Peace, Temporality, and the Vivacity of Differences

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Abstract

Peace, conceptually and practically, appears to be an engagement with the question of “otherness” and difference(s). In the history of Western politics this question tends to become answered in wide circles of IR theory and policy-making following the idea of E Pluribus Unum; i.e. the dictum of assimilation of the “other”/“otherness” and the unification of differences. Critical of this understanding, the paper argues that respective unifying concepts contribute to conditions for conflict and create asymmetric power relations in peace formation processes, rather than they would be conducive to the formation of peaceable relations among actors (individual, cultural groups, states). On the basis of phenomenological approaches to the question of the “other”/“otherness”, primarily referring to Alfred Schütz, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jacques Derrida, an understanding of peace shall be developed which envisions peace as the positive embracement and vivacity of differences as condition for the relation to the “other”.

1. The Problematic

Throughout the history of Western political philosophy and international relations thinking about peace encompasses enquiries such as how to accomplish peace, how to justify the breaking of peace, and how to define peace etc.; and relates to problems such as the relation between war and peace, ‘just war’, ius in bellum and ius at bellum. These discussions seem to have two characteristics in common, irrespective of their historical, political, and social circumstances: first, they understand peace, more or less, as the abolishment and supersession of differences, those differences which are conceived of as causing or having caused a distinct conflict. Thereby, the rationale which is supposed to serve this abolis-
ment and supersession is provided by different, but nevertheless epistemologically similar versions of universal reason under whose imposition those differences are expected to become united into one pacified and unified scripture of morality, ideology, and rationality. And second, this dominant Western narrative of ‘peace’ results in a rhetoric which, if it does not replace so at least interchangeably defines ‘peace’ as stability: as stabilization of the order of the self, leading to sometimes expedient strategies of power politics which are regarded as guarantee for the stabilization of the self and hence of ‘peace’.

Thereby, as paradoxical as it may sound at first sight, peace thinking (and practice) in Western modernity seems to be largely a Kantian project; not necessarily in its various practical attempts to build a cosmopolitan society, a world state, or a league of sovereign nations (as a League of Nations, or a United Nations) or to emphasize international cooperation – we know the ambivalences in Kant about these questions and the different answers it received in his writings\(^1\) as well as respective policies – rather than in *epistemological* terms. When scrutinizing different modes of Western modern ‘peace’ thinking, so labeled by themselves, there seems to be an overarching awareness of the division of the world into nation states and national ideologies which appears, quite rightfully so, as having reasoned histories of violence and of war, epitomized in the 19th century concert of powers and its breakdown and culminating in World War I and II. Concurrent to this awareness is the notion that this particularization needs to be overcome

\(^1\) See, amongst others, for this ambivalence in Behr (2010), Chapter II.2.3.
by a “concert of peace”;² different visions exist thereof, all emphasizing, in one or another way, the increase of international cooperation, of limitations of national sovereignty, of the establishment of an international society, of the strengthening of global civic society, of the relevance of international law, etc. Thus, the gap between a bellicose international world dominated by nation states and the international world as it should be results in the further awareness that peace is something to work for, something that needs to be established, something that is not the natural condition of international politics and hence must be brought about. As meaningful as this awareness and consequent positions seem, they appear, too, as problematic due to their underlying epistemology of peace (building), because, first, they are gained within the egological frameworks of Western metaphysical (Kantian) political thinking; thus, and second, frame the world and peace according to standards of the self which are, according to the logics Kantian metaphysics and reason, universalized, neglecting voices of ‘the’ “other”; and therefore, and thirdly, deploy essentialist imaginaries and vocabularies of “civilization”, “mankind”, “universalism”, “history” etc., which are either exclusive or forcefully inclusive due to their a priori character.

Not only is a Kantian vision of the world informed by a priori, metaphysical presuppositions, it, too, perceives itself, as metaphysical system, as inexorable standard of and for reasonable and true knowledge. In his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics ([1783] 2001), Immanuel Kant posits in the ‘Introduction’ that it would be impossible to evade the lessons of reason and understanding and

² So Woodrow Wilson, We must accept war, 1918 (here 2006).
therefrom derived judgments which he is presenting. One of those judgments is key in his thoughts *On Perpetual Peace* (1795), namely that the *only* rightful and lawful, and therefore universally acceptable, constitution of a state would be republican and that an international order of republics would generate conditions of and for perpetual peace.³ Immediately after this determination – in the ‘Second Definite Article of Perpetual Peace’ –, we hear that any alternative to a republican order, domestically and internationally, would signify ‘the attachment of savages to lawless liberty’, ‘barbarism’, ‘uncivilization’, and ‘brutal degradation of humanity’ whereas only republicanism would characterize a ‘race’ as ‘civilized’.

The problem with this construction is not that Kant shares a normative preference for republicanism, most of us probably would; rather that any alternative political order, domestically and beyond, is universally excluded, not only from reason, but also from humanity and civilization, seizing the claim of being civilized for itself. At the same time it is interesting to look deeper into this kind of construction, learning its arbitrary character.⁴ *On the one hand,* namely, for Kant

³ As we see here, the principle significance of the political order of a republic is not because it would serve peace, but because it appears as the only rightful and lawful political order *per se*; it is only because of its genuine qualities that it appears for Kant as, too, serving the establishment of peace; thus, its functionality as condition for peace is derived and secondary only (see *On Perpetual Peace*, ‘Second Section: First Definite Article of Perpetual Peace’). It appears that because of this influential and hierarchy and epistemology of principles, Woodrow Wilson shall later emphasize the role of right (as manifest in democracies, self-determination, international law, and ‘civilization’) over the role of peace; see Wilson, *Fourteen Points* (also: *Conditions of Peace*), 1917 (here 2006); the same preference is shared by Manley O. Hudson in ‘America’s relations to World Peace’ (1929; *Problems of Peace*, Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, Third Series, pp. 178-207); also by J.L. Brierly in ‘The function of law in international relations’ (ibid., pp. 208-241).

⁴ For which Kant is one of the main reference points of Friedrich Nietzsche in his biting critique of Western metaphysics in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (2008).
a priori, metaphysical concepts and synthetic propositions, as the ‘essential subject of metaphysics’, are per definition independent of and beyond experience, thus cannot be discovered or confirmed by experience. They are generated from pure reason. They further depend on a series of conditions which must be contained in metaphysical operations, the most important of which is that a ‘complete subject’ needs to be assumed as the substance who undertakes these operations: operations which would take us to, and reveal, the core, nature, substance, and/or ‘highest purpose’ of things in themselves because their essence is not empirical, but an idea, or concept, of this thing.

This alludes to the arbitrary character of this construction, depending completely on the reason of the ‘subject’ undertaking the metaphysical operation and then presenting, nearly ironically, a therefrom derived (synthetic) judgment about the world (which it initially and deliberately transcended into the realm of pure reason) as rational, true, and universal; and as politically, civilized, rightful, and lawful. Transcendental reasoning in Kant/à la Kant remains not transcendental, but is brought back ‘down on earth’ in form of (synthetic) judgments about the world and about politics, positing the discovery of a ‘highest purpose’ and of ‘universal conditions of things in themselves’ during the metaphysical and ego-logical journey of the subject: about the world, but without the world, without listening, talking to, but only categorizing, constructing, and judging, thereby either excluding ‘the’ “other” as non-civilized, inhuman, barbaric; or seizing ‘the’ “other” under the umbrella of the self. Metaphysics is/as imperialism, in theory and in practice.
On the other hand, or better: hand in hand, Kant declares the coincidence of metaphysics and its judgments with nature and with the teleological course of history. Again ironically, one must say, because a teleological theory of nature and history are themselves metaphysical constructions and therefore the whole system reveals as tautological. Nevertheless, Kant declares an universal cosmopolitan condition of politics being the ultimate purpose of nature; declares some given ‘us’ as civilized; declares the state as a metaphysical unit as well as war as the natural condition among men and states; talks about the/his principles of right as unconditional necessities and about a universal end of mankind, predetermined by nature; and finally legitimizes force to bring about law-governed societies and public law, domestically and internationally.

Again, the problem here is not a advocacy for certain norms of/in international politics such as cosmopolitanism, republicanism, and the strengthening of international law and civic society, but rather the essentializing, tautological, and egologic mode of their metaphysical foundation and construction. It appears particularly problematic that a conceptualization of international order and ‘peace’ universalizes its own principles and thereby violates differences and alterity. How can an epistemology of peace appear viable that construes of ‘peace’, despite all good will of its author(ship), ignoring its ontological relation towards difer-

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5 See in his Idea for a Universal History of Mankind from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) where he declares “world history ... is to some extend based upon an a priori principle” (here 1970: ###).


7 For all of the latter see in Appendix I and II of On Perpetual Peace.
ence(s) and “otherness”? Does its spectrum from ignorance of, to violation of, to arrogance towards, to omission of alterity and of voices of alterity not generate conditions of/for violence and conflict? Does the cognitive imperialism of Kantian metaphysics, applied to political concepts and judgments, not create ‘imperial’ peace under standards of the self and their imposition on, and expectation to be fulfilled by, “others”? And how can some conceptualization of ‘peace’ be universal, or be claimed to be universal, and apply to all mankind – a sacred and blessed wish indeed – when (the) voices of alterity are not heard, listened to, and carefully negotiated? But maybe Kant’s appeal to force in the ‘Appendix’ of his On Perpetual Peace sets the epistemological stage and framework for 20th century legacies of peace making? – as demonstrated by imaginaries and convictions such as of the necessity of ‘fighting for peace’ (so Caspar Weinberger), of war as a ‘powerful instrument of social solidarity’ (so EH Carr), of war as a ‘social institution’ in the civilized world (so Raymond Aron), or of the position that ‘peace needs [America’s] strength’ (so Richard Nixon); and many more.

2. Modern Western ‘Peace’ Narratives

I want to begin my, necessarily selective and incomplete recounting of ‘imperial’ Western peace epistemologies focusing on a series of lectures under the title Problems of Peace, given at the Geneva Institute of International Relations between 1927 and ##.8 The lectures delivered in these series demonstrate their authors’ deep concern with the political, economic, and social crises at the end of

8 I will here refer mostly to Series 3 (1929), 5 (1930), 6 (1931), 9 (1934).
the 1920s and throughout the 1930s. Simultaneously, all lectures in these series acknowledge the importance of international cooperation, of the strengthening of international law, and the building of international civic society (emphasizing the important and positive role of the League of Nations) in order to mitigate, and eventually overcome, the phenomena of crises and violence worried about – beyond any doubt important normative aspects of, and even more legitimate concerns about, international politics in the days before totalitarianism and World War II.

At the same time, however, we find exactly in these series the epistemological problem discussed above epitomized. Most indicative and instructive of this is a paper on ‘Asia and the League’\(^9\) (1929). Its main focus is (certainly well intended) on poor conditions of Chinese workers and their disharmony with Western working rights as they had meanwhile developed, even if not necessarily realized, in European states. In order to fill this worry and complaint with life, some statements of Chinese workers are quoted. Indicative of the epistemological problem now is that this problematic is framed and represented completely within the terminological framework of Western categories. Even though this representation follows a criticism of then (already) communist China,\(^10\) categories of ‘class’, ‘labor’, ‘rights’, ‘capitalism’, ‘proletarianism’, etc. are widely used to portray, describe and ‘analyze’ this situation (terminologies which are not used by the Chinese workers themselves).


\(^{10}\) The author of this paper describes himself as an ‘adherent (...) of the European Socialist Movement’ (265).
But more than this, this representation is itself embedded in essentialisms, dualisms, and respective judgments on ‘ Asiatic’, ‘ really Asiatic’, ‘ Near Eastern’, ‘ Mediterranean’, ‘ oriental’, ‘ Semitic’, and ‘ European’, and ‘ Western’ civilizations, viewed from a European and Western vantage point. Both modes of representation, the micro-level one on individual workers and the macro-level one on civilizations, though having cooperation, justice, and ‘ peace’ in mind, proceed in their visions without listening and giving a voice to ‘ the’ “ other”; not necessarily ignoring alterity, because the Chinese worker’s voice was referenced, but representing it in an epistemologically egologic and imperialist way using own, Western intellectual standards, categories, and terminology. The good political intention is thereby jeopardized through epistemological narrowness, invoking metaphysical (a priori) assumptions about the world, about ‘ the’ “ other”, and about civilizations in/of ‘ this’ world. Even if giving ‘the’ “ other” a voice, if this voice is represented and then construed in terminologies and according to standards of the self, one needs to ask whether it is really heard, or listened to.

And if ‘ the’ “ other” is perceived and categorized, even though with good intentions, according to essentialist concepts, what has become of his/her right of self-determination and of justice (two of the normative visions of tracing through the Geneva lecture series)? And in a very Kantian way this kind of construction and representation grows arbitrary because it is just a question of self-regressive assignments of essentialist concepts to ‘ the’ “ other” whether ‘ this’ “ other” is regarded as more or less bellicose or amicable; civilized or un-civilized; as enemy or foe. That and how, and this again in a Kantian way, this kind of essentialism
and categorization (which is indeed arbitrariness), is pictured as coinciding with
the ‘higher purpose’ of nature and history, can be learned from two other papers
in the same lecture series, one delivered in 1930 on ‘Education of World Citizen-
ship’, the other in 1934 on ‘Social Justice and World Peace’. The objective of the
education project, envisioned as part of the League of Nations and, at least an
ideational, forerunner of UNESCO, is being seen in the mission to educate peoples
around the world in a democratic spirit.

The then following plans refer to the idea of a selection and award of ‘good’
school text books around the world as well as to the idea to build universities
which teach international relations as a multidisciplinary subject, including his-
tory, law, and political science. At the same time, however, there are clear as-
sumptions about what those school text books and what the curriculum of inter-
national relations should, and should not, teach and what the democratic spirit of
education and educational messages would consist of. First democracy and the
democratic movement as embodied in the League of Nations are regarded to
have sprung of from “the roots of human personality” (a Kantian metaphysical
speculation about the essence of things themselves) which, ironically, appears to
be exclusively appealed to as a Western achievement and something self-evident
(any further specification what ‘democracy’ would consists of is spared). This as-
sumption communicates from the use of terminologies such as ‘civilized world’
(where conditions of ‘democracy’, whatever it may be, would already exist) and
‘backward people’ (such as ‘the Chinese’, ‘the Indian’, ‘the Argentine’, ‘the Lithua-

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nian’, which need to be ‘leveled’ with more advanced nations such as the British, the German, the French, and the North Americans; see pp. 309-311). Further to a metaphysical speculation about the essence of a ‘democratic personality’, we encounter here the idea of a teleological and natural (indeed egologically constructed) plan of history and of the historic progress of peoples’ educational level if educated and taught ‘rightly’, i.e. in the Western way.\(^\text{12}\)

The same dispositions speak from the paper on ‘Social Justice and World Peace’ whose core consists of the argument that social progress and improvement are a world wide necessity and that the League of Nations, especially the International Labour Organization (ILO), would have a special responsibility for development and would need to observe the implementation of respective policies as most relevant conditions of peace, particularly in non-democratic (not yet democratized) states. In such cases, it would be necessary to conduct policies of “possible interference in a host of questions which hitherto have been regarded as solely an affair between the State and its subjects”, policies which would therefore demand “the surrender of [national] sovereignty” (185). Again, there is no room for difference(s) (but only agreement); social justice, its contents (such as social insurance, hours of labor, and wages; p. 187), and its conditional relation to peace, and vice versa, are seen as an universal quality; which further needs to be manufactured until a global harmonization is reached, even under policies of interference into other states’ domestic policies.

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\(^\text{12}\) Most instructive is in this regard here another paper of the Geneva series on ‘The Theory of International Society’ (by Harold J. Laski; Sixth Series, 1931, pp. 188-209).
We may now, as it seems to throw some interesting light on the (founding) spirit of the League of Nations and its egologic and teleological metaphysical peace epistemology, turn our attention to Woodrow Wilson. We find here many of the metaphysical tenets, specifically on education, on teleological history, and on the universality of progress (of which one aspect is democracy/democratization), in a, naïve or consciously brutal, nevertheless decisively pure and explicit manner.

In 1896 Wilson gave an emphatic speech at the University of Princeton, in which he celebrated the spirit of this institution, its founding members, the greatness of their graduates, the special and heroic service they have rendered to the nation, and their devotion to the American society from the time of the American revolution. We encounter in this speech many of the metaphysical constructions in line with Zimmern’s speech on ‘Education of World Citizenship’ to the Geneva Institute some 24 years later, especially on the universalization of an egologic conceptualization of humanity, on its link to the unfolding of religious truth (claims), and to the teleological progress of history and politics, the latter in terms of democracy/democratization and peace. All this would become manifest and expressed not only in the American way and soul, but particularly embodied in the institution of the university of Princeton and the life-force it would instill in its students. The authorship appears to be penetrated and directed by the author’s in his unearthing of the essentialist substance of, and respective judgments on, men, history, and politics.\(^{13}\)

Some years later, in 1913 Wilson gave an *Address to the American Indians* (here 2006) which contains a plethora of statements on the superiority of American (white) civilization and society and which communicates his unshaken belief in his and the American's society right course, with again a strong emphasis on education. This speech is important here because it signifies in an outmost clarity the egologic suppression of difference(s) and violence to 'the' "other", expressed in a rhetoric of paternalism, patronization, and self-righteousness – and of the belief in the settlement of peace: a ‘peace’ which is accomplished through the unification (and suppression) of difference(s). The Indian is becoming recognized according to Wilson only because, and on the basis, of assimilation to white US culture and society and according to standards of the American self. The sovereign over the judgment of assimilation, or not, is the American society itself. The Indian is in this whole process a disempowered creature, awaiting as a dehumanized beneficiary the blessings of American society; easy to imagine that if the judgment about recognition of the Indian had found that times had not yet been ripe and Indian assimilation not yet been accomplished, the war of extinction would have certainly been still fought and continued. 'The' “other” is at total digression of the self and either receives paternalistic suppression or immediate extinction from a self-proclaimed historic and civilizational authority.

Another speech of Wilson, *We must accept war* (also *Urges to Congress to Declare War*) of 1917 (here 2006), and the language we find here is embedded in a more ambivalent context – that of German submarine warfare against US civil vessels and the following declaration of war of the US against Imperial Germany; never-
theless we encounter also here, next to the expression of profound concerns and a less easy way forward compared to his treatment of American Indians, the same self-righteous imaginaries of ‘civilization’, convictions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, of steadfastness, and of apparent inevitabilities of political action. It appears that not only another political power would have responsibilities as an actor for the course of things and subsequent events would be an outcome of human agency; rather things are portrayed as if history itself would unfold; as if history itself would be at stake; and as if the US would enter the war on behalf of the rescue of civilization and the historical good.

Saying this, is not to be misunderstood as a judgment on war guilt and the role of the US and Imperial Germany in World War I, but on the very way of the intellectual framing, i.e. of the epistemology, of the (here: American) self in the context of international politics. Two versions of this (Kantian) epistemology seem to prevail: first, the self is dominating, if not directly over ‘the’ “other” than at least over the relations to ‘the’ “other” while in both cases ‘the’ “other” is subdued to, and violated by, the standards of the self. There is no habitus of listening, of negotiation, of respect, and/or of learning. There is at best conditional recognition: conditions pre-determined and set up by the self. Second, the modern, Western self sees and legitimizes itself as acting on behalf of, and in accordance with, historic forces and as representing historic truth – and consequently, as fighting historic powers of evil. In order to be convinced by this narrative, a faith is needed that oneself has come in the possession of metaphysical knowledge about history and its course.
I here want to interweave an observation on some present-day references to Kant due the explicitness of these references and because they seem to well interlink with Wilson’s visions and (their) Kantianism. We will see these links between Bruce Russett et al. and paternalistic expositions of the Western self, perceiving itself as democratic subject of history, also in later policies, especially under the administrations of George Bush Sen. and William B. Clinton as well as within the United Nations, but the Kantianism of the democratic peace-hypothesizers is worth a note here. I thereby do not want to elaborate on the well-known practical references here – such as foremost the idea that democracy and democratization are supposed to advantage peaceful relations and the definition of democracy applied in this argument\(^\text{14}\) – rather I want to continue emphasizing the epistemological implications. Just as Kant did not see the principle value of republics in their contribution to peace, but in their intrinsic value as only rightful and lawful order domestically, and did then apply the idea of republicanism to the international, Russett, as did Wilson,\(^\text{15}\) expand the idea of democracy\(^\text{16}\) into the strategy of international democratization. We can here study that the application of domestic theories and concepts to international politics does not only create an inside/outside divide between the domestic and the international.

\(^\text{14}\) See here only short the following two sentences: “Democracies are (...) more peaceful in general than are authoritarian political systems (...) States within these three areas [largely the West – US/Europe – and Japan after World War II; HB] abide by Kantian principles and refrain from power politics” (Russett, 2001: 36, 31).

\(^\text{15}\) His national and democratic parochialism communicates clearly from his Fourteen Points (also: Conditions of Peace), 1917 [here 2006].

\(^\text{16}\) I omit here the question of in how far Kant’s idea of a ‘republic’ coincides with Wilson’s and Russett’s concept of ‘democracy’; see for this discussion, amongst others, Behr, 2010, Chapter II.2.3 as well as Michael C. Williams (1992).
tional (as discussed by Walker, 1993), with problematic consequences for theorizing international politics due to a series of ostensibly irreducible stigmata of the international (as being lawless, anarchic, chaotic, genuinely bellicose, etc.); but furthermore promotes the perception and construction of all those actors, cultures, people and peoples outside the own nation as different and as ‘the’ “other”.

The application and expansion of domestic theorems to the international and the allegory between a/the domestic and a/the international (virtually necessarily) show the international, i.e. all that beyond the self, in the light of the domestic after having it brought into place (through the inside/outside divide) in the first place. Its stigmatization as ‘different’, as ‘the’ “other” beyond and unalike the self, applies unrestrictedly all features used for the construction and perception of the political self, too, only (always and inevitably) opposite, different, dissimilar. Through the application of theorems about/of this self and its political system, widely understood, to the ‘outside’ world anything, anybody, anyone beyond the realm of the domestic self becomes ‘the’ “other” and becomes generated as inevitably deviant, aberrant, and different. And is getting judged, measured, categorized, branded, considered, and appropriated as either “ally” or “foe” according to standards of the self; in any case, is at the total digression of the self. As well intended as international politics and distinct policies may be, motivated as in our case by ‘peace’ making, the application of domestic political theorems to the international has inevitably an inherent dimension of subduing and suppressing
difference(s) and ‘the’ “other”, following its production in the first place. In this context we may then start to read an apparently plain sentence as problematic:

“As important as anything else, Gorbachev and his advisers accepted the idea that there are universal interests and values [needless to say that these are seen by this author as the Western values and interests of ‘democracy’, free market economies, human rights etc.; HB] (...) In this, they may well have been inspired by the success of Western Europe in establishing peace and prosperity” (Russett 2001: 31).

The focus of recounting Western accounts on ‘peace’ shall shift now from the Kantian narratives emphasizing the importance of international law, international organizations, democracy, democratization, and progress to versions which regard war as a/the normal condition of naturally bellicose international politics to be dealt with on the basis of hard security, stability, and balance of power – versions whose authors describe the narrative around law, democracy, and international organizations as “doomed to frustration” (Carr, 1942: xxiii)\(^{17}\) and idealistic and illusionary (see Aron, 1966, Part IV). Irrespective of this dissimilarity, the narratives of ‘peace’ to be discussed now share the same metaphysical imaginaries and parochialist vocabularies of ‘civilization’, ‘state’, and (national) self; they also suffer from the same problematic of applying domestic theorems to the international, resulting in the creation of an inside/outside divide, in the construction of difference(s) and “otherness”, and in the then following impos-

\(^{17}\) The longer quotation reads: “‘International peace (...) cannot be achieved by the signing of pacts or covenants ‘outlawing’ war any more than revolutions are prevented by making them illegal. A generation which makes peace and security its aim is doomed to frustration ... If the victors in the present war are able to create the conditions for an orderly and progressive development of human society, peace and security will be added unto them” (Carr, 1942, xxiii).
tion of the self on ‘this’ “other”; as well as they share the same belief in the monopole of reading, and acting in accordance with, history; alone their belief in historical progress and the betterment of the world is not as strongly developed. What happens to Kantianism and ‘peace’ here?

As I have emphasized above, Kant’s thoughts on international politics are ambivalently oscillating between peace through law and an international federation of sovereign states (as in his On Perpetual Peace) or a world state solution (as in Ideas on a Universal History and in his Rechtslehre); yet there is another major ambivalence in Kant which is often ignored: this relates to what he calls ‘permissive laws of reason’ (Appendix I, On Perpetual Peace) which ‘allow us to leave a system of public law (...) just as it is’ until the whole world would be entirely revolutionized even though the legal and political system upholding this law would be despotic and unjust; because any law and legal system would be better than none. Reading this concession to ‘physical power’, as Kant calls it, together with his metaphysical beliefs in, and prerogatives on, civilization, history, and ‘peace’, if needed through force, before the background of his affirmation on a warring state of nature among states, his parochialist statism, and before the self/”other”-problematic, we end up in a version of Kantian, ultimately provisional, but nonetheless imperative ‘Realpolitik’. This narrative permits politics of hard security, stability, and balance of power to nevertheless declare peace as the final goal of their policies, even though one might not see peaceable politics nowhere. It is in this vein, when EH Carr writes:
The civilized world on which the war of 1914 broke so suddenly was on the whole a prosperous and orderly world. It was a world based on contended and reasoned optimism – a world which (...) believed in progress as a normal condition of civilized human existence (1942: ix).

And it is also in this vein when war receives a form of legitimization as exactly this engine which drives historic progress in the very direction until, as Kant notes, ‘the whole world would be entirely revolutionized’ and peace – the ‘peace’ of the victor – would be within reach. The rhetoric of ‘fighting for peace’ (see below) finds its origin in Kantian Realpolitik; and just as paradox as this terminology appears, it also appears to be an ironical and oxymoronic absurdity that Kant, mostly celebrated as (one of) THE Western peace authors and promoters of republicanism, does both legitimize force as a possible means to bring peace and introduces a so-called ‘permissive law of reason’ prioritizing right and law (and order) before republicanism, even if dictatorial. It is only the metaphysical belief and the own monopole of reading and judging history that politics is nevertheless deemed to hold its ‘right’ course and to not be a complete distraction and disaster when force is applied and wars are waged in order, as (what can not be more than) rhetoric posits, to create ‘peace’.

Kantian Realpolitik and imperial ‘peace’ rhetoric find epitomic expressions in two powerful perceptions and related politics of the American self: in Richard Nixon’s report to the congress called U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace from 1973; and in Caspar Weinberger’s memories published in 1990 under the title Fighting for Peace. In both documents’ narratives we find the unshaken metaphysical belief in the Rightfulness and necessity of US America’s leadership
in the world, for own security purposes as well as for the benefit, safety, freedom, and prosperity of the rest of the world. Hence we read in Nixon’s report:

We began with the conviction that a major American commitment to the world continued to be indispensable. The many changes in the postwar landscape did not change this central fact. American strength was so vast, our involvement so broad, and our concerns so deep, that to remove our influence would set off tremors around the globe (...) Our own national security would soon be threatened. There was no escaping the reality of our enormous influence for peace (...) We made our new purpose a global structure of peace (Nixon 1973: 8);

and very similar in Weinberger:

The fight for peace is never over, unlike some of the wars in which we have engaged. Certainly we will have to fight another of those wars in the future, unless we keep ourselves strong, and unless we really are willing to fight for peace in peacetime (1990: 429).

And it may not be surprising to the critical student of US foreign policy, but it well links with the analytical framework of Kantian ‘permissive laws of reason’ that, though, or exactly because of, ‘peace’, freedom, responsibility, and rule of law penetrate these ‘peace’ narratives, that Weinberger dwells in confident nostalgia with regards to the rule of the Shah in Persia as democratizer, modernizer, ‘good friend’, and pillar of stability in the Middle East; and celebrates the Falkland War under Margaret Thatcher as a uncompromising restoration of international law and justice (see pp. 203-205; 355); and that Nixon celebrates the US was in Vietnam as an honorable effort which, if not undertaken, “would have crippled our efforts to build peace in the world” (19), that he declares Cuba a genuine part of the US sphere of interests and as a member of the American family, as well as
that he advocates clear “distinctions between friends and adversaries” (78), seemingly knowing in relation to all these issues *a priori* who “friends and adversaries”, and what their identities, interests, and civilizational status are according to a primordial positing of an US American self.

There would be many more examples from these and other documents from the Nixon and Reagan administration; what we learn here analytically further to those aspects discussed, is the portrayal of world history, and the US’s role in it, as in possession by the self. The self as THE subject of history, endowed with a monopolistic reading, and writing, of politics. Political alternatives are systematically excluded before the background of ostensibly certified knowledge. And even if ‘the’ “other” has to be put to ashes, the own course of action appears as coinciding with the only rightful things to do. Commitments *have* to be given, neutrality is *not* an option (Weinberger 1990: 6), convictions fly high, “inferiority [is] unthinkable”, “peace needs America’s strength” (Nixon 1973: 9), “(the) possibility of defeat does simply not exist” (Weinberger 1990: 205), ‘the’ “other”, the enemy, is *per se* uncivilized: these epistemologies of ‘peace’ see peace as the, if necessary martial manifestation and extension of the self: the self, its extension and manifestation as irreducible conditions of ‘peace’. The exclusion (or forceful inclusion, if politically opportune) of ‘the’ “other” under dictums of universalized reason; its *a priori* seizure as ‘friend’ as well as its likewise *a priori* stigmatization as ‘adversary’; its categorization following historic-teleological, essentialist classifications of ‘civilization’ and ‘uncivilization’; its, and all these features’ metaphysical cognition; its shutting-down (as voice of alterity and as participant in
the unfolding and formulations of ‘peace’ visions); its violation; and eventual extinction they all appear in anathematic incongruity with an understanding of peace suggested below (in section 3).

3. A Phenomenological Epistemology of Difference and Peace

I want to present a different approach to thinking about and practicing peace which is built upon the argument that those visions and practices which invoke some sort of universal reason in fact contribute to, if not cause conflict and even war fighting in the first place. Instead, this paper promotes a conceptualization and understanding of peace which is based upon a positive embracement of difference(s) and “otherness” and the cultivation of their critical tension. Thus, not the abolishment, but the cultivation of differences is to be seen as a vision and practice of peace.

This understanding of peace is rests upon an anti-essentialist approach to difference(s) and “otherness”. The theories of Alfred Schuetz, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jaques Derrida focus explicitly on the question of difference as represented in the figure of “the stranger” (in Schuetz also the “migrant”), “the other” (“l’Autre”; so Levinas) and the notions of différence and ‘ad-vent’ in Derrida. Their individual discussions take place before one common epistemological background which is the phenomenological thinking of the question of time (and history and historiography) and Being, referring to the oeuvres of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Irrespective of individual variances in their reception and references to Husserl and Heidegger and, irrespective of the fundamental departure of
Levinas and Derrida from the idea of ‘intentionality’, there is one episteme which marks the opposition of phenomenological thinking to the ontological tradition of essentialism of which many powerful modern Western traditional notions of peace are a manifestation.

This episteme introduces a way of thinking about time, history, and Being not as entities with fixed meanings, determined trajectories, and terminated identities, but rather as open-ended processes of becoming, development, change, and transformation. Rather than of ‘identity’ (of Being, history, and the “other”), we need to speak of ‘transformativity’ in an anti-essentialist way when reflecting upon political, social, economic and psychological questions and related discourses. One consequence of this perspective, which appears to be likewise its normative advantage over essentialist modes of thinking, is that phenomenological thinking does not allow and actually prevents us from assuming and subsuming what someone is, i.e. to determine and fix someone else’s ‘identity’ and to conclude and regulate his/her ostensible essence of being, living, and acting; but instead to study and attempt to understand another human’s (or society’s) Being as a being-in-time, i.e. as transformation and development whose purposes and ends cannot be foretold. But: what is the main consequence of this thinking about difference for our understanding of peace?

This approach holds that the cultivation of difference(s) and their positive embracement, articulated in perpetual self-reflective and critical discourses, produce and re-produce difference(s) and create (alternative) meanings of sociality and peace. According to this argument, belief systems, paradigms, ideologies,
principles, convictions, concepts and categories, *a priori*, etc. act as tools of silencing discourses, of intellectual and practical exclusiveness, always at risk to subjugate and objectify difference(s), thereby constructing “otherness” as an essentialized, dichotomist, and binary manifestation of a genuine human experience. Non-silence of and about difference(s) is key to their cultivation. Difference(s) have to be critically discussed and debated, have to be permanently and vivaciously exposed in and into the political sphere.

We arrive here at a very different dictum to the US American founding myth about difference, unity, and identity, the motto “*E Pluribus Unum*, which has driven endless ideologies in domestic (most importantly in immigration and ‘naturalization’ policies18) and foreign politics. I may be forgiven for the likewise Latin formulation of a counter-motto: “*Fatemini Pluribus Pluribum*” – which exactly does not intend to create some unanimity unifying and rationalizing difference(s) under some higher reason to make to the political body work. ‘*E Pluribus Unum*’ is one, probably one of the most powerful examples of intellectual and practical exclusiveness which operates on the basis of a violent construction of spatialized, sovereign, and exclusive identities. What is under attack here is the illusion that such kind of invocation of a unifying higher reason would actually contribute to making the political body work; rather it is argued that it fuels, if it does not create conflicts in the first place. Whether difference(s) and their universes of energetic articulation are claimed by certain groups, experienced by

18 As argued and studied in a huge body of literature; amongst others Behr, 1998, where many of the studies are discussed and respective policies explored.
others, requested by victims, demanded by activists, invoked by the marginalized, etc. may be important and crucial for the conduct of a politics of difference; what is more important, and likewise fundamental, is the normativity arising from their temporalized reasoning embracing their vocalizations, at the same time refraining from their essentializations and identification. This normativity goes equally with those who claim, request, demand, and invoke difference(s) and their own being different and singular. If reciprocity, as a mutual agreement about identities, fails due to the abolishment of intentionality (as in Lévi- Strauss and Derrida), its principle may be restored in form of the equal validity of the fundamental normativity arising from temporalized reasoning for all demanders, inviters, requesters, experiencers, etc. of difference(s): a normativity of de-essentializing, transformativity, and intangibility of difference(s) and “other-ness”; a normativity that understands the unknown and ungraspable of ‘the’ “other” and of differences as their universal rationality.

We face the problem here that the embracement of difference(s) in order and for the benefit of a mutual building up of plurality in vivacious diversity needs nevertheless a foundation in some kind of universal relationship and normativity which differences hold towards each other (see previously Behr, 2010: 243; see also Sartre 1956, Campbell 1996). This problem is about the normativity of deconstructing universalization and essentialism and as such also asks for the norms which underlie every (re)constructivist argument through critical dis-

\[19\] Put (again) differently, this problem is about the affirmative character of deconstruction which according to Jacques Derrida entails always an affirmative moment; see Derrida in Richard Kearney, ‘Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ (1984: 117, 118).}

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courses; but which discourse; what criticality; and whose criticality? If difference(s) and transformativities are produced and endlessly reproduced, beyond essentialism, intentionality, possession, and fixation, what are, where are, and from where come those principles of humanity and universalism that prevent solipsism, that guarantee humanity and humane practices (as Sartre and Campbell claim), and that allow the mutual building up of differences in plurality; which finally enable to think difference in the first place; and which lastly assure that the production of (alternative) meaning, which is to avoid past histories of essentializations, does not get trapped in individualization?

20 It is important for an elaboration of the questions about the normativity of deconstruction and about the version of the underlying universalism which enables humanity and sociality that, though they seem to share the appreciation of these problems, both Sartre’s and Campbell’s suggestion appear as stalemate. With regard to Sartre we can refer to Schütz’s criticism in his paper on ‘Sartre’s Theory of Alter Ego’ (1962); with regard to Campbell I refer to his concept of ‘humanitarianism’ in ‘Why fight’ (1998) where he develops a concept of humanitarianism from a critique that normative frameworks could resolve political and ethical questions and that the issue of humanitarian intervention could be decided according to a priori defined norms. Campbell, following Heidegger’s view that every humanism would be grounded in metaphysics, argues for a ‘New Humanitarianism’ (or ‘Against Humanism and For Life’; p. 504). He writes: ‘The humanitas of man refers not to a notion of human being, but to a conception of being human’ (506). With references to Lévinas, Campbell sees this humanitarianism in what he calls the ‘active affirmation of alterity’ (514). We encounter here in this argument the stalemate mentioned above because ‘alterity’ as argued by Campbell does not resonate with Lévinas’s ‘l’Autre’ which can exactly not be identified in any form of objectivication, but because of the tangibility of ‘the’ “other”, ultimately because of Lévinas’s idea of non-intentionality, withdraws from any attempt of being identified, subjected, and objectivated. Where the requested and searched form of humanitas would exist in is an affirmation of difference, not of alterity: or, as argued here, in the embracement and vivacity of difference(s). And where the kind of universalism requested appears to be found in is not conceptions of ‘being human’ based on an ‘affirmation of alterity’, but rather the understanding of the principle of the non-objectiviation, intangibility, and non-intentionality of ‘the’ “other” and difference(s). It appears that Campbell does not recognize Lévinas’s argument about intentionality/non-intentionality and ends up in a simplified and again substantialized notion of the (“other”) human; finally ‘alterity’ appears itself as an already (and a priori) constructed form of “otherness” and reaffirms (otherwise contested and de-constructed) dichotomies, binaries, and identifications which are exactly supposed to be overcome (not at least by Lévinas himself).
This kind of *non*-totalizing universalism consists of an understanding of the principle of the temporalized Being of difference(s) as transformative, un-intangible, un-graspable, non-fixable, of *Being-towards*. It is not an understanding of the "other" and of difference(s), not their assimilation, not their toleration, recognition, and acknowledgment, rather than an understanding of the principle of their temporalized Being and transformative articulations. What is required for the vivacity and embracement of difference(s) is the understanding of their rationalities as de-essentialized relations and the permanence of criticality as the momentum which drives their de-essentialization. This kind of universalism informs a politics of difference. Difference does then not appear as some differentiation from a *tertium comparationis* which differences would share and hold in common and only before which they could be differentiated and thought as such. This Aristotelian vision (see his *Metaphysics*, Book 10, Chapter 1) seems responsible for a totalizing form of universalism since the *tertium comparationis* necessarily rests upon some kind of universalized categories which presumes same qualities and characteristics to exist likewise in both ‘objects’ then differentiated according to their presumed similarity (similarities). This totalizing universalism is emphasized by Aristotle’s motto itself that we have to begin with what is familiar to us: a familiarity which is all too often and too easily used to subjugate the unknown. In opposition to this tradition, I emphasize Edward Said’s dictum that we have to begin with the unknown; this unknown *par excellence* ‘is’ the "other" and ‘are’ the difference(s) which exist *in relation to* the self. What is known is nothing

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more than the principle of its temporality, intangibility, ungrasp-ability, and transformativity; and the rationality of this very relation to the self (see for this argument further Lévinas, 1996: 23).

This understanding and the production of meaning, which rests upon and stems from this understanding, create a new form of sociability and humanity which does not think the “other” (i.e. does not exercise a form of objectification) and does not aim at acting together with or on behalf of the “other”, but practice this thinking and acting as a towards the “other” and difference(s). The unknown and the ‘project-in-draft’-character of the creation of meaning – of initiating a new beginning – accentuate the relation between self and “other” as a towards (as noun); and thereby avoid binaries, dichotomies, oppositions, possessions, and essentializations in their re-creation of (alternative) histories. Understanding “otherness” and difference as a towards performs as a rearticulated principle of sociality and humanity. They produce and embrace different singularities as infinite and irresolvable tensions towards each other. This creates a sociality and humanity which never ‘is’ (like one with another one), but becomes, is constituted by singularities in and on the move, and is to be portrayed as complex and infinitely transformative relationalities towards each “other”. It is anticipation of movement towards which never exists.

But what is the ‘object’ of this towards; if at all we can even speak of an ‘object’ under conditions of non-intentionality? What appears as the relational (as noun) of the towards (as noun)? What (or better how) is the relational of the ‘rapport sans rapport’ (Levinas), of this relationless relation; what/how ‘is’ the beyond of
this towards? It is here where the argument developed receives important support through Jacques Derrida’s notions of ‘ad-vent’.

Derrida’s notion of ‘advent’ connects with the problem of beginning, but does provide more specific ideas with regards to what is to come once the beginning has been initiated and how this event is to emerge. This notion of ‘ad-vent’ is most explicit in Derrida’s writings in relation to his thoughts about democracy and Europe (especially in The Other Heading, 1992). In both cases, the event – i.e. democracy and/or Europe – is not yet there/here, but something ‘that remains to be thought and to come’ (Derrida, 1993: 19). Derrida uses the French ‘àvenir’ and ‘survenir’ to describe this situation of ‘yet to be’. While both are derived from the Latin verb ‘venire’ (to come), the French ‘survenir’ contains a meaning which seems to be important and links with Derrida’s emphasis on the temporality of Being as well as with the notion of transformativity as developed here, which, however, seems lost in the English translation ‘to come about’ (as he argues in Psyche. Inventions of the Other; 2007: 24): the special meaning of ‘survenir’ is that something, an event (from Latin ‘ex’, i.e. out of something [ex-], and ‘venire’, to come), comes about suddenly, unexpectedly, and unpredictably. So the ‘ex-’ as the realm, terrain, space, or source, from where the event is coming is unknown, undefined, and undefinable.

And to keep this terrain unknown and undefined, thus to preserve the suddenness of the coming about of the event (of democracy, of Europe; and of the “other”) and to preserve its transformativity to the highest possible degree is very deliberate. To do otherwise, i.e. to foreclose the openness and namelessness of the
terrain from where the e-vent is coming from, would, so Derrida, mean ‘to total-
ize, to gather, versammeln’ (Derrida, 1997: 13), would be a form of ‘monogenalo-
gy’ (Derrida, 1992: 10) and depend upon and reproduce the ‘contagious or con-
taminating powers of a reappropriating language, (...) the language of the Same
that is foreign or allergic to the Other” (Derrida, 2007: 155); to preserve open-
ness and namelessness, and thereby the (chance of) transformativity of the event
(i.e. also of the “other”) means to ‘prevent totalitarianism, nationalism, egocen-
trism’ (Derrida, 1997: 14). When democracy, Europe, the “other” are called
events to come which remain to be thought, this does not mean that there would
not be democratic and/or European institutions or experienced differences, ra-
ther than preserving a critical space of openness for their free, unpredicted, and
non-forestalled development as a very deliberate choice; a choice which is con-
vinced that it is exactly in the ‘essence’ and of the normative value of democrac-
y/Europe/the “other”/difference(s) to be, and to be safeguarded to remain,
open towards the future and their development. Their nature and value is exactly
their openness, their optionalities to be and to let be; are exactly their provision
of and their demand for opened-up spaces for different modes of Being where
those modes are not becoming pre-defined, pre-determined, and/or anticipated,
but are being expected to approach, to emerge, to come about and to transform,
suddenly and unexpectedly. With regard to the “other”, ‘one does not make the
other come, one lets it come by preparing for its coming’ (Derrida, 2007: 45); for
its ad-vent (see also Derrida 1992: 77).
This same choice for preserving a critical space, safeguarded for the preparation of the potentially sudden advent of events to come, is, however, not of normative character alone, but derived from and related to, and inter-related with, a distinct reading of the ontological question. The opening-up of institutions, practices, habitus, imaginaries, legal systems, histories, etc. for multi-genealogical modes of Being and their coming is grounded in the ‘aporetic experience of the impossible’ (Derrida, 1993: 15), i.e. in a reading of the question of Being as Dasein as not an entity or essence (as ‘Vorhandenes’ according to Heidegger) of some sort, but rather as a being-possible and becoming-possible (‘das Möglichsein’ and ‘das Möglicherwerden’); as a Being which ‘trembles in [from, and towards; HB] an unstable multiplicity’ (Derrida 1993: 9) and which therefore demands normatively the making-possible of Being as Dasein. The ‘aporetic experience of the impossible’, while dismissing a reading of the ontological question as the entity, unity or essence of Being, involves the gaining of knowledge about the intrinsic dis-unity of, and differences within, histories, ‘identities’, cultures, institutions, groups, and individual psyches – what Derrida calls the ‘temporal experience’ (1997: 22) – as well as the proactive elaboration on and widening of respective dis-unities and their mutual tensions as critical practice –what Derrida calls deconstruction and ‘différance’, the latter referring to deferrals, dislocations, and disruptions of cultures, identities, groups, political and legal systems etc. due to their intrinsic dis-unities and tensions.22

22 Derrida notes: ‘There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference within itself’ (Derrida 1992: 9, 10); or: ‘(The) identity of a culture is a way of being different
The question asked above as to what is the ‘object of the towards the “other” and difference(s) receives a phenomenological answer: the aporia (impasse) of unity and essence as both experience of the ontological and as normative demand and desire asks and longs for the opening up of intellectual and practical spaces that make possible the impossible (as the unknown/intangible/unintentional/undefinable/unpredictable) from where and as what the “other” may appear (‘advent’) and suddenly be there as ‘naked face’ (Lévinas). Thus, the ontological and normative demand is neither to work within the framework of totalities, nor to work against them and to ‘move out of the impasse’ (Derrida, 1993: 13), i.e. to either accept their rationalities or to oppose and destroy them from outside, but instead to disrupt totalities through elaborating on and widening their inherent tensions and dis-unities. Such disruptions open up spaces for alternatives, prevent totalitarianisms, nationalism, and ego-centrisms, and finally articulate the condition for the relation to/towards the “other”. It is here, in a critical perception of difference(s) and “otherness” as transformative becoming, as endless beginnings towards the unknown and the impossible-to-grasp, as discursively produced meanings and openings of alternative spaces for the vivacious articulation and embracement of difference(s) and for the ‘advent’ of the “other”, where we find the conditions for a positive re-articulation of a renewed understanding of peace.

from itself; a culture is different from itself; language is different from itself; the person is different from itself’ (1997b: 13). In Margins of Philosophy (1982), Derrida describes différance also an activity of “temporization” (p. 9) and “spacing” (ibid.); see also 2007: 15).
4. Conclusions

First, difference is not present in an entity in any definable form, but needs to be understood through its own dynamics and articulations; and even if not understood or tangible, differences and “otherness” should not be negated on behalf of assimilating rationalities of the ‘Self’, but be acted towards.

Second, difference exists, is becoming experienced, and attempts should not be made to extinguish it. Differences should be kept alive in positive embracement, vivacity, and in relationships of critical tension.

Third, instead of concepts of peace which invoke some form of universal reason to be imposed upon conflicting parties or to guide one party’s own vision of “peace”, a phenomenological epistemology of differences enables peace through the abstinence of attempting to deny the conflict and warring parties’ right to live, act or think according to their own ways. This, so we must hope in the long-term, would make the reason to fight, and ultimately the reason to go to war, superfluous and thereby increase the chance for peace in international politics. Of course, such a concept of peace can not be put into practice straight away or be implemented by way of direct policies. Instead, it depends upon (peace) education, a learning process, and needs to be practiced through local discourses by those concerned rather than being implemented and forced upon conflicting parties or opponents directly by so-called foreign policy elites in national administrations.

And fourth, a peace research agenda following a phenomenological epistemology of peace – while emphasizing, and interrelating this approach with, the local (see
Richmond 2009, 2010, 2011; also Shinko 2008) and the hybrid character of peace formation processes (Mac Ginty 2010, 2011) – would need to focus on the question of how, and in how far dynamics and discourses in such processes engage the question of difference(s) and “otherness”. The following questions for research arise: Is in actual peace formation, peace negotiation, and conflict reconciliation processes an awareness of the problem of difference(s) and “otherness” and how are they discursively framed? Are difference(s) and ‘the’ “other” seen and thematized as natural enemies, are their characteristics essentialized (according to ethnic, national, religious, political etc. criteria) and are they stigmatized a priori? What patterns follow the self-other relations and definitions? Can, and if yes which, distinct features of the self-other relation be learned from successful peace formation, peace negotiation, and conflict reconciliation processes? And if yes, what kind of patterns are these and what is their rationality? And vice versa, can failed peace negotiation, peace formation, and conflict reconciliation processes be traced back to distinct perceptions and framings of the self-other relation; and if yes, to which? How are the relation and the actors’ perception of the relation between peace, security, and stability: are they equated and interchangeably used; or separated? And, in very practical terms, how can a phenomenological epistemology of peace be communicated with and successfully introduced to conflict and warring parties? And how can and need actors be distinguished and singularized in relation to all of these questions? And how can a de-essentialized reading of politics and peace maintain and act under its own conditions when encountering essentializing worldviews and ideologies?
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