

Multilateral Military Ops: Learning from Afghanistan and Libya



Canada Was Not Alone

- Extension Decisions
- Big Mistake Entering W/ Insufficient Forces
- Detainees
- Geographic Focus—One War or Twenty-Plus?

Benchmarks in Kandahar vs. **War in Afghanistan**


Coalitions vs. the Alliance

- Coalitions Of the Willing Not So Willing
 - Not Caveat-Free, Red Card-Free
- Technical Interoperability
 - Lots of “Under Radar” Stuff Went Fine in A-stan
 - CA w/UK/Dutch/US
 - Difficult Coordination in/over Libya Before NATO Took Over

Much Intra-Alliance Variation

- Afghanistan
 - Changing Commanders
 - CAVEATS!
 - Discretion: Red Cards, Phone Calls, Capability Limits
 - Oversight Varies Widely
 - Mixed Incentives
- Libya: Bombers vs. NFZ vs. Embargo vs. Zilch

Public Opinion and Discretion



Trends in Canadian P.O. & Caveats



Is It About Culture?

- A shared understanding of purpose of military and of force matters
 - Germany, Germany, Germany
- Two Problems
 - **Variation:** Can it account for changes over the short term?
 - Does Not Account for Non-German Cases

Inherent in Multilateral Ops

- NATO

- Essential to NATO—Consensus Required

Article V: each member “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such *action as it deems necessary*...”

- **Always** Civilian Control of the Military

- But Much **Variation** in How Control is Exercised

Means of Democratic Control

- **Selection of Agents**: Choose commanders whose preferences closely match those of principals
 - Constraint: Availability of Alternatives
- **Discretion**: Determine Agent's **Authority**
 - Under What Conditions Can Commander Make Decision or Have to Call Home?
 - **Caveats**, Capability Restrictions
- **Oversight**: **Monitor** Agent's Behavior
 - Passively or actively, Regularly or irregularly
 - Are Those Back Home Attentive? Engaged?
- **Sanctions**: **Penalize/Reward** Agent Performance
 - Commander's tenure & promotion contingent on what?

Democratic Institutions

Coalition Government

- **Discretion**
 - Caveats, Phone Calls
 - Capabilities
- **Oversight**

- Depends on **Composition**
 - Left, Right, Center
 - Broad/Narrow

Single Party Parl/Pres

- **Agent Selection**
- **Discretion** via Capabilities
- **Oversight**
 - Varies among principals
- **Incentives**
 - Canada vs Australia
- Depends on **Personality**

Institutions of Civil-Military Relations (History) Matter

Institutions and Caveats

Country	Institutional Type	Caveats
Belgium	Coalition Parliament	Tight
<u>Denmark</u>	<i>Coalition Parliament</i>	<i>Loose</i>
<u>Germany</u>	Coalition Parliament	Tight → Less Tight
Italy	Coalition Parliament	Tight
<u>Netherlands</u>	Coalition Parliament	Medium, Gone
Norway	Coalition Parliament	Loose to Medium
Sweden	Coalition Parliament	Medium
<u>Australia</u>	Coalition Parliament until 2007, Majority Parliament	Medium
<u>Canada</u>	<i>Minority Parliament</i>	<i>Tight, then Loose, Tight</i>
<u>France</u>	Premier-Presidential	Medium, then Loose
Poland	Premier-Presidential	Loose
Romania	Premier-Presidential	Tight
Spain	Majority Parliament	Tight
Turkey	Majority Parliament	Tight
UK	Majority Parliament	Loose
US	Presidential	Loose

Libya

Country	Institutions	Ideology	Maximum Effort
Belgium	Caretaker government	NA	Air Strikes
Germany	Majority Coalition	Right-Center	None
Greece	Majority Coalition	Left	Naval Embargo
Italy	Majority Coalition	Right-Center	Air Strikes
Norway	Majority Coalition	Left-Center	Air Strikes
UK	Majority Coalition	Right-Center	Air Strikes +
Canada	Minority → Majority Parliament	Right	Air Strikes
Denmark	Minority Coalition	Right-Center	Air Strikes
Netherlands	Minority Coalition	Right-Center	No Fly Zone
Sweden	Minority Coalition	Right-Center	No Fly Zone
Spain	Minority Parliament	Left-Center	No Fly Zone
Turkey	Majority Parliament	Right-Center	Naval Embargo
France	Premier-Presidential	Right-Center	Air Strikes +
Bulgaria	Premier-Presidential	Right	Naval Embargo
Romania	Premier-Presidential	Right-Center	Naval Embargo
Poland	Premier-Presidential	Right-Center	None
Portugal	Premier-Presidential	Left → Broad	None
United States	Presidential	Left-Center	Air Strikes ¹²

Implications

- **Mission Design for Canada**
- **Moderately Predictable Allies**
- **Tendency to Rely on SOF**
- **Uneven Burden-Sharing May Mean Fewer Ops**



Lessons

- **Strategies to Mitigate**
- **Coalitions of the Willing
≠ Workaround**
- **Smart Defence is
Problematic**

NATO in Afghanistan

Fighting Together, Fighting Alone

DAVID P. AUERSWALD • STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN

