RETHINKING CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES

2010
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PAPERS FROM A WORKSHOP HELD NOVEMBER 2, 2009, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

CO-HOSTED BY:
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Preface

As Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa, I am pleased to present this collection of essays on Canada’s international priorities for the future. This report represents a close collaboration between CIPS and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University. Both institutions are devoted to promoting academic research and informed public discussion of international policy issues and Canada’s role in the world.

In the opening chapter of this report, the Director of NPSIA, Fen Osler Hampson, and I introduce the essays that follow, written by ten thoughtful Canadians. Each contributor was asked to identify a few clear priorities for the future of Canada’s international policy in an era of profound global change. Our purpose was not to reach agreement on a singular vision for Canadian policy, but, rather, to generate as many creative, forward-looking ideas and recommendations as possible—and to make these ideas available to a wider audience.

The University of Ottawa is most grateful to the Aurea Foundation which supported the costs of this workshop.

In the coming years, CIPS and NPSIA will continue to promote scholarship and debate on international policy issues, including through publications and public events. For more information, please visit: www.cepi-cips.uottawa.ca and www.carleton.ca/npsia.

Roland Paris

March 2010
INTRODUCTION: LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY

FEN OSLER HAMPSON AND ROLAND PARIS

The need for leadership, the lack of proper resources to carry out foreign, defence, and development policy, the apparent absence of clearly defined priorities, and the failure to step up to the plate on pressing global issues are dominant themes in current debates about Canadian foreign policy. It is also fashionable to refer to Canada as a declining power on the world stage, although this theme is not new. It was the argument of Andrew Cohen’s book, While Canada Slept,¹ which drew invidious comparisons between the quality and assets of Canada’s foreign policies with the so-called golden age of Canadian diplomacy in the 1950s, as did an earlier instalment of Canada among Nations, published under the subtitle A Fading Power.²

Canadian foreign policy has always had its critics. Recall the criticisms that were levelled at Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Team Canada missions in the early 1990s, and the charge that Canada’s diplomacy was unduly crass and motivated by narrow economic self-interest, or later on at Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy for being overly idealistic, moralistic, and utopian. But today such criticism appears to have reached a new crescendo, intensified perhaps by the intense partisanship and rivalry that comes with chronic minority government status and the constant threat of an impending federal election.

¹ Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2004).
Notwithstanding partisan slings and arrows, underlying today’s debates about Canada’s place in the world is a deeper disquiet, which is reflected in four different contending schools of thought (or world views) about the future course and direction of Canadian foreign policy. Each of these schools has a different take on where Canada should channel its energies and resources in international affairs, and each deserves to be taken seriously. These schools can be characterized as follows: (1) continentalism; (2) revival (or restored) internationalism; (3) niche diplomacy; and (3) global problem-solving.

**Continentalism**

“Continentalists” argue that Canada’s international relations should play second string or second fiddle to preserving the health of the Canadian economy and the vitality of our trade and investment relations with the United States. They argue that with almost two billion dollars worth of goods and services crossing the border each day, and the fact that almost half of our gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by exports to the United States, Canada cannot afford to take any aspect of its economic and security relationships with the United States for granted, especially at a time when the United States is erecting new barriers to trade and the free movement of peoples across our border in order to thwart terrorists and other criminal elements who seek to enter the country.

According to this perspective, Canada cannot risk alienating or antagonizing Washington because we just have too much at stake in terms of our economic survival and well-being. Continentalists believe that the economics of our bilateral relationship should also dictate our other international political priorities and alignments, including our key defence and security priorities. Along with our commitment to the Afghanistan mission, where our troops have been working alongside American and NATO forces, continentalists also believe that there should be a greater commitment and share of resources that go into continental security and defence in order to secure the perimeter of North America, including greater investments in coastal maritime surveillance and control, intelligence, public safety, and general border security management with the United States. This is because Canada cannot risk the closure of, or disruption along, the border if there are future terrorist or military attacks against the North American continent.

**Revival (or Restored) Internationalism**

“Revival internationalists” focus on burnishing Canada’s multilateral vocation and credentials. They argue that we should concentrate the bulk of our diplomatic energies and efforts on making international institutions work better and on reforming the formal and informal machinery of international governance via the G20 and other new bodies to address new global challenges. They also believe that because the traditional postwar pecking order of
power and influence in the world is changing with the rise of new powerhouses in Asia and Latin America—notably China, India, and Brazil—Canada should strengthen its political and economic relations with these countries and vigorously support their efforts to gain a stronger voice in international institutions, particularly within the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Many of these same internationalists hark back to the key leadership role Canada played in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, when we championed the anti-personnel landmines treaty, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other global, normative regime-building efforts, many of which were associated with Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as foreign minister and his human security agenda, or even earlier when a Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney led the anti-apartheid movement in the Commonwealth and championed global action to halt climate change and protect forests and biodiversity at the 1992 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Environment and Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. They point out that our international activism, which garnered much international acclaim and attention, was also reflected in the vital involvement of our military, police, judiciary, and NGO communities in the great state building and democratic reconstruction enterprises of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which were led by the United Nations in such countries as Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Revival internationalists see sizeable payoffs for Canada in such multilateral ventures and associations where we can build coalitions, work with others, play the role of intermediary, and thus extend our political and diplomatic influence, especially at a time when rising powers such as India, China, and Brazil are exerting growing influence in the global political economy and perhaps even challenging the established political order.

**Niche Diplomacy**

Advocates of “niche diplomacy” are in some ways foreign policy bargain hunters. They argue that out of necessity Canada’s international relations will have to be carried out on the cheap in years to come for reasons that we understand all too well as we continue to grapple with the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. Niche diplomacy advocates believe that it is unrealistic for any government—Conservative or otherwise—to open the spending floodgates on Canada’s international relations when there are just too many things to worry about (and spend on) at home, especially as we now begin (yet again) to tighten our belts and close our wallets. Niche diplomacy advocates, for example, argue that our development assistance should be directed at a very small group of poor nations where we can work closely with other donors and in ways that demonstrate concrete results. We should also scale back on our foreign policy commitments to regions of the globe that are most closely tied to our national self-interest, such as the Western Hemisphere. In sum, champions
of niche diplomacy believe that we need to prune our international commitments, not enlarge or inflate them.

In many ways, niche diplomacy backers resemble and repeat the arguments of the early Trudeaucrats who repudiated what they saw as outsized Pearsonian pretensions or aspirations. Helpful fixer “meddling” was expressly rejected in the 1970 “Foreign Policy for Canadians” review, although by the end of his political life Pierre Trudeau had developed broader international aspirations and even some meddling habits of his own.

Global Problem Solving

“Global problem-solvers,” like Thomas Homer-Dixon, the Mackenzie Institute, and even some members of the medical profession and intelligence community, have a somewhat different take on the future course of Canada’s international relations. They are preoccupied with the very real global threats we confront and argue that today’s world is a much more dangerous place than it was during the Cold War, but for very different reasons that have little to do with traditional military-security threats. This is because there are a large number of indiscriminate, non-traditional threats and challenges to global security that emanate from a wide variety of largely non-state sources. Global warming, biodiversity loss, and emerging infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, SARS, H1N1, etc., all pose major new risks to the health and survival of people around the globe, including Canadians. Canada must prepare itself for these new global risks and uncertainties by deploying a much greater range of capabilities and assets to manage its international relations.

Global problem-solvers argue that foreign policy is increasingly a citizen-based activity directed at managing global risks. It is also one where traditional, bureaucratic lines of authority between the domestic and the international are blurred and problem management goes well beyond the competence and capabilities of traditional governmental authorities and lines of accountability. According to this school, developing an effective global risk management strategy for Canada will require new tools, new levels of civic engagement, new organizational mandates, new ways of thinking, and a whole new set of networks and relationships between governments and domestic and transnational civil society actors. (This emphasis on civic engagement distinguishes this school from revival internationalism which continues to put much stock in the value of intergovernmental institutions—albeit reformed ones—and states.)

According to the global problem-solving school, niche diplomacy only makes sense in a world that is predictable and where you can plan for the future. But, in a world that is filled with surprises, Canada needs to have much more robust capabilities and a much more diverse

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portfolio and range of foreign policy instruments, assets, and civic engagement. Heightened levels of public awareness and engagement must be tapped so that society as a whole can better anticipate crises, adapt to change, and be prepared for a world where it will be anything but business as usual.

These four schools or approaches in the current debate about Canada’s international relations drive home the point that we are, in effect, confronted with some tough choices. There is more than a kernel of truth to the point of view represented by each “school.” By the same token, each argument taken to its logical extreme takes us down a path that no policy maker—or Canadian—could plausibly support.

Do Canadians really want a foreign policy that plays second fiddle to our trade and economic ties with the United States and which defines our security and foreign policy interests so narrowly? That is, in effect, what we are saying if we subordinate foreign policy to keeping the Canada-US border open for business as some continentalists argue. Most Canadians would flinch at the proposition that Washington, even under an Obama administration, should dictate the terms of all or even most of our international engagements.

However, most Canadians are not unabashed revivalist internationalists either. They are smart enough to recognize that the world has changed since the days of the Cold War or the heady days of Pearsonian internationalism. They also recognize that simply throwing more dollars into diplomacy, overseas development assistance (ODA), and defence will not buy Canada one iota more of influence unless those dollars are spent wisely on causes that have real merit, impact, and public support.

Ringing endorsements of Pearsonian-style, liberal internationalism miss the mark. The world is a much more complex place than it was in the 1950s when the Cold War was in full swing. Today we confront a much wider array of problems, and the world stage is crowded with many more actors and institutions than it was in the 1950s. The real questions are, “Where should we act?” and “With what goals and intended result?” There are many failed or ailing states in the world and it is unrealistic to think that we can serve them all.

The sober warning of advocates of niche diplomacy that new money will not come easily under coming conditions of fiscal austerity suggests that some tough choices will ultimately have to be made. We obviously cannot do everything. But as the global problem-solvers warn us, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that there is some comfortable niche into which our foreign policy priorities easily fall. We do need a new approach to global risk management—one that engages ordinary Canadians along with the many different branches and levels of the Canadian bureaucratic and governmental apparatus and which breaks through the silos of traditional decision-making authority, mandates, and mindsets.

Finally, continentalists have a real point in that nothing practical can now be said of Canadian foreign, defence, or development policy without acknowledging the post-9/11 meanings
dominating Canada’s relations with the United States. However, this is the area of greatest uncertainty and also one of the most contentious domestically. Public opinion polls show consistently that although Canadians want “good relations” they have little appetite for any kind of grand, new, strategic bargain with the United States in trade, defence/security, or even immigration. Although security is now a central concern of Canadian policy, its variable meanings remain imprecise and controversial within the policy community and among the public-at-large. The uncertainty about how to define and shape the Canada-US relationship is magnified by the fact that we continue to live with minority governments in Canada, which greatly narrows and restricts political horizons and the prospects for any major new initiatives in relations with our southern neighbour.

As the essays in this study demonstrate, any serious review of Canada’s international relations and role in the world will have to grapple with the challenges represented by these four different schools. Successful foreign policy cannot be made by adopting any of these one-dimensional approaches or preference systems alone. It can only be made by resolving the tensions between them in ways that durably reflect Canadian interests and values. This indeed is the true test of political leadership.

The essays in this report offer the perspectives of ten thoughtful Canadians we recruited to discuss and debate the priorities of Canada’s international engagement in the coming years. We challenged each contributor to identify between three and five priorities, and to be as specific as possible. Our purpose was not to reach agreement on a singular vision, but rather to generate as many creative, forward-looking ideas and recommendations as possible, and to make these ideas available to a wider audience. As you will see in the essays that follow, the contributors responded to our challenge with intelligence and imagination.

Nearly all of the essays in this collection describe seismic changes taking place in the global political, economic, and security landscape—and lament Canada’s desultory response to these changes to date and the absence of serious public discussion of our international policy options. As a country, we have still not fully recognized the scope of these changes or to understand their impact on this country, nor the need to develop coherent, longer-term strategies to respond to these challenges and opportunities. To quote from Gordon Smith’s contribution: “Canadian foreign policy has rarely needed a thorough rethink more than it does now.” While the essays in this collection are not fully fleshed-out strategies, they do offer fresh ideas that could be the foundations of a new strategy or strategies—and they all share the strikingly similar conviction that Canada and Canadians cannot afford to act as though these global changes are not already upon us.

Consider just a few of these transformations, along with the challenges they pose:

- Emerging powers are rapidly transforming the world economy. Canada’s trade and investment relationship with the principal emerging markets is still relatively small, and our predominant trading partner—the United States—faces a crushing debt burden and the prospect of several years of modest economic growth. Further, the
North American free trade agenda is languishing, and post 9/11 security concerns have added uncertainty to relations between the United States and its North American partners.

- The international financial crisis and “Great Recession” exposed the fragility and interconnectedness of the global economy, and its effects will be with us for the foreseeable future. At home, we face the prospects of painful adjustment as jobs fail to return in underperforming manufacturing sectors, and the eventual task of reducing stimulus-inflated budgetary deficits during a period of expected low growth. Meanwhile, Canada’s productivity growth rate—the basis of our long-term prosperity—remains lower than many of our competitors.

- The system of international institutions that Canada helped to build after World War II is under great strain. Multilateral trade talks are stalled, there is little prospect for reforming the UN Security Council (which reflects the world of 1945, not today) and it remains unclear if the G20 will emerge as a central coordinating body in place of the G8—or whether some other mechanism, in which Canada may not have a seat or voice, will ultimately prevail.

- Transnational challenges in health and the environment have never been greater, with climate change posing a major threat to the earth’s future. Fragile and failing states, ethnic and religious tensions, transnational crime and terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies also pose serious challenges. These problems are aggravated by the growing gap between the richest and poorest: while some parts of the developing world are lifting themselves out of poverty, conditions for the “bottom billion” have continued to worsen.

The papers in this collection represent our modest attempt to motivate and inform this discussion. Each contributor’s essay is unique and speaks for itself. By design, we did not press the authors to reach a consensus. In fact, we asked them not to speak to each other about their papers until they were written—in order to solicit the broadest range of visions and suggestions for the future of Canada’s international policy. As expected, their perspectives are diverse, although several common themes emerge.

Peter Singer of the University of Toronto, for example, argues that Canada should focus on developing and exporting scientific solutions to global health, agricultural, and environmental problems. Former senior diplomat Jeremy Kinsman also believes that Canada should strive to become the “go-to” country for new solutions to vexing global issues, and that achieving this goal will require Canada to “reinvigorate its capacity for creative diplomacy” and to situate itself at the centre of international “civil society and research webs.” Mobilizing non-governmental networks is also one of the recommendations put forward by Ontario’s Fairness Commissioner, Jean Augustine, who previously served as chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade when she was a
Member of Parliament. According to Augustine, Canadians are well-placed to share their own experiences with urban issues in our multicultural cities—including community-based solutions to housing, employment, safety, and social welfare—with other countries, such as societies that are in the process of rebuilding after conflicts. Although Singer, Kinsman, and Augustine offer many additional recommendations in their respective articles, they envisage a similar niche for Canada in the world: we should be leading the search for solutions to specific transnational problems where we have a foundation of expertise, including through non-traditional types of diplomacy that muster the efforts of a broad range of governmental and non-governmental, international, and local actors.

While Augustine mentions war-torn states, they are a central theme in three other papers. Former Chief of Defence Staff Maurice Baril suggests that Canada should re-commit itself to supporting UN peace operations after the bulk of Canada’s military forces withdraw from Afghanistan, as they are scheduled to do in 2011. Baril notes that “peacekeeping is not dead but has evolved” from traditional to “robust” peacekeeping and peace enforcement in unstable countries, including several in Africa. Using expertise acquired in Afghanistan—including experience in civil-military and “whole of government” coordination, as well as counterinsurgency techniques—Canada could dedicate itself to supporting UN missions with civilians and military forces and by training personnel deployed by other countries. Along similar lines, Nancy Gordon, former president of the UN Association of Canada and former vice-president of Care Canada, writes that “serious consideration should be given to re-engagement with UN peacekeeping missions” after 2011, also noting that “robust” peacekeeping is the new reality. She puts special emphasis on the humanitarian imperative and civil-military cooperation in emergency situations, along with the principles of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Justin Massie of the University of Ottawa also recommends that Canada engage in fragile states, including Sudan/Darfur, in part because such missions can serve to unite different foreign policy constituencies within Canada, including those holding more humanitarian and more security-oriented views. Whatever international role is ultimately pursued, however, Massie insists that it must be based on a broad domestic consensus within Canadian society.

The Globe and Mail’s national affairs columnist, Jeffrey Simpson, also underlines the importance of building public support for a more sophisticated approach to Canada’s international engagement. Specifically, since “most issues are global in one way or another,” leaders in all walks of life need to explain the linkages between domestic and international policy to Canadians. Paradoxically, this “internal” imperative should be the “first objective of Canadian foreign policy,” including greater understanding of how various domestic policies may support or hinder our global activities, and vice versa. Michael Kergin, Canada’s former ambassador to the United States, also sees the need for more coherence between domestic and external policies: “…our ability to manage new external pressures, or indeed, even influence international trends, will be proportionate to Canadians’ capacity to maintain
economic and social cohesion within the federation.” But as Simpson notes, knowledge of international affairs and its relevance to Canada may be a precondition for achieving such coherence, which leads us back to Gordon Smith’s lament about the dearth of serious debate on international issues in this country. Smith puts it bluntly: “…we lack a reasoned and informed public discussion.”

Gordon Smith’s paper raises another theme that appears in many of the essays: Canada’s role in the reform of global governance institutions. Canadians need to be “rule makers” rather than “rule takers,” he says, meaning that we should be at the forefront of fashioning new multilateral mechanisms that are sufficiently representative and nimble to break “global deadlocks” on tough issues, from nuclear proliferation to climate change. Many of our existing post-World War international institutions have “outmoded mandates and decision-making mechanisms.” Now is the time, therefore, for Canada to take a leading role in crafting new institutions, including the G20, and to ensure that these mechanisms function well and include Canada as a member. In addition to avoiding Canada’s exclusion from new multilateral centres of power, several of the papers in this project also point to the need for stronger bilateral and regional partnerships, especially with emerging powers, as well as with civil society groups, as noted earlier. These relationships, explains Kinsman, tend to dissipate quickly if they are not maintained and nurtured—in fact, many “have lapsed” in recent years.

Pursuing any of these prescriptions for Canada’s future international policy will require vision, political will, public support, and institutional capacity. Regarding the latter, Kergin and Kinsman both see weaknesses in our international policy machinery. One weakness, according to Kergin, is the apparent lack of political confidence in “Canada’s conventional instruments of foreign policy, such as the Foreign Affairs and Trade Commissioner services.” For his part, Kinsman laments the “degradation of Canadian representational capacity abroad, the slashing of program funds essential for promoting Canadian purposes and activity, and the constricting of public diplomacy generally in favour of centrally controlled Ottawa-centric communications.”

As Robert Miller argues in his contribution, “Canadian foreign policy in general lacks the necessary focus, determination, vigour, and endurance to effectively pursue priorities…the coming year of G8 and G20 summits, which are being hosted by Canada, is an opportune time to get our act together.” However, the advancement of new policy initiatives will have to be complemented by the “dreary business” of fixing the machinery of government. At the top of Miller’s useful list is the need to “fix CIDA,” in much the same way the British government some years ago turned around their own Department of International Development (DFID) via a series of radical organizational and policy reforms. Gordon, whose paper also devotes considerable attention to development policy, says that major additional reforms are required in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), where “[a]ccountability chill has replaced innovation or creativity.” Several authors assert (or imply) that Canada has not done a good enough job of mobilizing civil society actors—at home
or abroad—in our international policy. This criticism is linked to the theme identified earlier, a theme that is one of the most consistent and strongly expressed across all the papers: If Canada is to succeed in an increasingly polycentric, diverse, complex world, our diplomacy and our diplomats must reinvent their traditional role. They must transform themselves and this country into organizing “hubs” of horizontal global networks comprised of governmental and non-governmental actors at all levels—local, national, and transnational, including both Canadian and non-Canadian actors—focusing on those who are involved in policy areas that matter to Canada.

When the drafts of these essays were presented at a November 2009 workshop in Ottawa, there was no doubt in the room that the United States loomed large in all the authors’ thinking, and that all considered the Canada-US relationship of paramount importance. Perhaps this point was so obvious that the authors opted not to dwell on the issue in their papers. But whatever the case, as Kinsman points out, “a close and productive relationship with the United States, and secure access to the US marketplace,” is one of the few “[o] verriding foreign policy priorities” facing all Canadian governments, regardless of political stripe. In the opinion of the project coordinators, this relationship has been allowed to languish, and seeking new partnerships and markets should not preclude efforts to strengthen the North American economic partnership and to explore “post-NAFTA” options, including a customs union.

Canada will host both the G8 and G20 meetings later this year, and as host we have the opportunity to define these meetings’ central themes. Doing so, however, requires a clear view of our larger and longer-term strategic objectives. The same is true of our ongoing campaign for a seat on the Security Council, which will culminate in a vote in the General Assembly this fall. Do we know what exactly we would seek to accomplish during a two-year term on the Council? Furthermore, Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan is scheduled to end in 2011, potentially liberating resources for use elsewhere, with continuing commitments to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. What role will our armed forces play in Canada’s international policy beyond 2011? These looming questions make it all the more important to engage in a broader strategic discussion of our global goals—and to pursue that discussion right now.

The papers in this study raise many other issues and priorities, from climate change and the environment to aid policies and the rich-poor divide, Africa, public diplomacy, terrorism, the Arctic, and good governance. We invite you to contemplate each author’s vision for the future of Canada’s international policy, to evaluate those visions critically, and to embrace the challenge of defining your own set of priorities.
Acknowledgments

The “Rethinking Canada’s International Priorities” project was co-sponsored by the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies and Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. The project reflects the desire of both universities to collaborate in the exploration of important international issues, and to engage policy practitioners and the public in these explorations.

We are grateful to the Aurea Foundation, Toronto, for its financial support. (The project coordinators were solely responsible for designing the project and selecting participants.)

Thanks are also due to all the paper writers and other participants at the November 2009 workshop at the University of Ottawa, where drafts were presented and discussed.

Finally, we thank Judy Meyer, Program Coordinator at the Centre for International Policy Studies, for managing the project, and Doris Whittleker at the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs for copyediting the report and preparing it for publication.
In an increasingly inter-connected twenty-first century world, the way in which Canada is perceived outside her borders should reflect the thoughts, aspirations, and values of the diverse multicultural, multilingual, multi-religious, and multidimensional reality within her borders. There is common agreement, backed by a number of surveys over the years, that our collective outlook can be justly described as one of social compassion backed by economic durability.

Canadians agree that we have an intrinsic responsibility to be actively involved in the world. And, irrespective of political leadership or global financial circumstances, best results are rightly generated when Canada’s roles, goals or activities at home and abroad balance those collective aspirations with our resource capacity in confronting the challenges of an evolving world.

Good domestic policy makes for good foreign policy. Over the next five years, Canada’s priorities for international engagement should be shaped by the following themes:

- the projection of Canadian values and culture;
- the improved application of our legal framework;
- the development of sensible communities in the new urban environment.

Ultimately, best results will come about through effective citizen ownership and continuous engagement amongst a broad spectrum of Canadians including individuals and groups, academia, legislators, and civil society stakeholders.
Canadian Values and Culture

Over the next five years, the projection of Canadian values and culture will continue to strengthen our capacity to influence desired outcomes around the world.

Canada, a microcosm of the world, entered the twenty-first century with enormous advantages. In an era of globalization, our multicultural makeup, reflecting citizens with roots in almost every country, remains a particular asset. Through years of immigration, we have developed and embraced a Canadian way of living together, resolving differences, reasoning together, and creating that which the United Nations Human Index Reports describes as quite simply one of the best countries in the world in which to live. Though our reality remains imperfect with, for example, the unresolved national unity question, our day-to-day polity reflects an instinctive appreciation of fundamental issues like the human side of globalization, human security, cultural diversity, and human rights.

But, in one of the most comprehensive foreign policy review exercises in recent history, the 1995 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) report, Canada in the World, offers that “…our unity will spring from pride in our civic nationality—based on shared values and tolerance, respect for the rule of law, and thoughtful compromise.” The report asserts the projection of Canadian values and culture as a matter of prime national interest; and includes a broad range of political, social, and economic factors such as democratic governance; or economic goals nuanced by sustainable development.

On the world stage, Canada’s history as a non-colonizing power and purveyor of constructive multilateralism, and our profile in international peacekeeping, lends credibility and distinguishes us among nations. Those factors help form the positive perception of Canada held by foreign governments, which undoubtedly enhances the likelihood of success in relevant pursuits. Those Canadian values came to bear in Canada’s role in the founding and leading of multilateral fora such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization (WTO); or the manner in which we’ve staked our positions on, for example, past treaties on land mines or the International Criminal Court; or our role in the global security arena through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and our positions on Iraq, Afghanistan, or China’s human rights record.

And, as we enter a new era of global discourse towards new expanded-member multilateral approaches, such as the G20, the projection of Canadian culture and values can help channel international cohesion and solidarity in confronting common problems and threats. In essence, Canada, with much fewer negative associations than other countries, is therefore more likely to be effective in promoting democracy and economic development, ameliorating conflict, or implementing sustainable economic aid and trade constructs that may help to reduce the causes of violence in conflict-prone areas such as the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Canada also stands to gain in many ways from such actions, including the development of opportunities for Canadian-based exporters.
But, our nation-building experience also forces the responsibility of leadership on a number of other non-economic fronts—for example, increased engagement along the path of how we move from rhetorical embrace of the Millennium Development Goals to a consensus on what needs to be done to achieve them. And, in a domain of particular interest—the welfare of children—how can we develop a healthier more global sense of awareness?

Our compassionate values urge that, even as we tackle the myriad issues and challenges around children in the Canadian metropolitan and suburban environments, our enhanced outlook must also incorporate the tragedy of child soldiers, the despair of child labourers, the plight of disabled children and street children, and the horror of child sexual exploitation—all within our global purview.

Our compassionate values will form our actions on the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of basic education for all, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and forming global partnerships for development. Canada will lead in defining and pursuing the “global yardstick” against which the world can measure progress in key areas.

Of course, over the next five years, these actions call for an expanded outlook and a framework of measurement through which we can strategize and channel our efforts. This will involve a wide variety of stakeholders from the non-governmental, voluntary, public, and private sectors.

Ultimately, more so than most others, Canadians are best positioned to fine-tune and implement approaches that lend not only to the excellence of Canada, but also to the well-being of our world.

**Better Application of Canada’s Legal Framework**

*Over the next five years, the improved application of Canada’s progressive framework of laws will bolster our capacity to influence desired outcomes around the world.*

It can be argued that Canada leads the developed world in its legislative efforts to ensure equality to its citizens. Over the past forty-odd years, a solid legal framework has been established that integrates a forceful collection of laws and policies. Co-existing with Canada’s 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Employment Equity Act, the Official Languages Act, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and the Citizenship Act.

It is also important to note that Canada is party to several international human rights instruments which call on governments “to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Our framework of legislation not only ensures equality under the law but also seeks to find that fine balance between individual and collective rights. And it is from this reality that, globally, we draw the moral authority to champion the fight on a number of issues of discrimination and racial intolerance beyond our borders and around the world.

Canadians draw much pride from our sense of international leadership in this area. We tell others that we value our diversity, and how it lends to our success as a nation, and we talk of our continued commitment to build a society that can move beyond tolerance to respect.

So, over the next five years, how can change be brought about in the evolving context of Canadian society? Firstly, it requires all Canadians—individual citizens, civil society, and levels of government—to work together. It requires increased dialogue and the building of constructive partnerships between governments and civil society. It calls for government departments and agencies to work together to implement new and existing policies, programs, and activities to address priority issues.

But it can’t stop there. Progressive partnerships between government and ethno-cultural community groups need to be developed to ensure that policies and programs address systemic inequities and reflect the needs of an increasingly multicultural population. Partnerships must also be formed between government and employers and associations, unions, and other stakeholders, to identify and address systemic barriers in the workplace. Law enforcement officers have to be more consistent in their approach across Canada to better serve ethno-racial communities. At the same time, these partnerships will help generate a tested body of knowledge and expertise that can be shared with other countries.

It was Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. who cautioned in 1963 that, “Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing Justice and...when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress.” Over the next five years, through enhanced dialogue and decisive action to mitigate the serious lack of knowledge about the impact of laws and policies, significant gains can be made along the path of building Canada as a truly inclusive society where everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Building social equity will be an ongoing responsibility.

Ultimately, by working to perfect the application of our own legal framework, Canada is better positioned to lead by example, sharing the best practices gathered with and within both domestic and international communities. This is how we build the just society that we deserve in Canada.

Sensible Communities in the New Urban Environment

Over the next five years, new urban environment themes will foster more responsive, innovative Canadian communities, and a body of thinking that lends to Canada’s position in the world.
The “new urban environment” approach engages the complex challenges and opportunities for diverse groups of people in an increasingly urbanized world. It injects issues of social justice, equity, family, neighbourhood, and individual development into the urban planning landscape. It can also include matters of affordable housing, employment, safety, transportation, social welfare, and belonging.

At large, urban environments are vibrant locations, sites of human creativity and resilience, cultural dynamism, and economic energy. They are politically rich and growing larger, expanding in populations of ethnic and linguistic diversity, and present visible opportunities for observing social transformation in processes of civic participation, as well as emerging possibilities for sustainable futures.

But educational achievement gaps, gross poverty, discrimination, unequal access to resources, homelessness, and a host of other social ills continue to have conspicuously negative effects on the achievement of full life chances for many residents of our cities—young and old alike. Theorists explain that urban factors can influence individual obedience to social rules, and that psychological pressure develops in more densely populated areas. As part of a comprehensive functional approach, better planning and deployment of individual space can make a difference.

In five years, new urban environment learnings will begin to form the infrastructure for central nodes in world markets. Practitioners will increasingly master a host of issues including maximizing accessibility of an area to people with different abilities, implementing urban design schemes to dissuade criminal behaviour, or “traffic calming” or “pedestrianisation” as ways of making urban life more pleasant.

The school system will be enhanced as a key to this dynamic environment, serving as a critical centre where children, youth, and families, in a multiplicity of social differences, gather together to learn, imagine, and realize our interdependent futures.

For example, the new urban environment practitioners take into account the important role that the community plays in the potential academic achievement of children, and how to think about school improvement in terms of creating positive relationships between schools and the communities that they serve. The role of teachers is vital in seeking out ways to engage with communities and to work with parents, activists, social service providers, recreation and healthcare professionals, and employment counsellors to link theory and research to local concerns and issues in order to develop an inclusive curriculum in their classrooms.

New urban environment themes also form a basis for Canada’s leadership in addressing the inordinate impact of climate change on Aboriginal peoples whose livelihood depends on the land, water, and other natural resources. We would make new investments to find new ways to maintain and protect aspects of the Aboriginal peoples’ traditional and subsistence ways of life. This could include the integration of climate change into existing planning processes,
taking into account variables like knowledge systems, culture, social values, spirituality, and ecosystems.

Around the world, Canada will find numerous opportunities to share its experience. For example, in the rebuilding of areas devastated by war or invasion, like Afghanistan or Iraq, some appreciation may be borne for Canada’s insights on a healthy social ecology, the restoration of natural systems, efficient land use, less pollution and waste, good housing and living environments, community involvement, and the preservation of local culture.

Conclusion

Over the next five years, the projection of Canadian values and culture, the improved application of our legal framework, and the development of sensible communities in the new urban environment can help form Canada’s position as a world leader.

Canada’s unique history as a non-colonizing power, champion of constructive multilateralism, and effective international mediator underpins an important and distinctive role among nations new and old. Our global influence will be further strengthened as we take steps domestically to improve consistency in the application of our robust framework of legislation. And, in an age where information is the currency of the realm, the new urban environment positions Canada as a leader in the complex challenges and opportunities for diverse groups of people in an increasingly urbanized world.

On the world stage, Canada will further solidify our respected position as a leader amongst open, advanced societies, backed by increased legitimization in line with our actions along the themes of good governance, health, and education—particularly on issues related to children. And Canada will offer examples to developing countries that are increasingly taking charge of their own development, providing a context where they identify their own priorities and create their own plans to implement and achieve them.

Canada will continue to work just as well within the new so-called Group of 20 countries, as it did in the G8. The new expanded membership better ensures that global issues beyond economic or financial imperatives are engaged at the highest levels—issues of poverty, climate change, war, and disease.

Already, countless Canadian individuals, NGOs, universities, professional associations, cooperatives, governments, and companies are already doing their part to help create the conditions in Canada and around the world in which people are better able—through their own efforts—to improve their lives and those of their families and communities. Through this, we better ensure that Canada will continue to do its fair share for the world, maintaining our proud and uniquely Canadian contribution to global governance and prosperity.
FUTURE ROLES FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

MAURICE BARIL

The framers of this workshop have identified conditions impacting Canada’s analysis of its foreign and defence policy. Most critical to my topic of the military is the 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of the majority of Canadian Forces (CF) from Afghanistan.

A predominant question centres on “what next?” for these forces who have distinguished themselves in a complex operation that has cost the country the blood and treasure of its finest young men and women.

Three factors frame my analysis, which has a longer-term view:

- Increased emphasis by the Obama administration on multilateralism and the revitalization of US support for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and peacebuilding;

- The emphasis on “smart power,” which “involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy.”  


- A reassessment of the use of force, or “robust peacekeeping” as defined by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), in order to better respond to the effects of conflicts on fragile, failing, and failed states;
Underlying these factors are undeniable realities:

- **Security is no longer exclusively measured in geographic borders that are physical.** Maintaining secure borders requires analyses that assess the impact of economic variables, pandemics such as H1N1 and HIV/AIDS, people movement due to climate changes, and the nature of intra-state conflicts. Borders are permeable, and money, disease, migration, ideas, and technology impact on how foreign and defence policy is and will be determined.

- **The nature of conflict has changed.** Responding to conflicts framed by ethnic and religious tensions, as well as by non-state actors who have access to sophisticated weapons systems used in guerrilla-like warfare requires analysis and decision making on the use of force between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

- **The investment by the United States in multilateralism.** The relationship between Canada and the United States means that Canada will have to manage the impacts of a shift in US foreign and defence policy from unilateralism to multilateralism as expressed by the Obama administration and the US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice; the fundamental question is whether this shift is a long-term reassessment or short term and specific to the new administration.

From a Canadian military perspective, these factors and realities lead to several questions for consideration:

- What should the CF do post-2011/post-Afghanistan? Is there a moral responsibility for the CF in a “whole of government” environment to use its experiences in stabilization and reconstruction operations to support the continuing development of other militaries who contribute to UN missions and UN-mandated missions? Based on the experiences in Afghanistan, there is a wealth of lessons learned and acquired technologies that would be of value to multiple actors who will continue to contribute to missions similar to Afghanistan.

- How will a multilateral US foreign and defence policy affect the post-2011 determination of Canadian defence, development, and foreign policy?

- Does the role of the CF in international defence diplomacy shift as the evolution from Pearsonian peacekeeping to peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping continues? Moreover, is this process reinforced by the UN DPKO Capstone Principles and Guidelines and the non-paper tabled by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) entitled *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*?

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2 Robust peacekeeping: “the use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process.” In UN DPKO Capstone Principles and Guidelines, 2008, Annex, p. 99.
What Should Canadian Forces Do Post-2011, Post-Afghanistan?

By 2011, approximately 41,000 Canadian forces personnel will have served in the Afghanistan mission; $7.5 billion will have been spent on combat operations. The Afghanistan campaign has been of importance to Canada for several reasons:

a) it is the first foray into combat since the Korean War;

b) it reaffirmed that the Canadian Forces were ready, willing, and able to engage in heavy combat vice being seen only as lightly armed peacekeepers; this signalled the willingness of our country to have a substantive role in international security issues;

c) it re-established that Canada could be counted as a leading troop-contributing country; and

d) it justified the financial re-investment in defence capabilities after the Forces were savaged during the 1990s.

The experience and lessons learned by the CF as a result of operating in a counter-insurgency environment are critical. It is likely that conflicts will continue to be similar to Afghanistan, but different. Indeed, one can view current conditions in Somalia, Darfur, Sudan, and other regions and predict that counter-insurgency and “whole-of-government” decision making will require re-thinking and “formalizing” the imbedding of civil-military cooperation/coordination into the professional development of the multiple actors who respond to stabilization and reconstruction missions.

The additional assessment that security and development are twinned also suggests that the military will remain a critical stakeholder in post-2011 Afghanistan. Without a secure environment and the protection of civilians working on peacebuilding, there will likely be a return to violence, which will not empower the development of rule of law, good governance, and sustained peace.

Of particular value is the experience gained by the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as representative of civil-military relationships. The emergence of PRTs is a model that has confirmed the need for a substantive civilian corps who can rapidly respond to peacebuilding requirements. The recent release of *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* is a response to the lack of guidance to inform planners, decision makers, and/or practitioners who are deployed from civilian institutions to what the missions are all.

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3 David Perry, “Canada’s seven billion dollar war: The cost of Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan,” *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 703. Additional figures place the price tag of the Afghanistan war at between $18-22b Canadian dollars.

about. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent Canadian document to analyze and trace the lessons learned for application in the post-2011 whole-of-government analysis. 5

Suggesting that the CF return home and retire to mothballs seems a waste of talent, treasure, life, and lessons learned. As noted earlier, peacekeeping is not dead, but has evolved. Having Canada re-engage substantively in UN missions and UN-mandated missions with “boots on the ground” could have significant and positive impact. First, the capacity to share the burden of UN missions through technical expertise, as well as with sophisticated, high-tech equipment would provide support to the current troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs). Second, participation in stabilization and reconstruction missions would provide support to robust peacekeeping, as it becomes the tool of choice in the protection of civilians, and the defence of the mandate.

Extending the borderless security argument, if the CF were more visible in these operations, their experience and expertise could be very useful in mentoring and supporting those who contribute troops and police to UN missions, in terms of technological support, planning, and human resource capability. A subsidiary benefit would be greater capacity for these forces to defend their own regions and be better able to maintain their own security. By extension, an argument can be made that, when conflict can be contained regionally, Canada’s borders are more secure.

How Will the Evolving US Policy towards Multilateralism—Specifically to Its Role with the United Nations—Affect Canadian Forces in a Post-2011 Defence and Foreign Policy?

According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies monograph, the Smart Power Initiative identified the United Nations as a force multiplier for US goals and interests and for other countries as well. 6 Currently, there are nineteen UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions at a cost of $7 billion (2008) in environments that have a direct link to the security of North America. By 2011, Canada will have spent “…an estimated $7.5 billion on military operations and $1.2 billion on development assistance”7 in Afghanistan; the point is that by 2011, Canada’s contribution to Afghanistan will be more than the total cost of UN peace operations. One could make the point that having CF engage in UN operations is not

5 Consultation with DND/MTAP and DFAIT/START, 27 October 2009.


7 D.S. McDonough, “Afghanistan and Renewing Canadian Leadership: Panacea or Hubris?” in International Journal, LXIV, no. 3 (Summer 2009), (Toronto: Canadian International Council), p. 652.
only cost effective, but puts to good use our experiences gained from fighting in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Canada’s return to UN operations and UN-mandated missions could provide benefits in a range of activities that includes exchanges in staff colleges to mentor and support the troop and police contributing countries; sharing equipment and technical support to the TCC/PCCs; providing logistical support; and continuing to support the UN as the force multiplier for Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives.

If UN operations are going to have stronger support from the United States, then how can the Canadian experience in UN peacekeeping and in counter-insurgency be used in mentoring and supporting troop and police contributing countries? Currently, the top troop and police-contributing countries are from the global South, where Canada’s lack of colonial or imperial ambitions/practices provides an opportunity for sharing the experiences in conflict zones like Afghanistan. For many of these countries, having Canada engage with them as partners in peacekeeping missions is desirable.

Given the Shift in the International Peacekeeping from Pearsonian Peacekeeping to Robust Peacekeeping as Part of the New Horizon/New Partnership, Has the Role of the Canadian Forces Changed to Manage the Demands Being Placed on the United Nations?

Contemporary, multi-dimensional peace operations have a multiplicity of actors, roles, responsibilities, and authorities. There is no “one-size fits all” model for complex peace operations. The need is for balancing flexibility and coherence—extracting what works, and tailoring responses to a variety of conflict situations. We know that responses to current day conflicts require a multidimensional, multifunctional, and multifaceted response, of which one tool in the toolkit is robust peacekeeping.

In April 2008, while evaluating the operational readiness of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), I identified issues and made recommendations that could impact Canadian Forces as it considers how to utilize and benefit from the Afghanistan experience. These might be useful as Canada responds to a southern neighbour whose shift to a more multilateral foreign and defence policy could more clearly engage with UN peacekeeping.

8 The top troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations are: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Ghana, and Jordan; the top police contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations are: Jordan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Senegal, and India. See Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), p.139.
As peacekeeping has evolved to meet the challenges of contemporary conflict, robust peacekeeping is delineated from peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is defined as coercive action authorized by the Security Council to maintain or to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has identified a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Robust peacekeeping is more tactical in that it is the authorized use of force by a UN peacekeeping force to defend its mandate against spoilers who constitute a threat to civilians, or whose actions risk undermining the peace process. Under the UN mandate, the CF experience in the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan has resulted in military forces whose capacity to engage in either peace enforcement or robust peacekeeping would be valuable to current UN operations. Increased focus on protection of civilians is complementary to the notion of population security noted in General Stanley A. McChrystal’s report.9

Therefore, what is needed for peace enforcement and/or robust peacekeeping to be successful? The following might be useful in framing the discussions:

- **Member States who contribute their troops and police will need to agree to the concepts and accept the challenges of peace enforcement and/or robust peacekeeping.** This will require a shift from the traditional definition of peacekeeping, which some CF personnel maintain; it will also necessitate a dialogue within the Member State’s own political apparatus as to caveats, casualties, and political costs at home.

- **Personnel from TCCs/PCCs will need to be well trained in the concepts, principles/guidelines, and practices of peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping, and understand both advantages and limitations.** Training provided both at the national level and in the pre-deployment phase will need to reflect the practices required for robust peacekeeping. At the civil-military interface, it will require a fully transparent understanding of roles, responsibilities, and authorities for the multidimensional set of actors who are on the ground in the contemporary conflict environment. Planning for peacebuilding will require closer coordination with development actors, and possibly expansion of the PRT concept. The return of CF to a more active role in UN peace missions would provide a means by which the experiences in Afghanistan could be shared with other troop and police contributing countries.

- **A fully identified and functional command and control and communication system is critical for the success of robust peacekeeping.** A subject of ongoing debates focuses on civil-military coordination (CMCOORD) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) at operational and tactical levels. Given the peace process requirements, there is general acceptance that “we cannot shoot our way to peace” and the involvement of a range of civilian actors and the civil-military relationship is critical. The model of the

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9 Commonly known as The McChrystal Report, it is available at: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews
PRT is noted as being one where the roles and responsibilities of CIMIC/CMCOORD have been refined; the CF experience could be useful in UN missions.

- **The provision of the necessary technology in a timely manner ensures that peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping be proportional in response, timely for effect, and based on proper intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.** Without detailed and accurate information based on more than rumour and assumption, robust peacekeeping could be detrimental to a peace process, particularly when civilian casualties become the headlines on the worldwide news circuit and TCCs/PCCs lose personnel; again, the CF experience in Afghanistan has been valuable in refining the use of technology in conflict situations. Mentoring and supporting troop and police contributions from Member States whose experience is not as recent would be useful to a UN mission.

The Canadian Forces will be impacted by how wars are waged, how multilateralism is structured, and how peace operations, regardless of their nomenclature, are conducted. Peacekeeping in the twenty-first century is framed by “smart power,” which requires the use of well-trained military forces married with diplomacy, development, economics, human rights, and a host of alliances and partnerships that build an environment where the cost of war is more than the price of peace.

The experience of Afghanistan has provided the men and women in the Canadian profession of arms a wealth of lessons learned and best practices that would be invaluable as the international community struggles to protect civilians caught in the crossfire of intra-state conflict and to find a path to sustainable peace.
It has become a truism to talk about failed and failing states, but it is necessary to examine carefully the context in which Canadian international policies will be executed in the upcoming years. In many parts of the world, the nature of states and their relationships to their peoples are changing from the Westphalian notion of states to rather loose connections of groups, tribes, and clans whose people shift allegiances from time to time. In this context, governments do not have the monopoly of coercive power we have traditionally thought a necessary attribute of a functioning polity.

In this context, Canada and the international system of institutions, in addition to dealing with states and governments, will also have to find new ways of relating to some rather loose collections of people, as opposed to governments as we have come to know them. Somalia provides a sobering example of such a geographic entity, as, some would argue, does Afghanistan, and the eastern Congo.

Recent experience also teaches us that within such geographic areas violence is likely to increase, creating and/or exacerbating deplorable living conditions for the people residing in them. Military or security engagement by external actors will have to adapt.

Despite the best efforts of traditional overseas development, the majority of the poor people in the Third World continue to be poor. Issues of climate change, raised and discussed at the recent Copenhagen conference, are also part of the context in the next five years, as are problems of food scarcity, poverty, illness, and lack of education in many parts of the world.

The new US administration has re-engaged with the United Nations (UN) system and has given priority to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The Humanitarian Imperative

When massive numbers of civilians are put at risk by violence or natural disasters, how and when does Canada intervene? How and when do we help?

We should begin by giving more support to the UN agencies charged with protecting vulnerable people—e.g., UNHCR (United Nations Agency for Refugees), WFP (World Food Programme), UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), and others. In addition, we should make provision for the non-governmental executing agencies to carry out their work. Ongoing support to the major NGOs working in the field would ensure more effective implementation of their mandates, and allow Canadians to participate in assisting those in distress.

Cooperation between civilians deployed in emergency or humanitarian situations and the military is essential. Each has its areas of expertise and they often depend on one another. Civilian actors need the security which only military personnel can provide; the military needs civilians to provide humanitarian assistance, which is likewise a skilled undertaking and can best be provided by civilians. The blurring of these functions is detrimental to both groups, as well as to recipients.

Canada led the way with the “Responsibility to Protect” resolution, but concrete results from its adoption are difficult to find. Now is the time for us to put more time, effort, research, and thought into ways and means of enhancing the principles and actions which flow from the notion of protecting innocent people from the vagaries and violence which accompany power struggles in these and other situations.

Overseas Development Assistance

Canadian overseas development assistance (ODA) should be .7 percent of gross national income (GNI)—it is currently .32 percent. In the next ten years, Canadian development assistance should increase until it reaches the .7 percent number.

But along with those increases should go major changes in the way foreign development assistance is allocated:

a) Smarter aid should draw on the experience of “Making Markets Work for the Poor,” where the application of business development assistance, along with market-driven forces, has raised the income of small subsistence farmers and entrepreneurs in the developing world. In addition, poor people should be assisted to find ways of leveraging financial resources through land title, loans, and technical assistance, so as to make major increases in their income, instead of by small incremental amounts, which has been the case with traditional development assistance.
b) Development assistance that counters the impact of climate change should also be a priority. Even if we begin to take serious actions to reduce carbon emissions, we know that there will be significant increases in temperature, with resulting rises in sea levels, along with drought. The poor in developing countries will be greatly impacted, and adaptation programs that assist them to cope, such as using more drought-resistant crops or altering the nature and type of livestock herds, should be stressed.

c) In determining where Canada’s ODA should focus, due regard should be paid to Canada’s historical presence in recipient countries. But, we should also find other ways of engaging with countries such as China and India.

d) Partnership should replace notions of donors and recipients in both words and deeds. In practical terms that means detailed and serious consultations with both governments and civil society in countries where we are proposing to allocate ODA.

e) Youth internship programs should once again be a priority at CIDA. Such programs not only provide personnel to assist in developing countries or multilateral institutions, they also give young Canadians the opportunity to gain experience working and living overseas. Such experience is invaluable for those involved who often go on to work in government, development, business, or the military. Internships also enhance the future ability of Canada to protect and project our interests and values by increasing the pool of skilled young people willing and able to play a role in building a better world.

Above all else, major reforms are needed at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), from the top down. The revolving-door approach to ministerial appointments has created an agency whose personnel are uncertain about the future and increasingly risk-averse. The relatively junior rank of the ministers does not indicate a government that is serious about ODA. And this is noticed in international fora, as well as with the Canadian public.

CIDA personnel are still largely Ottawa-based. Accountability chill has replaced innovation or creativity in their approaches. Other major donors, such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) or the US Agency for International Development (USAID), are interested in new and innovative ideas; CIDA, in contrast, has developed more rules and regulations.

Careful attention should be paid to the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in February 2007, which focuses on Africa and which also sets out details for major reforms to Canada’s ODA operations and organization.
Make Nuclear Non-Proliferation a Priority

The speech by US President Barack Obama to the UN in September, his presence at the Security Council the next day, and the Security Council resolution on non-proliferation indicate a major shift in American thinking and action on non-proliferation. Canada has expertise, experience, and ideas on this subject. We should seize on these initiatives, and renew our efforts through the UN on non-proliferation by working with like-minded states to encourage and support the Americans as they take on this vital subject.

Increase Canadian Attention to—and Action at—the United Nations

President Obama also spoke of American “re-engagement with the United Nations.” Canada should follow suit. There is an irony here—for many years Canadian foreign policy made the UN one of its pillars, partly as an antidote to the overwhelming importance of the United States in this country, and partly to counter what seemed like growing disenchantment in the United States with the UN. Nevertheless, it is crucial that multilateral responses to ongoing issues take precedence, and it is at and through the UN that those issues play out.

If Canada is elected to the Security Council, increased emphasis on multilateral approaches to major international issues will follow. Enhancing our ability to innovate as well as react to issues before the UN should be a priority. It is also important that we work to improve the functioning of the institution.

There are several areas which demand attention:

a) Peacekeeping. While in some circles it has recently become popular to talk proudly about the Canadian military role in Afghanistan as “not peacekeeping,” the function remains an important one, albeit one which needs adaptation as the nature of keeping the peace changes from state-to-state conflict to internal violence within states or geographic areas. Robust peacekeeping is now a more realistic concept. Canada took part in almost all UN peacekeeping actions until the last decade. Now the UN has more troops in the field than ever, but Canadians are not amongst them. The Canadian military is skilled and professional and could add greatly to the expertise of UN peacekeeping undertakings. When the deployment of the Canadian military to Afghanistan comes to an end in 2011, serious consideration should be given to re-engagement with UN peacekeeping missions.

b) A rapid deployment force. Canada undertook major work on this subject twenty years ago, and agreement could not then be reached. It is time to try again, using the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (commonly
known as the Brahimi Report), as well as the experience of the last ten years to bolster the case, as well as to provide examples of when and how its use might have averted ongoing problems.

c) The Security Council. While the Council has been more effective in the past fifteen years, primarily because of changing power relationships in the world, its structure does not reflect the realities of the twenty-first century. Reform of the Council is an old chestnut that hasn’t amounted to much in the past. Canada has been an effective non-permanent member, and thus has credibility with other members. If we are re-elected, we should give priority to making the Council better reflect current realities and power relationships. It is worth another effort if only to try to re-establish the primacy of the Council in the conduct of international affairs.

During the next five to ten years, it is important that Canada reinforce its credibility in international affairs. While reputation can take us a long way, it can soon dissipate if deeds do not follow speeches. Actions must accompany words. The Canadian reputation is good; it can be excellent.
THINKING ABOUT HOW WE MANAGE OUR PRIORITIES IS AS IMPORTANT AS FORECASTING THEM

MICHAEL KERGIN

Inevitably, there is a symbiosis (not always beneficial) between developments occurring outside Canada’s borders and the establishment of policy responses within Canada.

For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have compelled dramatic changes in the comportment of Canadians as they board aircraft, or cross the border to the United States. The transaction cost of cross-border business with Canada’s largest trading partner has greatly escalated, contributing in some measure to the government’s decision to seek new free trade agreements, inter alia with the European Union.

While global warming has not yet stirred our government to “launch a thousand ships,” the threat to the Arctic’s sustainability has revived Canadians’ interest in their northern reaches. The ease with which the H1N1 virus spreads through air travel brings the disease immediately home, sows daily headlines and compels Canadians and their governments to scramble to determine the attendant risks and safest counter-measures.

Chinese economic strength, coupled with its prompt emergence from recession, has eroded the Canadian government’s ideological hostility, with its accompanying policy of non-engagement, regarding the regime in Beijing. Official Ottawa is now beating a belated path to China’s hitherto unknown mega-cities.

The thesis I propose must by now have become clear: accelerated globalization and emerging non-traditional powers directly affect Canadians’ prosperity, not to speak of their personal behaviour. As a corollary, I would submit that our ability to manage new external
pressures, or indeed, even influence international trends, will be proportionate to Canadians’ capacity to maintain economic and social cohesion within the federation.

This suggests that, as important as identifying what the priorities are, examining how Canada manages these priorities deserves attention in a discussion such as this.

Let us break the question down into its components.

**Accelerated Globalization**

While not a novel phenomenon (“globalization” and “empire” were once synonymous), it is the speed with which communication and travel impact our personal lives, regardless of where we live, that is so strikingly new. And it seems that it is the negative aspects of globalization (terrorism, pandemic, contagious financial mismanagement), not its benefits, that have most affected our lives since the turn of the millennium.

The terrible image of the collapsing World Trade Towers, the view from space of the shrinking ice patterns in the Arctic, and the sight of hundreds donning white masks during the SARS episode dramatically bring home the vulnerability of our citizens as travellers on the “third rock from the sun.” Our global interdependence has been demonstrated by the speed with which toxic subprime assets morphed into a worldwide recession, depicted graphically by plunging lines on economists’ charts, spreading with a velocity and reach not experienced by the Depression generation.

No matter how distant from our own neighbourhood, local crises can quickly become global, necessitating immediate responses from national governments and their citizens. A pandemic alert requires governments to acquire sufficient stockpiles of vaccines; the citizens, for their part, are obliged to follow protocols regarding hygiene, while reporting infected cases to health authorities.

Similar partnerships between governments and civil actors have become necessary in confronting climate change effects. Inuit elders are asked to contrast currently changing conditions in the high Arctic with the circumstances of their youth. Fishers’ experiences provide the data for forecasting stock declines and movements that have accelerated over the past decade, due as much to changes in water temperature as to overfishing.

As global phenomena increasingly intrude onto local conditions, governments, which have traditionally depended on official channels and institutions, are becoming more reliant on non-governmental organizations, associations, and individuals—loosely termed “civil society”—at home and abroad, to receive intelligence, disseminate advice, or administer remedies. Most often, however, government and civil society partnerships are struck on a case-by-case basis, rather than being established systematically with a view to developing strategic alliances.
At the same time, civil society counterparts harbour suspicions when governments sound them out for information or reach out to collaborate in areas of mutual benefit. Many times, the fear of co-option becomes civil society’s default position, thereby obviating cooperation.

On both sides, there is evident advantage to improve communication and to work together on “intermestic” problems (those with international origins but having serious domestic consequences). While a tired cliché, “thinking globally, but acting locally” should be observed by governments and civil society as they attempt to cope with the effects of accelerated globalization.

A principal challenge for Canada over the coming years, therefore, will be to improve linkages with civil society and so better harness the expertise, networks, and collective will existing among the public to confront the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Emerging Non-Traditional Powers

For a brief decade, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the unipolar world. Then the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 heralded another world order, shaped by al-Qaeda, a shadowy terrorist holding company. Obscured by our obsession with the “global war on terror” (GWOT), non-traditional powers emerged from the periphery of our vision to play progressively central roles economically and politically, if not militarily. The coming out of China, Brazil, India, and Indonesia had not gone unnoticed by the foreign policy establishment; what few had predicted, however, was the rapidity with which they reached international headline status. (Interestingly, the business community was generally more prescient than official policy makers in recognizing the significance of the new players).

This emerging phenomenon has brought about a rebalancing of global institutions. While Canada has claimed pride of authorship for the G20 Heads of Government concept, it is by no means clear how long this unwieldy grouping will hold before giving way to a more restricted membership. Indeed, a new G8 may eventually come out from this forum, comprising, for example, the European Union, Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. Or will the G20 be further reduced to a G3? What then will become of Canada’s exclusive club, the “old” G8? Will it be further marginalized from global decision making, serving principally as a liaison for outreach to regional and developing countries, later to atrophy and disappear?

Since its creation in 1945, Canada has been privileged to serve once a decade in another most exclusive club, that of the UN Security Council. The Council’s abject inability to reconfigure its membership in the past forty-five years since its last re-organization, however, brings into question the UN’s effectiveness as an arbiter of international security.
When the Council’s composition reflected the global power balance in the middle of the last century, membership placed Canada at the centre of international authority. Going forward, however, it is unclear whether participation in the Security Council will result merely in the illusion, rather than the exercise, of Canadian influence.

Associated with the challenge of avoiding exclusion from new multilateral centres of power, Canada’s government and civil society partners will need to strengthen diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations with the emerging power brokers within the new global order.

While Canada has been tardy in re-ordering its bilateral relations with China, we have been even slower with India. For example, Australia, with half of Canada’s population, is currently hosting 97,000 Indian students to Canada’s 7,000.¹ Australia’s two-way trade at $10.9 billion is more than twice as large as Canada’s.

It will be important that Canada’s country priorities be retooled so as to engage fully the new G8 members mentioned above. This will require additional resources, but, more critically, a restoration of prime ministerial confidence in Canada’s conventional instruments of foreign policy, such as the Foreign Affairs and Trade Commissioner services.

As indicated earlier in the essay, it is important that the traditional foreign service establishment becomes a full partner to the extensive non-governmental networks developed by civil society.

**Improving Domestic Cohesion**

In this world of instant communication and immediate interconnectedness, as external pressures more acutely impinge on domestic well-being, societies will confront or deter threats to their prosperity more effectively from positions of cohesion, than being wracked by internal jurisdictional rivalry.

Many of Canada’s trading partners have adopted protectionist measures, triggered by the global recession. None is more damaging to Canada than the “Buy America” provisions attached to the $787 billion US stimulus package. Neither NAFTA nor multilateral trading agreements can provide Canada protection from this exclusionary measure.

Provincial contracting policies (aimed as much against each other as against the United States) prevented negotiators from including in NAFTA and the WTO reciprocal access to official procurement activities in the sub-national jurisdictions of other countries. Accordingly, Canadian contractors are lawfully prevented from bidding on infrastructure projects financed through US states and municipalities from the federal stimulus fund. (Canadian companies do have access to federally contracted projects.)

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¹ Comparable figures for Chinese foreign students are: Australia 127,000; Canada 42,000.
Last July, out of desperate necessity, Canada’s provincial premiers rapidly pulled together and agreed to open up their markets to US contractors on a reciprocal basis, so that Canadian suppliers might access the large number of stimulus projects expected in the United States over the coming years. It is unclear, however, whether the Obama administration and Congress will be receptive to this belated move. The potential for exclusion in the future from other sub-national programs remains high. Here is a good example where internal fractiousness has weakened Canadian economic activity.

Health care provides another incidence of the need for better national cohesion in the face of accelerated globalization. As the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has indicated in its call for a “pandemic czar,” preparations for rapidly transmitted epidemics can best be handled on a national basis to ensure consistency and effectiveness. Otherwise, the CMA is concerned that competing provincial and territorial jurisdictions will result in incomplete preparation and delayed administration, not to speak of the inconsistent application of treatment in some regions.

One further example will suffice. The uniformity of our banking regulations and reduced number of players in the domestic financial market have allowed Canada to resist much of the turmoil affecting other OECD countries, and have burnished the country’s reputation as a responsible financial manager. Contrast this with the fractured patchwork of securities exchange commissions spread among provincial jurisdictions.

Accordingly, our international reputation for the enforcement of security regulations is questioned. Lack of clarity, consistency, and certainty may have significantly inhibited foreign investment activity in Canada.

A country’s economy is inevitably reinforced and its prosperity enhanced by cohesive trade, fiscal, and investment policies consistently applied across its territorial reach. Similarly, its capacity for ensuring the well-being of its citizens and its reputation, as a serious international actor, are improved by uniform standards more easily administered by a national body.

**Conclusion**

Over the past decade, there has been a real increase in the speed at which external pressures assail Canada through a myriad of unconventional channels and conduits. That trend is likely to accelerate in the years ahead. Our country’s ability to manage these pressures will be strengthened to the degree that our governments can develop durable partnerships with relevant civil society groups. At the same time, the federal government will need to rework its relationships with the emerging global powers, while adapting to the new international architecture. Critical to both requirements is a reassertion of federal authority in those areas of rule making most susceptible to international demands.
A few overriding foreign policy priorities impose themselves on Canada, and this paper assumes their ingoing priority. Geography insists on a close and productive relationship with the United States, and secure access to the US marketplace; as conditions change, Canada needs to propose new ideas for the North American economic and environmental space. Though our neighbourhood is free of hostility, global terrorism is a national security threat.

For years the existential issue of national unity had a critical and potentially overriding external dimension, but has moved (again) to the back burner. Finding suitable international governance and cooperation for Arctic issues has recently become an urgent necessity.

**To Strategize is to Choose**

What are the discretionary foreign policy priorities? As an outward-looking country, Canada needs to choose foreign policy priorities that support the ongoing search for effective international governance and that generate political capital to support our international interests. They often over-link. For example, the United States thinks globally. While we need to work together with the United States (and Mexico) for positive outcomes on the big North American futures picture, we shall always have a better hearing in Washington if we are visibly active and effective across a range of key global issues. To get on the US agenda, to lift Canada’s profile in media and political circles, Canada needs to be a player of interest in world events.
The Necessity of Authenticity

Canadian strategic priorities on international security issues should flow from roles that others recognize as authentically rooted in an earned reputation for seriousness in international affairs, built over time from hard work on substantive issues, consistency and balance in judgments about others, and an overall, if not fundamentalist, commitment to the United Nations Security Council’s unique statutory authority to confer legitimacy under the UN Charter for the use of force.

Past Examples of Diplomatic and Military Initiatives

• Confidence and influence-building Canadian diplomatic projects would include:
  
  a) the Open Skies initiative of 1989-1990 organized under Foreign Minister Joe Clark, that led to the first East-West meeting after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Though the changing circumstances made the Ottawa conference in January 1990 redundant in its technical substance, it enabled NATO and Warsaw Pact parties to begin the process for the unification of Germany;
  
  b) the Ottawa Land Mines Convention conference organized as part of the human security campaign under Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was a global game-changer in both outcome and its process of engagement by civil society;
  
  c) a mixed example might include Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s international peace campaign in 1983-1984, intended to relax nuclear tautness that had tightened after the KAL 007 airliner episode but seen as unhelpful to US nuclear negotiations with the USSR.
  
• An initially positive example of military deployment was Canada’s agreement to serve as the mainstay peacekeeper in Cyprus after war broke out between NATO members Turkey and Greece. It is likely that US President Lyndon Johnson signed the Canada-US Auto Pact in consequence. (Cyprus became a frozen conflict holding Canadian forces down for almost thirty years.) A hypothetical contrary example would have been a deployment to Iraq in support of the US-led 2003 invasion, despite Canada’s commitment to the UN as the source of legitimacy for the use of force, as well as the lack of evidence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

• The deployment to Afghanistan is almost *sui generis*, a positive and nationally galvanizing contribution that has been under-recognized internationally. Its disproportionate costs to Canada have almost run their supportable course in light of the absence of sufficient solidarity of commitment from NATO partners.
Moving Backwards and Inwards

But in recent years, apart from, or perhaps partly because of, the all-consuming Afghan deployment, Canada has been vacating the roles that earned its reputation. Canadian political capital abroad is depleted. Successive minority governments have been partly responsible for substituting short-term domestic political goals for longer-term strategic ones, and for the growing recourse to gesture politics in international affairs rather than engagement.

The depletion in political capital has been accelerated by a degradation of Canadian representational capacity abroad, the slashing of program funds essential for promoting Canadian purposes and activity, and the constricting of public diplomacy generally in favour of centrally controlled Ottawa-centric communications.

Three Priority Swirls

To re-capture international profile and productive purpose, this paper proposes three mutually-reinforcing and time-sensitive issue swirls for sustained and visible Canadian activity and initiatives to:

a) strengthen multilateral capacity in peace and security;

b) strengthen international institutional capacity to negotiate cross-sectoral transnational issues;

c) strengthen Canada’s global reach via key bilateral relationships, public diplomacy, and Canada-branding.

Strengthening Multilateral Capacity in Peace and Security

The prospect of Canada re-joining the United Nations Security Council in 2011 urges focus on the Council’s role and potential. The former Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hillier, judges the UN is “useless.” Our purpose should be to work to make the UN useful in specific, concrete, practical ways where Canadian policy and political investment can make a difference. To avoid the more turgid aspects of UN culture, we should focus on areas and activities where improvements in institutions, technology, and political will enhance the prospect for outcomes.

The encouraging post-Cold War comity with Russia did not last, but neither Russia nor China is a competitor today to the United States in any existential way. All in all, more common
ground exists among the five permanent members of the Security Council in substance than at any time in six decades.

The US president is UN-favourable. Canada could develop our specific activities in ways that would complement key US concerns—proliferation of WMD, nuclear build-down, international terrorism, and the international community’s capacities to change the conditions of conflicts through mediation and effective peacemaking operations.

The Council’s potential mandate is enlarging to include multiple (non-traditional) threats to security, such as environmental degradation, natural disasters, migration, disease, and transnational criminal activity and terrorism. Canada’s “Responsibility to Protect” initiative permits the Council on a case-by-case basis to authorize collective intervention within states in cases of mass atrocity and genocide, a significant if as yet tentative step from the UN’s traditional unwillingness to countenance “interference” in the internal affairs of member states.

Specifics

We should identify focused activities that would benefit from concentrated Canadian attention.

- **UN Rapid Deployment Force.** The inadequacies of the current methodology for raising UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are well-known. Having sponsored so much in the area of enhancing human security at a time of “war among the peoples” (General Rupert Smith), and though it will be years before there is such a thing as an “international soldier,” Canada should help to give reality to the recommendation in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (commonly known as the Brahimi Report) for a UN force that could be pre-identified and equipped, and to enable mandates that match the missions. The Canadian government should get past the rejection of themes from previous Canadian governments and use political influence and especially our post-Afghanistan professional capabilities to advance this important cause.

- **Non-proliferation: strengthening the inspections regimes for WMD.** Weapons inspection in Iraq by the time of the UN’s Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 2002-2003 was a success story (unacknowledged at the time by the United States), reflecting real improvements in technologies for remote, more intrusive, and hence more accurate inspection. UNMOVIC had greater institutional integrity; its experts weren’t secondments with dual loyalties but international civil servants. Canada should make the ongoing, further strengthening of the UN’s inspection capabilities a forefront policy priority.
• Related to non-proliferation, *counterpart reductions of nuclear arsenals* were a Canadian preoccupation for decades until the Conference on Disarmament fell into paralysis some years ago. President Obama is using the advent of the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to urge nuclear powers, especially the United States and Russia, to build down arsenals from the current levels of about 27,000 warheads to several hundred. Canada should be providing every possible support in research, argumentation, and political outreach for this objective that some dismiss as a “pipe dream,” but that others, such as Professor John Polanyi of the University of Toronto, judge a core Canadian vocation, more credible because Canada declined to build nuclear weapons after the Second World War, and ceased to deploy them in Canada and Europe later.

• *Engaging in conflict resolution.* The hallmark of the Obama administration’s approach to foreign policy is engagement. The RAND Corporation identifies 648 terrorist groups that between 1968 and 2006 abandoned terrorism. Seven percent of these were compelled by superior military force. Others were absorbed by a political process. The transition needs engagement and mediation from good faith international actors, often not the larger powers—a role that Norway has helpfully played, for example, in the Middle East and in Sri Lanka. Because of a stand-offish declaratory approach to conflict, our ability to engage helpfully in conflict resolution is diminished. Canada has abandoned balance in its approach to the Middle East. But sufficient legacy capital remains to permit a helpful role to be re-assumed.

**Strengthening International Capacity to Negotiate Cross-Sectoral Challenges**

The G8 will be succeeded by a larger grouping that represents the shift in the world’s economic (and political) power toward emerging economies. It is assumed that Canada’s reach and influence in the world will necessarily shrink. An alternative scenario can see the new landscape favouring Canada, if it can re-possess and re-invigorate its talents and capacity for creative diplomacy. Anne-Marie Slaughter emphasizes that “in this world, the measure of power is connecting,” as the old power hierarchy of states gives way to a wider web of relationships. Canada can move to the centre of the global web and become a “go-to” country in the search for new ways of solving vexing international issues, taking advantage of Canadian experience in working with international civil society and research webs.

In June 2010, Canada will host the G20 summit. At present, Canadian government expectations are for a relatively non-controversial and limited agenda on financial issues and broad objectives for economic growth.
But the G20 should become the essential break-through forum for issues that go beyond finance and economics, and indeed that cross over different sectors. The G20 cannot replace existing universal international negotiating fora, especially as its membership reflects inadequate representation for the world’s poorest countries. But it can serve as a clearing house and catalyst on a wide range of interconnected issues.

For example, world trade talks are stalled, partly over the issue of access to developed countries’ markets for least-developed countries’ (LDCs) agricultural exports. Climate change negotiations are unlikely to agree on acceptable costs to developed countries to pay for technology to reduce Chinese and Indian carbon footprints; nor will China readily accept a much lower growth rate. A forum to explore balanced trade-offs between such nominally unconnected sectors is essential.

However, the G20 will need adequate organization and structures, including a preparatory process that is political and substantive, not process-driven and bureaucratic. It needs a competent rotational secretariat, an influential political-level group of statesmen and women as animators, and connectedness with international civil society. These can best be promoted by a country or countries within the G20 with a reputation for creative seriousness: the largest economies will hang back. But Canada’s government will need to upgrade its ambition levels and capacities considerably, particularly given its defensive positions on agricultural protection and carbon abatement.

Strengthening Canada’s Bilateral Relationships through Public Diplomacy

Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau once said that Canada is a global power because of important relationships in every part of the globe. These have lapsed. Bilateral relationships of consequence are built up over time. They can lose mass quickly. Each is a separate calculus—Canada’s seeded position as a partner of China and Russia, for example, that enhanced the positions of Prime Ministers Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien in world councils has eroded.

Strong bilateral and regional partnerships around the world serve Canadian interests directly and also create influence. It is not a question of “diversifying” relationships beyond the United States. Apart from being its own reward, the influence Canada can develop elsewhere can be useful in relations with the United States.

Nowhere is this more evident than with Mexico. As Robert Pastor has written “The best road from Ottawa to Washington is through Mexico City.” His point is undoubtedly that as Mexican security is a great preoccupation of the United States, and politically resonant domestically, Canada can more easily get on the US agenda with trilateral underpinnings to bilateral complaints on border security or US protectionism. The ability of Mexico’s fragile democracy to hold traction against dislocation from widespread drug violence needs support from both northern neighbours.
Public Diplomacy behind the Canadian Brand

Minority governments fall way short at sustaining efforts required for the pursuit of high-level relationships. Alternatives to an over-emphasis on the superficial technique of (frequently cancelled) ministerial visits need to be found.

Canada’s ability to compete internationally depends on abilities to communicate our competitive realities. As the “other North America” with demonstrable and remarkable areas of achievement to set forth, the Canadian story is enviable. But it is a crowded media and communications landscape globally: people don’t “think Canada” spontaneously. It is essential to position the country’s image and profile toward a threshold of influence.

Having no CNN International or International Herald Tribune, Canada is virtually ignored in international media, even when our international investments, as in Afghanistan, are costly.

The principal instruments and assets to enable Canada to publicize the Canadian narrative and to build the web of essential networks and international relationships are Canadian embassies and consulates abroad.

Modern diplomacy is public diplomacy. Today, our diplomats connect to the public sphere at home and abroad—to civil society, educational institutions, and science, business, and professional circles, as well as to government and to military and intelligence circles. They should showcase the best our country can offer in governance, social realities such as diversity, financial management, artistic creativity, innovation, and values. We need these assets to promote the kinds of foreign policy initiatives proposed above that will need international media resonance to succeed.

Canadian representatives should also be unstinting in giving support to civil society for democracy development and women’s rights.

Except in the United States, Canadian missions are today starved of program funds to mount the panels, conferences, exhibitions, and other showcase events we should use to get out our messages, as well as the exchanges with other countries and joint working groups and institutions with civil society and scholars. The communications job is not being done. Ambassadors who are the country’s principal voices abroad are constrained by unreasonable limitations on public messaging by an overbearing central communications apparat in Ottawa.

Cultural and performance exchanges and showcasing are essential because the tie-in between Canadian cultural creativity and promoting an appreciation of Canada as a locale for innovation is direct; in many respects, the best advance promotion for Canadian telecom solutions in Italy was Robert Lepage and Rhombus Media. Yet, funding for supporting cultural representation abroad has been slashed because of ignorance of its value on the part of an inexperienced, down-sizing government skeptical of the role of the arts.
Il est possible de cibler nombre d’enjeux internationaux qui, en raison de leur acuité actuelle, nécessitent une action immédiate et substantielle afin d’y répondre. On peut ainsi aisément citer le réchauffement planétaire et la croissance des inégalités socioéconomiques comme enjeux de l’heure, puis souhaiter que le gouvernement canadien modifie significativement sa politique en matière d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre et d’aide au développement afin d’alléger un tant soit peu ces maux.

C’est toutefois par une approche inverse qu’il me paraît souhaitable d’identifier les priorités à venir du Canada sur la scène internationale. Plutôt que d’offrir une analyse glauque de l’environnement international et des maigres moyens mis en œuvre par le Canada afin d’y répondre, il semble essentiel de souligner la crise de légitimité nationale qui a cours actuellement en matière de politique de sécurité internationale, puis d’identifier trois domaines où cette crise risque de s’exacerber avant d’offrir brièvement une façon d’y répondre de manière à alléger le double défi national et international que posent ces enjeux.

Articuler les intérêts nationaux

L’actuelle politique de sécurité internationale du Canada est illégitime aux yeux d’une majorité de Canadiens. Plus d’un Canadien sur deux s’opposent à l’intervention militaire en Afghanistan, c’est-à-dire à la mission où sont concentrées 90 pourcent des troupes militaires canadiennes déployées à l’étranger et où sont dépensées des centaines de millions de dollars par l’ACDI et d’autres ministères. La priorité actuelle du gouvernement fédéral en
matière de sécurité internationale bénéficie à peine de l’appui de deux Canadiens sur cinq et, significativement, est rejetée par plus de trois Québécois sur cinq.\(^1\)

Plusieurs estiment qu’il ne s’agit pas là d’un véritable problème puisqu’il suffit au gouvernement fédéral de mieux expliquer les raisons de l’engagement militaire canadien et de mettre en exergue les efforts réalisés dans les domaines non militaires afin de regagner la faveur populaire. Le comité Manley soulignait en ce sens le « déficit informationnel » et recommandait au gouvernement Harper de développer une « stratégie de communication systématique et plus équilibrée, mettant l’accent sur des échanges ouverts et constants avec les Canadiens ».\(^2\)

Il s’agit cependant bien plus que d’un problème de communication. Car même si le gouvernement fédéral a significativement changé sa manière de présenter l’engagement militaire du pays, il n’a pas réussi à convaincre une majorité de concitoyens de sa justesse. La crise de légitimité actuelle trouve son origine non seulement dans un manque d’information, mais également dans de profondes divisions quant au rôle que le Canada devrait jouer sur la scène internationale. Or, c’est l’identité d’un pays qui façonne en grande partie ses intérêts nationaux, particulièrement pour un pays en relative sécurité physique et économique comme l’est le Canada. En l’absence d’une conception relativement consensuelle de ce qu’est et devrait être le Canada d’aujourd’hui et de demain, il est dès lors très ardu de s’entendre sur ce qu’il doit faire sur la scène internationale. D’où la profondeur du dilemme que soulève la volonté d’identifier les priorités futures de la politique de sécurité et de défense canadienne.

C’est que trois grandes conceptions des intérêts nationaux du Canada coexistent et entrent parfois en collision. Il y a d’abord la vision continentale, qui prône un partenariat économique et sécuritaire étroit avec les États-Unis ; la vision internationaliste, qui valorise les activités humanitaires sous l’égide des Nations unies ; puis la vision atlantiste, qui privilégie un engagement politique et militaire au sein de l’OTAN afin de rehausser le statut d’allié crédible et engagé du Canada aux côtés de ses alliés traditionnels (les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et la France). Chacune de ces visions est prônée par différents groupes de Canadiens, que ce soit en termes de régions et de province, de classe, d’affiliation politique, d’âge ou de genre. Le grand défi de l’heure consiste donc à articuler les intérêts nationaux du Canada d’une telle manière à réconcilier ces trois visions parfois divergentes en une approche commune et relativement consensuelle. Cette articulation doit en outre interpeller les Canadiens. Autrement dit, un Canada fort à l’intérieur de ses frontières est un Canada plus fort à l’extérieur de celles-ci.

\(^1\) Voir les sondages réalisés par Harris/Décima du 22 octobre 2009 et de Angus Reid du 3 décembre 2009.

Où intervenir militairement ?

La première priorité n’est pas de déterminer si le Canada maintiendra un contingent militaire significatif en Afghanistan ou ailleurs après le retrait du groupement tactique de Kandahar en 2011. Il s’agit plutôt de déterminer où il sera déployé. En effet, le Canada déploie en moyenne, depuis 1991, plus de 4 200 soldats à l’étranger par année (3 200 environ présentement). Il serait donc plus qu’improbable que le gouvernement canadien ne déploie, en 2012 et dans les années suivantes, qu’une présence humanitaire minimale en Afghanistan (les équipes de mentorat et de reconstruction par exemple). Ceci est d’autant plus vrai que le lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie estime que l’armée canadienne sera en mesure de continuer sa contribution actuelle à la mission afghane au-delà de 2011.3 Le Canada a donc autant la capacité que la volonté (du moins traditionnellement) de contribuer davantage qu’une force militaire symbolique dès 2012. Il peut certes choisir de « surfer » sur le prestige conféré par son engagement « disproportionné » à Kandahar depuis 2005, reste qu’il sera tôt ou tard confronté au dilemme de déterminer où s’investir militairement de manière significative aux côtés de ses alliés traditionnels.

Le véritable défi revient donc à identifier où les Forces canadiennes (FC) devraient être engagées dans les années post-2011. Autant les continentalistes, qui estiment qu’il est impératif d’intervenir là où les États-Unis apprécient la contribution canadienne, que les atlantistes, selon lesquels il vaut mieux de participer aux missions prioritaires de l’Alliance atlantique, s’entendront pour dire que la réputation d’allié crédible et engagé du Canada pourrait être entachée s’il se retire d’Afghanistan sans compenser par une autre intervention d’envergure et de priorité similaires. Le problème est que les internationalistes peuvent miser sur une majorité de Canadiens et plusieurs au sein du Patri libéral, dont le chef Michael Ignatieff, qui souhaitent que les militaires canadiens reprennent leur rôle soi-disant « traditionnel » de gardien de la paix, qu’ils adoptent une posture beaucoup moins belliqueuse que l’exige une guerre contre-insurrectionnelle et qu’ils inscrivent leur action sous commandement des Nations unies.4

La première priorité du Canada est donc de trouver et d’articuler un rôle pour les FC – et une mission qui l’incarne – légitime aux yeux des Canadiens pour l’après-2011. En plus de maintenir un contingent humanitaire et de mentorat à Kandahar, de même que (possiblement) les ressources nécessaires afin d’en assurer la sécurité, le Canada devrait concentrer ses efforts dans les opérations de soutien à l’Union africaine déployées par l’OTAN depuis quelques années, en Somalie et au Darfour notamment. Il s’agirait de

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contribuer à fournir les ressources matérielles (dont le transport aérien) et humaines (dont l’expertise) canadiennes afin de former et d’entraîner les soldats de maintien de la paix de l’UA. Les besoins en ce sens sont criants.

Autant les atlantistes que les continentalistes et les internationalistes peuvent s’entendre sur la valeur que représente un tel rôle par rapport aux intérêts nationaux du Canada. Les missions sont appuyées directement par l’OTAN ; les deux États sont jugés « en déliquescence » (failed states) et représentent des terreaux fertiles pour le terrorisme international ; enfin, sans être dénuées de risques, bien au contraire, ces missions offrent la légitimité tant désirée par les internationalistes que lui procure son caractère onusien et non-américain. Au surplus, un tel engagement militaire permettrait de valoriser le caractère bilingue et multiculturel du Canada, offrant une avenue supplémentaire afin d’interpeller les Canadiens.

**Quel rôle pour l’OTAN ?**

La seconde priorité du Canada devrait être d’articuler une vision cohérente de l’avenir de l’OTAN, un thème cher aux atlantistes. Les deux enjeux de l’heure sont évidemment la transformation et l’élargissement de l’Alliance. Le débat est essentiellement le suivant : veut-on une OTAN globale aspirant à la sécurité collective ou une OTAN régionale se limitant à la défense collective ? La politique actuelle du gouvernement canadien privilégie l’approche globale et collective. Il s’agit, d’une part, d’accroître la capacité de l’OTAN à mener des opérations militaires à l’extérieur du continent européen, un objectif que les internationalistes et les continentalistes appuient également, pour autant, selon les premiers, que cela n’implique pas de participer à une guerre contre-insurrectionnelle dirigée par les États-Unis (lire l’Afghanistan).

D’autre part, l’adhésion possible de la Géorgie et de l’Ukraine soulève également d’importantes objections, notamment de la part de la France et de l’Allemagne. Ceci n’empêche pas le gouvernement canadien de soutenir un Plan d’action pour l’adhésion de l’Ukraine, d’appuyer ouvertement l’adhésion de la Géorgie et d’adopter une posture vis-à-vis de la Russie rappelant l’époque de la guerre froide. Il est pourtant impératif de nuancer la politique otanienne du Canada afin d’articuler une vision stratégique cohérente. L’expansion du rôle de l’OTAN dans les opérations paix doit effectivement être conjuguée à une Alliance plus politique, capable de soutenir les efforts de résolution de conflits, ce qui implique deux choses. D’abord, la nécessité d’éviter d’accroître les tensions aux frontières orientales de l’OTAN, c’est-à-dire avec la Russie, afin d’éviter le retour à un climat de guerre froide (avec les ressources, les contraintes institutionnelles et la possibilité d’engagements militaires que cela implique). Ensuite, une OTAN politique engagée dans des opérations militaires…

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« hors zone » nécessite une solidarité accrue entre les alliés traditionnels du Canada. À cet égard, le « retour » de la France dans les structures de commandement intégrées de l’OTAN est une excellente nouvelle. Malgré ceci, le Canada doit revenir à une politique visant à trouver des compromis entre Washington, Londres, Paris et Berlin de manière à favoriser un climat d’entente avec la Russie, plutôt que de se peinturer dans le coin avec une politique ouvertement expansionniste et anti-russe. En d’autres mots, le Canada doit s’approprier un rôle d’intermédiaire entre l’Europe et les États-Unis et adopter une politique d’engagement face à la Russie, de manière à atteindre pacifiquement son objectif stratégique de voir se réaliser une OTAN globale.

Ce rôle est non seulement chéri par une majorité de Canadiens, il est d’autant plus nécessaire devant une nouvelle administration américaine qui adopte désormais une politique russe beaucoup plus conciliatrice que celle de George W. Bush. Le Canada doit ainsi éviter de se retrouver quasi seul, avec certains pays de l’Europe de l’Est, à préférer une approche de confrontation. Il doit, conséquemment, renverser sa politique actuelle au sujet de l’Iran et du système de défense antimissile européen. Le succès de toute politique de sanction contre l’Iran passe nécessairement par l’approbation russe, alors que les gages de sécurité offerts à l’Europe orientale seront davantage consolidés par une politique de respect et de reconnaissance de la Russie comme puissance régionale que par une politique de confrontation. Le Canada n’a, du reste, aucun intérêt à ce que se dégradent les tensions actuelles dans la région. Un conflit ouvert découlant du double enjeu Iran/Russie serait tout simplement catastrophique pour le Canada.

**Quel avenir pour la défense continentale ?**

La troisième priorité pour le Canada dans les années à venir est d’articuler une vision cohérente de la défense conjointe du continent nord-américain. Plusieurs s’entendent pour dire, à l’instar de l’ancien ministre Bill Graham, que le NORAD représente un puissant symbole et une importance source de statut d’égalité et d’indépendance pour le Canada vis-à-vis des États-Unis et que le refus de permettre au commandement binational d’intercepter les missiles intercontinentaux a significativement marginalisé l’institution.6 Il en résulte un vide quant à l’avenir de la coopération canado-américaine en matière de défense nord-américaine, avec pour plus grave conséquence potentielle la disparition (effective ou symbolique) du NORAD.

Pourtant, l’enjeu de l’heure et pour les prochaines années en matière de défense continentale réside dans la gestion des eaux arctiques. À ce sujet, le principal rival aux intérêts canadiens demeure les États-Unis, avec l’épineux dossier du passage du Nord-Ouest, et non la Russie,

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comme s’entête à affirmer le gouvernement canadien sur la place publique. Il apparaît dès lors prioritaire d’arriver à une solution de compromis canado-américain tout en associant l’avenir du NORAD au contrôle conjoint des opérations maritimes. Car le Canada ne dispose tout simplement pas, et ne disposera pas, des ressources nécessaires afin de mettre en place une politique contraire aux intérêts américains. Il devient donc impératif de rompre avec la politique nationaliste actuelle et de collaborer avec les États-Unis, sans toutefois donner la fausse impression de compromettre l’indépendance du Canada. Celle-ci ne peut qu’être renforcée par une vision claire et cohérente des intérêts canadiens, des menaces contre ceux-ci et de la meilleure stratégie à mettre en œuvre afin de les défendre. C’est pourquoi le NORAD offre la base institutionnelle et symbolique idéale afin d’assurer la défense maritime commune et conjointe du continent nord-américain. Et puisqu’il est davantage dans l’intérêt du Canada de renforcer le partenariat nord-américain, c’est à Ottawa de prendre l’initiative d’une telle démarche géostratégique.

Conclusion

Trois priorités stratégiques ont été identifiées : faire du partenariat OTAN-UA la pièce maîtresse de la politique d’intervention militaire canadienne dans les années à venir, en particulier au Darfour et en Somalie ; réajuster la politique canadienne visant à établir une OTAN globale en privilégiant une stratégie d’engagement et de compromis conforme aux intérêts immédiats du Canada, dont la crise iranienne et la sécurité de l’Europe de l’Est ; enfin, promouvoir et mettre en œuvre une politique conjointe, canado-américaine, de défense maritime du continent nord-américaine. Ces priorités, énoncées très brièvement, n’ont certes pas pour but premier de répondre aux crises internationales actuelles telles que les changements climatiques et la croissance des inégalités socioéconomiques. Mais en recentrant certains objectifs géostratégiques du Canada sur la légitimité interne qu’ils nécessitent pour être atteints, il est possible d’articuler des intérêts nationaux susceptibles de rendre le Canada plus fort à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur de ses frontières. Reste cependant à trouver la volonté politique et les ressources nécessaires pour les défendre.
Introduction

In writing the papers in this collection, each of us was asked to identify and justify three to five Canadian foreign policy priorities. Instead of identifying new priorities, however, I intend to focus on long-standing priorities that we have done too little to implement or from which we are now turning our attention.

Canadian foreign policy in general lacks the necessary focus, determination, vigour, and endurance to effectively pursue priorities. Afghanistan, the notable recent exception, may partly be responsible for draining energy from the rest of our international policies.

In saying this I am contrasting Canada’s recent performance with earlier foreign policy achievements, including the Helsinki process, leadership in the fight against apartheid, achievement of North American free trade and, more recently, the land mines treaty.

Looking back at those cases, certain Canadian capacities stand out, including political leadership, adequate and effective mobilization of governmental and non-governmental resources, and steadiness of purpose over long periods of time.

I see no reason to conclude that Canada has reached a tipping point where such qualities are simply beyond us. On the contrary, this strikes me as an important and opportune time to get our act together.

It is important we do so because the world has entered another period of intensified stress that puts increased pressure on governments, especially those in weak states with the least capacity to cope or meet the needs of their peoples. Far from paring down the list of failed states in the coming years, we might well see it grow. We should get our act together to help prevent and weather the coming storms.

The coming year of G8 and G20 summits in Canada is an opportune time to get our act together. With the expansion of the global leadership group from eight to twenty, Canada
faces the risk of fading into the woodwork. Conversely, the summits are good chances for the
government to demonstrate Canada’s determination and capacity to remain a global leader.

In the pages that follow, I have put together a package of Canadian initiatives that we have
talked about for years but never done enough to implement. In the case of Africa, I argue that
the government should not downgrade the continent as a foreign policy and development
priority but rather stay the course. The priorities described here are all drawn from the areas of
development, democracy, and good governance with which I am most familiar, but I believe
they have wider relevance.

For purposes of discussion, I have listed priorities under two headings that distinguish
between housekeeping repairs on the one hand (physician, heal thyself) and policy actions on
the other (go forth and help the world).

Physician, Heal Thyself

A critical part of getting our act together has to do with the dreary business of machinery of
government. Much as it makes us drowsy, the goal of making government’s organization and
operations more effective is essential to Canada accomplishing as much as it should or could
internationally. For me, two familiar long-standing items fall under this heading.

Priority #1 - Fixing CIDA

We have talked about this priority for ever, or at least as long as I have been in Ottawa,
which is nearly as long. During that time, the general sense internationally and nationally is
that CIDA has gone downhill rather than in the other direction. Meanwhile, others like the
British and the Scandinavians have taken steps to make their departments of international
cooperation better run and more effective agencies of development.

In the past few years, Canadian discontent with this state of affairs has grown to the point of
hatching a “ban the agency” movement. Some argue that the simplest thing is to dismantle
CIDA and move the salvageable parts to Foreign Affairs. This has been rejected by those who
want to dismantle the Pearson building as well. Still others have advocated the “farming it
out” approach of gradually transferring CIDA responsibilities (e.g., international democratic
development) to so-called “arms length” agencies.

In my opinion, such ideas are in the main misguided and counterproductive. Every country
with effective development and foreign policies has effective departments of government
responsible for those policies. Shutting them down or farming them out are formulas for
chaos and cross purpose, the exact opposite of what Canada needs to get its act together.
What is needed instead is to fix CIDA.
I am no expert on how to go about doing so, never having spent a day of my life inside government. However, I do recall very interesting conversations I had several years ago with British officials about the ingredients that had gone into turning around the Department for International Development (DFID), now generally regarded as one of the best development agencies in the world.

The British stressed the importance of three things:

1) A Clear Mandate

DFID had been one of those “all things to all people” development agencies which made it prey to those in Britain who wanted to use it for any and all purposes under the sun. To fix this problem, the government gave the department a legislative mandate that is general enough to be flexible but specific enough to be meaningful. When you visit the DFID Web site today, you do get the impression of an organization with pretty clear mission and purposes.

CIDA by contrast still has a reputation for being too easily pulled this way or that, and for having insufficient overall sense of direction. Interestingly, this deficiency has been addressed through legislation initiated in 2006 by an opposition backbencher and, against all odds, passed by Parliament. Referred to as ODAAA—Official Development Assistance Accountability Act—the law states that Canadian overseas development assistance (ODA) may be provided only if the minister confirms that it contributes to poverty reduction, takes into account the perspectives of the poor, and is consistent with international human rights standards. These seem like sensible conditions considering the fundamental purpose of aid and the expectations of Canadians. Nonetheless, there are concerns that the Canadian government is not taking the act seriously. The first report to Parliament as required by the act simply claims that everything done by the government is consistent with and in furtherance of the act but without providing any solid evidence that the programs and activities actually contribute to the reduction of poverty and respect the provisions of the act. The government must take this exercise in aid accountability seriously if CIDA is to be given a clearer sense of direction.

2) Decentralization and Devolution of Authority

British officials told me that the legislative mandate by itself would have done little good if it had not been accompanied by sweeping decentralization of personnel and devolution of decision-making authority within DFID. These changes had the effect of greatly increasing the capacity of staff in the field to make timely and well-informed decisions compared with an earlier time when all significant decisions had to be referred back to headquarters, still largely the case with CIDA.

Although CIDA has made recent progress towards decentralization, it remains one of the most centralized development agencies in the world, and this despite the inherently
decentralized nature of development assistance. The mismatch between organization and mission has caused CIDA to be slow acting in circumstances (e.g., fragile and conflict-affected states) where timeliness of action is essential to aid effectiveness.

This problem will only be fixed when political authorities are willing to accept and defend the high levels of risk that often accompany international development assistance. Accountability models that fail to accommodate the nature of international development assistance are at least part of the reason why Ottawa has been so slow to grant adequate decision-making authority to CIDA staff and partners in the field. However, recent experiments involving significant devolution of financial and other authority to Canadian officials based in Afghanistan may point the way towards a new accountability model.

3) Strong and Steady Political Leadership

British officials rated strong and steady political leadership as the single most important ingredient in DFID’s renewal. Leadership started at the top with commitments by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to treat development as a high priority of British foreign policy and to provide DFID with the resources and authority needed to be effective. It featured another critical ingredient, namely appointing a senior minister as head of DFID and leaving her in the job for a period of six years. This is unheard of in Ottawa where development ministers come and go far too fast to provide strong, steady political leadership for CIDA.

The G8 and G20 summits would seem an ideal time for Canada’s top political leaders to demonstrate their commitment to the mission of CIDA by fixing its problems and announcing plans for steady increases in ODA as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). Given current fiscal circumstances, that would come as a welcome surprise and send a positive signal to the world’s most vulnerable countries and peoples.

Priority #2 – Whole of Government

This brings me to the hoariest of all foreign policy priorities where little progress has been made over the years, namely the goal of ensuring that the different parts of government involved in making and delivering foreign policy cooperate with one another and pull together in common purpose. The latest fusillade from retired General Rick Hillier, former Chief of Defence Staff, suggests that we have not quite reached the ideal state of intra-governmental cooperation in foreign and defence policy, although the General seems to mean by cooperation that everyone should agree with the Department of National Defence (DND). Unfortunately, it remains the case that one of the main impediments to foreign policy effectiveness is the grinding of gears that occurs when departments like CIDA, Foreign Affairs, and Defence work together, or fail to do so. The Munk Centre at the University of Toronto and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University are undertaking a
joint study of whole of government with the aim of making it work better or conceding finally that it can’t be done. Hopefully, the government will support the study in its research phase and act upon its recommendations.

Go Forth and Help the World

The purpose of fixing things in Ottawa is so that Canada can make a bigger and better difference in the world. I would now like to turn to three areas in which I believe we can and should do so.

Priority #3 – Supporting Democracy

The government has declared democracy support to be a Canadian foreign policy priority, but implementation has been moving ahead at a snail’s pace. In the summer of 2007, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a good report on the subject, which argued that democracy support was an area of strong comparative advantage for Canada where we are punching well below our weight. The government responded quickly and favourably to the committee’s recommendations, but until recently there were few signs of action.

At the time of writing, however, the Report of the Advisory Panel on the Creation of a Canadian Democracy Support Agency is about to be tabled in Parliament. The panel recommends the establishment of a new Canadian Centre for Advancing Democracy, “whose mission would be to support the process of democratization by helping to establish or strengthen pluralistic democratic institutions, particularly political parties, in countries where they are absent or in need of further encouragement and development.” A first reading of the report suggests that considerably more work remains to be done if the legislation establishing the centre is to obtain the support of opposition parties in the House of Commons. Its greatest weakness is the absence of recommendations to ensure that the establishment of the new centre would not come at the expense of existing Canadian organizations that have delivered programs to support democracy abroad for many years. The report also fails to appreciate the importance of the Democracy Council, a forum of government and non-governmental agencies formed to strengthen the Canadian community of practice in democracy support.
Priority #4 – Fighting Corruption

There are many factors that affect development but none is more insidiously negative than corruption. Though some corruption is inevitable, many developing countries are afflicted by endemic corruption that erodes social trust and destroys the capacity of government and non-governmental organizations alike to serve the public good.

Like democracy, reducing corruption has proved to be one of those long-term goals that demand steadiness of purpose for meaningful progress to be made. Most, if not all, the magic bullets have proved to be blanks, but far from diminishing the importance of the fight they only confirm it. The tragic decline of once promising countries like Zimbabwe and Kenya illustrate the high price that is paid when corruption becomes the very essence of politics and business. The prospects of Africa, about which we will say more below, are heavily dependent on bringing this scourge under control.

Fighting corruption is an area where Canada has done some good work but needs to do far more over a long period of time. The effectiveness of aid and its credibility with Canadians depend on reducing corruption in those countries that are the recipients of Canadian aid. Canada is well positioned to play a leadership role in this area. Although we have our own long experience with corruption, Canada ranks high as a country with relatively clean government and politics. Canadians, like the former Member of Parliament John Williams who founded the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption, are playing international leadership roles by developing tools and mobilizing political will to fight corruption. The government should identify itself with and strongly support such efforts. It should also establish anti-corruption standards for Canadian aid and insist that good governance, like poverty reduction, be a guiding principle of Canadian policy. Moreover, the two objectives of poverty reduction and good governance are closely connected: common sense and compelling evidence tell us that the poor are the first, last and greatest victims of corruption.

Priority #5 – Africa

Africa is the final, though far from being the least, of the priorities I wish to highlight in the paper. Where Africa is concerned, the government needs to change course, though that should not be too difficult for it to do. The Canadian government has indicated that it is shifting its foreign policy priority from Africa to the Americas, but in this area its record is better than its rhetoric. To enhance aid effectiveness, it has reduced the number of African countries on its “countries of concentration” list, but it has also kept the relatively modest commitment it made at the Gleneagles G8 summit to increase total Canadian assistance to Africa. Moreover, it has committed itself to finally taking the laudable and long overdue step
of untying all Canadian aid by 2012, a policy measure that will be of greatest benefit to Africa, which continues to receive the largest share of Canadian ODA.

The 2010 G8 summit in Canada, and particularly the G20 summit with South Africa as a member, affords the government an excellent opportunity to announce its ongoing commitment to Africa and determination to continue on the path of substantially increasing Canadian foreign aid. It should match that announcement by laying out its plans to make democracy, good governance, and the fight against corruption defining features of Canadian aid, making clear that it will terminate government-to-government aid to those countries that do little or nothing to reduce corruption.

The case for Africa as a high priority in Canada’s international relations has always been strong but will likely grow stronger in the years ahead. The effects of global stresses resulting from the financial crisis and climate change, among other things, will likely hit Africa especially hard with the potential of creating growing numbers of failed and conflict-affected states across the continent. Given the growing importance of Africa in the global economy and the looming threat of terrorism in the northern parts of the continent, Africa is clearly of major strategic interest. The fact that this interest coincides with the moral imperative to help the poorest and most vulnerable people and countries in the world means that Africa should remain one of the very highest priorities of Canadian foreign policy.

Conclusion

I want to conclude the paper as I began it by repeating the central theme. Canadians are gifted at identifying new priorities for Canada’s international relations, but we are sometimes less determined and effective in implementing those priorities. The aim of my paper has not been to identify new foreign policy priorities but rather to reduce the gap between the promise and performance of a number of our existing priorities.
Canadians did not know—how could they have known?—that, at the very moment they debated, approved, and ratified a free trade agreement with the United States, the United States was at the apogee of its power, from which it has slowly slid, and will continue to slide in the decades ahead.

Remember the context in the years of negotiation, ratification, and entry into force of the free trade deal: 1988-1992. The United States was the only superpower, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) having imploded. The United States was not only unchallenged militarily, it led an impressive coalition of nations to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The “peace dividend,” courtesy of the Cold War’s end, allowed some retrenchment in defence expenditures. Kuwait aside, there were few and mild military engagements that involved the United States, as in the Balkans and Haiti. The country, broadly defined, was at peace. Evidence of jihadi Islamic fundamentalism was beginning to emerge, but episodic attacks and internal intelligence briefings did not suggest a mortal threat, let alone the forthcoming “war on terror.”

China had begun its market liberalization policies a decade before, but it was too early to take the measure of those changes. And, anyway, the Tiananmen Square killings of 1989 made the Chinese regime look as unappealing as ever. What the killings and their aftermath seemed to have provoked internally was a re-dedication of the Chinese leadership to centralized political control and further market liberalization, although the Chinese political structure still controls large sectors of the economy and has decided not to allow its currency to float.

The 1990s, in retrospect, seemed in the United States like an updated version of the Roaring Twenties. The high technology boom lifted economic boats everywhere, from company productivity to Wall Street. Apple, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Sun Microsystems, Silicon Valley: these were among the iconic names of the high-tech boom. Meanwhile, investors supported the establishment of tech companies that spread from California to Utah and Arizona, and even to such sleepy, unlikely places as Bozeman, Montana, and Boise, Idaho. Endowments soared for US universities, or at least the elite private and largest public ones.

Capital gains revenues and overall economic growth swelled government revenues such that, starting in the late 1990s, the US federal budget actually showed a surplus. Interest rates were low, growth was strong, the budget was balanced, debt was being paid off, the rich were getting even richer, while the number of people in the lowest-income groups
fell. Could it have gotten any better? The country was so affluent, confident, and secure that it could allow itself the fixation on a president’s sexual dalliances, up to and including impeachment proceedings in the Congress. Countries with serious problems/challenges can scarcely afford to waste time on such trivialities; countries with little to worry about apparently can afford such diversions.

It was to the United States, at that marvellous time, that Canadians fixed more firmly than ever their economic star through the free trade agreement. Free trade was the right option, given the others on offer. The economic benefits were real; the potential escape from more threatening US protectionism worth taking. What the agreement did not accomplish, to the surprise of pro-free-trade economists, was to spur Canadian productivity that continues to lag behind that of the United States. Nonetheless, the economic case for the agreement, hotly debated in Canada at the time, now is contested only on the far and ineffectual left of the Canadian political spectrum. No political party calls for its re-negotiation, let alone abolition.

Twenty years after the free trade deal, the world and the US role in it, look different and sobering. The United States remains by far Canada’s largest market, closest friend, and continental partner. The web of relations almost defies analysis. The ties of family remain immense. No matter how far one peers into the future, none of these elements of the Canadian-American relationship will change. We are going nowhere; nor are they. And before the thought arises that we are about to predict the collapse of the United States, it should be remembered that people outside the United States have often found its ways and habits sufficiently bizarre and self-centered as to lead eventually, if not sooner, to a loss of influence and power in the world, and to endless problems at home. Any reasonable reading of history mocks those predictions.

And yet, we are far from those days of two decades ago. The US share of the world economy has fallen to 20 percent from 25 percent in 1990, free trade’s time. It remains by any standard the largest economy in the world, but the gap between it and China is narrowing. In 1990, the US trade deficit was small—$30-40-billion—but by 2006 it had exploded to $716 billion, roughly a quarter of which came from oil imports. The United States is now far more dependent on foreign oil than when President Jimmy Carter first drew attention to this dangerous dependence more than three decades ago.

Fiscal deficits have exploded, along with foreign borrowing to finance them. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that combining today’s $2 billion national debt with future deficits, the United States will accumulate a debt of $9 trillion by 2019, unless of course the Congress either raises taxes or cuts spending, neither of which that body has demonstrated to this point a willingness or ability to undertake.

In other words, the world’s leading country is living on borrowed money, and the borrowings are rising. The country has deficits on trade, current account, fiscal budget, oil, and social policy—health care and Social Security being the most obvious and costly. It has borrowed
beyond its means, imported more than it exported, spent more than it earned, and still contemplates additional military outreach in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama’s decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan will cost about $30 billion a year, funds that will have to be borrowed.

Anything beyond a time frame of, say, a decade, enters the realm of speculation. Nonetheless, should the United States fail within that period to take the most resolute action to restore some semblance of credibility to its debt and debt/GDP ratio, it is likely that interest rates must rise (along with inflation) to attract external money to finance deficits and debt, which would tend to push up the value of the dollar, thereby worsening the trade deficit. For example, the Peterson Institute has projected to 2030 that the US trade deficit could reach $3 trillion, debt to $50 trillion, and annual interest payments on the debt of $2.5 trillion. The erosion of domestic living standards to send this kind of money overseas would be considerable.

As stated, we are in the realm of speculation. What can be said is that these US deficits on all fronts are potentially destabilizing for the country and the international economy. No country could escape the consequences of this destabilization and the consequent rearrangements of power relations in the world. Canada, its economy tied so tightly to that of the United States, could not help but be buffeted by the storms.

Already, the state of US domestic affairs has created huge imbalances in the world economy, with the Chinese taking the proceeds from trade and lending to the United States to invest throughout the world in long-term supplies of commodities, diplomatic relationships, and domestic wealth creation. It is fashionable, and correct, to say that China remains far behind the United States in purchasing power, per capita income, and all other economic measures. But remember where China was twenty years ago, and where, if similar broad trends were to continue both in China and the United States for another fifty years, the two countries would be relative to each other. Imagine, too, if Taiwan and China were joined by some sort of Hong Kong-style arrangements, and Hong Kong, its fifty-year grace period after Britain’s departure having expired, were drawn completely into China. A China with a fully integrated Hong Kong and some sort of integration with Taiwan would be even more formidable.

It is also true that China has serious environmental challenges and that the long-term effects of the One Child policy will make for a much older, and perhaps less productive society, although the integration of Taiwan and Hong Kong would ease those difficulties. China’s population will grow much less rapidly than that of the United States, but from a base four times larger. And it remains obviously uncertain whether authoritarian rule can remain compatible with a freer domestic market, the widening of the middle class, and the exposure of more Chinese to other ways of arranging a polity. Thus far, the Chinese authorities have managed the economic transition with no serious threats to domestic political order, but there
is no guarantee that the political status quo can last for, say, another fifty years in a country whose history has been marked by periodic internal combustions.

However China emerges, the world is moving slowly to a less US-centric place. Its soft power, English language, creative economy, best educational institutions, and many other attributes will continue to make the United States an example for many other countries and a magnet for people. It will remain an “indispensable” country in the sense that others will want its presence for stability in regions (Asia, the Middle East) or because it is a more trusted interlocutor than anyone else. It will obviously be able to project force far beyond the capabilities of any other country, yet, as we have seen, having military might to topple regimes does not necessarily mean the ability to control events thereafter. It is reasonable, or at least plausible, to postulate that the huge deficits referenced above will make the United States at least somewhat more cautious about engaging in overseas military missions that tend to run on and cost more than those who launched them ever contemplated.

There will, however, be countries whose economies in relative terms to that of the United States will increase and whose governments therefore will want a greater role for their countries in the world, both in class power terms and within multilateral institutions. This shift has already been felt in the change from a G8 to a G20 and new voting arrangements in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pressure for changes in the composition of the UN Security Council will remain, as will the complications for and opposition to reform. But an institution created to reflect the realities of 1949 will be unlikely to remain unchanged in 2049.

If the world evolves in these directions, then Canadians need to re-engage, or engage, as never before with countries and economies beyond the United States, without ever losing sight of the fact that our most important relationship will remain with our neighbours.

Canadian governments have fitfully been down this road before. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau attempted an opening to Europe called a “contractual link” and briefly pursued a rather vaguely defined Third Option to diversify Canada’s trade and political links. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien led a series of Team Canada missions to China, India, and Latin America. Prime Minister Paul Martin repeatedly spoke of the growing importance of China and India. He can be credited with being among the handful of world leaders who encouraged the shift of the G8 group of countries into the G20, an idea he had trumpeted as Canada’s minister of finance. Belatedly, Prime Minister Stephen Harper visited China, where he was upbraided for being so tardy.

The emerging trends of the coming decades suggest that Canada must now make diversification or, to put it better, globalization of itself and its foreign relations an imperative objective, not in contra-distinction to its relationship with the United States but as an adjunct to it. The most important emerging trend is the relative decline of the United States and the drift of the world towards a more multi-polar set of arrangements. This shift does not necessarily mean a nineteenth century great power rivalry; indeed, today we enjoy a period
where struggles and wars for control of territory are not among the challenges of the era. But it does mean changes in trade patterns and political influence. It means, too, an enhanced importance for multilateral institutions, always an objective of Canadian foreign policy. This means that it is in Canada's interest, as a middle-sized power, to be engaged in as many international networks as possible—and to contribute actively to them financially and in the realm of ideas—and to encourage the major world powers to participate in these institutions.

The world, alas, will continue to be plagued by Islamic jihadism/militancy, an intellectual/religious movement that does not threaten the entire international system but parts of it. Although the principal target of this way of seeing the world through a certain astringent prism of Islam is the United States, terrorism and appeals to jihad exist in swaths of Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and areas of Southeast Asia (the Philippines, northern Thailand, Indonesia), China, and Russia. The infection of these views, propagated by the Internet, can even wash onto Canadian shores, as seen by the guilty pleas in the terrorism trial in Toronto, where the accused admitted to having planned, in a somewhat amateurish way, to blow up the CN Tower and other Toronto sites.

The jihadi/militant version of Islam can both reflect and contribute to weak states with poorly organized central governments (Somalia, Afghanistan) or justify autocracy (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, for example) on the grounds that anything less than firm central rule would lead to takeover by Islamist groups, an example being the insurrection in Algeria that was put down after considerable loss of life. Of all the many global patterns that will influence the future, the persistent failure of Arab states to advance economically and open politically is among the most significant, as a series of reports done by Arab intellectuals for the United Nations Human Development Program (UNHDP) keeps underlining. The resulting stagnation, coupled with a rapidly expanding population, means a series of existential frustrations about the economic weakness and technological lethargy of the Arab world (and Islam), and internal tensions in various Arab states that in turn lead to political repression. A particular danger involves the possibility that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of such groups.

Despite foreign aid, it would appear that underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa, are falling even further behind in the globalized economy. HIV/AIDS is ravaging some of them, devastating their human capital. The continent remains plagued by ethnic conflicts within states, a few of them reflecting a Muslim/Christian divide (as in Nigeria), or leading to debilitating internal strife (Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya). The economic difficulties of the continent lead countries to mortgage their future by selling resource development opportunities to Chinese and Western interests and, increasingly, their fisheries resources to Europeans and Japanese who, having decimated their own fisheries, sign deals with African countries to exploit theirs. In China's case, companies (often state-owned) bring in Chinese labour, meaning the local country is cut out of jobs. The continent's struggles have spawned a series of books and reviews of foreign aid, many of them critical, a few even calling for the elimination of aid on the grounds that it contributes to bad governance and corruption. The
rich/poor divide in the world will continue to be among the salient features of the coming decades, with Africa being at the centre of the issues related to that divide, at the very least summoning a moral imperative among the rich countries, such as Canada.

Africa risks being further impoverished by another major development that will shape the future: environmental degradation. Global warming, among other changes, will increase desertification in already dry areas, change rainfall patterns in other areas, and inevitably lead to further economic marginalization in those drier areas. The result, too, will be internal migrations and heightened pressure of emigration from those areas. The very long-term effects of human-induced climate change will be significant. They will be seen and felt in Canada, where already Arctic ice is melting rapidly, mountain glaciers are receding (affecting river levels that depend upon them), and insect infestations have struck forests.

How, then, should Canada react to these trends: the relative decline of the United States, the rise of new economic powers, the instability caused by Islamic jihadi militancy, failed states and rich/poor divides, and the global stresses on the environment?

The first response, albeit a very hard one, is for citizens to understand that although all politics is local, as the saying goes, most issues are global in one way or another. Everywhere one looks domestically, industries, unions, farmers, fishers, and individual citizens are influenced by what happens globally. The livelihood of the automobile worker in Ontario and the aerospace worker in Quebec depends upon their companies’ ability to produce for the world market. The wheat farmer on the prairies and the fisher in Nova Scotia produce globally. Canadian banks and financial institutions operate internationally.

These and many other examples suggest a truism that is still not adequately understood by enough Canadians. Canada is a small country, economically speaking, of only 33 million people that is integrated with the global economy. The same global perspective shapes us every day, as immigrants and refugees arrive, the degradation of the global commons through climate change alters our geography, and the threat of terrorism at home and abroad challenges our defence and intelligence capabilities. Even our beloved social programs such as public health-care and education and equalization payments depend upon the capacity of the economy to produce taxable revenues to support them. Those revenues depend in turn on the country’s ability to compete internationally.

Competing internationally requires asking of domestic policies: Do they help Canada compete internationally? Do they make us more global in our outlook? These are admittedly difficult questions for politicians of any stripe to ask, since they are elected locally, not globally. Asking these questions, and drawing logical conclusions from negative answers, can produce conflict with vested interests and established ways of proceeding that have often been built up to cushion people and communities from competition. Small countries that turn in on themselves, that waste decades as Canada did with constitutional and federal-provincial
debates, and that seek to protect themselves from the world rather than focusing internal efforts on competing within the world, are destined to long-term decline.

Therefore, the first objective of Canadian foreign policy must be, paradoxically, an internal one: that of leaders in all walks of life (including the media) explaining global realities to the population so that support might be found for making Canada as connected a country as possible to the world.

Connection in economic terms means, among other things, trade. It would be manifestly in Canada’s interest, as a country highly dependent on foreign trade, if the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization trade talks were to succeed. Alas, Canada is among the countries working to see that they do not succeed, at least in the key domain of agriculture where Canada lurks in the corner with South Korea, Japan, France, and a few other European Union countries determined to block or at least restrict liberalization. In Canada, this negotiating position is assumed in the name of protecting supply-management, a protectionist racket that imposes stratospheric tariffs on imported dairy products and poultry. There is regrettably no chance of this policy being altered any time soon, as it enjoys universal support among the political parties whose members are terrified of the political power of angry farmers.

In the absence of progress in the WTO Round, countries are rushing to negotiate bilateral trade agreements. Canada has negotiated, or is negotiating, such agreements with Peru, Colombia, the Caribbean states, Panama, the European Union, and South Korea. The Harper government should be applauded for these initiatives, and encouraged to take more. Free or liberalized trade is so clearly in Canada’s interest that it should remain a driving force of a policy to make Canada more global. Whether Canadian business leaders will follow up such initiatives is an open question, since many of them still remain cocooned in North America.

Canada’s universities produce a disproportionate number of tomorrow’s leaders, so they need to ask themselves whether they are properly preparing their students for the global world of tomorrow. It would be an interesting initiative for universities to review their curriculums and make it obligatory for students in the social sciences and humanities to take a minimum number of courses dealing with international matters. The universities’ nonchalant attitude towards requiring students to learn foreign languages remains a blight on their record.

Universities have developed links with other institutions, but mostly in the developed world or the emerging countries of China and India. Links with the Third World are sparse. It would be an interesting experiment for the government to take money from the bloated bureaucracy of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), give it to an arms-length agency, and encourage Canadian universities to develop programs to twin themselves with universities in the Third World, so that aid might be delivered differently and in the form of human capital development in those countries. Universities that develop such plans would be invited to bid for the funding for five-year renewable periods, with the money allocated by an arms-length organization, as is done with grants and research chairs today. One could
imagine a Canadian university involving many faculties in such an effort to deal in partner countries with everything from rule of law and governance, to public health and sanitation, to engineering projects and architectural training. Canadian universities would therefore be able to give their students and faculty an appreciation of Third World challenges and perspectives; joint research projects would assist both countries; and aid would be delivered in a novel way. As an added bonus, Canadian universities would become more global.

Part of being active in the world—of connecting or becoming more global—suggests intensifying and improving Canada’s efforts to spread good governance and strengthen civil societies abroad. A multiplicity of Canadian institutions does this kind of work, but therein lies the problem. Each protects its own turf, conceding only a talking shop role for something that brings them together, the Democracy Council. The collective Canadian effort is therefore widely scattered, uncoordinated, and enjoys no profile with Canadian taxpayers. What is needed is not another institution such as the government’s proposed agency for supporting political party development in other countries, but a large umbrella organization—call it “Democracy Canada”—that would coordinate the activities of the various agencies, raise the profile of this work in Canada, and bring greater coherence and profile to Canada’s efforts. The money is there for such an agency in the CIDA budget; indeed, the agency should take responsibility from CIDA for this work, since within CIDA projects by definition get politicized, profile is grabbed by politicians, and an excessive bureaucracy stifles initiative.

Canada has the world’s longest coastline, the second-largest land mass, and has among the world’s most abundant supplies of fresh water. With such a piece of geography, environmental threats to land and water would seem to be self-evidently important as a preoccupation for foreign policy.

Many threats to our geography come from abroad. Climate change is the most evident threat: to the Arctic, prairie soils, Western Canadian timber, fish stocks, shorelines, urban smog. Canada is among the world’s largest per capita emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that cause global warming. Canada’s record in fulfilling international emission reductions commitments is the worst of all countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions grew faster in Canada since Kyoto than in the United States, governed for most of that period by President George W. Bush. The approach of the Harper government has followed the depressing Canadian pattern: setting targets that will not be met and following well behind other countries.

A country with such exposed geography should be in the front rank pressing for serious action, even if Canada is responsible for slightly less than two percent of the world’s emissions. With such a terrible domestic record, Canada cannot credibly enjoin other countries to do more. As with agricultural trade, we are widely seen as a miscreant country in the climate change debate.
Ideally, Canadian foreign policy would take a leading role in international efforts to abate GHG emissions—and in all environmental dossiers. The health of the planet’s oceans will be the next great global environmental challenge, since they are in a depressing state of decline, as fish stocks evaporate, coral reefs shrivel, vast oceans of plastic bobble on the surface, and acidification proceeds apace. The widening Arctic waters are especially vulnerable to the effects of sea degradation, and stand exposed to grave risks from environmental mishaps or disasters. The Arctic waters are now expected to be ice-free in summer in three decades, or sooner, according to the latest scientific evidence. It is therefore in Canada’s interest as an Arctic country, with immense coasts east and west, and so many communities that depend on the oceans, to make the environmental protection of the oceans, as the atmosphere, a foreign policy imperative.

The literal opening of Arctic waters presents another foreign policy imperative for Canada, one with many dimensions. The Harper government, to its credit, has paid more attention and spent more money in the Arctic than any previous Canadian government. As climate change literally readjusts the contours of the Arctic, issues of sovereignty emerge, as countries attempt to delineate their territories. Canada has boundary disputes with the United States and Denmark, and might have more once countries submit their final claims to the Far North. Canada claims the Northwest Passage as domestic waters; no other country with a long-distance marine capacity accepts Canada’s claim, including the United States. Therefore, Canadian foreign policy will have to give priority to all the dimensions of asserting sovereignty in the Arctic—and the Canadian military, in turn, will have to possess greater in situ capacities in the Arctic, both to buttress claims of sovereignty and to respond to search-and-rescue issues, plus any threats that might emerge. (Search-and-rescue is now located at Trenton, Ontario, three to three-and-half hours of flying from the nearest Arctic locations.) This will mean equipping the military and coast guard for Arctic missions, in keeping with the military’s primary duty which is to defend a country's sovereignty. Obviously, Canada does not expect military invasions or assaults from the Arctic, but there will be countries that wish to test our capacities to assert sovereignty.

A country’s military has two abiding purposes: defence of the realm and aid to the civil power. Defence of the realm requires focusing on Arctic sovereignty, but in a global world of failed states and jihadi terror—the two often nesting together—threats can emerge to Canada and its allies far from Canada’s shores. Canada’s foreign policy must therefore have military capacities that can, with allies and the United Nations, intervene either as passive peacekeepers or as active keepers of the peace. If Canada is to play an active role in the world, it will need a properly equipped military—properly meaning a force with transit capacity and on-the-ground capabilities in multilateral counterinsurgency or stabilization efforts. These future roles suggest less or no need for fighter aircraft, tanks, long-range artillery, and other weapons of conventional military battles.
A final point, following from the observation that all politics is local but most issues are global: it is Canadians’ hubris to believe, as the Chapters/Indigo slogan suggests, that “The World Needs More Canada.” This attitude reflects a comfortable and corrosive moral superiority not grounded in reality. Anyone who has practiced, or observed, Canadian foreign policy understands that Canada is easily ignored or given little attention, unless it fights for that attention with resources, commitment, and ideas. The shift from a G8 to a G20 should suggest to Canadians just how the world is changing, and how consequentially less important in the global scheme of things we are. But since what happens internationally should be of ever-greater concern to us because of its influence on our domestic life, it becomes more imperative than ever for Canadians to spend the money on advancing our interests and values abroad through the three pillars of any foreign policy: diplomacy, military, and foreign aid. Foreign policy on the cheap might conceivably work for larger countries; it cannot for a small country such as Canada.
Global Problems and Canada’s Role

Fighting disease and improving health in the developing world, where almost ten million children die each year before their fifth birthday and where almost a billion people go hungry every day, poses enormous challenges. Climate change can only make these problems worse, threatening human health, agricultural production, and leading to a greater number of extreme weather events that threaten communities.

At the same time, the emergence of the G20 as the new institution for global governance signifies in a dramatic way the transition from a Western-dominated world to a new global community. It underlines the reality that the world is faced with the urgent need to manage its affairs and solve its problems in an increasingly concerted way. This new world is forcing Canadians to redefine their global role.
Canadians, for their part, are eager to play a role in helping the world deal with its problems; indeed, Canadians are most relevant to the world when they are helping to solve the world’s big problems. This capacity for leadership, to articulate a compelling vision and guide its implementation, has ensured our influence in the G7/G8 and will continue to do so in the new forum of world leaders, the G20. At the same time, the Canadian value system embraces a wider Canadian role in the world, employing our wealth, people, and knowledge to solve problems.

Today, many Canadians are looking for ways to reinvigorate Canada’s role in making the world a safer, more prosperous, sustainable, and equitable place. By leading the way we can also help ourselves: Canada can only succeed as part of the global community. The threats of SARS and H1N1, and the global spread of HIV/AIDS show how quickly disease can jump from continent to continent. The impact of the global economic crisis on Canada, in lost jobs and failed businesses, shows that, despite our own solid performance since the mid-1990s in restoring fiscal health, balancing budgets, and significantly reducing public debt, as well as ensuring a high quality of domestic financial regulation, we are still vulnerable to events outside our borders. There are no safe havens in the twenty-first century.

In short, Canadian foreign policy is looking for a new vision, an opportunity that will engage Canadians and that reflects our abilities and interests. Canadians have a long history of seeking to make a safer and more equitable world, using their wealth and knowledge to back this up. Fifty years ago, we did this through peacekeeping—recognized by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester Pearson. But that was over half a century ago. We have, of course, had successes since—the Kimberly process on blood diamonds, the international treaty on landmines, our support for the International Criminal Court, our advocacy of the responsibility to protect, and our perseverance in establishing a G20 of global leaders.

But as we head into the next decade of the twenty-first century we need a coherent and compelling new vision for our foreign policy—one that combines our self-interest and our desire to help achieve a better world.

Solutions to global health, food security, energy security, and climate change will require major advances in science and technology and significant innovation in our institutional arrangements. These are areas where Canada can make a significant contribution and, by making these contributions, inspire Canadians and expand our relevance and influence in the wider global community. A compelling proposal is that Canada’s contribution to a better world, and our brand identity, should be to help other countries address global challenges using science and innovation.
Leveraging Canada’s Assets and Comparative Advantage

In June 2006, the Council of Canadian Academies produced a report entitled *The State of Science and Technology in Canada*, which identified four clusters of Canadian science and technology strengths as judged against international standards of excellence:

- the natural resource sector;
- information and communications technologies;
- health and related life sciences and technologies;
- environmental science and technology.

The commitment and leadership to utilize these capabilities to support global development could become a new and fundamental focus for Canadian foreign policy. Our value proposition would be that Canada helps solve global challenges using science. We do so both directly and indirectly by helping developing countries solve their problems with science. No other country projects this priority or role as a central plank in foreign policy. This would give Canada a distinctive image in the world. It would be a “cool” brand for a “cool” Canada.

This opportunity to lead is especially relevant in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. These eight big goals, to be achieved by 2015, were adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. Five of these goals fit well with Canada’s scientific capabilities. These are to:

- eradicate extreme hunger and poverty;
- reduce childhood mortality;
- improve maternal health;
- combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
- ensure environmental sustainability.

These are challenges that will continue to confront the world for the next several decades.

Mobilizing our scientific and institutional capabilities to help overcome some of the world’s most difficult challenges can represent a significant reorientation of Canadian foreign policy, one that can inspire Canadians of all ages, bring real gains to the developing world, and build new bridges between the wealthy North and the global South. This could be a unique niche for Canada, one in which we can lead the way and inspire other nations to join in.
Canada has a credible base of development institutions from which to embark on this new foreign policy. We have the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), not widely known in Canada but respected in the developing world, whose tag line is “science for humanity.” Created in 1970 by Parliament as a Crown corporation, IDRC helps “developing countries use science and technology to find practical, long-term solutions to the social, economic, and environmental problems they face.” With a budget of $217 million, including an annual appropriation of $158 million from Parliament, IDRC resembles a US foundation. But it is unique amongst public institutions delivering official development assistance.

More recently, in its 2008 budget, the Government of Canada announced an initial $50 million to establish a Development Innovation Fund. Its mandate is to “create breakthrough discoveries with the potential to significantly improve the lives of millions in the developing world.” As the budget stated:

When Sir Frederick Banting and Charles Best isolated insulin in 1921, they transformed the lives of Canadians and people around the world. Similarly, today, scientific innovation has the potential to improve the lives of the world’s poor. For example, new vaccines and cures could save millions of lives lost to tropical diseases. Higher-yield, drought-resistant crops could prevent future famines. And lower-emission energy sources could power industrial development and job creation with a minimal carbon footprint....The fund will support the best minds in the world as they search for breakthroughs in global health and other areas that have the potential to bring about enduring changes in the lives of millions of people in poor countries.

A substantive initiative will also require cooperation between domestic science agencies and international development agencies. In Canada, in the area of health, this has already occurred through the Global Health Research Initiative (GHRI), which is a partnership among Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the International Development Research Centre, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC). It “promotes Canada-South collaborations—engaging health research and health system stakeholders in partnerships to develop new knowledge to strengthen LMIC [low and middle income countries'] health systems and build global health research capacity in developing countries and in Canada.” GHRI also provides an example of how innovation is not only technological but also extends to social innovation, in this case with its focus on health systems.

In the new foreign policy initiative, the goal would be to utilize Canadian scientific and institutional capabilities, along with those of other nations and foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, to create global solutions—such as vaccines that do not need refrigeration, drought tolerant crops, and cheap solar energy. In addition, we also want to help developing countries themselves to innovate. A great way to make sure countries stay poor is to ensure that they waste their talent and never turn their domestic ideas into products...
and services. Canada’s new foreign policy should help researchers and entrepreneurs in the developing world build their own industrial capabilities and successful businesses.

Canadian universities, civil society, and industry also have key roles to play in helping developing countries solve their problems through science. Universities could become involved not only through collaborative research projects, but also by harnessing the incredible energy and interest of Canadian students to address global problems. With respect to civil society, one need only think of examples like Engineers without Borders, Médecins sans Frontières, and Oxfam Canada to understand the potential to engage our young people in a meaningful way.

This approach could also create an exciting opportunity for Canadian companies to partner with their counterparts in developing country economies. Canadian companies often lack the necessary knowledge and skills to market their products and services in emerging market nations and capitalize on their great growth opportunities. Canadian life science entrepreneurs and researchers need help to build the necessary relationships to provide effective humanitarian aid while also building commercial bridges. There are potential synergies between innovative Canadian small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with global research excellence and companies in emerging market nations that can offer ready access to and understanding of critical new global markets. There are also opportunities for Canadian companies to benefit from partnerships with SMEs in these countries that share similar interests.

Another important asset for Canada is our diaspora. Many of Canada’s leading scientists and engineers have come to us from developing countries and continue to have family and other connections to their countries of origin. Canada is home to more than 15,000 scientific and health-related professionals from developing countries. These linkages provide an important opportunity to expand our Canadian scientific and trade networks into the developing world. We can help our scientists and engineers give back to the nations from which they have come and with which they still have profound personal and family connections.

Finally, Canada can be the platform for the celebration of success in solving problems using science. The Canada Gairdner Global Health Award provides an excellent example that is readily transferrable to other sectors.
Benefits of Branding Innovation in Canada’s Foreign Policy

What are the benefits of an approach that projects Canada’s comparative advantage in science and innovation into its foreign policy?

1. We will help solve important problems plaguing five billion people in the developing world.

2. We will develop solutions that will benefit us domestically, with respect to shared threats like climate change, chronic disease, and H1N1. Some of the solutions will be of particular relevance in our Aboriginal communities.

3. Developing a foreign policy brand related to innovation, whilst originally pursued in development, will also reinforce trade relations in innovative sectors for the commercial benefit of Canada, especially in emerging economies. Canada has signed science agreements with India, China, and Brazil, and is funding research partnerships through ISTPCanada.

4. By helping developing countries solve problems with science, we will help them develop. Arguably, the primary difference between a rich country and a poor one (natural resources and their associated problems aside) is the ability to nurture domestic talent, tap its ideas, and turn those innovations into goods and services that are sold on the domestic market and ultimately exported. Given the widespread questioning of traditional models of international development, stimulated by books such as Dabissa Moyo’s Dead Aid, it may well be time to try something new.

5. Science fosters diplomacy. When politicians and diplomats are unable to speak, scientists can. Science has a shared language and culture all around the world—it is one culture that is truly universal.

Opportunities to Promote Canada’s New Science and Foreign Policy Focus

What are the opportunities to take this new focus for Canadian foreign policy “to market”? The G7/G8 and G20 summits in Muskoka in June 2010 are the first important opportunity. Canada, as host of the G7/G8 summit and co-host of the G20 summit, has a major opportunity to shape the agenda of both. It is a unique opportunity to exercise leadership. We should raise the role of science and innovation as a theme; showcase the Development Innovation Fund—which can serve as a major proposal to advance global health and agriculture; invite other G8 countries to support the initiative; and invite some G20 members, such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and South Africa, to partner as well.
Another opportunity to underline Canada’s new commitment to science and institutional innovation to solve developing world problems could come in the fall of 2010, should Canada continue with its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. We could build on our work on human security, arguing that there is not only a responsibility to protect displaced civilians in conflict, but also to protect those suffering from disease, hunger, and lack of access to clean energy. As the UN Secretary General advances a new concept of “Twenty-first Century Development,” Canada could help define what that means. The Secretary General has launched a biotechnology initiative so is already in the frame of mind to accept the notion that development means helping countries solve problems with science.

Let us not wait for another fifty years to once again punch above our weight. The blue helmets of fifty years ago should also make room for the white lab coats of today.
Canadian foreign policy has rarely needed a thorough re-think more than it does now. And yet, the current level of debate in Canada over key international issues ranges from simplistic to non-existent, with few stops in between; thus we lack a reasoned and informed public discussion. Two examples concern Canada’s role in the newly minted G20 and Canada’s role in Afghanistan.

In 2010 Canada will host back-to-back G8 and G20 meetings. Later in the year there will be another meeting of the G20 in Korea. These meetings are important for the opportunities they provide to the Canadian government to safeguard and pursue Canada’s interests in the world.

Unfortunately, thus far the Canadian government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper has resisted the inevitable development of the G20. The rationale for this attitude remains obscure, but seems to rest on the conviction that it is better to be a member of a more exclusive club of eight than a club including twenty countries, despite the fact that the latter consists of major countries such as China and India. Another, somewhat less worthy, reason seems to be that the G20 is identified with Mr. Harper’s Liberal predecessor, Prime Minister Paul Martin. Notwithstanding these apprehensions, it is undoubtedly in Canada’s interest to make the G20 work. There will not be a return of the G8’s premier position.

It behooves Canada to show we deserve to be one of twenty. Canada may “make the cut” in 2010 but nothing is permanent in this sort of architecture. If twenty is indeed too many for effective action, another smaller group may yet emerge. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is already on record as preferring a grouping of fourteen or so, and he will chair both the G8 and the G20 in 2010. It would be wise for Canada now to be showing why we ought to be around the table. The relative size of our population, gross domestic product (GDP), and armed forces will inevitably dwindle in the decade ahead, and it won’t be as obvious in ten or fifteen years why we are indispensable to the group, even if it remained at twenty. Indeed it isn’t obvious to everyone even now.

Summits matter because we live in an increasingly interdependent world; the effectiveness of global governance is lagging behind the extent of interdependence. While there is a
plethora of international institutions, some big and some small, these institutions have proved remarkably resistant to change—they have outmoded mandates and decision-making systems. The consequence is an increasing number of global deadlocks and issues that require a degree of cooperation and coordination, and that that coordination is not available, or at least forthcoming, from existing institutions and arrangements.

Take the United Nations (UN). It is fine to say that everybody has an interest in climate change and that negotiations should therefore take place in the UN. But does anybody really think that 192 countries, varying in size from China and the United States to small island states, can negotiate anything of the complexity of climate change with its linked issues of energy, technology, security, and development?

It may not sound very democratic, but the world needs a steering committee to set agendas, determine the principles and parameters for deals, and to commission negotiators to prepare feasible proposals for more universal bodies. What we have seen over the last few years is that that committee has been transformed from the G8 to the G20 for global economic coordination. Moreover, it is “economic coordination” writ large. Reforming the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the financial dimensions of climate change, trade, and development have already been addressed by the G20, which is natural given the linkages amongst these issues.

Breaking global deadlocks requires making deals. One might think that focus and keeping issues separate would be simpler. But having a variety of such negotiations going on in separate places means that the trade-offs that need to be made in “grand bargains” won’t happen. “Grand bargains” are a fact of life on the international stage, where it is necessary for everyone to come out a winner.

At the time of writing in late fall 2009, it seems that geopolitical and security issues will still be pursued by the G8 (although some have even mentioned the G7—including Russia). Of course, the original intention of the G7 was that it was to deal only with economic issues. But, what happened is that when leaders met at the same time as a political crisis occurred, unsurprisingly they discussed it. The same will happen again with the G20, perhaps not in 2010 but sometime soon.

Moreover, if one thinks of the big issues on the international agenda—say the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran (subject to some doubt about what the Iranians really want), how could these be addressed without China present?

Canada has for decades pursued the goal of strengthening the multilateral system. This is not just a matter of “values” but of “interests.” These two notions are not mutually exclusive—in fact, policy should be based on interest and consistent with values.
It is time for Canada to accelerate the inevitable. There is an opportunity with the 2010 summits for Canada to be taking a lead. Canadians need and want to be “rule makers” rather than “rule takers.” Let’s show we can (again) perform credibly on the larger international stage. This is an opportunity to help move the really tough issues, such as climate change and Afghanistan.

Climate change is a little like the Middle East. Everybody knows what the contours of the final package must look like. The tough question is, “How does one get there from here?” Part of the answer is to ensure that all the key players can go away talking about their success—not just success in reaching a broad agreement but why the outcome is in the interest of their specific country.

Developed countries insist that developing countries take on binding targets—this can be done on a lagged basis (a principle well established in trade negotiations)—giving developing countries more time with the confidence that a reliable monitoring and verification system would provide regarding developed countries’ commitments. Each country can be a winner if there is a global collaborative research and development (R&D) effort—applying lessons from the International Space Station, the Large Hadron Collider, and the successful agricultural research network, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Research establishments can be placed strategically around the world. Not only Indonesia and Brazil would benefit from a new global priority on forests—Canada, Russia, and the United States could be net beneficiaries. Setting up a new intellectual property regime for renewable energy, clean coal, and power generation, with advanced market commitments, could be a positive sum game where every country would be a “winner.”

A wide range of commentators have thought through the actions required for a climate change approach, including targets for emission reductions, global cap-and-trade market arrangements, financing for adaptation, technology transfer, preventing deforestation as well as promoting reforestation, and cooperation on research and standards. Canada could lead by massaging the potential initiatives into win-win-win packages and persuading the major actors that they can each be winners.

Moving from opportunities to problems, at the top of the list for Canada is the lethal killing ground of Afghanistan. It is widely understood in Canada and elsewhere that the war is not going well. Everybody knows that it cannot be won by foreign militaries. But the level of debate in this country over how to remedy the situation is very low. The argument tends to be polarized between those who believe in the continuing threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as the reason why we cannot abandon Afghanistan, and those who believe that we should get out as soon as possible, or at least on the present schedule in 2011, because the mission is impossible.
Al-Qaeda remains a very real threat to the United States and many other countries, not just those fighting against it. One needs only to think of the activity of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, indeed all the way across northern Africa to Somalia and Yemen. President Obama stated in his speech announcing 30,000 more troops for Afghanistan that al-Qaeda terrorists, trained in the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been recently arrested in the United States. It is true that even if there was “success” in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda’s franchised operations could and would turn up in many other parts of the world that are effectively beyond governance, domestic or international. But that doesn’t lead to the conclusion that we can walk away from Afghanistan and be indifferent to what happens in Pakistan.

The most likely outcome if all international forces left Afghanistan any time soon is that the country would descend into civil war. With no outside involvement the Taliban could well again take over the country. Pakistan would increasingly be weakened and beset with a civil war. This instability in Pakistan would run the risk that its nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of the Taliban. This prospect could even lead to conflict with India.

The objectives for Afghanistan as stated by President Obama have been considerably scaled back. The outcome of the last election, the continuing corruption, and the weakness of President Hamid Karzai’s government are all realities. Yet everybody knows the only hope for Afghanistan is that its government, including military and police, learns to stand on its own feet. Obama’s plan is to ramp up forces in 2010 to reach a peak in 2011. By 2011, the plan is that the Afghan military and police can stand on their own. There is, of course, no certainty of such an outcome.

There is an illusion in Canada that we can wind down our military engagement, and, as a substitute, step up our development engagement. The spread of the insurgency to parts of the country hitherto seen as safe bodes poorly for this approach. The reality is that there can be no development without security.

President Obama has made Afghanistan “his” war. The possibility of declaring victory any time soon and moving on is not on the horizon—despite the views of those who draw analogies with Vietnam. Obama made clear the big difference is that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong did not attack and continue to pose a direct threat to American citizens, but al-Qaeda did attack and is continuing to try to launch further attacks against not only the United States and its allies, but against many other countries.

Will the same thing happen as happened in 1969 when Prime Minister Trudeau wanted to pull all of Canada’s forces out of NATO Europe? What happened then was that Canada set off alarm bells with its decision to withdraw. The United States took a very strong line against the Canadian cuts to show to all its allies that it was going to fight Senator Mike Mansfield’s Senate Resolution to reduce US troops in Europe. The Europeans took a very strong line criticizing Canada to show the Americans how noisy they would be if the United States sought
to reduce its commitment. In short, Canada became the whipping boy; the decision was amended. Will the same thing happen in 2011? Already there is talk that Canada, instead of leaving, might move to a safer part of the country and focus on training the Afghan Army.

Anybody who has simple answers on this subject isn’t worth listening to. What we need, desperately, is a sophisticated, informed debate in Canada. We need to sort out our interests (deterring terrorism) and their implications. We need to think through what the implications are for what we decide on the Obama administration and Canada-US relations. We also need to think about our values. Are we really willing to walk away, having given people (in particular women and girls) a taste of human rights and democracy, because we are not prepared to pay the full price and stay the course?

I am inclined to believe Canada should remain militarily in Afghanistan beyond 2011, but in a training role. There may also be opportunities where Canadian Forces could help protect development assistance. Such assistance given in a form that promises rapid visibility in terms of results is essential. Other than for special-forces-type operations and self-defence, I would have Canada cease active pursuit of Taliban fighters in counter-insurgency operations. But I would most definitely not walk away in 2011.

I don’t know, however, with any certainty the answers to these challenges. I do know they are not receiving enough sensible attention. We cannot begin that debate too soon.
Jean Augustine – Commissioner, Office of the Fairness Commissioner, Toronto

Maurice Baril – Board of Directors, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

Nancy Gordon – Former President of United Nations Association and former Vice-President of Care Canada

Fen Osler Hampson – Chancellor’s Professor and Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

Michael Kergin – Senior Advisor, Bennett Jones, and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Jeremy Kinsman – Chancellor’s Lecturer, University of California, Berkeley

Justin Massie – Professeur adjoint, École supérieure d’Affaires publiques et internationales, Université d’Ottawa

Robert Miller – Former President and CEO of the Canadian Parliamentary Centre

Roland Paris – Director, Centre for International Policy Studies, and Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Jeffrey Simpson – National Affairs Columnist, Globe and Mail

Peter Singer – Professor of Medicine, McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto

Gordon Smith – Director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs