuality of terrorism in Middle America. *Feminist Formations*, *25*(2), 153–173.

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *20*(3), 415–433.

Ortbals, C. D., & Poloni-Staudinger, L. (2014). Women defining terrorism: Ethnonationalist, state, and machista terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, *7*(3), 336–356.

Phillips, B. J. (2015). What is a terrorist group? Conceptual issues and empirical implications. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *27*(2), 225–242.

Piazza, J. A. (2007). Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *30*(6), 521–539.

Pilat, J. (2009). The causes of terrorism. *Organisational Transformation and Social Change*, *6*(2), 171.

Puar, J. K. (2006). Mapping US homonormativities. *Gender, Place & Culture*, *13*(1), 67–88.

Rehman, F. U., Nasir, M., & Shahbaz, M. (2017). What have we learned? Assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies in Pakistan. *Economic Modelling, 64*, 487–495.

Richards, A. (2015). From terrorism to "radicalization" to "extremism": counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus? *International Affairs*, *91*(2), 371–380.

Romaniuk, P. (2014). The state of the art on the financing of terrorism. *The RUSI Journal*, *159*(2), 6–17.

Rotberg, R. I. (2002). Failed states in a world of terror. *Foreign Affairs*, *81*(4), 127–140.

Salman, A. (2015). Green houses for terrorism: measuring the impact of gender equality attitudes and outcomes as deterrents of terrorism. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, *39*(4), 281–306.

Schneckener, U. (2004). *How transnational terrorists profit from fragile states. SWP Research Paper*. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/terrorists-profit-from-fragile-states.

Schotten, C. H. (2015). Homonationalist futurism: "Terrorism" and (other) queer resistance to empire. *New Political Science*, *37*(1), 71–90.

Silke, A. (1998). Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, *4*(1), 51–69.

Sjoberg, L. (2009). Feminist Interrogations of terrorism/terrorism studies. *International Relations*, *23*(1), 69–74.

Sjoberg, L. (2015). Seeing sex, gender, and sexuality in international security. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, *70*(3), 434–453.

Sprinzak, E. (1991). The process of delegitimation: Towards a linkage theory of political terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *3*(1), 50–68.

Stern, J. (2016). Radicalization to extremism and mobilization to violence. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *668*(1), 102–117.

Tikuisis, P. (2009). On the relationship between weak states and terrorism. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *1*(1), 66–79.

Urdal, H. (2006). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. *International Studies Quarterly*, *50*(3), 607–629.

Qui gouverne le développement ?
Introduction aux mutations du champ politique et défi de l'émancipation des peuples sous le prisme du partenariat mondial pour le développement

LISE CAZZOLI[*]

Abstract — The ICT revolution of the 1980s and the disastrous consequences of decolonization policies have played a catalyst role in the emergence of new actors, changing conflicts and the reconsideration of the Westphalian Nation-state, resulting in a shift in international security theory. Issues related to security, democratic governance and Southern development are at the crossroads of these mutations. This study will seek to determine how these dynamics have materialized in a mutation of the policy area, by examining the governing actors and processes in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), often presented as the components of the first international development agenda ever realised. We will show that new security challenges have emerged from public policies organized in networks, and how this public arrangement resulted in a new exclusion from the democratic space.

Keywords: Human security; governance; international development; millennium development goals; networks; globalization; international organizations.

Résumé — La révolution de l'information et des communications des années 1980 et les conséquences de politiques de décolonisation désastreuses ont joué le rôle de catalyseurs ayant permis l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs, de conflits d'une autre nature, et la profonde remise en question de l'ordre westphalien et de ses États-Nations, ainsi que des paradigmes gouvernant nos perceptions de la sécurité internationale. Au confluent de ces mutations se mêlent alors enjeux de sécurité, gouvernance démocratique et développement du Sud. Cette étude se donne pour objectif d'analyser comment ces dynamiques ont pu se matérialiser en une mutation du champ d'action politique, en examinant les acteurs et processus ayant gouverné l'implémentation des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD), souvent présentés comme les composantes du premier agenda international pour le développement jamais réalisé. Nous verrons que l'action publique organisée en réseaux crée de nouveaux défis sécuritaires liés à l'exclusion de l'espace démocratique.

Mots-clés : Sécurité humaine; gouvernance; développement international; objectif du

---

[*]   Lise Cazzoli holds a B.A. in Sociology and Anthropology from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. She is pursuing a M.A. in Public and International Affairs from the University of Ottawa, and is currently attending the M.A. in International Development from the Paris School of International Affairs (SciencesPo Paris). Her research interests revolve around development issues related to globalisation and global governance from an anthropology and political science perspective. Her current research deals with the topic of resilience and bottom-up innovation in post-conflict settings. Lise pursues interdisciplinary and applied research and can be contacted at lcazzoli@uottawa.ca.

[*]   Lise Cazzoli détient un diplôme de Sociologie et Anthropologie de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgique. Elle poursuit une maîtrise en Affaires Publiques et Internationales à l'Université d'Ottawa, et se spécialise actuellement en développement international à la Paris School of International Affairs (SciencesPo Paris). Ses intérêts de recherche tournent autour des enjeux du développement liés à la globalisation et à la gouvernance internationale. Elle étudie actuellement le thème de la résilience et de l'innovation bottom-up appliqué aux contextes post-conflictuels. Lise pratique la recherche interdisciplinaire et appliquée et peut être contactée à lcazzoli@uottawa.ca.

millénaire; réseaux; globalisation; organisations internationales.

Introduction

« La modernité ne se réduit pas à l'être-présent, elle n'est pas la simple quête pour savoir ce qu'est le monde, ou encore le présent en tant que tel ; elle recherche plus précisément la réponse à une inquiétude : pourquoi aujourd'hui n'est-il plus comme hier ? » (Martuccelli, 1999, p. 10). Cette « inquiétude », ce questionnement lié à l'émergence de nouvelles dynamiques, a ainsi été la source de nombreux débats ces dernières années : comment répondre aux évolutions récentes en évitant les infortunes ? La révolution de l'information et des communications des années 1980 et les conséquences de politiques de décolonisation désastreuses ont pu être autant de catalyseurs ayant permis l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs, de conflits d'une autre nature, et la profonde remise en question de l'ordre westphalien et de ses États-Nations (Badie, 2016).

L'ouverture des imaginaires a ainsi également permis la constitution d'une opinion publique sur l'international (Badie, 2016 ; Abélès, 2008), grâce à laquelle les peuples du monde peuvent aujourd'hui mettre en perspective leur vécu quotidien et les finalités de leurs actions. Ainsi, et malgré les merveilles scientifiques, technologiques et culturelles que promet notre temps, s'est développée une prise de conscience accrue des conséquences historiques de l'activité humaine : le débat international a ainsi accordé une place grandissante aux enjeux liés à la dégradation de l'environnement (Hilary, 2015) ou à l'accroissement des inégalités (Escande, 2016) durant ces dernières décennies. Cette prise de conscience a d'ailleurs pu se traduire politiquement par un désaveu de la globalisation et de ses conséquences, certains prônant un retour aux valeurs nationales, sociales ou de la simplicité (Badie, 2016).

Faut-il dès lors à leur image rejeter la mondialisation ? En réalité, d'après de nombreux spécialistes tels que Jean Staune (2015), Marc Abélès (2008) ou encore Bertrand Badie (2016), cette tâche est tout simplement impossible car, comme le mentionnait Kofi Annan en 2006, « arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity » (Nations Unies, 2006) : le mouvement en marche ne peut être freiné sans en payer le prix. Ainsi le véritable enjeu pour ces auteurs se situe ailleurs ; en effet, la mondialisation aurait engendré un véritable changement de paradigme, nécessitant de remplacer les instruments qui nous permettaient de penser le monde hier, afin de le penser aujourd'hui. La diplomatie doit ainsi être réformée, et l'être humain replacé au centre de la société afin de lui assurer davantage de prospérité et de sécurité (Badie, 2016 ; Rioux, 2001).

Si cette évolution est toujours en débat aujourd'hui et reste le théâtre de nombreux désaccords, la discipline a pu connaître sur base de ce discours un certain nombre de développements majeurs, parmi lesquels une remise en question du concept de sécurité a pu être réalisée. S'est ainsi opéré un glissement entre, d'une part, la « sécurité nationale », c'est-à-dire une conception traditionnelle de la sécurité comme protection de la

souveraineté d'un État vis-à-vis de menaces militaires extérieures, et d'autre part la « sécurité humaine », définissant la sécurité par la protection des populations et des communautés autochtones (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). Selon Rioux (2001), cette dernière implique ainsi un « détachement entre la sécurité de l'individu et celle de l'État » (p. 24). En effet, cette conception, popularisée par les Nations-Unies à-travers le Human Development Report de 1994 (UNDP, 1994), envisage la sécurité non seulement comme un défi militaire, mais également économique, alimentaire, environnemental et sanitaire (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007), illustrant toute la complexité d'un monde globalisé avec ses enjeux étroitement connectés. Cette relation intime entre mondialisation et sécurité humaine fut par ailleurs établie par Kofi Annan, secrétaire général des Nations-Unies, lors de l'Assemblée générale du 3 avril 2000 (cité dans Rioux, 2001) :

> La mondialisation doit devenir une force positive pour tous les peuples du monde (…) Elle doit nous servir à bâtir ensemble un avenir meilleur pour l'humanité entière, dans toute sa diversité. Nous devons apprendre à gouverner mieux, et à gouverner ensemble. Le plus important, c'est que l'être humain soit au centre de tout ce que nous faisons. (p. 24)

Cependant, étant données les évolutions du politique liées à la mondialisation, comment envisager la gouvernance ? À ce sujet, de nombreux auteurs avancent l'hypothèse de l'émergence d'une gouvernance mondiale (Blin & Marin, 2015 ; Appadurai, 2001 ; Badie, 2016), dont les grands ensembles politiques supranationaux (OPEP, ONU, G20 etc.) seraient les embryons (Abélès, 2008). Beck (1992) avance même qu'une gouvernance planétaire serait non seulement émergente mais nécessaire, tout comme le suggèrent des auteurs comme Thomas Piketty (2013) en proposant la mise en place de politiques transnationales telles qu'un impôt mondial sur le capital afin de contrer les inégalités croissantes. Selon Blin et Marin (2005), cette nécessité s'articule avec une refonte des institutions. En effet, les fonctions régaliennes de l'État ayant été mises à mal par le développement des technologies de l'information et de communication (TIC) (Badie, 2016), Staune (2015) oppose « la richesse des réseaux » à la « richesse des Nations » d'Adam Smith (1853), spécifiant ainsi que ces institutions doivent être amenées, non pas uniquement à être mises à jour, mais bien à changer profondément de nature.

En conséquence, si le politique connaît de telles mutations et si la sécurité humaine constitue une expression pragmatique des nécessités liées à la globalisation, il serait opportun de se demander comment la coopération a pu être organisée autour de ces enjeux durant les dernières années et qui en ont été les protagonistes. La mise en œuvre de cette nouvelle conception a-t-elle nécessité la participation de nouveaux acteurs ? Leur collaboration a-t-elle été organisée via des canaux spécifiques ? Les mettre au jour nous permettrait-il de construire une conception du politique propre au XXIème siècle ?

Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre au jour comment ces dynamiques, intrinsèquement liées à un changement profond de paradigme en matière de sécurité internationale, ont pu se matérialiser en une mutation du champ d'action politique. Pour ce faire, nous examinerons les acteurs et processus ayant gouverné l'implémentation des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) — et plus particulièrement de l'objectif 8, « Partenariat pour le développement », souvent présentés comme les

composantes du premier agenda international pour le développement jamais réalisé. En effet, les OMD sont perçus comme une application du concept de sécurité humaine tel que développé par les Nations-Unies (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007), mettant à l'agenda huit questions de développement social à résoudre durant la période 2000–2015 et précisant les moyens préconisés pour y parvenir (Blin & Marin, 2015).

La pertinence de cette question réside dans son actualité et dans son intérêt pratique. En effet, de nombreux observateurs dénoncent aujourd'hui l'inefficacité de certaines institutions de gouvernance telles que le G20 ou l'Union Européenne et la nécessité de trouver les moyens de résoudre certaines problématiques urgentes ; l'accroissement des inégalités ou la dégradation de l'environnement en sont deux exemples populaires. Par ailleurs, si les OMD rencontrent également des critiques, Blin et Marin (2015) affirment que leur analyse pourrait constituer une source d'inspiration qui permettrait de penser de futurs processus plus intégrateurs. Le problème soulevé ici n'est donc pas uniquement d'ordre théorique, c'est bien d'action publique dont il est question.

De Malthus aux OMD : un long chemin vers une reconnaissance du développement humain comme enjeu mondial majeur

Il faut attendre le XIXème et le début du XXème siècle avec les travaux de Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, Marx ou Schumpeter (Jolly, Emmerij & Lapeyre, 2004) avant de voir apparaître la question du développement au sein de l'espace intellectuel européen. Celle-ci concernait alors essentiellement les enjeux liés au développement de l'Europe elle-même, et notamment de sa population. Cette période coïncide en effet avec l'émergence de dynamiques démographiques, économiques et politiques nouvelles. Cependant, la question du développement ne sera abordée sous l'angle international qu'à partir de 1940 avec le National International Measures for Full Employment (1949), le Measures for Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries (1951), et le Measures for Economic Stability en 1951, constituant ainsi les premières tentatives de prendre en charge et d'analyser les enjeux liés à l'instabilité au sein d'un cadre clair et global (Emmerij, 2005). Ces rapports affirmaient également pour la première fois la nécessité de combiner l'action ciblant les pays sous-développés à une action plus globale.

Ces efforts, bien que freinés par une série d'échecs globaux — tels que la crise pétrolière, entre 1970 et 1980—, seront bouleversés durant la même période par l'émergence de la « Nouvelle Question Sociale », définie par Rosanvallon (1998) comme une crise de l'État-Providence nécessitant une idée renouvelée de la Nation. Celle-ci s'appuie sur deux piliers : d'une part, les décideurs se rendent compte que d'anciens problèmes n'ont pu être résolus par la doctrine néolibérale, et d'autre part que de nouveaux problèmes émergents, tels que les crises migratoires de masse, la criminalité internationale et la croissance continue de la pauvreté individuelle nécessitent une action politique d'urgence. La complexité de ces enjeux est redoublée alors qu'ils s'inscrivent sur une scène internationale en mutation. En 1990, les Nations Unies feront plusieurs propositions à cet égard, en permettant la naissance des premières conférences globales ayant pour objet la résolution de nouveaux défis planétaires tels que la dégradation de l'environnement, la

croissance de la population, l'urbanisation ou encore la défense des droits des femmes de voir le jour (Emmerij, 2005). Bien que n'engendrant souvent que des actions faibles et inadéquates aux défis posés, ces conférences marquaient cependant l'entrée de la société civile dans le cercle des discussions. En 1994, l'United Nations Development Programme publiera également le célèbre Human Development Report, posant les fondations d'une nouvelle conception de la sécurité et des relations internationales à la fin du XXème siècle (voir supra).

Notons à quel point les dynamiques exprimées ci-dessus correspondent à l'émergence de la globalisation telle que définie par Badie (2016). Cette évolution illustre ainsi de quelle façon un certain nombre d'événements sociaux, politiques et économiques ont pu modifier l'agenda politique mondial en moins d'un siècle. Comme le souligne Emmerij (2005), « globalisation requires a human face if it is to address new threats to security — human and otherwise — and new social problems. Neo-liberal policies are not the only path towards globalisation. The search is on for an alternative route that benefits all people » (p. 40).

Quand gouvernance, sécurité et développement s'entremêlent

Si la globalisation appelle de nouvelles réponses politiques et que les OMD constituent en eux-mêmes un nouvel agenda politique mondial, il est pertinent de se demander de quelle façon ces derniers ont pu être mis en œuvre. Sont-ils eux-mêmes porteurs d'une nouvelle façon de « faire politique » au niveau international ? Afin d'analyser cette question, nous ferons largement référence au concept de « gouvernance. » Selon Bevir (2012), cette notion « can refer abstractly to all processes of governing. It supplements a focus on the formal institutions of government with recognition of more diverse activities that blur the boundary of state and society. It draws attention to the complex processes and interactions involved in governing » (p. 5).

De nombreux auteurs se sont donnés pour ambition de conceptualiser et de définir le concept de gouvernance ; cependant, comme le notent Joshi, Hughes et Sisk (2015), il n'existe pas vraiment de consensus sur ce à quoi renvoie exactement ce concept. Ainsi, nous commencerons par identifier certaine des approches dominantes dans l'étude de la gouvernance et sa définition. Pour ce faire, nous emploierons la typologie développée par Joshi, Hughes et Sisk (2015), qui met en évidence trois perspectives analytiques qui seront commentées successivement.

Certains auteurs tels que Fukuyama (2013), envisagent la gouvernance comme un processus par lequel les gouvernements vont délivrer des biens et services à leurs populations. Ces auteurs mettent ainsi l'accent sur les enjeux liés à l'efficacité des gouvernements, l'autonomie de la bureaucratie, etc. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, il s'agira donc de s'intéresser de manière large aux outils qui rendent possibles l'action publique, aux institutions et à leurs interactions ainsi qu'aux règles de droit qui ont été établies pour les encadrer. Pour ces raisons, nous utiliserons le terme « approche institutionnelle » afin de qualifier cette première perspective théorique.

Une seconde manière d'envisager la gouvernance est de se concentrer sur les intrants, et plus particulièrement sur le rôle de la société civile dans la conception des politiques publiques (Bevir, 2009). Cette approche, portée par Bevir (2009) ou par Bingham, Bunachi et O'Leary (2005), « highlights new tools of citizen involvement in « quasi-legislative » and « quasi-judicial » governing processes such as « deliberative democracy, e-democracy, public conversations, participatory budgeting, citizen juries, study circles, etc. » (Bingham, Bunachi & O'Leary, 2005, p. 547). Cette approche s'adapte particulièrement bien à notre analyse étant donné que les OMD sont le fruit d'accords internationaux, au sein desquels la société civile ne dispose, dans le cadre des relations internationales classiques, que du mécanisme de la représentation afin d'assurer ses intérêts. Dans les faits, ils peuvent également être portés par les lobbies, mais cette approche favorise une implication plus directe des citoyens au sein du processus décisionnel. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous la nommerons « approche de la participation », afin de mettre l'accent sur cette dernière composante.

Enfin, nous nommerons « approche multi-niveaux » (ou « approche contextuelle »), celle qui envisage les organisations privées, publiques et à but non lucratif constituées en réseaux comme de nouvelles structures de gouvernance s'opposant à la prise de décision hiérarchique (Bingham, Bunachi & O'Leary, 2005). Elle est portée par des auteurs comme Weiss (2000), qui analysent les relations entre l'État et la société civile afin d'appréhender les organisations internationales et multinationales.

Il est possible de noter que de manière générale, ces trois approches renvoient directement non seulement aux processus mis en œuvre dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques, mais aussi et surtout à leurs protagonistes. Pour compléter cette lecture théorique, nous pourrions brièvement en étayer la nature grâce à la lecture développée par Deborah Avant et Martha Finnemore dans leur célèbre ouvrage Who Governs the Globe? (2006). Ces deux théoriciennes proposent une lecture analytique de la gouvernance basée sur ses acteurs, les « global governors », qu'elles définissent comme des agents actifs qui œuvrent pour la mise en place de nouvelles structures ou de nouvelles normes afin de solutionner les problèmes contemporains et de transformer l'ordre international. Ces acteurs jouent un rôle important dans le cadrage des enjeux (1), la définition des agendas (2) et des modes d'actions pertinents pour les mettre en œuvre (3), ainsi que dans l'évaluation de leur implémentation (4). Dans le cadre de cette recherche et après avoir identifié les principaux acteurs de l'implémentation des OMD, nous nous attacherons ainsi à identifier lesquels parmi eux détiennent effectivement ces quatre fonctions ; qui donc a gouverné les OMD ?

D'un point de vue théorique, cette perspective recèle également d'autres implications que nous pourrions exploiter. Elles sont tout d'abord normatives, en posant la question (1) de la légitimité (les *global governors* ne peuvent gouverner sans qu'une certaine confiance ne leur soit garantie), (2) de la démocratie (comment garantir cette confiance ?), mais également (3) de la notion de bien public global. La coopération entre différents acteurs est en effet susceptible de déboucher sur la production d'un bien commun à l'ensemble des partenaires. Par ailleurs, la reconnaissance de l'existence d'un tel bien est également susceptible de créer elle-même des partenariats (pensons par exemple aux politiques visant la protection de l'environnement). Ensemble, ces trois notions renvoient

de façon assez directe aux trois approches de la gouvernance développées plus haut : la légitimité renvoie ainsi à la notion de « confiance comme économiseur institutionnel » (Rosenau, 1990), constituant un outil intangible de l'action publique, la démocratie à la participation plus ou moins directe des citoyens au sein du processus, et la notion de bien public global à la notion de partenariat et d'une certaine horizontalité. Il est donc possible d'affirmer que cette approche est particulièrement englobante sur le plan analytique. Notons que dans le cadre de cette recherche, la notion de bien public global est particulièrement intéressante, dans la mesure où l'on peut supposer que les OMD sont prévus afin de protéger certain bien public global — ou plusieurs, que nous tenterons de définir.

Une action multi-niveaux

Afin d'analyser les mutations de l'action politique liées au renouvellement des conceptions de la sécurité internationale, nous avons spécifiquement choisi d'examiner les processus et acteurs ayant participé à l'implémentation des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement des Nations Unies. Cette recherche a abouti sur six observations majeures :

1. Il est possible de dresser le plan d'un réseau d'action établi entre les acteurs afin de rencontrer les OMD, comme représenté par le schéma ci-dessous. Les traits pleins y représentent un lien de partenariat entre deux entités, tandis que les flèches représentent un lien de création. Comme le montrent les ensembles de couleur, certaines initiatives ont regroupé certains acteurs de façon permanente. C'est d'ailleurs le cas des organisations internationales (sectorielles ou multi-sectorielles telles que l'ONU et ses agences spécialisées, ou plus spécifiques comme la FAO) qui ont établi entre elles des partenariats clairement identifiables, en formant quatre réseaux d'action distincts (en bleu, jaune, rouge et gras sur le schéma). Les philanthropes, les entreprises et partenaires privés ainsi que les ONG constituent quant à eux trois autres acteurs prépondérants de l'action internationale, bien que, comme nous le verrons, de manière plus mineure.

2. Les acteurs semblent avoir développé des stratégies d'action plus horizontales, en impliquant à la fois des acteurs locaux, régionaux et internationaux; cependant, les organisations internationales — et en particulier les Nations Unies, l'OMC, le FMI et la BM — semblent avoir joué un rôle central au sein de ces réseaux, au détriment des ONG qui elles, s'y sont trouvées peu intégrées. Par ailleurs, les organisations internationales — en particulier à caractère politique — semblent être les principales actrices de l'établissement des stratégies d'action.

3. L'action au sein de ces réseaux est bien souvent organisée grâce à la création de groupes de travail ou de plateformes d'action; des modes d'action plus classiques tels que les mécanismes de consultation ou la mise en place de sommets internationaux ont également été conservés. On note alors une tendance à une meilleure intégration de la société civile au sein de ces sommets.

Figure 1. Les acteurs de l'action internationale.

4. Les ONG se distinguent largement des organisations internationales sous plusieurs aspects; d'une part en établissant leur action à plusieurs niveaux, et d'autre part en développant des stratégies indépendantes en reprenant l'agenda des Nations Unies, sans forcément y avoir été invitées. Elles ont ainsi contribué à constituer de nouveaux réseaux d'action en-dehors des réseaux créés par les organisations internationales afin de rencontrer les OMD. Cette tendance se renforce avec les Objectifs du Développement Durable (ODD).

Figure 2. Les niveaux de l'action internationale

5. L'absence d'utilisation de plateformes numériques pour l'objectif numéro 8; si de nombreux partenariats incluant des plateformes numériques ont vu le jour dans le cadre des OMD (et encore plus des ODD), les acteurs ne semblent pas avoir développé ce type de stratégies dans le cadre de l'objectif numéro 8 et de l'aide au développement. L'avènement du numérique permet pourtant de favoriser l'accès aux réseaux d'action.

6. Les approches liées à l'aide au développement varient selon les régions considérées; les pays en développement africains semblent ainsi préférer la coopération internationale, tandis que les pays en développement asiatiques semblent préférer la coopération régionale.

Quelle gouvernance pour les OMD ?

Nous pouvons à présent examiner les processus ayant présidé l'implémentation des OMD selon les différentes approches mentionnées plus haut. Une grande part de l'implémentation des OMD a en effet été organisée sur le plan institutionnel et formel. Les OMD sont tout d'abord le résultat d'un accord entre les pays membres des Nations Unies. En tant que tels, ces derniers se sont engagés à les mettre en œuvre sur le plan national. Les organisations internationales ont également organisé leurs initiatives sur le plan formel par le moyen d'accords interinstitutionnels et en instaurant des mécanismes de consultation impliquant également leurs partenaires privés. Elles ont également créé un certain nombre de plateformes de travail partagées qui détiennent leur propre statut juridique. Ces mécanismes ont-ils suffi à délivrer les services promis par les OMD ? Il est certain que la création de plateformes de travail a effectivement constitué un pas en avant en comparaison avec la seule pratique des sommets internationaux et a très certainement permis d'impliquer davantage d'acteurs au sein du processus. Ces acteurs semblent également avoir été efficacement coordonnés.

On peut cependant en dire davantage en examinant la seconde approche développée par Josh, Hughes et Sisk, soit celle de la participation. Les acteurs des OMD ont en effet mis en place un certain nombre de processus visant une meilleure implication de la société civile en invitant certains de leurs représentants à des sommets spéciaux ou en impliquant les ONG au sein des processus de décision. Un groupe de travail a également été créé afin d'encourager la participation des acteurs de la jeunesse à l'implémentation des OMD. Des réseaux semblent avoir pu se créer afin de permettre cette participation. Par ailleurs, il est possible de constater une multiplication des plateformes citoyennes numériques ayant pour objectif de rencontrer les OMD en-dehors des réseaux officiels d'action. Cette tendance semble se renforcer avec les SDG, mais peine à s'insérer dans les efforts liés spécifiquement à l'aide au développement.

Enfin, l'approche multi-niveaux nous permet également de tirer certaines conclusions. Il est clair que les acteurs ont tenté de développer progressivement des modes d'action plus horizontaux et inclusifs. Ces modes d'action ont d'autre part été organisés en réseaux via de multiples partenariats. Cependant, comme nous l'avions noté précédemment, les organisations internationales restent les acteurs centraux de ces processus et ces réseaux ne semblent pas être parvenus à une grande intégration des sociétés civiles au sein de la discussion.

Qui pour gouverner les OMD ?

Afin de démontrer la centralité des organisations internationales au sein des processus d'implémentation des OMD, nous pourrions utiliser les travaux d'Avant et Finnemore (2006) examinant les fonctions et la nature des *global governors*. Nous avons vu que ces derniers remplissaient quatre fonctions principales : le cadrage des enjeux (1), l'établissement des agendas (2), la définition des modes d'actions pertinents pour les mettre en œuvre (3), et l'évaluation de leur application (4).

Il est clairement possible d'admettre que les organisations internationales ont effectivement joué un rôle de cadrage dans le cadre des OMD. À ce sujet, Barnes et Brown (2011 : 167) mettent par exemple en évidence la manière dont « the idea of partnership appears to have risen to prominence during the 1990s, a period often understood as a time of « great changes in the world ». Les différentes approches adoptées jusqu'alors en matière d'aide au développement étaient en effet controversées, provoquant une forme de « crise de l'aide au développement » à laquelle les acteurs internationaux devaient répondre (Barnes et Brown, 2011 : 170). Les auteurs montrent ainsi comment les Nations Unies ont décidé de construire une histoire convaincante à propos de l'aide au développement, qui nécessiterait la participation de multiples acteurs aux perspectives très différentes. Ainsi, selon Barnes et Brown (2011 : 172), « the idea of partnership was framed in such a way as to answer to various criticisms about the effectiveness of aid and aid agency operations. » Nous ne développerons pas cette idée davantage, mais ceci illustre parfaitement de quelle manière les organisations internationales ont pu jouer un rôle-clé dans le cadrage des enjeux liés aux OMD.

Les organisations internationales ont également largement participé à l'établissement des agendas et à leur mise en œuvre. Les OMD représentent en eux-mêmes un tel agenda, et lorsqu'ils ont été présentés à l'Assemblée des Nations, ces OMD étaient déjà accompagnés de sous-objectifs spécifiques. Ceci ne signifie pas que d'autres acteurs n'ont pu participer à l'établissement de cet agenda, mais simplement que les Nations Unies en ont été les principaux commanditaires. Par ailleurs, une grande partie des agendas d'action liés aux OMD ayant été publiés ont été rédigés par des organisations internationales. L'évaluation a également été organisée au sein des organisations internationales, et notamment par des institutions financières telles que la Banque Mondiale et le FMI qui établissaient chaque année le rapport d'activité lié aux OMD.

Vers une gouvernance démocratique au 21ème siècle : comment l'exclusion crée l'insécurité et bafoue les droits de l'homme

Globalement, nous avons vu que les OMD avaient développé des modes d'action plus horizontaux. Nous pourrions cependant attirer l'attention sur une dynamique plus intrinsèque à l'aide de la théorie des réseaux développée par Castells (1998). Selon cet auteur, l'avènement des TIC a permis le développement d'une société en réseaux en renforçant la réflexivité et l'intelligence des acteurs, ce qui nous oblige à lire les relations

différemment, en assumant que le clivage dominant à analyser ne serait plus le clivage entre dominants et dominés, mais entre inclusion et exclusion (Castells, 1998).

En liant la perspective de Castells (1998) et les discussions récentes sur la démocratie délibérative notamment, il est possible de se rendre compte que cette dynamique pourrait poser un problème de participation politique. En effet, la société en réseaux valorisant la communication sur la relation, des acteurs n'ayant pas connaissance de l'existence de certaines initiatives (de consultation par exemple) et n'étant associés d'aucune manière (ou de manière faible) aux réseaux de décision se trouveront systématiquement exclus de l'élaboration des politiques publiques.

Le fait qu'il soit ici question d'aide au développement de manière spécifique est par ailleurs porteur d'une dimension qui, au-delà de l'efficacité des processus, requiert une réflexion éthique. Osmani (2006 : 1) a ainsi mis en évidence que l'idée de participation était souvent reconnue pour elle-même, indépendamment de l'apport empirique que celle-ci pourrait apporter dans l'accomplissement d'objectifs spécifiques. Amartya Sen a notamment développé l'idée de « development as freedom » qui évoque clairement cette idée d'une valeur intrinsèque de la participation au sein des processus liés au développement (Sen, 1999).

Ceci permet d'entrevoir en quoi les modes d'action élaborés dans le cadre des OMD posent problème ; en organisant des réseaux centrés sur les organisations internationales, les populations, bien que certains efforts aient été mis en place afin de favoriser leur inclusion, se retrouvent en grande partie exclues de la définition de leur propre destin.

Ainsi, dans une société globalisée et articulée en réseaux, comment rendre la parole aux populations locales au sein des processus de décision afin de les rendre maîtresses de leur destin ? Cette question est ainsi avant tout d'ordre démocratique alors que l'ordre international se trouve bousculé par la montée du populisme en Occident et les thèses du repli identitaire. En effet, nous pourrions émettre l'hypothèse que les évènements récents ont été causés par un sentiment d'exclusion des populations mondiales, qui n'ont trouvé d'autre moyen que de refuser la globalisation et ses enjeux afin de peser dans le débat. Les réintégrer dans les réseaux de décision, notamment en utilisant les moyens que le numérique met aujourd'hui à notre disposition constitue ainsi, outre un enjeu de développement international, un enjeu démocratique et sécuritaire pour la défense des droits humains.

Bibliographie

Abélès, M. (2008). *Anthropologie de la globalisation*. Paris, France : Payot.

Appadurai, A. (2015). Après le colonialisme. Les conséquences culturelles de la globalisation. Paris, France : Payot.

Avant, D., Finnemore, M. et Sell, S. (2010). *Who governs the globe?* Cambridge, Angleterre; Cambridge University Press.

Badie, B. (2016). Nous ne sommes plus seuls au monde : un autre regard sur l' « ordre international ». Paris, France : La découverte.

Barnes, A. et Brown, G. (2011). The idea of partnership within the millennium development goals: Context, instrumentality and the normative demands of partnership. *Third World Quarterly, 32*(1), 165–180. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2011.543821.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*. Londres, Angleterre : SAGE Publications.

Bevir, M. (2012). *Governance: A very short introduction*. Oxford, Angleterre : Oxford University Press.

Bingham, L., Bunachi, T. et O'Leary, R. (2005). The new governance: Practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. *Public Administration Review, 65*(5), 547–558. doi : 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00482.

Blin, A. et Marin, G. (2015). *Dictionnaire de la gouvernance mondiale*. Paris, France : Nuvis.

Castells, M. (1998). L'Ère de l'information. Vol. 1, La Société en réseaux. Paris, France : Fayard.

Emmerij, L. (2005). How has the UN faced up to development challenges? *Forum for Development Studies, 32*(1), 21–47. doi : 10.1080/08039410.2005.9666299.

Escande, P. (2016, 3 Octobre). Les inégalités, point commun de tous les pays. *Le Monde*. http:// www.lemonde.fr/economie-mondiale/article/2016/10/03/les-inegalites-point-commun-de-tous-lespays_5007272_1656941.html?xtmc= environnement&xtcr=5.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance*? Governance, 26*(3), 347–368. doi :10.1111/gove.12035.

Hilary, J. (2015, 15 décembre). Want to know how to really tackle climate change? Pull the plug on the World Trade Organisation. *The Independent*. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/want-to-knowhow-to-really-tackle-climate-change-pull-the-plug-on-the-world-trade-organisation-a6774391.html.

Jolly, L., Emmerij, D. et Lapeyre, F. (2004). *UN contributions to development thinking and practice*. Bloomington, Indiana : Indiana University Press.

Joshi, D., Hughes, B. et Sisk, T. (2015). Improving governance for the post-2015 sustainable development goals: Scenario forecasting the next 50 years. *World Development, 70*, 286–302, doi : 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.013.

Martuccelli, D. (1999). *Sociologies de la modernité*. Paris, France : Gallimard.

Nations Unies. (2006, 28 Janvier). Secretary-General Kofi Annan's opening address to the fifty-third annual DPI/NGO Conference. http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/ annualconfs/53/sg-address.html.

Osmani, S. (2006). Participatory governance: An overview of issues and evidence. *United Nations.* http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan 028357~2.pdf#page=19.

Piketty, P. (2013). *Le capital au XXIème siècle*. Paris, France : Seuil.

Rosanvallon, P. (1995). La Nouvelle Question sociale. Repenser l'État-Providence. Paris, France : Seuil.

Rosenau, J. (1990). *Turbulence in world politics: A theory of change and continuity.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rioux, J.-F. (2001). La sécurité humaine : une nouvelle conception des relations internationales. Paris : L'Harmattan.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. New York : Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. (1853). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. London : T. Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row.

Staune, J. (2015). Les clés du futur : réinventer ensemble la société, l'économie et la science. Paris : Plon.

Tadjbakhsh, S. & Chenoy, A. (2007). *Human Security*. New York : Routledge.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (1994). *Human Development Report 1994*. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

Weiss, G. (2000). Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), doi : 10.1080/713701075.

Beyond the Rhetoric — Hamas' Strategies to Bridge the Gap between Ideology and Interests

PAUL LECLERC[*]

Abstract — Any institution seeking self-preservation faces a discrepancy and trade-off between its stated, idealistic, long-term ideology, and its compromising, immediate interests. The first is a source of popular legitimacy; the second ensures day-to-day survival. Hamas, an Islamist movement and the *de facto* government of the Gaza Strip, does not escape this dilemma. Hamas is a pragmatic, rational actor which knows that permanence violence toward Israel, though in line with its ideology, is not a sustainable policy. Hamas cannot afford the continual loss of human and material capital, and is accountable to foreign actors. Still, this ideological extremism results in the ideology–interests inconsistency being magnified. The movement thus has come up with innovative rhetorical strategies and justificatory discourses to bridge the gap. These bridging strategies can be explained in light of the distinction between fundamental and operative ideologies, as well as the theory of framing. The result of these necessary practices is that the ideological goals get blurred with immediate interests. This mix is what ultimately drives Hamas' strategy and decision-making process.

Keywords: Hamas; Gaza; legitimacy; political Islam; decision-making; ideology; interests; accountability.

Résumé — Toute institution ayant pour but sa propre préservation est confrontée à un décalage et à un compromis entre son idéologie idéaliste de long-terme, et ses intérêts immédiats. La première est une source de légitimité politique ; les seconds garantissent la survie au jour le jour. Le Hamas, un mouvement islamiste, gouvernement *de facto* de la bande de Gaza, n'échappe pas à ce dilemme. Le Hamas est un acteur rationnel et pragmatique, conscient que l'action violente permanente contre Israël, quoique conforme à son idéologie, n'est pas une politique durable : le Hamas ne peut pas se permettre de perdre en permanence son capital humain et matériel, et doit rendre des comptes à d'autres acteurs internationaux. L'extrémisme du Hamas conduit à une incohérence amplifiée entre idéologie et intérêts. Le groupe a ainsi développé des stratégies rhétoriques et des discours justificatifs innovants pour combler cet écart. Ces stratégies de *bridging* peuvent être analysées à la lumière de la distinction entre idéologies fondamentale et opérative, ainsi que par l'approche du *framing*. Cependant, ces méthodes entrainent un effacement de la distinction entre objectifs idéologiques et intérêts immédiats. Le processus de décision du Hamas est donc dirigé par ce mélange entre idéologie et intérêt.

Mots-clés : Hamas ; Gaza ; légitimité; l'Islam politique ; prise de décisions ; idéologie ; intérêts ; responsabilité.

[*] Paul Leclerc is a graduate student in international relations and Middle Eastern studies at Sciences Po Paris, France. He spent an academic year abroad at Al-Quds University in the Palestinian territories. His research interests include the application of transitional justice tools to the colonization issue in the West Bank, as well as the dynamics between sport, civil society and the state in Palestine through the study of the Right to Movement NGO.

[*] Paul Leclerc est étudiant en master en relations internationales et études du Moyen-Orient à Sciences Po Paris, France. Il a également étudié à Al-Quds University dans les territoires palestiniens. Ses thématiques de recherches incluent l'application des outils de la justice transitionnelle à la question de la colonisation de la Cisjordanie, ainsi que les dynamiques entre le sport, la société civile et l'État en Palestine à travers l'ONG Right to Movement.

Introduction

Any actor of international relations permanently faces the risk of a discrepancy, in terms of decision-making, between its stated ideology and its immediate interests. For its leadership, both the short-term interests and the long-term ideological goals are crucial, and one cannot be sacrificed in the name of the other. Indeed, if we are to proceed on the assumption that an institution's ultimate goal is self-preservation, it can be argued that while its immediate interests must be satisfied in order to ensure its day-to-day survival, its stated ideology must not be overshadowed as this is what gives the institution its popular legitimacy. *Both* are necessary to the institution's self-preservation.

The problem arising in this dialectic is that ideology and interests often conflict. Ideologies may be conceived of as long-term goals, while interests are immediate and address the needs of the hour. Ideologies tend to be absolute, idealistic and uncompromising, while interests most often reflect a pragmatic approach. Ideologies reflect the genuine aims of the group producing them, while interests arise from external pressures, compromises with other actors, and adaptation to the current context. The institution, therefore, has to make a decision on which balance to maintain. Numerous factors can influence an actor's position regarding the ideology–interests dilemma. The critical move it needs to make, however, is not so much the realization of an optimal balance, but rather, the creation of a compelling rhetoric bridging the gap between the two. Building an illusion of consistency with justificatory discourses, the organization can both ensure its daily survival through pragmatic decisions *and* preserve the popular legitimacy based on its ideology, which appears to not have been betrayed.

In this paper, I focus on the case of Hamas. Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist movement, officially created in 1987, at the beginning of the first Intifada, as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, and has played a major role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and peace processes ever since its inception (Abu-Amr, 1993). Hamas' ideological crucible is twofold: Islamist, and violent/revolutionary. On the one hand, it has a clear Islamist heritage from the Muslim Brotherhood and seeks the Islamization of the Palestinian society. On the other hand, its violent, revolutionary approach to the struggle for Palestine breaks from the traditional reformist line of the Brotherhood. Though lacking international recognition, its *de facto* control of the Gaza Strip makes it a very standard state-actor of international relations (Seurat, 2014). It has a well-established administration and leadership, as well as relatively consistent policies. These policies, however, cannot escape the ideology–interests dilemma. Hamas is particularly interesting in that regard, because it has come up with innovative ways to bridge its ideology and interests, thereby preserving its legitimacy and ensuring its survival. *What exactly are the points of discrepancy between Hamas' ideology and interests, and the strategies it deploys to suppress the gaps?*

I attempt to answer this question by looking at four main aspects of Hamas' decision-making process. First, in light of the distinction between fundamental ideology and operative ideology, I assess the level of discrepancy between Hamas' long-term, idealistic goals and its short-term, pragmatic ones, and in the process demonstrate Hamas' ability to rationally articulate an adaptive, dual strategy between the two. Second, I look at

how two conflicting sources of legitimacy for Hamas — the logic of revolution and the logic of the state — shape its ideology–interest balance. Third, I address the issue of Hamas' double accountability, domestic and foreign. Lastly, using the framing approach, I analyze the rhetoric Hamas deploys to bridge the ideology–interests discrepancy, framing pragmatic decision in Islamic terms.

As I will attempt to show, there is no clear dichotomy between ideology and interests, as they largely affect one another, and Hamas' Islamist discourse is both a resource for the legitimation of pragmatic action, and a constricting handicap on interest-driven options.

Between Idealism and Pragmatism

Hamas as a Rational Actor

Hamas is plagued by the image of a radical group interested solely in the destruction of the state of Israel. While it is true that the Hamas Charter — Hamas' ideological basis — firmly affirms these principles, Hamas is much more than its Charter. It is fundamentalist, but not fanatical. It is a rational, flexible actor, able to adjust its policies to the realities on the ground. This is not to say that Hamas is moderate. Its Charter leaves no room for ambiguity with regard to its revolutionary, Islamist stance, with a will to destroy the state of Israel and to establish an Islamic state on all of former Mandatory Palestine. However, Hamas is certainly smarter, savvier, and more complex than how it is portrayed by the West. The depiction of Hamas as irrational and fanatical fails to recognize its ability to assess accurately its own short-term interests: the preservation of its authority over the Gaza Strip, the continued support of its foreign donors and supporters, and the security of its material and human capital (Wagemarkers, 2010).

Simply put, Hamas is not a prisoner of its ideology. Most of its political output is not actually in line with the Charter. Menachem Klein (2007) describes Hamas as "pragmatic and action-directed, rather than theological and ideological." It is very conscious that the implementation of its ideology on the ground requires compromise. When its own ideology presents a threat to its survival, Hamas is always prepared to deviate from it. Thus, Hamas' decision-making is a combination of ideological intransigence and of pragmatic realpolitik.

Long-Term versus Short-Term: A Dual Strategy

Martin Seliger (1970) has drawn a distinction between two types of ideologies. On the one hand, fundamental ideology consists of an absolute set of goals and beliefs. On the other hand, operative ideology consists of pragmatic, compromising goals. There is a constant tension between fundamental and operative ideologies. Klein (2007) has applied Seliger's theoretical framework to Hamas and shown how the uncompromising Hamas Charter, with its long-term, visionary end, corresponds to fundamental ideology. By contrast, Hamas' flexibility in response to the fluctuating situation on the ground reflects its operative ideology.

The central difference between fundamental and operative ideology is their time frame. In the case of Hamas, we can equate Seliger's fundamental ideology to long-term, ideology-driven strategy, and operational ideology to short-term, interest-driven strategy. History tells us that this pragmatic approach has proved, often, to be more important than ideological principles in the eyes of the Hamas leadership. We will focus here on three examples.

The signature by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993, which would lead to the Oslo Accords, was severely condemned by Hamas. The Hamas Charter rejected all the major principles on which the DOP was founded, i.e., the principle of direct negotiations with Israel, Yassir Arafat's official rejection of terrorism (that is, of violence as a means of resistance), the relinquishing of most of Mandatory Palestine to Israel, and the acceptance of Israel as a state alongside the future Palestinian state. Hamas' opposition to the Oslo process went further than words: the year 1996 was marked by a series of suicide bombings — attributed to both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad — unprecedented in Israel. Yet, the popular and international infatuation for the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution, as well as the new reality on the ground created by the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) forced Hamas to adapt. Thus, in order to preserve its domestic and foreign legitimacy, and not to be sidelined from the Palestinian political game, Hamas mitigated its criticism towards the Oslo process from its official line (Kristianasen, 1999), which it would not have done had it acted only on an ideological basis. This decision was clearly interest driven.

During the second Intifada, Hamas pursued, first, a militant policy, engaging in violence and conducting several suicide bombings. Then, from mid-2002, it reduced this militancy by a great extent, maintaining a low profile. At the end of June 2003, the Hamas leadership unilaterally declared a *hudna* ("truce"), which only lasted for a couple of weeks, and in 2005, it declared a *tahdi'a* ("calming"). Both the *hudna* and the *tahdi'a* involved a halting of violent operations. They were the logical consequence of Hamas realizing that its immediate interests were no longer consistent with continuous attacks, because they resulted in massive Israeli retaliation. Hamas' most immediate interest became survival, and it could not afford the loss of equipment, infrastructure and lives. Therefore, it implemented the *hudna* in the aftermath of Israel's operation "Defensive Shield" in 2002, and the *tahdi'a* after operation "Rainbow" led in 2004, both substantially threatening Hamas' material and human capital. Even more striking is the truce agreed in 2004 between the two top Hamas leaders in Gaza, Ahmad Yassin and Ábdel Áziz ar-Rantisi, and Israel. Hamas conceded that "it is difficult to liberate all our land at this stage, so we accept a phased liberation" (Klein, 2007). Pragmatism was characterized here by the shift from total to gradual objectives.

More recently, Hamas has refrained from stepping in during the ongoing uprising that began in October 2015, which has been characterised by a number of stabbings. As Leila Seurat (2015) explained in an interview to the Huffington Post, Hamas is still licking its wounds from the 2014 operation "Protective Edge," and has adopted a balance between ideology and interests on the matter, supporting the uprising only through words:

Hamas affirmed clearly its support for the [October 2015] uprising, while refusing to fire rockets. Its security forces, moreover, prevented any other armed faction [in Gaza] from engaging in operations against Israel. Hamas' support is thus limited to its discourse… Hamas is tired after the past three wars in Gaza, particularly the last one, and so, does not want to mobilize right now.[*]

In all these instances, Hamas' pragmatism is not a simple rejection of its long-term ideological goals. Rather, Hamas adopted a dual strategy of both short and long-term goals. This two-level strategy consists of adding short-term, temporary goals to the unchanged, ultimate objectives. This allows Hamas to avoid blatantly rejecting its ideological principles every time it takes an interest-driven decision. By claiming that the addition of these intermediary goals is part of an incremental process towards the ultimate ends, Hamas enjoys flexibility in decision-making and preserves the legitimacy it draws for its ideological intransigency.

Leaders Inside and Outside the Gaza Strip

Hamas' balance between ideology-driven and interest-driven strategies depends largely on the geographical position of its leaders. Typically, Hamas' leaders in exile attach more importance to ideological objectives than those in Gaza who are facing the day-to-day hardships of life under siege and are more conscious of immediate concerns. This division, though not perfectly neat, shapes Hamas' decision-making process to a significant extent (Bhasin & Hallward, 2013). During the Oslo years, Klein (2007) argues, there were "two ways of thinking the organization," with the most extreme officials, Khalid Misha'al and Ímad al-Ámani, based in Hamas' office in Damascus, and the supporters of the diplomatic–pragmatic approach, Hasan Yusuf and Isma'il Haniyya, based in Gaza.

Klein (2009) also notes that after the establishment of the PA and the announcement of general elections, "a debate ensued in the Hamas leadership, between those who demanded a boycott of the election on ideological grounds and pragmatists who advocated suspending a decision until the conditions [of the elections] were determined." Similarly, the assassination of both senior leaders of Hamas in Gaza, Yassin and ar-Rantisi, by Israel in 2004, caused the leadership to shift towards outsiders, which, explains Gruber, resulted in a resurgence of ideology-driven violence since the new leadership remained disconnected from conditions on the ground and unaffected by repercussions, and could see no reason for moderation. It thus continued to advocate violent militancy from the safety of its offices in Damascus.

Logic of Revolution versus Logic of the State

In this section, I establish the opposition of two different logics of legitimacy and accountability: the logic of revolution and the logic of the state. In the revolutionary logic, the organization is legitimized if it manages to display a convincing ideological rhetoric attracting masses. All the major Palestinian resistance movements were founded on a

---

[*]   Our translation.

revolutionary logic. In the logic of the state, the ruling organization is in charge of a population and draws legitimacy from its ability to administrate it successfully and provide the people with satisfying living conditions. The two main Palestinian political organizations, namely, the PLO and Hamas, entered, at some point in their history, the logic of the state.

The Vulnerability of the Ruler: Democratic Legitimacy

Following its foundation as an armed branch/proxy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, Hamas drew tremendous popular legitimacy as a revolutionary movement displaying promising and uncompromising goals. This lasted until Hamas became accountable as a state, after its takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 following its victory in the 2006 elections. However, unlike the PLO which abandoned the logic of revolution in favour of the logic of the state following the establishment of the PA, Hamas tried to maintain a balance between both logics.

This was, and still is, particularly challenging for Hamas. For instance, firing rockets to enhance its legitimacy as a revolutionary movement results in Israeli retaliation profoundly affecting the Gazans' safety, which hampers Hamas' legitimacy as a state. We see here how the revolutionary logic overlaps almost perfectly with Hamas' ideological goals, whereas the logic of the state corresponds to shorter-term interests and day-to-day survival.

Even more importantly, one should note how instead of pouring into a greater reserve of legitimacy, the two logics result in increased accountability; in fact, in terms of legitimacy, this is more of a curse than a blessing. After 2007, Hamas faced a trade-off between the two logics, a problem which it did not have to worry about beforehand. Hamas inherited domestic responsibilities, such as managing issues of poverty, employment, economy, public services; and became accountable for these tasks. Writing before the takeover, Are Knudsen (2005) argued that "it is neither Hamas's political programme nor its ideology, but rather the living conditions [in Gaza]" that formed the basis of Hamas' political support. That was true as long as Hamas avoided accountability in Gaza but after 2007, difficult living conditions combined with Hamas' state status resulted in a reverse outcome.

Acquiring legitimacy through the logic of the state also requires engagement in political processes and the building of a democratic system. Hamas' rule is authoritarian, and the democratic deficit in Gaza has become particularly problematic since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The popular challenge to repressive rule throughout the region did not spare Hamas. Popular discontent pushed Hamas to seek out solutions to contain the uproar, which it found in increasingly repressive behaviour. This, in turn, gave rise to more popular hostility (Milton-Edwards, 2013). However, Hamas has engaged, to a limited extent, in electoral processes in order to strengthen its legitimacy. For instance, when Hamas took part in the 2006 general elections — in spite of its ideological rejection of the PA — one of its motives was to pander to popular approval of elections (Bhasin & Hallward, 2013) and thereby to consolidate its legitimacy as a political faction engaging in democratic processes.

Hamas' Grassroots Welfare System

Hamas' transformation into a de facto Gazan state meant that it could no longer hide behind the Israeli occupation of Gaza, which ended in 2005, or present itself as an underground, opposition movement. Nevertheless, it was largely prepared for this increased accountability. A large branch of Hamas' infrastructure is dedicated to welfare and charity services, a feature inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood (Abu-Amr, 1993). Hamas' social-civilian wing, a dense network of institutions providing services in multiples sectors (Bhasin and Hallward, 2013) including education, health, religion, leisure and charity, (especially for the poor, widows, orphans and families of martyrs) is actually the core of the overall organization, both in terms of budget — with an estimated 95% of Hamas' revenues devoted to its social service in 2005 (Knusden, 2005) — and of popular legitimacy. As Eyal Pascovich (2012) puts it, "whoever seeks the real source of power of Hamas … will find it in [its] daily activity of assisting the needy, educating the young generation, and assimilating religious values."

Thus, Hamas actually draws a considerable part of its popular legitimacy from its provision to the people of satisfying living conditions, that is, from the logic of the state. Its social-civilian wing secures a sizeable mass of supporters and significant control over financial resources, namely, the *waqf* (Islamic mortmain properties) and *zakat* (Islamic charity tax) systems (Knusden, 2005). This, however, does not mean that Hamas' goal in providing these services is purely utilitarian; the ideological-Islamic principle of charity is not of negligible importance. Similarly, it would be inaccurate to explain Hamas' will to secure a popular base through an ultimate goal of conducting violent operations. Looking at Hamas' historical background, the provision of welfare services clearly preceded terrorism (Pascovich, 2012). Hamas' violent attacks against Israel (perpetrated by its military wing) and its welfare apparatus are clearly separated, (Bhasin & Hallward, 2013) and represent Hamas' dual strategy, maintaining a subtle balance between the logic of revolution and the logic of the state as sources of legitimation.

Foreign Accountabilities

Hamas, as an actor of international relations, is entangled in the broader geopolitical situation, and is engaged in asymmetrical relations with Turkey, Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Western donor community, to name just a few. These actors provide Hamas with financial, logistical and diplomatic support, in exchange of which Hamas is accountable to them. Yet, Hamas remains accountable to the population in its ruling of Gaza. Not only may the interests of these foreign actors and the Gazans clash, but the interests of different foreign actors, which Hamas cannot afford to vex, add further conflict to the situation. Hamas is thus in a tricky situation of double accountability, domestic and foreign.

Regional Powers

Hamas relies heavily on Arab partners for its survival. Financially speaking, domestic sources of revenue, *waqf* and *zakat* only made up 15% of the organization's budget, as estimated in 2005. The remaining 85% were provided by foreign donors, the most

important being the wealthy rentier states of the Gulf (Knusden, 2005) namely, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Hamas' third major partner in the region is Iran. All these powers see Hamas as a proxy, useful both to develop their influence over the region, and to legitimize themselves in the eyes of their population, appearing as champions of the Palestinian cause. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are notorious competitors, but the most salient division is between Saudi Arabia and Iran, currently engaged in a Middle Eastern cold war.

In this situation, it is difficult for Hamas to satisfy one side and to act as its perfect proxy without angering the other. Hamas leaders decided to keep a low profile in the Saudi–Iranian clash and avoided taking a diplomatic stance on the matter, not wanting to jeopardize their relations with either state. This tightrope walk has been going on for decades, shaped by the regional crises. For instance, Saudi Arabia was Hamas' top funder from 2000 to 2004, before scaling back its support due to US pressure. Iran took over this spot but Iran–Hamas relations deteriorated quickly after Iran sided with, and Hamas against, Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian regime in 2011. Hamas is currently trying to maintain a somewhat neutral position. For example, while Hamas' main offices outside the Gaza Strip are located in Qatar, a GCC country, Hizbullah, an Iranian proxy, still provides Hamas with military aid and training.

With the Arab Spring dramatically shaking the geopolitical landscape of the region, Hamas has had a hard time maintaining cordial relations with all neighbouring regimes and was forced into strategic shifts. The most important one was the evacuation and relocation of Hamas' external headquarters from Damascus to Doha in 2011, following its public disavowal of the Assad regime. Emir ath-Thani's official visit to Gaza in 2012 was a symbol of Qatar's endorsement of Hamas which, alongside Qatar's monetary support, allowed Hamas to compensate for its lack of democratic legitimacy with renewed "financial legitimacy" (Milton-Edwards, 2013). As for Egypt, while the Muslim Brotherhood, in power with Mohamed Morsi at the helm in 2012–2013, was a natural and historical ally of Hamas, the current counter-revolutionary regime governed by as-Sissi displayed unambiguous hostility towards Hamas, attempting to list it as a terrorist organization. Lastly, Turkey, also a regional hegemon in the Middle East, supports Hamas only to a limited extent since Ankara has relatively close economic ties with Israel, which it seeks to preserve.

Western Powers and Foreign Humanitarian Aid

Hamas' survival also depends on the international (mostly Western) donor community, providing humanitarian and developmental aid. As Tamer Qarmout and Daniel Béland (2012) argue, aid is never neutral, and always conditional. In the case of Hamas, there is a political conditionality of foreign aid. Officially, aid is conditioned to Hamas' commitment to democratization and good governance. However, in reality, regardless of Hamas' efforts since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, politically conditioned foreign aid is consistently "directed at bypassing, isolating, and weakening the Hamas administration in Gaza." Selective aid became a punitive tool Western powers use to undermine Hamas. The international boycott and no-contact policy the West adopted vis-à-vis Hamas was a devastating blow to the economy of the Gaza Strip, seriously threatening Hamas' stability as a ruler.

Suffering from negative publicity, Hamas continues its struggle to obtain recognition, in the eyes of the European Union, the US and the UN, of the legitimacy it draws from the 2006 elections. As a result, it must take decisions that are seemingly inconsistent with its ideology, but which reflect its accountability to Western powers through a dependency on their aid. This explains Hamas' decision to participate in the traditional political competition from the mid-2000s, intended to prove to the world its good will to act as a regular political party, helping the movement gather funding from the international donor community. Bhasin and Hallward (2013) argue that "pragmatic concerns of funding [are] the most compelling explanation of *why* Hamas decided to participate in elections." Furthermore, one can understand Hamas' stepping down from military activism in 2002 during the second Intifada as a reaction to the international diplomatic pressure to put a stop to violence in order to engage in the "Roadmap for peace" resolution plan to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Wagemarkers, 2010). In the same vein, Hamas' choice to clearly separate its military wing — the Qassam brigades — from its social-civilian welfare wing reflects its dedication to improving its image by displaying its charity work and hiding its violent operations, thereby maintaining good relations with donors who reject these military activities.

Bridging the Ideology–Interests Discrepancy

The Framing Strategy

Drawing from the social movement theory's concept of framing, one can analyze justifying discourses for the changes in decision-making and foreign policy (Goffman, 1974). Typically, an actor shifting its focus from ideology to immediate interests must, in order to justify both the change in policy and its apparent contradiction with the ideology, reframe its new policy within the ideology. The main tool of framing is rhetoric, that is, a manner of communication that highlights and hides certain elements of reality. In the context of the ideology-interests dilemma, the goal is to mould reality into one specific interpretation, which purports to tell the whole story, and convinces the audience that there is no contradiction between the interest-driven policies and the ideology. This rhetoric may require a "stretched" re-interpretation of the ideology. At the end of the day, the goal is to make any shift in policy — which is virtually always dictated by interest — appear consistent with the long-term ideology, thereby preserving the legitimacy drawn from the seemingly unaltered ideology while actually addressing the needs of the hour.

It should be noted here that any political decision, be it consistent or not with the actor's ideology, is grounded in immediate interests. The framing strategy thus happens regardless of whether or not the policy is consistent with, or contradicting, the ideology. Even a decision seemingly consistent with ideology remains, as we shall show, primarily interest-driven. The aim of framing, then, is to conceal the interests that affected the decision, in order to make it appear as genuinely, and solely, ideology-driven.

Hamas' leadership has been particularly innovative and efficient in finding solutions to bridge the gap between their interest-driven decisions and the fundamentalist ideology (Klein, 2007, Wagemarkers, 2010, Seurat, 2014). I focus here on two main

examples where Hamas has used the framing strategy to make its policies appear solely driven by its long-term ideological goals, disguising their less glorious, more pragmatic aspects. I address Hamas' military actions against Israel, particularly over the course of the second Intifada, and Hamas' participation or non-participation in the Palestinian electoral process over time.

Military Actions against Israel

Joes Wagemarkers (2010) has applied the concept of framing to Hamas' decision-making process during the second Intifada He showed how the movement's leadership framed its decisions within the ideology both in the first phase of the uprising, when Hamas' militancy was at its peak, and in the post-2002 phase, during the stepping-down of armed action. Until mid-2002, Hamas' military action against Israel was congruent with its ideology. Yet, the decision to engage in violent resistance was driven by opportunism: Hamas wanted to take advantage of the weakness of the PA and of popular anger towards Israel. Hamas' goal, in terms of framing, was to put ideology at the centre of its decision. It thus insisted on a core principle of its charter: *tawhid* ("unity"). The concept of unity fluctuates in the mouths of Hamas leaders, referring either to the Muslim *umma* or to the Palestinian people. In any case, Hamas affirmed that unity was necessary to succeed in the establishment of a Palestinian state, and that the only way to achieve unity was through armed resistance. Hamas further insisted on the *makasib* ("gains") that the intifada would secure in the long-term objective of recovering Palestine.

From mid-2002 onwards, Hamas largely de-escalated violent operations, for reasons we have highlighted *supra*. The leadership had to come up with a new rhetoric in order to justify this position, which stood in stark contrast to its ideology. For instance, the 2003 *hudna* and the 2005 *tahdi'a* were two different words for a perfectly identical reality triggered by the same pragmatic needs, that is, the unilateral suspension of armed struggle. Hamas used the word *tahdi'a* in 2005 because the concept of *hudna* had already been used in 2003, and that truce had been a failure. The word *tahdi'a* was thus a rhetorical trick. Hamas moreover kept using the concepts of *tawhid* and *makasib*, completely inverting their meaning and implications. In terms of unity, Hamas suddenly tempered its discourse: resistance was no longer building unity, but the other way around. Since, at the time, Palestinian factions were divided — thus, not united — on which strategy to adopt in terms of resistance, Hamas argued that the efficiency of resistance was in jeopardy and that a pause was therefore needed. In other words, before mid-2002, preserving unity meant continuing the attacks; after mid-2002, it meant stopping the attacks. As for the concept of gains, Hamas insisted upon the gains of keeping quiet, as opposed to those of resisting. It drew attention to the advantages that a truce entailed, which would serve the long-term ideological goal of liberating Palestine: liberation of prisoners, cessation of violence on the civilian population, etc. We see here how Hamas, through the subtle use of rhetoric, managed to reframe its pragmatic decisions into its ideology. Interviewed in 2008, the senior leader of Hamas, Khalid Misha'al, illustrated the non-permanence of armed struggle and the periods of calm and truce with an inventive metaphor:

The history of the Palestinian Revolution has developed in what I call waves. It is a history of ebb and flow, a cycle of struggle, like farming. You prepare the soil, sow the

seed, reap the crop, then prepare the soil and sow again to reap a new harvest. It is not a continuum of consistent intensity, but cyclical (Rabbani, 2008).

Oslo Process and Palestinian Elections

As explained *supra*, the Oslo Accords, which set up the PA and the Palestinian electoral process, were explicitly rejected by the Hamas leadership. The Oslo process contradicted Hamas' ideology. However, Hamas' condemnation of Oslo was also grounded in pragmatic concerns. The establishment of the PA, which was granted tremendous capabilities, power and legitimacy, was a harsh reality for Hamas, limiting its capacity to take action on the ground (Kristianasen, 1999). In terms of interests, Oslo was a disaster for Hamas, so the fact that it also contradicted its ideology was a blessing. Hamas could always invoke its grand ideological principles to reject Oslo, even if the rejection was an interest-driven decision.

For instance, the Hamas boycott of the 1996 general elections — a direct consequence of Oslo — was in line with its principle of refusing compromise and negotiation with Israel, and was indeed justified — framed — as such. However, the decision was actually interest driven: Hamas knew that its popular base was not large enough to secure a majority of seats in the elections and that participating in the electoral process would not result in a gain of political power. In other words, the participation in the 1996 elections was not in Hamas' interests (Klein, 2009). Yet, it invoked ideology, describing the PLO's participation in the Oslo process as act of treason against the Palestinian cause, in order to draw legitimacy and support from and for its non-participation. Ten years later, as its popular support had risen sufficiently, Hamas displayed no reluctance to participate in the elections because it had become in its interest to do so. This strategy proved to be profitable: Hamas won the elections and would have, in theory, acceded to the state resources of the PA had a quasi-civil war not broken out. In order to erase the blatant inconsistency between its participation and its public rejection of the Oslo process, Hamas once again displayed an innovative justification, conceptually separating the Oslo Accords from the PA institutions and processes. Leila Seurat, in a November 2015 interview, described this resourceful discourse as such:

In March [2005,] the Cairo Accords, signed by all Palestinian factions, consecrated Hamas' participation in the electoral game. Until then, it had only participated in local elections. Hamas had refused to participate in the 1996 legislative elections. It considered engaging in this process to mean recognizing the Palestinian Authority, and legitimizing the Oslo Accords. [In 2006,] to explain its about-face, it argued that the Oslo Accords are henceforth dead and therefore participation in the PA structures no longer legitimizes them. However, it is obvious that, beyond its discourses, the objective of Hamas was, undeniably, to take advantage of the resources that the PA, born from the Oslo agreements, had to offer.[†]

[†]   Our translation.

Conclusion

Hamas, as any organization, faces a gap between its ideology and its interests. This discrepancy has several sources. We have addressed Hamas' need for short-term survival, the influence of its leaders inside or outside the Gaza Strip, Hamas' accountability as a revolutionary movement, as a state organization, as a proxy for regional powers, and as an actor depending on aid and recognition from the West. Hamas is a rational actor, able both to deviate from its fundamentalist ideological foundations if need be, and to articulate a framing rhetoric in order to hide the inconsistency of its policies with its ideologies. On that matter, it has proved particularly innovative in finding ways to implement policies blatantly contradictory to its creeds.

Our analysis relies on a distinction between the concepts of ideology and interest. Nevertheless, we recognize, just as Seurat does, that there is no binary dichotomy between the two, especially in the case of Hamas, where ideology is constantly stretched to accommodate contingent interests. The division between interests and ideology is never absolute and neat, but blurred and constantly shifting. Ideology is more than a smokescreen to conceal underlying pragmatism, nor is it the sole source of decision-making. Hamas uses ideology as a tool to secure popular legitimacy, which is in turn necessary for the organization's self-preservation. Preserving its own ideology thus becomes, for Hamas, an immediate interest. We see here how ideology and interest are closely interlinked concepts. As Leila Seurat (2015) argues:

Ideology is as much a solution to problems as it is a potential source of conflict. … Recognizing this complexity allows us to overcome the simplistic, prejudiced view according to which the use of ideology characterizes the more offensive periods, whereas more defensive periods would be marked by a return to realism.[‡]

Thus, as far as Hamas is concerned, the Islamist ideological repertoire is a resource of legitimacy as much as a constraint on decision-making.

Lastly, I must acknowledge some of the blind spots of this contribution. One would be the impact of Hamas' relations with the other Palestinian factions — mainly, the PLO/Fatah — in its ideology–interest dilemma. Another would be the role of civil society vis-à-vis the strategies deployed by Hamas. To what extent do these stratagems actually deceive the population? How civil society reacts to the tactics discussed in this paper is worth investigating, as the Hamas leadership has to, in turn, adapt and respond to this feedback.

[‡] Our translation.

References

Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Hamas: A historical and political background. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 22*(4), 5–19.

Bhasin, T., & Hallward, M. C. (2013). Hamas as a political party: Democratization in the Palestinian territories. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 25*(1), 75–93.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis*, New York, NY: Harper Colophon.

Klein, M. (2007). Hamas in power. *Middle East Journal, 61*(3), 442–59.

Klein, M. (2009). Against the consensus: Oppositionist voices in Hamas. *Middle Eastern Studies, 45*(6), 881–92.

Knudsen, A. (2005). Crescent and sword: the Hamas enigma. *Third World Quarterly, 26*(8), 1373–88.

Kristianasen, W. (1999). Challenge and counterchallenge: Hamas's response to Oslo. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 28*(3), 19–36.

Milton-Edwards, B. (2013). Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic shifts? *Middle East Policy, 20*(3), 60–72.

Pascovich, E. (2012). Social-civilian apparatuses of Hamas, Hizbullah, and other activist Islamic organizations. *Digest of Middle East Studies, 21*(1), 126–48.

Qarmout, T., & Béland, D. (2012). The politics of international aid to the Gaza strip. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 41*(4), 32–47.

Rabbani, M. (2008). A Hamas perspective on the movement's evolving role: An Interview with Khalid Mishal: Part II. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 37*(4), 59–81.

Seliger, M. (1970). Fundamental and operative ideology: The two principal dimensions of political argumentation. *Policy Science, 1*(1), 325–38.

Seurat, L. L. (2014). *La politique étrangère du Hamas 2006–2013 : idéologie, intérêt et processus de décision* (Doctoral dissertation). Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris, France.

Seurat, L. L. (2015, February 12). Peut-on expliquer l'action du Hamas par sa seule idéologie? *Le Huffington Post*. http://www.france-palestine.org/Leila-Seurat-le-Hamas-au-dela-des-discours.

Seurat, L. L. (2015, November 3). Leila Seurat, le Hamas au-delà des discours. *Association France–Palestine Solidarité*. http://www.france-palestine.org/Leila-Seurat-le-Hamas-au-dela-des-discours.

Wagemarkers, J. (2010). Legitimizing pragmatism: Hamas' framing efforts from militancy to moderation and back? *Terrorism and Political Violence, 22*(3), 357–77.

International Institutions, Global "Partnerships" and the Structural Power of Multinational Corporations: The UNHCR Case Study and a New Research Agenda

MARK MACHACEK[*]

Abstract — Throughout the last two decades, institutions of global security and governance have undergone a paradigmatic shift in their engagements with multinational corporations (MNCs). The United Nations, in particular, has increasingly embraced big business as "partner" in human security, humanitarian response and development through formalized "global public–private partnerships" (GP3s). Naturally, a debate has emerged on the efficacies of these GP3s and their implications for global governance. This paper contributes to this debate by proposing and employing a new research agenda that interrogates the impacts that GP3s have on international institutions themselves using a case study of a particular UN agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It will argue that UNHCR GP3s are a highly asymmetrical set of power relations that are having constitutive effects on the agency. The UNHCR is undergoing significant operational and ideological changes in the GP3 process in a manner that is synonymous with Stephen Gill's (1998) concept of "new constitutionalism"; a reconstitution that opens up and further embeds the agency within the forces of

Résumé — À travers les deux dernières décennies, les organisations de sécurité et de la gouvernance mondiales ont connu un changement de paradigme en ce qui concerne leurs interactions avec les entreprises multinationales. Plus particulièrement, le « partenariat » entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les grandes entreprises est de plus en plus courant en matière de sécurité humaine, d'intervention humanitaire et de développement. Ce « partenariat » se concrétise par le biais des « partenariats publics–privés mondiaux » (PPPM). Un débat s'est ouvert sur l'efficacité de ces PPPM et de leur impact sur la gouvernance mondiale. Le présent article contribue au débat en proposant un nouveau programme de recherche qui se penche sur l'impact des PPPM sur les organisations internationales. L'article met en pratique ce programme de recherche en faisant appel à une étude de cas relative à une agence de l'ONU, le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR). Il est soutenu que les PPPM de le HCR présentent des rapports de force grandement asymétriques qui ont des effets constitutifs sur l'agence. Dans le processus des PPPM, le HCR subit d'importants changements opérationnels et

[*]   Mark Machacek is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC. His research interests revolve around market actors and processes in the global political economy and the structural power of capital. His current dissertation research focuses on the political nature of UN–business relations and global public–private partnerships with particular attention to the UN Refugee Agency. This research overlaps with the discipline of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies, adopting theoretical insights from International Relations and applying them to the analysis of the refugee regime and global refugee policy.

[*]   Mark Machacek est candidat au doctorat en science politique à la Simon Fraser University, à Burnaby en Colombie-Britannique. Ses intérêts de recherche concernent les acteurs du marché, les processus en place dans l'économie politique mondiale et les pouvoirs structurels du capital. Sa thèse de doctorat consiste en l'examen de la nature politique des relations ONU-entreprises et les partenariats publics–privés mondiaux, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. Cette recherche se rapproche de l'étude des réfugiés et des migrations forcées, en faisant appel à des concepts théoriques relatifs aux relations internationales et en les employant à l'analyse des politiques en matière de régime d'asile et de réfugiés à l'échelle mondiale.

the capitalist global political economy. Hence, this case study demonstrates that GP3s are capable of undermining the mandate and autonomy of global security and governance institutions.

idéologiques qui se rapprochent du concept de « nouveau constitutionnalisme » proposé par Stephen Gill (1998); la reconstitution ancre davantage l'agence dans l'économie politique capitaliste mondiale. Ainsi, la présente étude de cas démontre que les PPPM peuvent porter atteinte au mandat des organisations de sécurité et de la gouvernance mondiales et à leur autonomie.

Introduction

Throughout the last two decades, institutions of global security and governance have undergone a paradigmatic shift in their engagements with multinational corporations (MNCs). The United Nations, in particular, has increasingly embraced big business as "partner" in human security, humanitarian response and development through formalized "global public–private partnerships" (GP3s); relatively institutionalized, long-term and multidimensional engagements between public and for-profit entities established for the provision of global public goods. Naturally, a debate has emerged on the efficacies of these GP3s and their implications for global governance. Proponents contend that they increase the capacities of international organizations and fill governance gaps while extending participation in governance and encouraging best practices in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Critics, on the other hand, articulate the asymmetrical relations inherent within GP3s, positing them as manifestations of neoliberal hegemony and corporate dominance.

This paper contributes to this debate by proposing and employing a new research agenda that interrogates the impacts that GP3s have on international institutions themselves using a case study of a particular UN agency — the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This agenda will assist in understanding the constitutive effects and politics in the GP3 process in order to sufficiently assess their wider implications for global security and governance. From a critical political economy perspective, this paper asks the following: a) What forms do UNHCR–business partnerships take? b) What power relations do they constitute? and c) What sort of impacts do they have on the UNHCR? It will show that UNHCR GP3s entail intensifying ideational interactions, most notably within epistemic forums centred on private sector knowledge-sharing, consultancy and advocacy activities. This paper will further demonstrate how the UNHCR GP3s are a highly asymmetrical set of power relations in terms of the actors' structural positioning and the risks, commitments and benefits they accrue. Finally, it will argue that the UNHCR is undergoing significant operational and ideological changes in the GP3 process in a manner that is synonymous with Stephen Gill's (1998) concept of "new constitutionalism"; a reconstitution that opens up and further embeds the agency within the forces of the

capitalist global political economy. Hence, this case study demonstrates that the political nature of GP3s is capable of undermining the mandate and autonomy of global security and governance institutions.

International Relations, UN–Business Relations and the "Partnerships Debate"

The study of International Relations has traditionally been concerned with relations between states, largely neglecting the political roles played by MNCs internationally. Though liberal institutionalists and regime theorists began recognizing the importance of institutions and non-state actors of global security and governance throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Keohane & Nye, 1989; Krasner, 1983), these approaches progressively became more state-centric and pluralist, underplaying the for-profit sector as actor and the broader structures in the global political economy. Corresponding with the end of the Cold War and intensifying globalization processes was a massive increase in studies on "global governance" that began to take seriously the role of MNCs, "private authority" and the power of global capital (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Higgot et al., 2000; Ruggie, 2004). MNCs were shown to have impacted global trade rules (Cutler, 2010; Sell, 2000), climate change negotiations and global environmental regulatory schemes (Chatterjee & Finger, 1994; Levy & Egan, 2000) and to have formed a number of private international regimes of self-regulation and global rule-setting (Cutler et al., 1999; Haufler, 2000). Beginning in the early 2000s, research turned considerable attention toward UN–business relations and the evolving GP3 process (see Andonova, 2010; Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Bull & McNeill, 2010; Newell, 2005; Therien & Pouliot, 2006; Utting, 2000).

Historically, relations between the UN and big business have been antagonistic. During the Cold War period the UN largely avoided contact with corporations as a signal of impartiality towards free and command economies. In the 1960s, UN–business relations entered a period of what Therien & Pouliot (2006) describe as "institutionalized animosity." This was the latest era of de-colonization that ushered a massive entry of new Southern states into the global system. An institutionalized North–South divide began to emerge in the UN with the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) and the subsequent UN Conference on Trade and Development which sought, among other things, a series of interventionist policies to establish equitable terms of trade and global corporate accountability. This trend continued in the 1970s with rising discussions of the New International Economic Order and attempts by the G77 to establish an international code of conduct for MNCs as well as develop stronger capacities to deal with them through the creation of the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, respectively. These efforts were strongly lobbied against by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), conservative think tanks and the Reagan administration that championed free markets and challenged the UN's interventionist stance throughout the 1980s (Smith, 2010; Soederberg, 2007; Therien & Pouliot, 2006).

Tensions between the UN and business began to ease in the 1990s as the end of the Cold War centered power in the West, heralding in a neoliberal political economy under

the Washington Consensus and Bretton Woods institutions. Intensifying globalization processes were also changing the global landscape with the number, activities and rights of MNCs expanding exponentially. Simultaneously, the UN was encountering legitimacy issues, particularly in the West where it faced intense criticisms of ineffectiveness and irrelevance (Andonova, 2010; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014). Opening up the institution and engaging with corporations provided the opportunity to reassert its relevance in the modern political economy and increase its capacity to fulfill its expanding security and governance mandates (Andonova, 2010; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014; Pingeot, 2016). The unprecedented presence of MNCs at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development signalled a turning point in UN–business relations and resulted in the World Business Council on Sustainable Development. That same year, in part due as a symbolic gesture to business interests and their lobbying efforts, the UNCTC was abolished, ending the UN's initiative toward creating a legally binding international code of conduct on MNC activities (Bull, 2010; Gregoratti, 2012; Smith, 2010).

This paradigmatic shift in the UN's relations with business was consolidated in 1997 as Kofi Annan, himself a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's business school, assumed the position of UN Secretary-General. Annan entered during the UN's biggest financial crisis due to unpaid membership arrears, largely from the US (which accounted for approximately 30% of the UN's budget). At the same time, an emerging global social movement began to erupt against corporate globalization. Facing crises of legitimacy, financing and a global backlash against global neoliberalism, Annan committed himself to reforming and opening up the UN, declaring a "new universal understanding that market forces are essential for development" to the World Economic Forum (Tesner & Kell, 2000, 32; Witte & Reinicke, 2005). Symbolizing the private sector's commitment, the vice chairman of AOL donated $1 billion to the agency and the UN Foundation was established to manage the grant (Ibid).

The idea of "partnerships" began to enter the UN–business relations discourse in this period. The definitions of GP3s offered in the literature vary significantly, reflecting the dynamic relations they constitute. They operate in a variety of ways and capacities throughout the policy process. GP3s, however, are often academically and self-described as collaborative, mutually beneficial and grounded in common interests that navigate a "third way" between state intervention and market-based resource allocations. The various definitions of GP3s also share an acknowledgement that they entail an intensification of both material and ideational engagements between the UN and MNCs, including epistemic activities such as knowledge-sharing, norm-diffusion and advocacy (see Bexell & Morth, 2010; Borzel & Risse, 2007; Bull & McNeill, 2007; Schaferhoff et al., 2009). The UN institutionalized the term when it established the UN Fund for International Partnerships and the UN Office for Partnerships to facilitate and manage this escalating mode of corporate engagement (Andonova, 2006; Bull & McNeill, 2007; Gregoratti, 2012).

In a series of meetings with the ICC, Secretary-General Annan affirmed his commitment to GP3s and proposed the "Global Compact of Shared Values and Principles" — the largest and most well-known global partnership program. Emphasizing the declining legitimacy of global neoliberalism mounted by the anti-globalization movement, Annan offered the idea of the Global Compact to "give a face to the global market" (UN, 1999)

through facilitating global CSR initiatives outlined in its ten principles (Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Soederberg, 2007). The Global Compact draws on these previously declared UN principles to stimulate "best practices" in CSR while simultaneously leveraging business capacities. It is not designed as a legally binding framework but as an arena for dialogue and social learning amongst the UN and corporate partners. The ICC and other free market advocates have supported this softer approach to regulating corporate conduct (Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Sethi & Schepers, 2014). In 2000, just months after the unprecedented anti-globalization protests at the WTO meeting in Seattle, the Global Compact was launched.

Though faced with criticisms from civil society organizations, GP3s have become normalized across the UN system since the Global Compact, existing across the domains of global governance (see Borzel & Risse, 2007), development (Bull, 2010; Newell, 2005), environmental security (see Bexell & Morth, 2010), health security (see Bull & McNeill, 2007) and, as this study demonstrates, human security more generally. They increasingly promote corporate input at every stage of the policy process and increased engagement in all major global conferences, many of which play a part in shaping the UN's agenda, including the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the subsequent 2012 Conference (Bexell & Morth, 2010; Bull & McNeill, 2010; Gregoratti, 2010).

Generally, there are three approaches to explaining the paradigmatic turn to and rapid spread of GP3s in global security and governance. The first is the structural approach which can be further divided amongst the functionalists and constructivists. Structural-functionalists, many of whom are neoliberal institutionalists or public policy analysts, view GP3s as a natural result of governance gaps in the global environment and the structurally facilitated needs to enhance collaboration on the provision of public goods. GP3s, they argue, further compliment states and international institutions with market-based mechanisms and efficiencies (Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Ruggie, 2004; Witte & Reinicke, 2005). Structural constructivists, on the other hand, emphasize ideational factors with particular attention to the diffusion of neoliberal norms and their market-based prescriptions (Bull et al., 2004; Bull & McNeill, 2010) or the emergence of a new "global public domain" of shared public and private interests and arenas of interaction (Ruggie, 2004). The second set of approaches focuses on the rational agency of the UN and/or corporate actors. Authors have outlined the UN's strategy in reasserting its authority and consolidating alternative avenues of financial and operational assistance (Andonova, 2006, 2010; Kell, 2012; Pingeot, 2016) and the strategic interests of business, including the development of a positive corporate image, the pre-emption of harder forms of regulation and the development new markets for profit (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Finally, critical explanations generally focus on power asymmetries inherent in the global political economy. Critical theorists argue that GP3s result from the structural and ideological hegemony of business and capital (Gregoratti, 2010; Levy & Newell, 2002).

Linked to these explanations is a continuing debate on the efficacy of GP3s and their implications for global governance. Proponents generally come from fields related to the study of Global Public Policy and apply the functionalist logic to highlight their benefits. They frame partnerships as mutually beneficial collaborations with shared common purposes in filling governance gaps and providing public goods (Reinicke &

Deng, 2000; Ruggie, 2001). GP3s are understood as forms of "network governance" that induce social learning and diffusion of UN values toward impacting corporate behaviour and expanding CSR initiatives (Reinicke, 2000; Ruggie, 2001; Kell, 2012). Networks are posited as responses to the global democratic deficit and inefficiencies of the public sectors via expanding participation in global governance and combining the material and knowledge resources of both sectors (Rasche & Waddock, 2014; Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Ruggie, 2004). Finally, GP3s are also offered as another liberal compromise that addresses the societal backlash against corporate globalization similar to the post-war era of "embedded liberalism" (Reinicke, 2000; Ruggie, 2004).

Critics of GP3s, many of whom emanate from civil society groups in the anti-corporate globalization movement and the neo-Gramscian school of critical theory, problematize the pluralism of the functionalist perspective, arguing that its approach is apolitical, problem-solving theory that disregards issues of power and unproblematically reifies existing structures of inequality. GP3s, neo-Gramscians argue, exist in a global political economy constituted by massive inequalities in instrumental, discursive and structural power. The subsequent asymmetrical power relations operate throughout GP3s, threatening a potential corporate takeover of the global agenda, commercialization of the UN system and cooptation of any counterhegemonic protests (Gregoratti, 2012; May, 2015; Soederberg, 2007; Utting, 2000; Zammit, 2003). Other critical scholars focus attention on the poor institutional design and subsequent performance of GP3s, demonstrating their lack of clear mandates and the inadequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that encourage MNCs to shirk their CSR responsibilities (Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Sethi & Schepers, 2014; Soederberg, 2007). Companies such as PetroChina, Nike, Nestle and Shell, all of which are Global Compact signatories, have all been shown to have engaged in business practices that violate human rights, labour rights and environmental standards (Sethi & Schepers, 2014; TRAC, 2000). GP3s, they argue, amount to corporate "bluewashing" that enhances the legitimacy and brand of MNCs through UN association while avoiding any substantial changes to corporate behaviour (Paine, 2000; Utting, 2000; Utting & Zammit, 2009).

Despite the growing literature and intensifying debate on GP3s, there are very few empirical studies that inquire into the partnerships of particular UN agencies and the impact these relations have on the agencies themselves (see Bull, 2010; Gregoratti, 2010 as exceptions). We have little insight into how these partnerships operate, the types of activities they envelope nor their inherent politics. This paper therefore offers an in-depth case study to understand their underlying political nature.

Analytical Framework and Methodology

In general, the literature outlines UN–business partnerships as multi-dynamic processes linked to overarching structures in the global political economy that include material (i.e., supply-driven) and ideational (i.e., norm-diffusion, legitimacy claims) interactions. This inquiry therefore employs a neo-Gramscian analytical framework to situation UNHCR GP3s in an analysis of the global political economy but also to combine analysis of both structure and agency and transcend state-centrism and the levels-of-analysis problem by

focusing on social forces. Neo-Gramscian theory assumes that structural and discursive power relations among social forces — such as business or social movements — undergird the global political economy. Social forces operate throughout the state and global levels of analysis as well as global regimes and institutions. Power is largely constituted by a social forces' position within the material and ideological structure of the capitalist global political economy and is enacted by strategic agency and discourse (Cox, 1981, 1987; Gill, 1993; Bieler & Morton, 2004; Levy & Newell, 2005). Structural power is a resultant of overarching political, economic and ideological conditions that privilege particular social forces or institutions over others (Gill & Law, 1989). Privileged structural positioning simultaneously affords discursive power by granting actors access to arenas of legitimation, norm diffusion and agenda-setting (van Dijk, 1993). This analysis is not structure all-the-way-down, however. Power is not automatic but enacted by purposive, strategic agents, often through discourse and ideology. The question is to what extent does structural and discursive power impact agency and vice-versa.

This analysis, therefore, is methodologically interpretivist. It entails an in-depth deconstruction of the structural and ideological conditions and communicative acts of UNHCR GP3s to identify their inherent power relations. It also involves contextualizing and tracing key factors and processes to understand structure-agency determinacy. Information for this research was collected from primary sources, including the UNHCR, UN and their respective corporate partners' reports, public statements, websites and other related documents as well as secondary sources including research in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies and Global Political Economy.

Structure and Asymmetry of UNHCR–Business "Partnerships"

UNHCR GP3s do not function as mutually beneficial collaborations, nor do they exist in a pluralist, apolitical environment. Rather, they are largely a product of the overarching political, material and ideological structures of the global political economy. The agency of the UNHCR, dependent upon voluntary contributions for its work, is in a perpetually weak structural position with mounting pressures from a series of refugee crises, the increasing restrictive refugee policies of states and the agency's resulting financial crises that have severely constrained the options available to secure funding and fulfill the agency's mandate. Simultaneously, the "partnerships" ideology spreading throughout the UN system has constituted and legitimized the GP3 option. MNCs continue to enjoy a powerful position in the global political economy, controlling vast resources and buttressed by the free-market tenants of neoliberalism (Cox, 1981, 1987; Gill, 1993, 1998) and the Global Compact's legitimization of market-based processes and resource allocations. Their asymmetrical power relations are mirrored in the GP3 process, distributing asymmetrical benefits to business and asymmetrical risk and commitment to the UNHCR. The following analysis will outline the structural determinacy of GP3s and their inherent political relations.

The UNHCR was established in 1950 under the authority of the UN General Assembly as a temporary agency to assist the over 30 million Western Europeans displaced

by World War II. The agency was mandated with protecting and assisting these refugees, including assistance with the "durable solutions" to their displacement — either repatriation to their home country, local integration in their initial state of asylum or third country resettlement. During the decolonization period of the 1960s and the subsequent regional and civil conflicts that erupted, the General Assembly acknowledged that the refugees were not confined to Western Europe and passed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, waiving the temporal and geographic limitations of the original 1951 Convention. Today, the UNHCR's mandate has since expanded to include internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those in protracted displacement situations and refugee camps around the world (Loescher et al., 2008; UNHCR, 2013).

Research on the UNHCR in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies has drawn out the direct and indirect links between forced displacement and regional, international, human and environmental insecurities along with the roles institutions play toward mitigating insecurity. Refugee movements and populations have been found to be both a consequence and cause of national and regional insecurities, often fleeing from intra- and inter-national conflicts while simultaneously provoking local social instabilities and providing warring factions with potential combatant recruits. Protracted refugee situations, most often in the form of large encampments, often exacerbate these local and regional insecurities while also threatening the human security of refugee populations and the environmental security of the surrounding area (Betts, 2014; Loescher, 2011; Milner, 2009). The restrictiveness of refugee camps often leads to violations of refugee rights outlined in the Refugee Convention, thereby undermining their socioeconomic security (Crisp, 2010; Milner, 2009; Slaughter & Crisp, 2009). On the global scale, refugee populations have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to exploitation and recruitment by international terrorist organizations (Milner, 2009; Moller, 2015). For its part, the UNHCR has played the refugee regime's largest role as a security actor in its attempts toward minimizing these insecurities in both material and social ways. While the agency employs its resources for the protection and assistance of refugee populations, it has also promoted a security discourse around the refugee question and has leveraged its moral and epistemic authority to promote global burden-sharing and multilateralism (Hammerstad, 2014; Loescher & Milner, 2011; Slaughter & Crisp, 2009).

Business engagement with the UNHCR is not a new phenomenon. Being dependent on voluntary contributions to service its budget, the agency has accepted financial contributions from the corporate sector since its inception. Unlike the UN, the UNHCR's mandate had no direct concern for the global regulation of MNCs that set in place a history of antagonism. From the beginning the UNHCR and business had a different relationship, albeit with similar tones of hesitation and mutual skepticism of motives (see Ogata, 1999; BHF, 2017a). Their interactions throughout the post-war and Cold War period centered on philanthropic and procurement activities.

Coinciding with the paradigmatic shift occurring throughout the UN system, the UNHCR began to embrace the idea of partnerships in the late 1990s when the agency was facing unprecedented pressures and constraints to fulfill its mandate. During the Cold War, refugees possessed geopolitical value between the great powers. After the war, however, refugees no longer possessed this value and many Western states began to employ more

pronounced restrictive refugee policies and encourage repatriation (Chimni, 1998; Gibney, 2004). Compounding the stress this placed on the UNHCR were increasing flows of forced migrations, much of which was linked to political and economic crises in developing countries (Gibney, 2001). Consequently, more and more refugees were ending up in camps, creating an unprecedented number of protracted situations and peoples of concern for the organization. Corporate "partnerships" became a much more normalized approach internationally, stemming from their legitimation in the UN and constituted a readily available option to an agency that possessed very limited positional power and alternatives. The moral authority commanded by the UNHCR was not a sufficient resource under current conditions as appeals for additional voluntary support and co-operation from states to keep pace with the expanding needs of the agency went unmet.

Spearheading the UNHCR's shift to GP3s was the 1999 establishment of the Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF), the first major epistemic forum and link between the agency and business. The BHF is a self-described private research, consultancy and advocacy partnership, co-chaired by now former UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata, former Secretary-General of the ICC and former President of Unocal Corporation (among other business representatives) (BHF, 2017b). It states that it seeks to "bridge the gap of understanding and promote co-operation," emphasizing "common goals" and "corporate social responsibility" (BHF, 2017a). In a landmark speech made by then High Commissioner Ogata to the BHF on facilitating the partnership, Ogata cautioned on their potential conflicts of interest, emphasizing the underlying profit motive of business and highlighting business involvement in undermining global security by perpetuating conflicts and violating human and labour rights. She rationalized partnerships as to create a common interest in business pursuing a "sustainable profit"; stable societies and markets. Working together, she argued, would help to address and avoid dangerous business practices while collaborating on humanitarian assistance (Ogata, 1999). However, there were no explicit mechanisms or procedures put in place to ensure corporate partners would take steps toward genuine CSR initiatives nor any indications or reports that the BHF has facilitated any change in the considerations of MNCs. Rather, the BHF largely facilitates corporate investment in humanitarian projects and leverages the expertise and ideas of business for refugee protection and assistance.

The creation of the BHF came with opposition from civil society, though it was hardly acknowledged institutionally. Critics highlighted the unethical business practices of particular BHF partners, including Unocal's widely publicized human and labour rights violations complicity in Burma, which themselves sparked a massive population displacement, and Nestlé's widely known violations of infant formula codes and environmental standards. The concern was that business partners were receiving asymmetrical benefits from the BHF, including a soft regulatory environment to avoid substantive CSR initiatives, an opportunity to "bluewash" nefarious business activities and increased input and influence in humanitarian governance (CorpWatch, 1999; TRAC, 2000). The UNHCR, on the other hand, developed a long-term partnership with Microsoft that, at the time, was facing significant decreases in stock value as a result of multiple anti-trust lawsuits (Suder & Nicolas, 2009). The partnership afforded Microsoft positive brand exposure with the company contributing a newly designed refugee registration system for Kosovar refugees. The UNHCR established its Private Sector and Public Affairs Service

office to strengthen private sector fundraising and build stronger institutional links with potential corporate partners that same year (UN-NGLS, 2017).

Throughout the early years of the GP3 process and the 2000s, conditions under which the agency operated had increasingly placed significant constraints and pressures on the agency. The post-9/11 security concerns ushered in a new era of restrictionist refugee policies across many Southern and Northern states. State contributions to the UNHCR also became more politicized as they began tightly earmarking their contributions to specific strategic areas of their respective interests (Barnett, 2002; Loescher et al., 2008). Additionally, new wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were increasing the flow of forced migrations, adding to the existing peoples of concern to the UNHCR.

By the mid-2000s the UNHCR's GP3 approach had become normalized. The agency underwent a number of changes, both organizationally and ideologically, as the GP3 process intensified. It established several offices as new institutional points of contact with business including the Private Sector Fundraising Unit and the Corporate Foundation Partnership Unit. It also began playing a significant discursive role in legitimizing and normalizing the approach, particularly when it started including specialized "partnership" sections in its annual *Global Report* and *Global Appeals* publications in 2005. These UNHCR publications emphasize the common goals of the UNHCR and business, including the "development of more stable societies [which is] clearly good for business" (UNHCR, 2005, 2007a). They were further legitimized with reference to leveraging the knowledge and expertise of business to apply the "rigours of the marketplace" to UNHCR operations (UN Business, 2017; UNHCR, 2005, 2007). Since these publications began, there has been no mention of distributing UN ideas or values to MNCs. Rather, ideational interactions in epistemic forums seem to be a one-way street for the diffusion of the ideas of business.

The UNHCR underwent another significant alteration in how it operated with the private sector when it established another major epistemic forum, the Council of Business Leaders, in 2005. The Council is the self-described "driver" of the UNHCR's GP3 program, is composed of representatives from five major corporations — Microsoft, Nestle, Nike, Merck and PricewaterhouseCoopers — and is chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner (UNHCR, 2007, 2007b). It is meant to provide consultation from the corporate sector on "how to be more business-like in carrying out humanitarian work" and establishing a more integrated partnership program (UNHCR, 2007). The Council does not indicate any changes to corporate conduct outside of promoting investment from MNCs to humanitarian causes. Like the Business Humanitarian Forum, it applies a strictly market-based logic to CSR and humanitarianism. Critics have protested against the inclusion of partners such as Nike and Nestle, both of which are facing some of the largest consumer boycott campaigns for their violations in labour rights (CorpWatch, 1999; TRAC, 2000). The inclusion of MNCs involved in highly contentious activities adds additional risk to the UNHCR as such affiliations have the potential to compromise the moral authority and integrity of the agency (Ibid; Utting, 2000). MNC partners need not worry of such issues, as affiliation with a humanitarian actor offers only positive legitimacy and branding opportunities.

This level of engagement with MNCs has intensified in the post-2010 period and is indicated in the discursive and ideological changes of the UNHCR. The agency has begun applying a market-based, rather than strictly rights or CSR-based, rationales to GP3s, emphasizing core business interests and "innovation." The UNHCR's discourse has shifted to marketizing refugee populations and issues, reflecting neoliberal, market-based prescriptions of GP3s more generally. The agency has started to advertise partnerships to the business community by appealing directly to the profit motive, highlighting branding and market opportunities, scalability and profit (Betts et al., 2016; see UNHCR, 2015b; UNHCR, 2017c). As stated on the agency's website:

Collaboration with UNHCR provides businesses with branding, marketing and growth opportunities. Joint initiatives can also instill pride and loyalty among employees, as well as trust and credibility in customers and decision-makers. Benefits include positioning the company as a social actor, building an international profile, understanding new and emerging markets, identifying local and international partners, and, in some cases, co-developing new products and solutions (UNHCR, 2017c).

The UNHCR has simultaneously been undergoing a modernization process after it had commissioned a private company, Synthesis Corp, for an internal organizational review in 2011. The company recommended "modernizing" the agency by opening it up to further GP3s as sources of expertise and institutional innovation (Betts et al., 2016). A result of this process was the creation of UNHCR Innovation, another epistemic forum and research group that leverages the ideas of business. Innovation partners include Vodafone Foundation, UPS, Hunt Power and Hewlett Packard, among others. The partnership's council, known as "iCircle," includes IKEA Foundation, Hunt Oil and Microsoft. iCircle facilitates regular meetings between the UNHCR, business and researchers for "strategic guidance, technical expertise [and] advice on public–private partnerships" (Refugee Studies Centre, 2014). Innovation's first project was an experiment in developing IKEA-based, flat-backed "Better Shelter Units" as alternatives to traditional refugee tents (UNHCR Innovation, 2017). Similar to the BHF and the Council of Business Leaders, UNHCR Innovation does not contain any additional commitments on MNCs toward CSR outside of contributing materials and ideas to GP3 programs. They do not reflect the initial institutional skepticism of for-profit motives and the initial ideas of mutuality and shared learning toward impacting the outside behaviours of business. Rather than reconstituting the interests and CSR initiatives of MNCs, partnerships facilitate core business interests in positive branding, market opportunities and voluntary, non-binding CSR — as advertised by the UNHCR (see UNHCR 2015b, 2017c).

An epistemic community has begun to develop from both outside and within the "innovation" process, providing intellectual leadership and neoliberal logic to applying market mechanisms in refugee assistance. This community invokes the functionalist insights from the study of Global Public Policy (see Betts et al., 2012; Betts et al., 2016; Boyer & DuPont, 2016). Their approach conceptualizes refugee communities as "new humanitarian markets" and emphasizes the opportunities they provide for developing economies of scale for corporate products and services (Ibid). "Situations of displacement," it is argued, "can provide opportunities to innovate, test new products and enter new markets, leading to increasing value for the company and its shareholders, including the

opportunity to increase competitive advantage" (Boyer & DuPont, 2016, 367). This marketized humanitarianism is best understood as being based off the "bottom of the pyramid" model of consumer markets that targets the largest (and poorest) socioeconomic class, the global poor. The approach also proposes freer regulatory environments for business to operate. As a prominent organic intellectual of this neoliberal approach articulates, "The challenge is how to create incentive structures that facilitate the private provision of public goods while mitigating any possible risks that may stem from regulating these alternative, private providers" (Betts et al., 2016). The legitimacy that is afforded to market-based approaches and for-profit actors across the epistemic community and UNHCR discourses indicates an ideological terrain in the global refugee regime that works in the interest of business.

This period of operational and ideological change and intensifying relations with business is coinciding with one of the largest refugee crises in history. Beginning in 2011, the Syrian War has produced the largest displacement of a state's population (40%) since WWII. The UNHCR is currently serving over 16 million displaced globally (UNHCR, 2015, 2017). It is also facing its greatest funding gap ever, with contributions standing at just 40% of their current budget in the 3rd quarter of 2015 with the gap expected to increase through 2017 (UNHCR, 2017b). Many Western and Southern states are continuing to tightly earmark their contributions and apply the restrictive refugee policies they've had in place over the last two decades.

Business as Usual, for Business

The preceding analysis of UNHCR–business relations and the GP3 process reveals their structural determinants and inherent power asymmetries. Prior to and throughout the process the UNHCR has contended with increasing pressures and constraints to fulfilling its mandate. GP3s were a readily available opportunity, legitimized and normalized by the UN's Global Compact. At the same time, business enjoyed very strong structural positioning, constituted by its command of resources and the neoliberal ideological environment that promoted free market mechanisms and processes in their interests. The asymmetrical structural relations between the UNHCR and corporate partners are mirrored in their GP3s. Business is accruing more benefits from the engagement while the UNHCR has taken on more risk and commitment. Contrary to the functionalists, pluralists and partnership advocates in the debate on UN GP3s, this inquiry finds that UNHCR GP3s are highly political and asymmetrical arrangements that are having constitutive effects on the agency. Business, on the other hand, has not undergone such dramatic changes.

A collection of research has demonstrated the autonomous agency of the UNHCR and instances of its international leadership (see Andonova, 2010; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Hammerstad, 2014). The agency has leveraged its moral authority and discursive techniques to impact state behaviour, including its post-9/11 securitization discourse strategy (Hammerstad, 2014). The UNHCR does play a necessary role in understanding the GP3 process. In this analysis, the agency of the UNHCR is apparent in the discursive contributions it made to legitimizing GP3s. However, its weak structural position — constituted by its dependence on voluntary contributions, compounding refugee crises,

decreasing state responsibilities and subsequent financial crises — strongly constrained the UNHCR's agency and available strategies. The UN's Global Compact further shaped options through its legitimization and normalization discourses, creating another structural incentive to embrace the partnerships approach.

The structural determinants of GP3s are reflected in the asymmetrical relations they envelope. Relative to the UNHCR, business is in a very powerful position commanding the material and ideational resources the UNHCR seeks to leverage while holding a significant degree of global legitimacy and authority in the neoliberal political economy. The functional legitimacy of MNCs has been bolstered by the emerging pro-partnership epistemic community and the GP3 discourse. The asymmetrical relations of GP3s are further indicated in their distribution of benefits, risks and commitments. According to the UNHCR, the pro-partnership epistemic community and their critics, GP3s afford corporations the benefits of positive imaging and branding opportunities, increased access to new and expanding markets and opportunities to produce economies of scale. GP3s also offer corporations an opportunity to engage in CRS activities without the burden of legally binding regulations or substantive changes in behaviour while further legitimizing the capitalist global political economy (Andonova, 2006; Betts et al., 2016; Boyer & DuPont, 2016; Ruggie, 2001; UNHCR, 2017c). The benefits of positive CSR exposure and avoidance of legal obligations essentially override any risks in financial donations or investments incurred by MNCs. Furthermore, outside of the financial and knowledge-sharing commitments of business, which ultimately work to its benefit, MNCs have not had to make any substantive commitments to changing their behaviours or the way they operate in the global political economy. Instead of embedding values in the economy, GP3s embed refugee assistance in the market. For business, it's business as usual.

Assessing the benefits that the UNHCR gains from GP3s is a much more nuanced and difficult task. There are cases — such as IKEA's "Better Shelter Unit" or Vodafone's "Instant Network classrooms" — that seemingly provide genuine contributions to refugee assistance. However, as current research stands, we do not know the extent to which even these partnerships may be systemically changing the agency's agenda by virtue of their areas of expertise and investments. Innovation partner projects such as IKEA's "Better Shelter Unit" may be refocusing efforts toward encampment techniques over durable solutions, for example. More research is needed into this particular systemic dynamic. Yet, despite the intensifying engagement with the corporate sector, which is now the 10th largest contributor to the agency, the UNHCR continues to contend with an annually increasing budget deficit. It is more apparent, however, that the agency has taken on a disproportionate amount of the risk and commitment in these arrangements. Considering the significant asymmetries of power between the UNHCR and MNCs, it is troubling to find that the agency has no safeguards put in place to protect institutional autonomy nor mechanisms to ensure corporate accountability. The agency not only risks questions of moral legitimacy in its engagements with its widely scrutinized MNC partners, but also the very real potential of corporate capture of the agency's agenda as the UNHCR increasingly re-constitutionalizes and commits itself to the whims of the global capitalism.

Stephen Gill (1998) articulated the process through which states reconfigure themselves both institutionally and ideologically, in order to attract, and yet be

subsequently vulnerable to, the power of private investment. This process, known as "new constitutionalism," has witnessed states increasingly enact policies that essentially internationalize state governance, re-constituting themselves as arenas for transnational investment and increasing the legal protections of business while decreasing regulations. The UNHCR has undergone a similar process, increasingly re-constitutionalizing itself, both operationally and ideologically, in a manner that further embeds the agency within the global political economy. The UNHCR has altered the way it operates with MNCs, sharing and establishing epistemic forums where the ideas and logics of business are leveraged and where we can assume that, at the very least, MNCs are promoting their core interests. The UNHCR is also changing ideologically as indicated in its emerging market-based discourse. Considering the structural positioning of the agency and the current refugee crisis, this new constitutionalism process should provoke questions of institutional integrity and autonomy.

This is not to argue that genuine collaboration with the private sector is inherently undesirable. Fully accountable and refugee needs-focused efforts do provide opportunities for public–private co-operation, though the inherent nature of these relations need at least a consideration. This paper is meant to show that GP3s reflect broader patterns of structural and discursive relations and that their considerable power asymmetries can have real effects, as manifested in the ongoing new constitutionalism of the UNHCR. To what extent this impacts the efficacy and mandate of the agency is a matter of further research. However, there are indications that marketizing refugee issues can be injurious to refugee dignity, well-being and overall human security and should serve as a cause for caution. Samasource, a silicon valley-based company, provides such an indication. The company partnered with the UNHCR to provide "micro virtual work" for refugees, essentially outsourcing small digital projects that are easily delegated to an unskilled workforce. However, Samasource was found to be exploiting the cheap labour it found in a refugee camp, paying their refugee workers \$50/month compared to the average \$100/month found in the camp. This resulted in some of the refugee workers walking off the job, voicing concerns of long hours and low pay, and cancellation of the program (Betts et al., 2016). These types of exploitative business practices not only threaten to undermine the agency's goals in assisting in the socioeconomic, and hence human, security of refugee communities but may also undermine the socially perceived integrity and moral authority of the UNHCR, one of the very few sources of power it has at its disposal. Hence, the UNHCR case study shows that GP3s are capable of undermining the mandate and autonomy of global security and governance institutions.

Conclusion

Considering the asymmetries of power inherent in UNHCR GP3s, there may be some potential options to offset structural differences and mitigate the risks that the UNHCR faces. One obvious recommendation from current findings would be to ensure a secure operating budget that is not completely dependent on the voluntary (and highly politicized) contributions of states to offset the agency's structurally dictated dependence. However, this would be an incredibly difficult political task. For now, we could recommend establishing open and publicly assessable avenues for civil society input and oversight

across the GP3s, including in the epistemic forums where business knowledge and norms are diffused. This could provide an extended deliberative space to counter inherent biases in knowledge claims. We should also recommend articulating and emphasizing in GP3s not just the human rights of refugees, but also their social and economic rights to protect their well-being and livelihoods if they are to be embedded within market processes. Additionally, we should avoid discourses that reduce refugees to their economic value as new markets and commodities. This marketization of the refugee question trivializes solutions according to their economic viability. Finally, at the very least, we should recommend further research into the politics and power dynamics inherent within the GP3s of the UNHCR, other UN agencies and international institutions of security and governance to inform and counter the apolitical conceptualization and unproblematic promotion of GP3s and other market-based approaches.

This paper is meant to facilitate a new research agenda into the impacts UN–business partnerships have on the institution itself. Further research toward this agenda could include comparative analyses across UN agencies and/or other international institutions to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of these relations and inquire into the other new constitutionalism processes. In terms of global security, understanding GP3s in particular security regimes would assist in producing new knowledge and filling the mutual analytical gaps in both the GP3 and Security Studies literature. Additionally, more research is needed into the discursive and structural dynamics of these arrangements. We know very little of the discursive processes that occur within epistemic forums and the longer-term structural impacts these GP3s may have for an agency's agenda. Understanding these dynamics between the UNHCR and MNCs is particularly pertinent now more than ever considering the bleak outlook for peace in Syria, the stated impeding isolationism of the Trump administration, and the increasing salience of xenophobic and protectionist sentiments in the West.

References

Andonova, L. B. (2006). *Globalization, agency and institutional innovation: The rise of public–private partnerships in global governance*. Goldfarb Center for Public Affairs and Civic Engagement, Colby College, Waterville, ME.

Andonova, L. B. (2010). Public–private partnerships for the Earth: Politics and patterns of hybrid authority in the multilateral system. *Global Environmental Politics, 10*(2), 25–53.

Andonova, L. B. & Levy, M. (2003). Franchising global governance: Making sense of the Johannesburg type II partnerships. *Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development 2003/2004, 19*(31), 19–31.

Backstrand, K. & Kylsater, M. (2014). Old wine in new bottles? The legitimation and delegitimation of UN public–private partnerships for sustainable development from the Johannesburg Summit to the Rio+20 Summit. *Globalizations, 11*(3), 331–347.

Barnett, L. (2002). Global governance and the evolution of the international refugee regime. *International Journal of Refugee Law, 14*(2/3), 238–262.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization, 53*(4), 699–732.

Berliner, D. & Prakash, A. (2014). The United Nations global compact: An institutionalist perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics, 122*(2), 217–223.

Berliner, D., & Prakash, A. (2015). "Bluewashing" the firm? Voluntary regulations, program design and member compliance with the United Nations global compact. *The Policy Studies Journal, 43*(1), 115–138.

Betts, A. (2014). International relations and forced migration. In Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K., & Sigona, N. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (pp. 60–73). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Betts, A., Bloom, L., & Omata, N. (2012). *Humanitarian Innovation and Refugee Protection*. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, England.

Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J., & Omata, N. (2016). *Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development.* Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Bexell, M., & Morth, U. (Eds.). (2010). *Democracy and Public–Private Partnerships in Global Governance.* London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF). (2017a). *History.* http://www.bhforum.org/aboutus/History.aspx?tab=1&nav=2332.

Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF). (2017b). *Organization.* http://www.bhforum.org/aboutus/organization.aspx?tab=1&nav=2333.

Bieler, A., Bonefeld, W., Burnham, P., & Morton, A. (Eds.). (2006). *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labor: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bieler, A., & Morton, A. (2004). A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: Neo-Gramscian perspectives in international relations. *Capital & Class, 28*(1), 85–113.

Borzel, T. & Risse, T. (2007). Public–private partnerships: Effective and legitimate tools of transnational governance? In Grande, E., & Pauly, L. W. (Eds.), *Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century* (pp. 195–216). Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto.

Boyer, G., & DuPont, Y. (2016). The contribution of the private sector to solutions of displacement. *Forced Migration Review, 52*, 36–38.

Bull, B. (2010). Rethinking multilateralism: Global governance and public–private partnerships with the UN. In Ougaard, M., & Leander, A. (Eds.), *Business and Global Governance* (pp. 181–199). New York, NY: Routledge.

Bull, B., & McNeill, D. (2007). Development issues in global governance: Public–private partnerships and market multilateralism. New York, NY: Routledge.

Bull, B., & McNeill, D. (2010). From business unusual to business as usual: The future legitimacy of PPPS with multilateral organizations. In Bexell, M., & Morth, U. (Eds.), *Democracy and Public–Private Partnerships* (pp. 103–121). London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bull, B., Boas, M., & McNeill, D. (2004). Private sector influence in the multilateral system: A changing structure of world governance? *Global Governance, 10,* 481–498.

Chatterjee, P., & Finger, M. (1994). *The Earth brokers: Power, politics and world development.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Chimni, B. S. (1998). The geopolitics of refugee studies: A view from the South. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 11*(4), 350–374.

CorpWatch. (1999, September 23). *Groups expose more United Nations affiliations with corporate predators*. http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=940

Cox, R. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10*(1), 126–155.

Cox, R. (1987). Production, power, and world order: Social forces in the making of history. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Crisp, J. (2010). Forced displacement in Africa: Dimensions, difficulties, and policy directions. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29*(3), 1–27.

Cutler, C. (2010). Unthinking the GATS: A radical political economy critique of private transnational governance. In Ougaard, M., & Leander, A. (Eds.), *Business and Global Governance* (pp. 78–96). New York, NY: Routledge.

Cutler, C., Haufler, V., & Porter, T. (Eds.). (1999). *Private authority and international affairs*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Gibney, M. (2001). The state of asylum: Democratization, judicialization and evolution of refugee policy. *New Issues in Refugee Research (Working Paper No. 5)*, Geneva: UNHCR.

Gibney, M. (2004). The ethics and politics of asylum: Liberal democracy and the response to refugees. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, S. (Ed.). (1993). *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, S. (1998). New constitutionalism, democratization and global political economy. *Pacific Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 24*(3), 399–423.

Gill, S. & Law, D. (1989). Global hegemony and the structural power of capital. *International Studies Quarterly, 33*(4), 475–499.

Gregoratti, C. (2010). UNDP, business partnerships, and the (UN)democratic governance of development. In Bexell, M., & Morth, U. (Eds.), *Democracy and Public–Private Partnerships* (pp. 190–210). London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gregoratti, C. (2012). Transnational partnerships: Whose democracy? Whose justice? *Global Society, 26*(4), 515–534.

Hall, R., & Biersteker, T. (Eds.). (2002). *The emergence of private authority in global governance.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Hammerstad, A. (2014). The rise and decline of a global security actor: UNHCR, refugee protection and security. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Haufler, V. (2000). Private sector international regimes. In Higgott, R. A.; Underhill, G. R. D., & Bieler, A. (Eds.), *Non-state actors and authority in the global system* (pp. 121–137). New York, NY: Routledge.

Higgott, R. A.; Underhill, G. R. D., & Bieler, A. (Eds.). (2000). *Non-actors and authority in the global system*. New York, NY: Routledge.

International Development Research Centre. (2000). *The United Nations, networks, and the future of global governance.* Ottawa, Canada: Reinicke, W.

International Development Research Centre. (2000). *Critical choices: The United Nations, networks, and the future of global governance.* Ottawa, Canada: Reinicke, W., & Deng, F.

Kell, G. (2012). 12 years later: reflections on the growth of the UN global compact. *Business & Society, 52*(1), 31–52.

Kell, G. & Ruggie, J. (1999). Global markets and social legitimacy: The case of the "global compact." *Transnational Corporations, 8*(3), 101–120.

Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1989). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition.* Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

Krasner, S. (Ed.). (1983). *International regimes.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Levy, D., & Egan, D. (2000). Corporate political action in the global polity: National and transnational strategies in the climate change negotiations. In Higgott, R. A.; Underhill, G. R. D., & Bieler, A. (Eds.), *Non-state actors and authority in the global system* (pp. 138–154). New York, NY: Routledge.

Levy, D., & Newell, P. (2002). Business strategy and international environmental governance: Towards a neo-Gramscian synthesis. *Global Environmental Politics, 2*(4), 84–101.

Levy, D., & Newell, P. (Eds.). (2005). *The business of global environmental governance.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Loescher, G. (2011, February 8). The global crisis of protracted displacement. *World Politics Review*. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7804/the-global-crisis-of-protracted-displacement.

Loescher, G., Betts, A., & Milner, J. (2008). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The politics and practice of refugee protection in the twenty-first century. New York, NY: Routledge.

Loescher, G., & Milner, J. (2011). UNHCR and the global governance of refugees. In Betts, A. (Ed.), *Global Migration Governance* (pp. 189–209). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

May, C. (2015). *Global corporations in global governance.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Milner, J. (2009). Refugees and the regional dynamics of peacebuilding. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28*(1), 13–30.

Moller, B. (2015). Refugees, prisoners and camps: A functional analysis of the phenomenon of encampment. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newell, P. (2005). Business and international environmental governance: The state of the art. In Levy, D. L., & Newell, P. (Eds.), *The Business of Global Environmental Governance* (pp. 21–45). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ogata, S. (1999, November 1). Can business help? Partnership and responsibilities in humanitarian work. *Business Humanitarian Forum.* http://www.bhforum.org/pdf/ogata_011199.pdf.

Paine, E. (2000, October). The road to the global compact: Corporate power and the battle over global public policy at the United Nations. *Global Policy Forum.* https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/32188-the-road-to-the-global-compact.html.

Pingeot, L. (2016). In whose interest? The UN's strategic rapprochement with business in the sustainable development agenda. *Globalizations, 13*(2), 188–202.

Rasche, A., & Waddock, S. (2014). Global sustainability governance and the UN global compact: A rejoinder to critics. *Journal of Business Ethics, 122*(2), 209–216.

Refugee Studies Centre. (2014, November 24). Alexander Betts, RSC Director, Meets Refugees in Jordan with UNHCR Innovation Circle. https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/rsc-director-meets-refugees-in-jordan-with-unhcr-innovation-icircle.

Ruggie, J. (2001). global_governance.net: The global compact as learning network. *Global Governance, 7*(4), 371–378.

Ruggie, J. (2004). Reconstituting the global public domain — Issues, actors, and practices. *European Journal of International Relations, 10*(4), 499–531.

Sell, S. (2000). Structures, agents and institutions: Private corporate power and the globalization of intellectual property rights. In Higgott, R. A.; Underhill, G. R. D., & Bieler, A. (Eds.), *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (pp. 91–106)*.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Sethi, P. & Schepers, D. (2014). United Nations global compact: The promise–performance gap. *Journal of Business Ethics, 122*(2), 193–208.

Schaferhoff, M., Campe, S., & Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational public–private partnerships in international relations: Making sense of concepts, research frameworks, and results. *International Studies Review, 11*(3), 451–474.

Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011). The new political role of business in a globalized world: A review of a new perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance and democracy. *Journal of Management Studies, 48*(4), 899–931.

Slaughter, A., & Crisp, J. (2009, January). *A surrogate state? The role of UNHCR in protracted refugee situations*. UNHCR, policy development & evaluation service. http://www.unhcr.org/research/working/4981cb432/surrogate-state-role-unhcr-protracted-refugee-situations-amy-slaughter.html.

Smith, J. (2010). Power, interests, and the United Nations global compact. In Porter, T., & Ronit, K. (Eds.), *The challenges of global business authority: Democratic renewal, stalemate, or decay?* (pp. 89–113)*.* New York, NY: New York Press.

Soederberg, S. (2007). Taming corporations or buttressing market-led development? A critical assessment of the global compact. *Globalizations, 4*(4), 500–513.

Suder, G., & Nicolas, N. M. (2009). Microsoft's partnership with UNHCR: Pro bono publico? *Journal of Business Ethics Education, 6*, 1–16.

Tesner, S., & Kell, G. (2000). United Nations and business: A partnership recovered. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Therien, J.-P., & Pouliot, V. (2006). The global compact: Shifting the politics of international development. *Global Governance, 12*(1), 55–75.

TRAC (Transnational Resource & Action Center). (2000, September). Tangled up in blue: Corporate partners at the United Nations. http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf.

UN (United Nations). (1999, February 1). *Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos* [Press release]. http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.

UN Business. (2017). *UNHCR Profile*. https://business.un.org/en/entities/30.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2005). *The global report 2004*. http://www.unhcr.org/4a0c13d76.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2007). *The global report 2006*. http://www.unhcr.org/501f7d2e2.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2007b). *Global appeal 2008–2009*. http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/474ac8c12.pdf.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2013). *Note on the mandate of the High Commissioner for refugees and his office*. http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugees-office.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2015). *Global report 2014*. http://www.unhcr.org/5575a78b0.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2015b). *Doing business with UNHCR.* Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/admin/sts/3b9203194/ business-unhcr-2015.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2017). *Figures at a glance*. http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2017b). *Financials*. http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2017c). *Private sector supporters*. http://www.unhcr.org/private-sector-supporters.html.

UNHCR Innovation. (2017). *Partners*. http://www.unhcr.org/innovation/ partners.

UN-NGLS (United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service). (2017). *UNHCR*. https://unngls.org/index.php/engage-with-the-un/un-civil-society-contact-points/141-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-refugees-unhcr.

Utting, P. (2000). *UN–business partnerships: Whose agenda counts?* Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Utting, P., & Zammit, A. (2009). United Nations–business partnerships: Good intentions and contradictory agendas. *Journal of Business Ethics, 90*(1), 39–56.

Van Dijk, T. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society, 4*(2), 249–283.

Witte, J. M., & Reinicke, W. (2005). *Business UNusual: Facilitating United Nations Reform through Partnerships.* New York, NY: Global Public Policy Institute, United Nations Global Compact Office.

Zammit, A. (2003). *Development at Risk: Rethinking UN–Business Partnerships.* Geneva, Switzerland: The South Centre and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Beneath the Veneer of Peacebuilding: Insincere Peace Work and International Greenlighting

ERIN TROY *

Abstract — This research turns a critical eye to peacebuilding in Rwanda, by revealing the negative outcomes of efforts undertaken by Paul Kagame's regime. Evaluation of five key pillars of peacebuilding demonstrates that a veneer of peacebuilding has again put Rwanda on a dangerous trajectory towards civil war. Examining the role of international greenlighting as a causal factor of the Rwandan genocide offers a new framework through which to understand our own complicity and responsibility. This framework, in the current Rwandan context, underscores the importance of interrogating ongoing patterns of greenlighting in the post-conflict period, and how we continue to contribute to conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Middle powers like Canada bear an onus to generate innovative methods of peacebuilding assessment, in order to understand actual impact on the ground. This allows us to see beyond insincere peace work, and points us towards a place of taking action.

Keywords: international greenlighting; Rwanda peacebuilding; post-conflict period.

Résumé — Le présent article porte un regard critique sur la consolidation de la paix au Rwanda, notamment en discutant des effets négatifs des efforts déployés par le régime de Paul Kagame. L'évaluation de cinq piliers centraux de la consolidation de la paix démontre que les efforts déployés par le régime Kagame ont encore une fois placé le Rwanda sur une trajectoire menant à la guerre civile. En examinant le rôle de l'approbation tacite de la communauté internationale comme étant un facteur causal du génocide au Rwanda, l'auteure propose un nouveau modèle permettant de comprendre notre propre complicité et responsabilité. Dans le contexte actuel du Rwanda, ce modèle met l'accent sur l'importance de questionner les modes d'approbation tacite qui persistent dans la période post-conflit et sur notre contribution continue au conflit dans la région des Grands Lacs en Afrique. Les puissances moyennes, comme le Canada, ont le fardeau de mettre en place des procédés permettant l'évaluation de la consolidation de la paix, et ce, pour comprendre l'impact réel sur le terrain. Ce faisant, nous pourrons aller au-delà des opérations de paix insincères et intervenir efficacement.

Mots-clés : approbation tacite de la communauté internationale ; Rwanda ; consolidation de la paix ; période post-conflit.

---

* Erin Troy is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at York University. Her research focuses on political opportunities for women in post-conflict societies, and the media representation of women in elite political roles. Proposed doctoral research investigates opportunities for societal shifts through social movements during the peacebuilding period. Erin completed her MA in Political Science at the University of Toronto, with a collaborative program in Women and Gender Studies.

* Erin Troy est candidate au doctorat en science politique à l'Université York. Elle se concentre sur les perspectives politiques des femmes dans les sociétés sortant d'un conflit et la représentation des politiciennes dans les médias. Son projet de recherche proposé s'attarde sur les trajectoires des femmes dans les sociétés sortant d'un conflit et examine les changements sociétaux possibles par le biais des mouvements sociaux durant la période de consolidation de la paix. Erin a complété une maîtrise en science politique jumelée à un programme collaboratif en études sur les femmes et le genre à l'Université de Toronto.

Introduction

So much research has been generated regarding the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that one wonders whether there are any further insights to be had. Our continual return to Rwanda speaks to a paucity of improved approaches to conflict, coupled with an inability to come to terms with the scope of violence. Rwanda haunts, and it should. However, collective guilt mustn't render us paralyzed in the face of concerns in the current Rwandan context.

More than two decades after the Rwandan genocide, questions arise about how we measure peacebuilding success. The case of Rwanda is complicated. Achievements in some respects have seemingly come at the costs of others. Should post-conflict Rwanda should be condemned or used as a template for success in societies emerging from extensive violence? Despite the variance in interpretations, there is a decidedly undemocratic character to the Rwandan regime. What does this mean for our assessment of peacebuilding outcomes in the Rwandan context and beyond? A close examination of key peacebuilding efforts undertaken by the regime reveals a disingenuous approach to peacebuilding, placing RPF ambitions before peace, and endangering the gains that have been made in the post conflict period. Furthermore, international greenlighting driven by Kagame's manipulation of guilt enables a bypass of necessary components of a durable peace. This is important, as only two decades after the genocide, Rwanda is in many ways a precarious state once more.

Historical Context

It is difficult to have certainty about the origin of Hutu and Tutsi peoples in Rwanda. Both groups migrated to Rwanda at some point in the distant past, positioning the Twa as the only ethnic group indigenous to the area (Des Forges, 1999, 31). However, what is clear is that all three groups were present before colonization by Germany in 1897. Anthropologists describe identification as Hutu or Tutsi or Twa as fluid characterizations which "referred to a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of class, caste, and social status" (Jones, 2001, 18). Social hierarchy emphasized clan membership, and movement between Hutu and Tutsi categories was possible (Jones, 2001, 18). German, and subsequent Belgian colonizers after World War I, favoured the taller, lighter skinned Tutsi people, and gave them administrative roles and power over their Hutu countrymen (Jones, 2001, 17). This facet of the colonial encounter would prove a disastrous contributor to ethnic tensions in Rwanda, particularly because the division became a salient political tool. This is not to say that Rwandan society supported total equality between groups prior to colonization, but it certainly became more polarized thereafter. The Belgian introduction of identity cards proved particularly symbolic of this categorized entrenchment of ethnic difference, as the "creation of this internal discrimination system, which allowed the Tutsi privileged access to the state, to jobs, and to the church, would have a profound impact by creating an ethnic hierarchy" (Jones, 2001, 19).

The transition to independence in 1962 was fraught with violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi elites, each using ethnicity explicitly as a tool for mobilization (Jones, 2001, 19). Ongoing violence between groups led the Belgians to support a transition to a Hutu

government, framed saliently by the new leaders as the "Hutu Revolution" (Des Forges, 1999, 36). Large numbers of Tutsi living as refugees in surrounding nations conducted incursions into Rwanda over the following decades, fostering a sense among Hutus of a shared struggle against violent Tutsi forces (Des Forges, 1999, 36). Of course, these narratives would be manipulated during the genocide, and prove a strong factor in the dehumanization of entire ethnic groups.

Hutu General Habyarimana would assume power from the Parmehutu in a coup in 1973, and he subsequently placed the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MDNR) at the head of a single-party state (Des Forges, 1999, 37). It would be Habyarimana's assassination in 1994 which provided the proverbial spark for genocide immediately thereafter.

Civil War

Habyarimana had been under great pressure to democratize with transition to a multi-party state (Desrosiers, 2011, 435). The political tone in Rwanda was already strained, with high unemployment, worsening economic outlook, and frustration with Habyarimana's favouring of Hutus from his own clan (Jones, 2001, 26–27). The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), formed by Tutsi refugees in Uganda in 1987, saw this as a fortuitous moment to pursue a militarized return of refugees to Rwanda, particularly as they were growing concerned about their long term prospects in Uganda (Jones, 2001, 23, 28). The invasion of the RPF in October 1990 would signal the start of the civil war. Bruce Jones (2001) suggests this did considerable damage to the regime's public image, prompting increased calls for reform (p. 28). He also notes that Hutu elites, known as the akazu, felt a distinct threat to their power (Jones, 2001, 28). This contributed to their subsequent plans to eliminate this threat in the most literal sense possible (Jones, 2001, 28). The next two years were punctuated by a series of failed ceasefires, and an effective military campaign by the RPF made "a strong psychological imprint on the country" (Jones, 31, citing interviews with RPF members).

The Arusha peace negotiations were the regional and international response to the conflict. As described by Jones, the process seemed a rare ideal on the surface (Jones, 2001, 90). He portrays direct communication between opposing groups, which proceeded without the onus of a time limited format (Jones, 2001, 71). All negotiating parties had supportive allied powers built into the process, and they had an excellent facilitator in Mpungwe of Tanzania (Jones, 2001, 70). Rwandan political parties were broadly represented, as well as regional interests (Jones, 2001, 72–74). Second track forums provided unique venues for addressing dissent, and a number of supportive third parties contributed as well (Jones, 2001, 91).

Still, Habyarimana was reluctant to cede any power (Des Forges, 1999, 95). Pivotal successes for the RPF on the battlefield increased pressure upon the Habyarimana government to sign on to the Arusha peace treaty (Jones, 2001, 85). Many of the regime's supporters expected that the RPF would soon be capable of winning the war, and urged them to settle (Des Forges, 1999, 95). As Des Forges (1999) describes, the ultimatum issued by Rwanda`s largest aid providers, including their stalwart ally France, prompted

acceptance of the terms by Habyarimana (p. 95). Rather than lose massive financial support, he signed the agreement on August 4th, 1993.

It was a very comprehensive agreement. Terms included a broad power sharing transitional government, military integration, repatriation of refugees, and implementation timelines (Des Forges, 1999, 95). However, the RPF was able to shape the agreement more to their benefit, due to a relatively stronger negotiating position borne of recent military gains (Jones, 2001, 85). They rejected governing with radical Hutu CDR members, and insisted on a 50/50 share of government and holding important military positions (Jones, 2001, 85, 91). This caused alarm even among moderate Hutus, including moderates, including moderates, as this would present a very large power shift, and the Tutsi proportion of the population was considerably below 50% (Jones, 2001, 93).

Consequently, there was a great deal of resistance to the implementation of Arusha. Radicalized Hutu elements and the akazu began to coordinate to defend their positions of power (Des Forges, 1999, 97). The cogs of the United Nations turned very slowly to dispatch the peace keeping mission to supervise the implementation of the Arusha Accord (Des Forges, 1999, 99). In the interim, more radical Hutu elements who were most resistant to the agreement planned and mobilized. The October 1993 assassination of Hutu President Ndadaye of Burundi, by Tutsi military members, unleashed a torrent of ethnic violence, and sent massive numbers of Hutu refugees spilling into Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999, 101). Rwandan Hutus were shaken by what seemed evidence of the deeply harmful intent of the opposing ethnic group (Des Forges, 1999, 101), and this easily jeopardized the implementation of the peace agreement. Des Forges (1999) describes the immediate effects within Rwanda as follows,

> The movement known as Hutu Power.... the coalition that would make the genocide possible, was built upon the corpse of Ndadaye. The doubts about RPF intentions, sown by the February 1993 attack and fed by the extent of RPF gains at Arusha, ripened following the assassination in Burundi. As one political leader commented during the genocide. "…Who didn't have his eyes opened by what happened in Burundi... where they elected President Ndadaye, who really wanted Hutu and Tutsi to live together, but you know what they did to him...." (p. 103)

Tensions were incredibly high when the understaffed and under-equipped UN peace keeping force, UNAMIR was finally deployed in December 1993. Over the next few months, three key elements of the conflict unfolded. First, Habyarimana continually delayed the implementation of the peace agreement by raising numerous challenges to the terms of the Accords (Des Forges, 1999, 113). Second, radical Hutu elements, or Hutu Power, continued to prepare to eliminate all threats to their power (Des Forges, 1999, 103), by accumulating weapons, military strategies, names of targets, and built facilitating networks across Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999, 97–98). Meanwhile, and most disturbingly, during this period the international community received an unending tidal wave of advance warning about what was to come (Des Forges, 1999, 113). As Des Forges (1999) describes,

As the weeks passed, preparations for renewed conflict increased. The warnings of catastrophe multiplied, some public, like assassinations and riots, some discreet, like confidential letters and coded telegrams, some in the passionate pleas of desperate Rwandans, some in the restrained language of the professional soldier. A Catholic bishop and his clergy in Gisenyi, human rights activists in Kigali, New York, Brussels, Montreal, Ouugadougou, an intelligence analyst in Washington, a military officer in Kigali — all with the same message: act now or many will die. (p. 113)

Finally, with the assassination of Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994, the Rwandan powder keg erupted. With the execution of the murderous plans of Hutu elites, by July 1994, over 1 million predominantly Tutsi Rwandans had lost their lives in the genocide (Reyntjens, 2004, 177). Tactics often included forcing Tutsi citizens to gather in supposed safe spaces, where they were slaughtered by government sponsored forces. Hutu moderates who supported shared governance with Tutsis were assassinated almost immediately following Habyarimana's death (Longman, 2004, 61). The RPF swiftly undertook military action to eliminate or remove Hutu forces from the country, and assumed control of Rwanda in early July (Reyntjens, 2004, 178). Millions of Rwandans spilled over the borders into surrounding countries (Reyntjens, 2004, 178). This presented a massive and immediate need for humanitarian aid, which, while quickly dispatched, unfortunately provided support to fleeing Hutu militia members (Jones, 2001, 136, 170).

Causes of the Genocide

Theorists see the causes of the Rwandan genocide in a number of different ways, and certainly the complexity and historicity of the event defy any singular explanation. Scholars note that poverty, inequality and environmental concerns can be seen as playing a role (Jones, 2001, 47). There are, however, a number of key tenets that are crucial to note, in our attempt to distill warnings for the future.

Jones (2001), in his detailed and compelling account of the Arusha peace process, connects the genocide with the failed implementation of the Accord. His argument focuses on the content of the agreement itself, rather than the process (p. 92). He rightfully describes that the terms of the agreement represented too much of a "win" for the RPF (Jones, 2001, 93). The shift in power would have been too drastic, and their radical opposition, the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), had been excluded (Jones, 2001, 93). Antagonizing "spoilers" to the peace process led directly to preparations for genocide, in order to preserve their hold on power (Jones, 2001, 93). He adds that a lack of understanding amongst the international players of the deeper contexts of the conflict (particularly in regards to historical patterns of ethnic manipulation and mobilization) made possible the CDR's disastrous exclusion from the agreement (Jones, 2001, 95–96). This left forces unprepared for their resistance to the terms of Arusha (Jones, 2001, 97). This is a valuable insight, and it is painful that we are only left with a counterfactual "what if" to consider the potential of a process which had so much in its favour. Had the CDR been included, had RPF gains been more in proportion to their population, had resistance been expected... It is reasonable to expect that the outcome of the civil war might have been drastically different.

In *Leave None to Tell the Story,* Alison Des Forges (1999) corrects the initially widely held assumption that the genocide was the result of ethnic tensions between brutally violent groups. Rather, she corrects that it was the political manipulation thereof which enabled the slaughter (p. 6). Hutu elites wielded propaganda presenting a Tutsi threat, and underscored instances of violence in surrounding countries to reinforce concerns about Tutsi intent within Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999, 57). For instance, following the assassination of the Hutu leader of Uganda by Tutsi forces, Hutu elites fuelled fears by perpetuating an image of Tutsis intending to take over Rwanda by force (Des Forges, 1999, 58). This manipulation of ethnic divides speaks to a longstanding pattern within Rwanda, from the late colonial period onward (Desrosiers, 2011, 432). Ways of framing previous, long term struggles between groups, and acts of marginalization, proved salient narratives in attempts to incite fears and violence. Without such a compelling message reinforcing their deepest fears about Tutsi intentions, it is hard to envision that the brutality and extent of the violence would have occurred. What must be noted, though, is that this was undertaken with a political aim from above; the ethnic based concerns were not initially generated by the civilian population (Des Forges, 1999, 6). Regular, everyday life in Rwanda, while not devoid of ethnic tensions, did not impede the groups from living in the same villages, or intermarrying.

Filip Reyntjens (2015), an expert on the Great Lakes Region, suggests three causal factors for the genocide. First, he explains that the instability borne of the transition from a one-party system to a multiparty democracy is part of a nexus of lethal factors (p. 20). This stands to reason: had the Hutu elites had not felt that their power was threatened, they would have had less impetus to prepare to eliminate their opposition. Second, he points to the polarized nature of the ethnic structure in Rwanda (Reyntjens, 2015, 20). While Des Forges (1999) has raised the point that this was largely politically emphasized (p. 6), there has been a lengthy history of distinction between the two groups. Finally, he highlights the monoethnic character of the RPF. This made it easy for the Hutu powers to frame the RPF as a coherent enemy to be feared and eliminated, a central element to genocide (Reyntjens, 2015, 20).

A common way of approaching the responsibility for the Rwandan genocide has been as an international failure to react. Jones (2001) himself suggests that poor coordination at the international level, and a dearth of political will were key contributing factors to the genocide (p. 160), and Des Forges' (1999) documentation of unheeded warnings is overwhelming (p. 113). The delayed and severely under-equipped UNAMIR force is rightfully a focus of condemnation, as a larger contingent with an appropriate mandate might have stopped the slaughter before it could spread beyond Kigali (Jones, 2001, 160). Much of the literature surrounding the genocide indicates that the recall of UN peacekeeping forces was the signal to the Hutu elites that they would be able to proceed unimpeded (Jones, 2001, 120). The reluctance of the international community to refer to the horrors unfolding in Rwanda as a genocide had the deepest impact: it subsequently delayed an international intervention (Des Forges, 1999, 24). This makes clear that the international community's decisions in response to the conflict proved to be a significant causal factor.

It is important to refine this point of responsibility further, and see it through a slightly different lens. There were a number of instances wherein Hutu forces conducted acts of brutality against Tutsis in the months before the genocide. The lack of a response by the international community, despite clear knowledge of these massacres, had a distinct political impact. By deciding not to respond, they "greenlighted" similar, and escalating acts of violence.

Rwanda has long been a heavily aid dependent country, which must foster a positive relationship with international powers in order to survive (Desrosiers, 2011, 437). This is, as mentioned above, how France convinced Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accord (Des Forges, 1999, 95). There was certainly ample opportunity to condemn acts of violence, or to withhold aid. None was ever taken. In this usage, *Greenlighting*, refers to fully understanding the scope of violence and deciding not to make any statements of condemnation, despite doing there being little personal cost, and having great influence over the perpetrators. The term refers to a decision to license condemnable behaviour by deciding to say nothing, which provides the perpetrator with a "green light" to continue. This concept is important for two reasons. First, from an ethical viewpoint, it speaks to a culpability far beyond passive negligence. There is a direct intentionality to greenlighting which doesn't necessitate a predictive knowledge of subsequent, genocidal outcome in order to resonate. This certainly provides an apt frame for the failures of the international community in Rwanda. Second, it is vital to keep this concept in mind as we examine the flawed nature of peacebuilding efforts, to which we now turn. A narrative shift to understanding such instances of international implication in conflict as greenlighting can impart a sense of obligation to undertake small speech acts of condemnation that have considerable impact.

Current Context

The Rwanda left to the RPF forces was in a state of devastation (Reyntjens, 2004, 178). Over a million Rwandan citizens had been killed, millions more were left internally displaced persons, and over two million had fled into surrounding countries (Reyntjens, 2004, 178). Infrastructure, crops, and service provision methods had been destroyed, and many villages were decimated. Despite destruction, Paul Kagame's regime could boast impressive reconstruction efforts in a relatively short period. Reyntjens refers to "a period of impressive modernization and economic development," and cites remarkable economic growth rates of 8% (Reyntjens, 2015, 19). In the years since the genocide have also made excellent strides towards meeting Millennium Development Goals (Reyntjens, 2015, 19). Foreign aid has poured into the country to rebuild infrastructure, as well as to provide infrastructure services and housing (Jones, 2001, 136). Many would be quick to suggest that their biggest success has been avoiding a return to conflict, or the "security" component of peacebuilding. So, how we are to think of security in a post conflict context, and measures of peacebuilding success in general? While Kagame's regime currently exercises extensive control over any resistance in Rwanda, there are many reasons to be concerned about a return to violence, rather than a lasting peace. In a close examination of the pursuit of key peacebuilding elements by the regime, we can see that a disingenuous approach to peacebuilding, which places RPF ambitions before peace, endangers the gains that have been made in the post conflict period. Furthermore, international greenlighting

behaviours, driven by Kagame's manipulation of guilt, enable this avoidance of the necessary components of durable peace.

Method

While there are varying understandings of the pillars of peacebuilding, there are a few fundamental aspects. For the purposes of this work we will consider the following elements: Economy, Statebuilding, Security, Justice and Reconciliation, and Good Governance. After examining each of these in the Rwandan context, the serious nature of the false veneer of peacebuilding will emerge. We will then turn to an assessment of our own role in Rwanda's current descent towards disaster.

Economy

At first glance, economic development seems to have been the clearest peacebuilding achievement of the Kagame regime. Rwanda, posited as a "development darling," is seen as an excellent development partner of geopolitical importance (Matfess, 2015, 187). The surrounding countries in the Great Lakes Region are seen as relatively higher risk countries in which to invest (Matfess, 2015, 187). The apparent stability of the regime is a key element considered by foreign investors and development programs (Matfess, 2015, 187). It also attracts a relatively large amount of foreign aid (Samset, 2011, 271), and has undertaken modernization of its agricultural sector (Samset, 2011, 273). The Rwandan population is framed by the government as hard working and dedicated to improving their recovering nation (Samset, 2011, 272). This has been paired with Rwandan government investments in education and health (Samset, 2011, 273).

However, after examination of the dispersion of wealth in Rwanda, it becomes clear that the high rates of economic growth have not benefited the rural poor majority (Samset, 2011, 272). Despite lessening poverty in a relative sense, the inequality between the urban elites and the rural poor has increased drastically (Samset, 2011, 271–272). While there is some variance across the ethnic divide, neither Tutsi nor Hutu citizens have been excluded from this phenomenon. The investments in education have not been felt across the country equally, and language policies which insist upon instruction in English are to the benefit of old caseload Tutsi returnees, rather than Tutsi survivors and Hutus who speak Kinyarwanda or French (Samuelson, 2010, 205). Most importantly, the agricultural modernization schemes undertaken by the government have had a negative impact upon rural farmers. They now face insufficient land for subsistence, forced use of expensive, "superior" seeds, and a focus on singular crops which leave them at greater risk to fluctuating environmental conditions (Reyntjens, 2015, 29–30).

Clearly the benefits of foreign aid and economic opportunity are experienced primarily by the urban elites. Despite the appearance of success in regards to the economic pillar of peacebuilding, upon closer examination, we discover a scenario that fosters rapidly increasing inequality, desperation, and hence a greater chance of a return to violence.

Security and Statebuilding

Because of their level of entanglement, in the Rwandan context, it is most appropriate to examine these two elements together. State building refers to the presence of strong institutions in the post conflict context, along with clear structure. In large part, Rwanda's quick recovery can be attributed to a history of a strong state (Purdekova, 2011, 476), which helps hasten a return to state function after conflict. At the time of the genocide, the RPF had a clearly defined hierarchical structure and a strong, disciplined military (Purdekova, 2011, 477). Furthermore, the RPF already had a template for an interim government and rule of law in the terms of the Arusha Accord. (Des Forges, 1999, 95). While the legal system suffered from a lack of lawyers and judges following the genocide, the incorporation of community level traditional mechanisms helped to address this gap, and foreign aid was directed at training new lawyers and rebuilding courts (Zorbas, 2004, 35–36).

This relates very strongly to the Rwandan government's ability to provide security. A strong state and impressive military, as well as a formidable intelligence mechanism, are crucial to security in a post conflict period. However, this is where the divergence between governance and state building comes sharply into view. In order to maintain security and state stability, the Rwandan government has undertaken a long list of repressive measures.

One of the first actions of the new Rwandan government was to significantly change the terms outlined for the transitional government in order to concentrate power into their hands (Reyntjens, 2004, 178). In the name of security, the military has made numerous incursions into surrounding countries, initially in pursuit of Hutu perpetrators who had escaped, and to repatriate Rwandan refugees (Reyntjens, 2004, 204). Not only have they committed massive atrocities against unarmed civilians (Reyntjens, 2004, 194–195), they have also greatly contributed to destabilization in the entire area (Reyntjens, 2004, 204–208). Their interference into the matters of other sovereign states have led to anger and violence directed at Tutsi refugees, and led to reprisal incursions into Rwanda (Reyntjens, 2004, 207). Their involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, initially for security concerns surrounding Hutu extremists, evolved into a means to ensure access to Congolese resources and supported links to criminalized organizations (Reyntjens, 2004, 206). Rwandan citizens live in a constant state of fear, due to repressive and yet vague laws that could see anyone charged with genocidal ideology for expressing doubts about the state, referring to unofficial views of the genocide, or mentioning one's ethnicity (King, 2010, 301). The permeation of surveillance throughout the Rwandan society only serves to increase tensions and build distrust of the regime (Purdekova, 2011, 489).

While all of this control allows the regime to have a stranglehold on any dissent, it immediately raises concerns about the long term outlook. Domestically, the amount of repression and fear experienced by everyday Rwandan citizens forms a groundwork for subsequent dissent. Recently, even top RPF officials have been leaving the country to coordinate in exile, bemoaning the dictatorial tone of Kagame's rule (Reyntjens, 2015, 25). Some of these alliances are between groups who up until recently sat at opposite sides of the political spectrum, due to the regime's alienation of previous supporters (Reyntjens,

2015, 25). As Kagame's own rise to power suggests, this presents a significant threat to security and state stability, which is entirely counter to the peacebuilding project.

Justice and Reconciliation

Rwanda's community based approach to justice, the Gacaca court system, is now widely known as an innovative approach to dealing with justice and healing in a post conflict context (Zorbas, 2004, 35–36). Not only is Gacaca seen as a more legitimate form of justice because of its cultural origins and grassroots nature, it has also helped to bridge the gap while the broader justice system is rebuilt (Matfess, 2015, 190). In addition, the international community has created tribunals and international courts to bring charges against main instigators of the genocide (Zorbas, 2004, 33). Nationwide memorialization projects and education have allowed Rwandan citizens to share their experiences and have their suffering recognized (King, 2010, 294). Special solidarity camps, or *ingando*, soon to be mandatory for all Rwandans entering university, help to foster shared understandings of the conflict, and uptake of a shared Rwandan identity (Matfess, 2015, 190).

Unfortunately, these efforts have not had very good outcomes. Many complain that Gacaca courts cannot legitimately serve their purpose, because they are only able to pursue cases against Hutu perpetrators, and not RPF forces (Reyntjens, 2015, 27). In addition, participation is limited to confession and apology only, rather than investigating complicated cases (Reyntjens, 2015, 27). Narratives are limited: only Tutsis may be seen as victims, and Hutus can only be genocidaires (King, 2010, 301). International courts have completed very few cases (Zorbas, 2004, 34), and when there has been any effort to investigate RPF atrocities, the regime applied enough pressure to disable the process (Reyntjens, 2015, 27). Official accounts of the genocide, including museums and textbooks, only allow the expression of Tutsi victimization, and what is presented as a very small number of Hutu who tried to help them (King, 2010, 303). These limited depictions are heavily reinforced by the ideologies put forth by the state run youth solidarity camps (Zorbas, 2004, 39). Of course, this silencing of other accounts of the genocide, including mixed race Rwandans, or those victimized by RPF forces, only serves the official state narrative of the RPF as a heroic, liberating force (Zorbas, 2004, 46). As mentioned above, this lent legitimacy both inside and outside of Rwanda (King, 2010, 293).

The stifling of alternative stories increases tensions by leaving these events unaddressed. As King (2010) explains, "unacknowledged wounds can present an obstacle to peacebuilding in both present and future generations" (p. 293). Avenues to pursue justice are similarly restricted by state sanctioned foreclosure of these narratives (King, 2010, 304). Similar to the economic inequality underlying supposed development achievements, the Rwandan state's avoidance of effective justice and reconciliation feeds discontent, and contributes to grounds for a future revival of conflict (King, 2010, 304). Finally, the impunity borne of not being able to prosecute the extensive war crimes and human rights abuses of the Rwandan government in the time since the genocide undermines the legitimacy of the government (Zorbas, 2004, 41), and builds a foundation for future uprisings.

Good Governance

To paint a picture of widening political enfranchisement, gender quotas have been incorporated into the constitution (Coffe, 2012, 286), and Hutus have the chance to participate in government. Elections happen at regular intervals, and boast very high voter turnout, which suggests increasing democratization (Matfess, 2015, 186).

It is disappointing that these measures have not generated the outcomes required to support good governance in Rwanda. International election monitors have recorded fraud, including reports of stuffed ballot boxes, unclear counting procedures, and ballots which require a thumbprint of the voter (Reyntjens, 2004, 183). Potential opponents who are not under the regime's control are banned from running, disappear, or have been assassinated (Reyntjens, 2004, 186). Recently, sources have reported that Kagame is considering overturning laws surrounding term limits so that he can run again in the next election (Reyntjens, 2016, 61). As many would suspect, current research demonstrates the strong links between increasing democratization and adherence to term limits (Reyntjens, 2016, 65). Members of the government offer negligible resistance to RPF aims, and an environment of high party discipline leaves members unwilling to offer a dissenting voice (Coffe, 2012, 290). Interviews with women politicians demonstrate that they do not see themselves as having a substantive effect on policy, rendering their incorporation into government as merely symbolic (Coffe, 2012, 290). A previously vital civil society has been silenced by laws that leave funding in the control of the government, and rendering expulsion from the country a very real threat (Reyntjens, 2004, 198). The media has been significantly curtailed by vague genocidal ideology laws, and academic researchers face significant sanctions for publishing work that is critical of the government (Reyntjens, 2004, 197, 202).

This type pf censorship has produced a veneer of a stable state (Matfess, 2015, 186–187). This is crucial to the government's aim of attracting foreign investment partners and to maintain their image in the eyes of the international community (Matfess, 2015, 186–187). However, the increasing political disenfranchisement of the Rwandan people and the stifling of dissent foster an increasing level of discontent with the state. This is not a state that is responsive to its people — citizens cannot express their needs, nor can they pursue them. The illusion of democratization, while useful externally, in fact delegitimizes the Rwandan government and ultimately undermines their stability (Reyntjens, 2004, 210). As Reyntjens (2004) explains,

> ...most Rwandans, who are excluded and know full well that they have been robbed of their civil and political rights, are frustrated, angry and even desperate. Such conditions constitute a fertile breeding ground for more structural violence, which created anger, resentment and frustration and may well eventually again lead to violence. (p. 210)

Having examined each of these crucial pillars, it is clear that the political emphasis of the Rwandan state has been on their own objectives, rather than actually undertaking the hard work of building a positive, enduring peace. Twenty years post conflict, we can no longer rationalize increased state control over the short term. Kagame's regime has

undertaken a campaign to eliminate dissent, concentrated its power, and crafted an outward image which attracts economic development. This is certainly a heartbreaking outcome for a long suffering people. While some might argue that they are not currently contending with a genocide, the most serious ramification of this veneer of peacebuilding is the long term impact. It is not a question of if, but rather, when massive conflict will erupt. A common thread emerging in recent academic literature draws remarkable comparisons between the current government, and the Habyarimana regime (Desrosiers, 2011, 432). Kagame would find this a highly distasteful comparison; yet, domestic repression, emphasis upon attracting foreign investment, and the depiction of Kagame as the benevolent leader takes a page directly out of Habyarimana's guidebook (Desrosiers, 2011, 448–449). With the growing dissatisfaction with the regime, and new alliances being made by Rwandans in exile, it seems increasingly likely that we are destined to see history repeat itself.

A Response?

It would seem as though we now find ourselves in a helpless position. The Kagame regime has authoritarian control over the Rwandan state, and quite a bit of heft internationally. However, if history is about to repeat itself, perhaps a useful tenet can be drawn from our previous examination of our own conduct during the initial conflict. As stated previously, greenlighting refers to an avoidance of expressing dissent, despite a low personal cost of making such a statement, and a high potential impact of doing so. While it is unfortunate enough that we can find examples of international greenlighting during the genocide, it is doubly distressing that the pattern has continued in the aftermath. The unwillingness to apply pressure to the Rwandan government has enabled the Kagame regime's avoidance of crucial aspects of peacebuilding.

A specific pattern of greenlighting involves the international responses to atrocities committed by the RPF. Some have rationalized that in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, international players were left with a choice to either overlook the RPF slaughter of unarmed civilians, or to support the genocidal Hutu forces (Des Forges, 1999, 556). This presented a dilemma: one option was distasteful, while the other was absolutely unforgivable and politically impossible (Des Forges, 1999, 556). However, this doesn't have to preclude simple but possibly effective statements of dissent that could express concern for the civilian population.

In April 1995, the Kibeho camp, home to thousands of internally displaced Rwandans, was subject to attack by the Rwandan military, the RPA (Reyntjens, 2015, 26). Despite the RPF's reports of the number of casualties, Australian peacekeepers reported that four thousand unarmed people had been killed (Reyntjens, 2015, 26). The international community didn't pursue their initial concerns regarding these practices, and the regime therefore grasped that there would be no sanctions for this sort of action (Reyntjens, 2015, 26). Unsurprisingly, within the next year the same military force was responsible for committing far more atrocities. A 2010 report declared that most of the 617 such incidents they investigated between 1993 and 2003 were war crimes, and possibly acts of genocide (Reyntjens, 2015, 26). Reyntjens (2004) details the decision to suppress the UNHCR Gersony report which detailed extensive atrocities committed by the RPF (p. 198). He

insists that the international community has been implicit in the creation of a veritable dictatorship in Rwanda, by failing to push the regime to address rampant and increasing voter fraud with each subsequent election (Reyntjens, 2004, 210). In this way, the international community has greenlighted Kagame's increasing concentration of power, despite the resulting implications for building a long term peace. This demonstrates the consequences of choosing to greenlight such activities, or giving a de facto "go ahead" signal to perpetrators in the wake of initial transgressions. However, there is evidence that a simple dissenting statement can have a restraining impact. The Rwandan government is most certainly attuned to how they are perceived by foreign nations (Desrosiers, 2011, 437), as they are dependent on foreign aid, and therefore the favour of the international community (Desrosiers, 2011, 437).

The increasingly authoritarian tone of the regime has also brought with it a willingness to wield what Reyntjens and others describe as a "moral credit" (Zorbas, 2004, 46). By this he refers to the ability of the Rwandan regime to capitalize upon the intense guilt of the international community's failure to act during the genocide (Reyntjens, 2004, 198). Kagame handily responds to international critiques of his conduct by calling forth this "genocide credit," which retrenches the legitimacy of his regime (Reyntjens, 2004, 199). Reyntjens (2004) relates this to similar behaviours exhibited by the state of Israel when criticized for their treatment of Palestinians (p. 199). He explains that "the 1994 genocide has become an ideological weapon allowing the RPF to acquire and maintain victim status and, as a perceived form of compensation, to enjoy complete immunity" (Reyntjens, 2004, 199). This guilt has proven paralyzing (Reyntjens, 2004, 198), and demonstrates the importance of using a greenlighting lens when taking into account our role in licensing violence and perpetuating conflict. It entrenches a sense of agency that shatters the more comfortable overtone of passive negligence. Should members of the international community begin to see their intentional inaction in this way, they may have more opportunities to curb an increasingly authoritarian regime, and to address some of the current risks to peace in Rwanda.

Suggested Approaches

The study of the Rwandan genocide and the unsatisfying peacebuilding efforts that have followed, make clear the need for new and innovative approaches to international responses to conflict. A suggestion that arises out of this work, and the frequent misinterpretation of Rwandan success, surrounds the ways in which we measure peacebuilding outcomes. Theorist Sherene Razack (2007) has investigated our role as Canadians in how we view our own culpability in the wake of such extensive violence as unfolded in Rwanda (p. 385). She advocates the need to move from a place of outrage to a place of responsibility (Razack, 2007, 376), seeing our actions through the lens of greenlighting is an attempt to do so. However, this premise of taking responsibility can also be applied to how we approach assessment of peacebuilding activities in the post conflict context. It is clear from the Rwandan case that to get past the top down veneer of peacebuilding, measurement needs assess changes in the lived circumstances of regular citizens. Twenty years after the genocide we are given the opportunity to do just that.

In addition, I think a crucial insight about a potential framework can and should be drawn from the recent past. While the international community, and Security Council in particular, were for many reasons slow to respond to the genocide, the temporary members of the Council pushed the permanent members to take action (Des Forges, 1999, 21). In this regard, middle powers are somewhat less entangled than great powers in questions of international influence. As the Czech Republic expressed, Rwanda was not on their list of priorities, but they felt compelled to respond as human beings (Des Forges, 1999, 26). Perhaps it is here that we can find a role for middle powers such as ourselves, in response to the communal guilt borne of our previous inaction. We could take responsibility for conducting assessments of peacebuilding efforts, and for generating new, more relevant approaches to measurement. Efforts such as these, when connected with a responsibility to address greenlighting, offer interesting avenues of investigation.

References

Coffe, H. (2012). Conceptions of female political representation: Perspectives of Rwandan female representatives. *Women's Studies International Forum, 35*, 286–297.

Des Forges, A. (1999). *Leave None to Tell the Story*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

Desrosiers, M., & Thomson, S. (2011). Rhetorical legacies of leadership: Projections of "benevolent leadership" in pre- and post-genocide Rwanda. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 49*(3), 429–453.

Jones, B. D. (2001). *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The dynamics of failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

King, E. (2010). Memory controversies in post-genocide Rwanda: Implications for peacebuilding. *Genocide Studies and Prevention, 5*(3), 293–309.

Longman, T. (2004). Obstacles to peacebuilding in Rwanda. In T. M. Ali & R. O. Matthews (Eds.), *Durable Peace: Challenged for peacebuilding in Africa* (61–81). Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Longman, T. (2005). Rwanda's paradox: Gender equality or emerging authoritarianism? In Bauer, G., and Britton, H. (Eds.), *Women in African Parliaments* (210–233). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Matfess, H. (2015). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men. *African Studies Review, 58*(2), 181–204.

Purdekova, A. (2011). "Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes": Surveillance and state reach in Rwanda. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 49*(3), 475–497.

Razack, S. A. (2007) Stealing the pain of others: Reflections on Canadian humanitarian responses. *The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies, 29*, 375–394.

Reyntjens, F. (2004). Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship. *African Affairs, 103*, 177–210.

Reyntjens, F. (2015). Rwanda: Progress or powder keg. *Journal of Democracy, 26*(3), 19–33.

Reyntjens, F. (2016). A new look at the evidence. *Journal of Democracy, 27*(3), 61–68.

Samset, I. (2011). Building a repressive peace: the case of post-genocide Rwanda. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5*(3), 265–283.

Samuelson, B. L., & Freedman, S. W. (2010). Language policy, multilingual education, and power in Rwanda. *Language Policy 9*, 191–215.

Zorbas, E. (2004). Reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. *African Journal of Legal Studies, 1*, 29–52.