Background and Context of the Conference

The conference on “Promoting Democracy: What Role for the Emerging Powers?” was presented by the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für EntwicklungsPolitik (DIE) in partnership with the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa, with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

The conference convened a group of international experts, including academics, researchers, development practitioners and other stakeholders. The presenters and participants examined the role that the democratic emerging powers - countries such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, India and Indonesia - can play in promoting democracy. The conference was divided into six panels – three dealing with individual countries (Brazil, India and South Africa), one assessing the democracy promotion actions of two ‘Muslim democracies’ (Indonesia and Turkey), and two others dealing with the more general questions and conclusions.

This report highlights the key arguments that were presented, the feedback provided, and the subsequent links or questions that arose from the discussions. The report follows the format of the conference.

Main Highlights

Setting the Stage

Following welcoming remarks by the Director of CIPS, Roland Paris, the conference organizer, Gerd Schönwälder, a Senior Associate at CIPS and former Guest Researcher at DIE, set the tone by stressing the significance of the rise of the democratic emerging...
powers (DEPs). He noted that their phenomenal economic ascent had brought them membership in global governance forums such as the G20 and increased clout in global trade negotiations. At the same time, these countries had been called upon to help deliver a range of “global public goods” - among them democratic governance and greater respect for human rights.

Schönwälder acknowledged that the DEPs so far had been rather cautious and hesitant in their support for democracy elsewhere, but argued that there were grounds to scratch the surface and look for cracks in the facade, so as to identify ways in which this status quo could change. Schönwälder noted that for democratic states, there were good arguments both in favour and against supporting democratization processes elsewhere, but criticized the fact that these arguments were often not examined side by side, which prevented proper analysis of the resulting tensions between them. Rather, there were sometimes presented in terms of a linear progression, from a state of “idealism” to one of “realism”, almost akin to a “growing up period for states” in which they shed the enthusiasm of their youth for the wisdom of old age.

Schönwälder noted that - aside from portraying democratic principles as somehow inferior to more tangible goods such as security or economic gain - this argumentation obscured the fact that a “realist” stance had considerable costs, not just benefits. By contrast, aside from the more principled arguments in its favour, democracy could have considerable “practical utility,” for example, by promoting greater political stability and economic prosperity. From the perspective of a democracy promoter, the task was therefore to tilt the balance away from the constraints and towards the promise of democratization.

Schönwälder reminded his listeners that the political systems of the democratic emerging powers - as those of more established democracies - were not perfect, and that the DEPs had made some questionable choices in not sanctioning certain human rights violations at the international level. But this did not invalidate their impressive gains. All democratic countries, including the DEPs, needed to look beyond their short-term interests, focusing on the long-term goals and the improvement of the public’s ability to scrutinize state activity at home and outside their borders.

Panel 1: General Questions

*Emerging Donors: The Promise and Limits of Bilateral and Multilateral Democracy Promotion (Andrew Cooper and Asif Farooq, University of Waterloo)*
Cooper and Farooq presented on their findings related to the mapping of the DEPs’ democracy promotion activities. Given the challenges in gathering data, Cooper and Farooq developed a two-by-two matrix as a means to capture the type or channel and goal of the DEPs’ work. According to the presenters, their findings demonstrate the following trend: DEPs tend to provide procedural democracy assistance through bilateral means (country-to-country) and substantive democracy assistance through multilateral organizations. This approach allows them to follow low-risk behaviours (by not antagonizing neighbours and other partners) and gain ground as good international citizens.

Cooper began by noting the limited quantity and quality of data and the inherent conceptual challenges related to the definition of democracy promotion. Cooper and Farooq dealt with these complexities by drawing on publicly available data, accepting the definitions established by these countries, and using two general categories to capture the DEPs’ interventions: procedural democracy (mostly related to electoral assistance) and substantive democracy (covering the rest).

Their approach led to the development of a two-by-two matrix that is defined by two categories: the type of initiative (multilateral or bilateral) and the goal of the initiative (procedural or substantive democracy). The goal of this matrix is to assess the behaviour or intentions of emerging donors. Their findings indicate that the DEPs supported procedural democracy principally through bilateral means and substantive democracy through multilateral institutions.

Multilateral Democracy Promotion through the Lens of Power: The Western Hemisphere Experience (Thomas Legler, Universidad Iberoamericana)

Legler presented on the state of multilateral regional cooperation in Central and South America. He argued that while the Central and South American DEPs are directly and indirectly active in promoting democracy through multilateral institutions, they tend to undermine their own actions through the practice of heightened presidential authority and activism at the regional level. Legler defined the combination of these two practices as ‘presidential lynchpin’ and used this concept to demonstrate that the DEPs are not necessarily promoting democracy but maintaining the existing level of democracy by limiting their actions to the protection of democracies and their presidential leaders from serious threats (protection against coups).

According to Legler, the DEPs seem to be active in the promotion of democracy through multilateral organizations and their support has helped ensure that these organizations have some democratic principles embedded in their charters and actions. However, the manner in which these organizations function clearly indicates that they are suffering
from a case of ‘presidential lynchpin’. This situation has come about because of the weak nature of the multilateral institutions, a new regional political arena, a rise in regional presidential spaces (post-hegemonic regional trend), and decisions to protect against an overthrow of democracy rather than to strengthen democratic institutions and processes. Thus, these organizations are fragmenting the defence of democracy and are suffering from presidential improvisation, uncertainty, lack of continuity and forward thinking, and acceptance of the backsliding into authoritarianism.

Feedback and Discussion

Paper-specific Feedback:

Feedback related to the Cooper and Farooq paper touched on the difficulty of teasing out the bias in the data given the heavy reliance on unclear information, the bias inherent in the difficult real-life distinction between procedural and substantive dimensions (due to some overlap between the concepts), the difficulty in teasing out real intentions behind the DEPs’ actions, and the overlooking of the impact of high-level diplomacy. Comments were also related to measurement issues given the need to include the amount of funding directed towards democracy promotion and the varying impact levels that multilateral institutions have (power and influence). Overall, there was a strong debate related to the usefulness of what was considered by several to be a simplistic and possibly inaccurate matrix.

Feedback related to the Legler paper highlighted the fact that the leadership of executives is not necessarily a bad thing. The European Council was put forward as an example of a unit that is led by executives, has been positively impactful, and has incorporated democratic norms in its actions. Other comments were related to the counterfactual – strong, empowered, able and willing multilateral institutions – and whether it is a realistic measure to aim for or compare others against.

Overall Thoughts Relevant to the Panel:

Some general questions or issues were raised regarding the possible inclusion of foreign policy tools for a more complete assessment, especially in areas that lack a deep-rooted culture of democracy promotion. This broadening of the analysis can shed light on the role of civil society and its impact on the democratic principles that underlie foreign policy and democracy promotion. Others concluded that the data points to a tendency or inclination towards, rather than a clear objective of, democracy promotion.

Panel 2: Brazil
De Almeida was unable to present at the conference due to an unforeseen professional commitment. Dr. Marques read de Almeida’s speech. In his speech, de Almeida claimed that the DEPs, especially Brazil, are neither becoming more democratic nor pushing for democratic governance. His thesis is that the minor actions that are taken by these countries regarding democracy promotion are intended to help them gain power on the international stage. According to de Almeida, Brazil, as well as India, offer no lessons since they have not distinguished themselves as defenders of democratic principles at home or abroad.

De Almeida claimed that Brazil and Lula’s government are internally and externally undemocratic. Brazil, according to de Almeida, has two foreign policy agendas (one driven by the Workers’ Party and the other by the Foreign Affairs Department). De Almeida claimed that the rise of the new left does not represent the rise of democracies or democratic practices – it represents Stalinism and the commitment to maintaining power.

Marcondes de Souza Neto’s presentation focused on the broader question of the political implications of Brazil’s involvement in Africa. According to Marcondes de Souza Neto, Brazil’s approach to democracy promotion in Africa is one of pragmatism: earning praise from the international community while safeguarding and improving its economic interests (trade and investment). This balancing technique has led to a certain level of confusion regarding Brazil’s work in promoting democracy. However, given the various Brazilian non-governmental and private sector players in Africa and their democracy promotion efforts, an accurate stock-taking of Brazil’s democracy promotion activities requires the inclusion of these multiple actors.

Marcondes de Souza Neto highlighted Brazil’s increased interaction with and pragmatic approach towards Africa. Brazil’s democracy promotion statements and actions are for the benefit of the international community and are often checked by Brazil’s economic and trade interests. This dual approach has led to a certain level of ambiguity related to Brazil’s work on promoting democracy. Brazil seems to be following a non-interventionist (demand-driven), cautious, discrete, dialogue-based, and back-stage approach towards African countries. Brazil has maintained its indirect interventions by using Brazilian companies to pressure African governments to do more on democracy. Brazilian civil society organizations have also been involved in Africa. As such, the assessment of
Brazil’s democracy promotion needs to account for the contribution of all Brazilian actors.

*Promoting Democracy: The Role for Brazil* (Joseph Marques, King’s College London)

According to Marques, Brazil lacks an explicit policy for the promotion of democratic governance, is reluctant to be seen as a regional hegemon, sees all developing countries as equal partners, and is responsive to the expressed needs of its partners (demand-driven). Brazil’s assistance is primarily focused on its immediate neighbours. Brazil has a genuine desire to help developing countries, but its non-interventionist approach and own democratic deficiencies weaken it as a possible case study of the link between home-grown democracy and democracy promotion abroad. According to Marques, the next few years are critical in the formation of Brazil’s next phase of development assistance.

Brazil has an appreciation of the benefits of democracy, but internal democratic deficiencies abound. The struggle between the two has been reflected in Brazil’s foreign policy. Brazil’s assistance is driven by the idea of ‘diplomacy of solidarity’, non-intervention, self-determination, peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international law, multilateralism, technical South-South cooperation, and the reduction of power asymmetries through multilateral institutions.

*Feedback and Discussion*

Paper-specific Feedback:

Comments related to de Almeida’s paper were very critical of how Brazil was represented. According to these comments, Brazil is much more democratic than de Almeida claimed, the paper does not represent the real story of Brazil, and the practice of separating Brazil’s foreign policy from the election of the Workers’ Party is undemocratic and unhelpful. Commentators also cautioned against ignoring possible lessons learned from democracy promotion actions of non-liberal leftist parties.

Comments specifically related to Marcondes de Souza Neto’s presentation included references to the lack of evidence in support of the claim that Brazil’s cooperation is beneficial. There was also a desire to address the measurement of the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector on democracy promotion, especially when they are not fully aligned with Brazil’s foreign policy.

Comments on Marques’s paper touched on the need to address Brazil’s low monetary contributions to democracy promotion and the resulting impact on its influence and
achievements. There was also some scepticism related to the claim of Brazilian compassion towards and solidarity with the developing world.

Overall Thoughts Relevant to the Panel:

Comments from the floor referenced the interest in assessing the relationship between the level of democracy in the country’s foreign policy and its track record in promoting democracy. The Brazilian case also highlighted the need to look at all levels of government actors, civil society and businesses in order to develop a more wholesome picture of democracy promotion. In Brazil’s case, some noted the lack of cooperation between the various Brazilian actors, something that is perhaps undermining Brazil’s good will. Some in the audience wondered about the level of power that Brazil actually has. Comments were also related to the need to question whether we should hold emerging powers to a higher standard than that of existing powers, especially as it relates to economic and geopolitical interests.

Panel 3: India

India and Democracy Promotion: Caution and Opportunity (Yeshi Choedon, Jawaharlal Nehru University)

According to Choedon, India has been hesitant to join the democracy promotion bandwagon. Its ‘cautious prudence’ has led it to reluctantly join the West in promoting democracy and allowed it to avoid imposing good governance as a precondition of aid, interfere only when asked by the local government, use a top-down approach to development assistance, and prefer the term democratic assistance or support rather than promotion. According to Choedon, Most of India’s influence has come from its soft power and its substantial contributions to spreading democracy through the work of its Elections Commission.

During the Cold War, India followed a foreign policy based on non-alignment and non-interference. This allowed India to shy away from supporting civil society, especially the groups that push for changes in governance or power. However, India cautiously joined the West in promoting democracy as a result of international pressures, its economic interests, and its need for recognition. India’s reluctance or ‘cautious prudence’ stems from its realistic approach to managing its domestic political struggles, increasing its influence, and safeguarding its national interests (especially as they relate to China and Pakistan). According to Choedon, India’s experience demonstrates that democracy promotion can be based on a country’s own experience and that its soft power attracts many developing countries to it.
India’s Aid Policy and the Democratic Transition of Afghanistan (Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, Institute of South Asian Studies)

According to D’Souza, India’s assistance to Afghanistan is shaped less by a desire for democracy promotion and more by security concerns (controlling terrorism and Pakistan’s role in it), political interests (having soft power with broad-based engagement), and economic goals (connecting South Asia with Central Asia). As such, India provides most of its support to the Afghan government, works with it instead of shaming it, and works on sectors that align with its geo-strategic interests.

India’s role as a development partner is shaped by its overall position on South-South cooperation, aid giving rather than development cooperation, and its economic interests in the current neo-liberalism system (market access and trade). These three factors, along with security and political concerns (controlling terrorism and not antagonizing Pakistan), make up the core of India’s assistance to Afghanistan. India’s assistance is mostly bilateral and delivered largely through the government (building the parliament, training parliamentary officers, supporting elections commissions, and helping to decentralize governance). India has also shied away from openly shaming Afghanistan as it relates to corruption and other undemocratic practices. Instead, it has taken a knowledge approach where it provides the technical assistance to help teach government officials and parliamentary staffers about corruption and other democratic practices.

Between Geo-strategic Interests and Democratic Ideas: India’s Shifting Foreign Policy towards Myanmar/Burma (Kristina Roepstorff, Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt University)

Roepstorff was unable to attend the conference due to health reasons and her statement was read by Jörg Faust. In her statement, Roepstorff talked about a shift in India’s foreign policy principles in the case of Myanmar. India’s support to democracy promotion went through four phases: idealist (1950-60s), realist (1970-80s), pragmatic (1990s), and a combination of both (2011). India’s hesitation and its incoherent and inconsistent approaches to democracy promotion lie in having to deal with pressure from the United States, the resulting contradiction with its policy of non-interference, setting priorities that benefit national and geopolitical interests, and working with limited personal and resource capacity. Currently, geo-strategic interests dictate India’s relationship with Myanmar.

Between 1998 and the beginning of the 1990s, India supported pro-democratic activities and democracy promotion in Myanmar. It also disengaged with the leadership because of its anti-democratic behaviour. However, this changed in the early 1990s when India
shifted its policy because of national economic and political interest (competition from China, need for energy, and security concerns within its own nation). This shift led many, including Western states and large segments of India’s civil society, to criticize India for its silence on the regime’s antidemocratic behaviour. More recently, India has somewhat heeded to international pressure and refocused its approach to include a mix of idealism and realism with a primary focus on geo-strategic interests (economic and security) and a secondary focus on democracy promotion.

**Feedback and Discussion**

Overall Thoughts Relevant to the Panel:

The three presentations raise some common challenges and conclusions. First, measuring India’s contribution to democracy promotion is a challenge due to the fact that data is often not released for fear of antagonizing neighbours. Also, its approaches are incoherent, not very obvious, and possibly being undermined by India’s support of authoritarian structures. These two factors led to a strong debate regarding the accuracy of the statements made by Choedon and D’Souza. Second, it is important to assess whether democracy promotion occurs as a result of exporting democracy outside one’s borders, leading by example, or a combination of both. Each avenue seems to have its own measurement challenges. Third, while India seems to be behaving like any established power by placing its geopolitical and economic interests ahead of democracy promotion, it is under pressure to demonstrate its commitment to democracy promotion as a precondition to earning international influence. Fourth, perhaps a better understanding of India’s contribution will come about once we lower our expectations of DEPs and move away from using perfect rigid models. These last two points mirror the points of discussion following the Brazil presentations.

**Panel 4: South Africa**

*South Africa’s Democracy Promotion in Africa (Gilbert Khadiagala, University of the Witwatersrand)*

Khadiagala’s presentation highlighted the impact of the country’s neighbourhood, leaders’ personalities, and internal challenges to the promotion of democracy. According to Khadiagala, South Africa’s democracy promotion has been heavily impacted by its rough neighbourhood, its work through weak multilateral institutions, the level of personal commitment by its leaders, and internal political interests. Thus, South Africa’s internal and geo-strategic factors have superseded its work on democracy promotion. Ul-
Ultimately, Khadiagala argued that the expectations on DEPs need to be checked so as to better reflect the challenges inherent in the act of democracy promotion.

With South Africa’s political and economic experience, great expectations have been placed on its leaders and its democracy promotion work. However, since 1994, South Africa has experienced more obstacles than opportunities in its democracy promotion agenda. The country went through three phases of democracy promotion. Mandela tried to promote democracy but was faced with a rough neighbourhood where there was resistance from leaders, rogue states and pragmatic economic interests. Mbeki was more forceful by infusing democratic norms and values into African institutions, but he also faced challenges. Currently Zuma’s policy is one of muddling through or perhaps even a retraction given that democracy promotion is currently absent in South Africa’s foreign policy and the African National Congress (ANC) is weaker and suffering from descent.

*The Evolution of South Africa’s Doctrine on Democracy Promotion in Africa: From Idealism and Norm Promotion to Pragmatism (Fritz Nganje, Institute for Global Dialogue Pretoria)*

According to Nganje, South Africa’s work on democracy promotion is both a by-product of its sense of obligation towards the powers that helped it through its most difficult times and the personal beliefs of its leaders. Its achievements have been constrained by the contentious issues surrounding the concept, neighbours who are unenthusiastic about democracy, external economic and political competitors (e.g. China), and an internal struggle between its identity based on both a liberal and a third world tradition.

Nganje’s presentation highlighted the contentious nature of the agenda of democracy promotion. According to Nganje, South Africa embraced democracy as a means to continue its enterprise of freedom, establish stability, and appease the powers that helped it move away from apartheid. Mandela, who was perceived as a Western agent, was not very successful in promoting democracy. He faced competition from neighbouring leaders and overriding economic challenges. Mbeki advanced democracy promotion as a cultural concept, shifted towards a multilateral approach, and linked it to the need to reform the global system and its existing power relations (counter-hegemony). Zuma decreased the emphasis on democracy promotion, especially when it ran counter to South Africa’s economic interests and caused a dangerous divide within the ANC. As such, South Africa’s success in promoting democracy has varied according to the external and internal political, economic and personal constraints facing its leaders.

*South Africa and Zimbabwe: Democracy Promotion or Regime Consolidation? (David Moore, University of Johannesburg)*
Moore presented on the second half of his paper dealing with the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa has followed an inconsistent approach to democracy promotion in Zimbabwe, one ranging from direct anti-democratic interference in its internal political affairs to championing democratic resolutions to its land reform and political crises. Ultimately, South Africa’s relationship with Zimbabwe and the outcome of its interventions, or the lack thereof, have their roots in the historical relationship between the two, the competition amongst its leaders, and South Africa’s economic interests in Zimbabwe.

According to Moore, Mbeki, unlike Mandela who did not intervene in Zimbabwe’s affairs, had an inconsistent democracy promotion approach to Zimbabwe. He intervened to help democratically resolve the crisis over the issue of Zimbabwe’s land reform and influenced the internal functioning of the Zimbabwean political system so as to limit the subsequent rise of political competition within South Africa. Zuma, like Mbeki, worked hard on remaking and reforming Zimbabwean political parties while flip-flopping on his support to and condemnation of Mugabe and his undemocratic processes. Moore’s findings seem to indicate that South Africa will only promote democracy as long as it does not become too hard or complicated for its leaders. South Africa’s behaviour with Zimbabwe is a perfect example of the country pulling back on its democracy promotion agenda when its economic interests are threatened.

Feedback and Discussion

Overall Thoughts Relevant to the Panel:

Feedback included discussions about the true nature of South Africa’s commitment to democracy promotion given Swaziland’s utter dependence on South Africa. Questions were also related to the effectiveness of South Africa’s democracy campaign, especially given the inconsistency of its actions and its weak foreign policy focused primarily on economics. Others noted the implications of the increased merger between one dominant party and the state and the backsliding into authoritarianism. But, as in the case of Brazil and India, questions were raised regarding whether South Africa was different from Western donors whose actions are dictated by geopolitical and economic interests. Moreover, some brought forth the issue of culture as it relates to seniority, its impact on limiting younger leaders’ success, and the development of forms of governance that are better suited for the region. The discussions led to calls for further research on these alternative systems of governance, the drivers behind the selective interventionist processes, and the means to evaluate South Africa’s achievements given the role of powerful non-democratic neighbours.
Panel 5: Muslim Democracies

Indonesia and the Promotion of Democracy, its Power and its Influence (Muhadi Sugiono, Universitas Gadjah Mada)

According to Sugiono, Indonesia has earned a unique leadership position among the DEPs. Its position as the third largest democracy with the largest Muslim population in the world has helped it earn leverage and become a rising power in the region. Indonesia has shifted from an indirect actor to an active promoter of democracy through multilateral institutions and diplomatic channels. It has adjusted its non-interventionist approach but remains cognisant of sensitivities when dealing with its non-democratic neighbours. Also, despite its Muslim makeup, Indonesia is not very influential in the Muslim world due to its limited resources, measured interventions, and a perceived incomplete Islamic character.

Indonesia went through two phases that helped inject democracy promotion into its foreign policy. The first phase was that of passively promoting democracy, and the second saw a more active Indonesia with democracy promotion becoming a pillar in Indonesian politics and foreign policy. This renewed active stance towards the promotion of democracy has led it to adjust its position on the principle of non-interference in order to allow it more flexibility, especially when having to deal with problems emanating inside its own neighbourhood. Indonesia’s rise as a democratic power makes the question of compatibility between Islam and democracy less relevant. It is a strong supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement and a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its influence, both passive and active (through diplomatic and project-level interventions), comes from its status as a rising power and its aspiration of leadership amongst its peers.

Turkey and the Promotion of Stability and Democracy in Fragile States: Afghanistan as a Turning point towards a new Unilateralism (Jöran Altenberg and Lea Zorić, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ))

Altenberg and Zorić presented on Turkey’s approach to promoting democracy in Afghanistan. According to the presenters, Turkey has been active bilaterally and through multilateral institutions. It has implemented an indirect and realist approach to democracy promotion in Afghanistan. Its approach is based on its policy of non-interference, a desire to protect its economic and geo-strategic interests, the need to deflect attention from its own democratic flaws, and the desire to remain a player on the international scene. Also, there seems to be a lack of political will to actively promote democracy.
Turkey maintains a desire to not be seen as patronizing, leads by example, and works to maintain its regional power. As such, it assists in promoting democracy only when asked by the receiving country and has a strong history of non-interference with its neighbours. It is however active through multilateral organizations that are involved in democracy promotion and does not abstain from debates regarding democratization (e.g. the democratization of Afghanistan debate).

In Afghanistan, Turkey’s assistance is only slightly aligned with that of the international community. Its development agency avoids working on governance issues and provides technical assistance when requested. This active avoidance allows Turkey to evade being instrumentalized by the European Union as a means to promote the strategic interests of other countries. At the multilateral level (through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN)), Turkey avoids real engagement on issues of governance and stability. Due to its Muslim identity, Turkey is able to work on sensitive issues with various actors, including religious leaders.

*The Role of Emerging Powers in Africa and the Muslim World: The Case of Turkey, Indonesia and South Africa (Muna Abdalla, International IDEA Office to the African Union)*

Abdalla’s presentation focused on the Islamic states of Turkey and Indonesia. According to Abdalla, Islam as a political model (as opposed to an ideology) is the basis for the legitimacy of the governments in Indonesia and Turkey. Islam is viewed as a shield from Western ideas and influences. This Islamic base has allowed Turkey and Indonesia to influence democracy promotion directly by offering a new non-Western agenda in the UN. According to Abdalla, both Turkey and Indonesia share a level of pragmatism as well as a regional and ideological balance to their approaches. Internal challenges to their own level of democracy feature prominently in their current democracy promotion agendas.

Following 9/11, Turkey and Indonesia took advantage of the West’s loosening of its democracy demands on the less-than or un-democratic regimes that helped in its anti-terrorism agenda. This allowed them to avoid international criticism regarding the state of their own democracies and become examples of success for other Muslim countries. It also allowed them to directly influence democracy promotion by offering a new non-Western agenda in the UN and by supporting democratic reforms in multilateral institutions. Overall, their approaches to democracy promotion are based on a level of pragmatism, a regional and ideological balance, and the influences of real internal challenges related to their own democratic performance.

*Feedback and Discussion*
Comments specifically related to Sugiono’s paper highlighted the need to reassess the conclusions related to Indonesia’s influence through the UN Democracy Fund given its lack of funding to it, recognize the limitations of working at the regional level, and use either power or influence in the paper’s title.

There was a suggestion to reorganize the Altenberg and Zorić paper and begin with an overview of Turkey’s general democracy promotion activities followed by a focus on its role in Afghanistan.

Abdalla’s presentation raised questions and led to a discussion regarding the claim that Islam is the source of legitimacy in the countries covered, especially in Indonesia.

Overall Thoughts Relevant to the Panel:

The distinction between Sunnis and Shiites was raised as an issue when assessing democracy within an Islamic culture. An idea was also put forward to look at using the Cooper-Farooq matrix as a model to understand why Turkey and Indonesia seem to be mostly active on the multilateral level. Finally, given the outspokenness of Indonesia in a region that is not less difficult than others, suggestions were made for further research targeting the nuances behind the approaches of the various DEPs.

Panel 6: Conclusions

The format of this final panel was different from the preceding five panels. The panel was opened by Stuenkel’s presentation related to his paper and reflections on broader comparative aspects. This was followed by Faust’s longer commentary in which he drew on the outcomes of the previous panels to present the similarities and differences between the DEPs and more traditional democracy promoters. In the interest of engaging all participants in an exercise of reflection regarding the outcomes of the conference, some panellists were then invited to share their brief and concise reflections.

Comparative Perspectives (Oliver Stuenkel, School of Social Science São Paulo)

Stuenkel provided a comparative analysis based on his paper and the contributions of the other conference panellists. According to Stuenkel, the current system seems to separate between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ stakeholders. In doing so, it ignores the special challenges that DEPs face, including those arising from their relative power in the region, their own stage of democratic development, and their mostly anti-democratic neighbours. This system needs to change in order to make the practice of democracy promotion more enticing and successful. As well, there needs to be a greater em-
phasis on removing the current ideological bend behind democracy promotion. Doing so will allow for a more impactful engagement by the DEPs, less rhetoric, more open government initiatives, and perhaps an increased involvement by civil society. One of the key divergences between the West and the DEPs is on the issue of engagement. While Western powers perceive DEPs as cozying up to authoritarian regimes, DEPs often prefer dialogue to condemnation as a more appropriate means to both improve democracy and avoid backsliding.

Democratic Emerging Powers and ‘Traditional’ Democracy Promoters (Jörg Faust, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE))

Faust summarized the findings of the conference and raised the following important fundamental issues that need to be answered when assessing the role of DEPs in democracy promotion. Faust argued that before assessing whether DEPs actually promote democracy outside their borders, one should assess the underlying reasons behind the expectations on democratic governments to promote democracy elsewhere. A potential answer lies in assessing the possible reasons behind their decision to not promote democracy. Another lies in the fact that DEPs tend to do some democracy promotion, unlike other non-democratic emerging powers.

Their ‘limited’ level of democracy promotion, at least as it is currently defined, is partially explained by the inconsistent democratic transitions amongst the DEPs and their differing approaches when compared to the West. The DEPs approaches are more demand driven, more geared towards formal and legalistic elements, more cautious, and less conditional (including fewer or no sanctions/violence). But fundamentally, their cautious calculated approach is not unlike that of the West.

Comments by other Panellists

Yeshi Choeden - All democratic emerging powers have common characteristics. These include their starting position, approaches to democracy promotion (lack of force), sensitive horizontal cooperation, solidarity, appreciation of the demand-driven process, and regionalization of democracy promotion. These powers bring different norms that apply better to developing countries and it is these norms that need to be enshrined so as to make the system more democratic, more reflective and more accountable.

Muna Abdalla - These emerging powers are pragmatic and have a duality of messages (one for their constituents and the other for their network). It seems that we are putting too much faith in the ability and power of these countries and thus we need to reassess their actual power before increasing our expectations.
Muhadi Sugiono - There needs to be an understanding of what the nature, parameter and significance of DEPs are and whether we should assess their power and role with non-economic indicators. Also, there needs to be a consensus on the meaning and measurement of democracy promotion and an understanding of the differing democracy promotion approaches by DEPs (as compared to that of Western donors). Finally, there needs to be a broadening of the understanding of intentions to include national interest.

Lea Zorić - There needs to be a further understanding of the relationship between stabilization and democracy promotion as well as an attempt to bring the DEPs on board by combining the two, especially in cases where stabilization could undermine the work being done on democracy promotion.

Issues Arising from the Final Discussion

Comments by participants and attendees at the end of the conference raised some interesting questions or concerns that require further research. These have been grouped together as follows:

*Revisiting the basic tenets of democratic theory:* Understanding how formal equality links to social equality; using other non-liberal democratic lenses to look at how societies are ordered and serve the common good; understanding the real impact of cultural embeddedness and its necessity; exploring a more suitable light form of democracy; assessing whether the promotion of democracy through formal democratic structures actually promotes a democratic culture; and understanding the drivers and motivations of emerging powers.

*Revisiting the definition of democracy promotion:* Advocating a maximalist approach to defining democracy promotion and capturing non-traditional efforts; assessing the differences in the discourse between development and democracy promotion; defining and understanding democracy promotion and its implications on the assessment of interventions; and assessing conceptual issues related to the understanding of the practice of democracy promotion by emerging powers (definition, data and impact).

*Casting a wider net in order to understand the real driving forces behind the DEPs democracy promotion:* Assessing the reasons behind the DEPs’ interventions through other more critical perspectives (e.g. post-colonial, deconstructivist, neo-Gramscian, feminist); assessing the impact of the neo-liberal agenda on the behaviour of the DEPs; assessing the impact of the politicization and securitization of aid on democracy promotion; and further exploring the role of Islam and ‘Muslim democracies’.
Revisiting the manner in which one measures the DEPs’ democracy promotion activities and collecting more empirical data: Undertaking a systematic approach that deals with budgetary expenditure issues and the real magnitude of democracy promotion; exploring democracy promotion through means other than aid provision; exploring the ethics behind the judgement of efforts; and mapping the differences between the approaches of Western and emerging donors.

Exploring the DEPs’ democracy promotion initiatives through multilateral institutions: Identifying and understanding the most successful blend of multilateralism and bilateralism; understanding the implications of the trend to regionalize and exclude traditional donors; and assessing the DEPs’ multilateral approaches and their implications on democracy promotion.

Improving the suitability of interventions: Developing recommendations on how traditional donors can interact with emerging donors; developing new lessons learned that reflect the experiences of DEPs; and holding deep policy discussions on who is best placed to apply strategic approaches.

The Way Forward

Participants were told that aside from the conference report, there were plans to publish select contributions to the conference in the form of an edited volume or a special issue of a journal, as well as to organize a panel at a conference next year. Gerd Schönwälder, the conference organizer, thanked all the participants and attendees for their contributions to the conference, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at University of Ottawa for their help in organizing it, as well as the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for providing logistical and financial support.