

Canada's Global Role in Promoting Inclusive Governance

Recommendations and Report on Workshop Findings

compiled by Gabrielle Bardall, PhD

2012 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholar

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Please contact gabrielle.bardall@trudeaufoundation.net with all inquiries.

Sommaire Exécutif

Le Canada entre dans une période cruciale de soutien à la démocratie et aux droits de la personne dans le monde. La prolifération des États semi-autoritaires au sein des pays du Sud, la montée du populisme de droite en Europe et aux États-Unis ainsi que les interminables conflits internes de certains pays menacent la stabilité mondiale et la confiance portée envers les processus et institutions démocratiques. L'affaiblissement de la démocratie et l'instabilité politique globale mettent gravement en péril la politique étrangère, la sécurité ainsi que la prospérité du Canada. Parmi les nombreux instruments de politique étrangère mis à sa disposition, soutenir la démocratie à l'étranger est l'une des actions les moins coûteuses et les plus efficaces que le Canada puisse poser afin de résister à ces forces, afin de défendre les valeurs globales et afin de maintenir la sécurité nationale.

Ce rapport allie une recherche comparative aux idées échangées lors de l'atelier « Le rôle du Canada dans la promotion de la démocratie à l'étranger » organisé par la Fondation Pierre Elliott-Trudeau et le Centre d'études en politiques internationales (CÉPI) de l'Université d'Ottawa en juin 2016 dans le but d'offrir une analyse détaillée ainsi que des recommandations sur la problématique. Le présent rapport décrit la singulière capacité du Canada à promouvoir la démocratie à travers ses relations internationales:

La promotion de la démocratie a des lacunes: Les enjeux de la démocratie sont de plus en plus complexes, et les 25 ans de pratique dans le domaine international ont finalement atteint un plateau en matière d'innovation et d'impact. Les États-Unis, qui ont été un véritable leader dans la promotion de la démocratie, ont récemment réorienté leurs politiques internationales et sont maintenant confrontés à une crise de légitimité, créant ainsi des lacunes dans ce secteur. Une analyse canadienne peut certainement répondre aux enjeux actuels.

La promotion de la démocratie nécessite une expertise technique : L'expérience canadienne avec ses divers modes de gouvernance participative et avec son processus d'administration des élections est profondément respectée dans le monde entier. Les élections canadiennes ont une histoire unique d'inclusion, car elles sont fondées sur le principe de réduction des barrières à l'accès, et elles encouragent les électeurs à être proactifs et responsables en s'inscrivant. Longtemps recherchée par de nombreuses organisations internationales, l'expertise canadienne dans ce domaine est unique.

La promotion de la démocratie exige une expérience et une introspection : Le Canada doit intervenir et devenir un partenaire de cet effort global, reconnaissant ainsi le besoin d'apprendre et de s'améliorer aux côtés des États qu'il soutient. Les succès et difficultés rencontrés par le Canada avec les enjeux du multiculturalisme, du fédéralisme, des droits des peuples autochtones et des minorités, ainsi qu'avec l'engagement auprès des diasporas et des réseaux internationaux comme la Francophonie et le Commonwealth ont permis au Canada de s'engager de façon constructive dans les problématiques les plus urgentes auxquelles fait face le monde. Ayant appris des succès précédents dans ce domaine et des dures leçons du passé tirées des expériences dans d'autres pays tels que l'Afghanistan et Haïti ou de nos propres Affaires Autochtones, le Canada a su répondre aux différents enjeux de façon réfléchie. Les Canadiens comprennent d'ailleurs que la démocratie est indissociable des autres aspects du développement tels que la croissance économique, l'égalité, la sécurité, la santé et l'éducation.

La recrudescence de l'engagement canadien dans le soutien d'une gouvernance participative à l'étranger devrait :

- Maximiser les forces des organisations existantes déjà actives dans les domaines prioritaires.
- Comblar les lacunes institutionnelles afin d'atteindre les buts prioritaires.
- Défendre les objectifs de la gouvernance participative sur la scène internationale.

Afin d'atteindre ces objectifs, **le gouvernement canadien devrait envisager la création d'une organisation dévouée et semi-autonome** réunissant l'expertise, l'expérience et les leçons apprises du passé et les appliquer correctement en fonction des objectifs stratégiques. Un tel mandat devrait coordonner, mettre en œuvre et promouvoir la gouvernance participative à l'étranger.

Le succès du travail de promotion de la gouvernance participative dépendrait de plusieurs éléments : d'une part, il lui faudrait déterminer des objectifs clairs, tels qu'un mandat fondé sur les droits; la promotion de la diversité; des programmes adaptés et axés sur l'innovation et la recherche; une analyse multisectorielle; et enfin une approche à long-terme et financièrement stable. Les domaines d'intérêt devraient à la fois refléter les communautés historiquement marginalisées et devraient aussi travailler de manière constructive avec certaines idéologies différentes. Les pays devraient être ciblés en fonction de plusieurs facteurs tels que le type de régime, les sous-domaines (le fédéralisme, le renforcement parlementaire, l'administration électorale, la participation des femmes, les droits des peuples autochtones, le multiculturalisme et le multipartisme inclusif) ainsi que les liens historiques ou stratégiques.

Toutes ces fonctions seraient mieux servies sous la gestion d'une organisation distincte plutôt que sous la gestion étatique ou sous celle des agences non-étatiques déjà existantes. Unir l'expertise et l'expérience de cette manière permettrait premièrement de mieux cerner les objectifs du programme, et deuxièmement, elle permettrait une coordination et une mise en œuvre renforcée. Une telle structure pourrait donc fournir une meilleure réponse et agilité institutionnelle qui protégerait ainsi la neutralité politique et créerait un soutien multipartite. Une organisation si méthodique pourrait bâtir une plate-forme axée sur l'éducation, le plaidoyer et le développement des partenariats multilatéraux.

Le soutien à la démocratie dans le monde est un investissement peu coûteux qui cependant aurait un grand impact sur la croissance et les valeurs canadiennes. La démocratie — la paix et le bien-être public qu'elle promeut — génère des sociétés plus saines, des partenariats commerciaux plus prospères et un monde plus sécuritaire. Le Canada a un rôle unique à jouer dans l'élaboration de ces objectifs. Nous entrons dans une période cruciale qui invite le Canada à devenir le leader de la défense des valeurs démocratiques dans le monde.

Executive Summary

There has never been a more vital time for Canada to support democracy and human rights in the world. The proliferation of semi-authoritarian states in the global south, the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the United States, and the drawn-out conflicts in countries around the world threaten global stability and confidence in democratic processes and institutions. Weakened democracy and global political instability seriously endanger Canada's foreign policy, its security, and its domestic prosperity.

Of the many foreign policy tools at Canada's disposal, supporting democracy abroad is one of the least costly and most effective contributions the country can make to resisting these forces, upholding global values and protecting national security.

This report combines comparative research with the insights shared during "Canada's Role in Democracy Promotion," a workshop organized by a Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation scholar and the University of Ottawa's Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) in June 2016 to provide analysis and recommendations. The report describes Canada's unique capacity to meet democracy promotion goals in international relations, expounds on four key insights, and makes one principal recommendation:

Democracy promotion faces a gap. Challenges to democracy have become more complex and the 25-year-old international field of practice is experiencing a plateau of innovation and impact. The US, which has been a leader in this field, has undergone a policy shift internationally and is faced with a legitimacy crisis at home, deepening the gap in the field. A fresh, Canadian analysis can meet today's challenges.

Democracy promotion requires technical expertise. Canadian experience with various models of inclusive governance and Canada's record in electoral administration are deeply respected around the world. Canadian elections have a unique history of inclusiveness because they are predicated on reducing barriers to access and proactively taking responsibility for registering, informing, and engaging voters. Highly valued by international organizations, Canadian expertise in this field is unique.

Democracy promotion requires experience and introspection. Canadian successes and struggles with multiculturalism, federalism, Indigenous and minority rights, as well as Canada's engagement with diasporas and international networks like the Francophonie and the Commonwealth, have positioned Canada to constructively engage with the world's most pressing issues. Learning from past successes in this area, as well as from hard lessons from experiences in countries such as Afghanistan and Haiti and from domestic Indigenous affairs, Canadians understand that that democracy is indissociable from other aspects of development, such as economic growth, equality, security, health, and education. This deep understanding makes it possible for Canada to come to the table as an experienced global partner that recognizes and demonstrates the need to learn and improve alongside the states it supports.

Democracy promotion and Canada's support of inclusive governance abroad should:

- Maximize the strengths of existing organizations active in priority areas
- Fill institutional implementation gaps to meet priority goals
- Advocate on the international stage for specific elements of inclusive governance

Recommendation. To achieve these goals, **the Canadian government should consider creating a dedicated, (semi)-autonomous organization** that assembles expertise, experience, and lessons learned under one roof, and applies them intelligently to strategic objectives. The mandate of such a body would be to coordinate, implement, and advocate for the promotion of inclusive governance abroad.

The success of work to promote inclusive governance will depend on several elements: clear objectives; a rights-based mandate; the fostering of diversity; responsive, research-based, innovation-driven programs; a multi-sectoral analysis; and a financially stable long-term approach. Inclusivity should be reflected in program design as well as outcomes, with an emphasis on local leadership and accountability. Areas of focus should both reflect both historically marginalized groups and work constructively with ideological oppositions. Countries should be targeted according to such considerations as regime type, subfield focuses (federalism, parliamentary strengthening, electoral administration, women's participation, indigenous rights, multiculturalism and inclusive multi-partisanship), and historical or strategic ties.

Uniting expertise and experience in this way will allow for better programmatic targeting, enhanced coordination and stronger specialization. Such a structure would be better able to provide institutional responsiveness and agility, as well as protect political neutrality and build multi-party support. A consolidated organization would establish a platform for advocacy and education on the issue and facilitate multilateral partnerships.

Supporting democracy in the world is a low-cost, high-impact investment in Canadian growth and values. Inclusive democratic governance – and the peace and public welfare it facilitates – generates healthier societies, prosperous trading partners, and a more secure world. Canada has a unique role to play in realizing this objective. The timing has never been more critical for Canada to step forward as a leader in defending democratic values in the world.

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Introduction

Developed in the context of the ongoing dialogue on Canada's global role in promoting inclusive governance, this report summarizes the findings and ideas expressed during the workshop, “Canada’s Role in Democracy Promotion”, convened by Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation scholar Gabrielle Bardall and the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa on June 13, 2016. The event brought together nearly two dozen experts from government, academia, INGOs, and NGOs in a dialogue to assess if and how Canada may further its foreign policy and international development objectives to encourage the growth of inclusive governance abroad.¹ The objective of the workshop was to re-ignite the dialogue, generate debate and new ideas about Canada’s role in this area and potential policy options, notably in relation to US and international involvement in this field of practice.

Heeding the call of Sustainable Development Goal 16, to “*Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels,*” and recognizing the critical importance of re-engaging to support democratic governance abroad, the workshop was convened on the principle that any future steps must be inclusively informed by diverse views and experience, and must consider the successes, obstacles and shortcomings of the past through various lens. Renewed engagement must adapt to the realities of the entrenched semi-authoritarianism of the world’s non-democracies today (including backlash against democracy promotion), as well as the unique security and human rights challenges of world politics. A key objective of the workshop was to situate Canada within this global context.

This paper draws on three primary fields of information. Firstly, historical research and contextual information was collected during the winter/spring 2016, as a basis for the workshop. This material draws on academic, professional and other public writing and is primarily reflected in the background section of this piece.

Secondly, this paper summarizes many of the distinct opinions and experiences expressed during the workshop in June 2016. Comments made at the workshop were not for individual attribution, however we wish to recognize the expertise that was shared and express gratitude to the many thoughtful and informative contributions made by the speakers during the event. I have sought to provide attribution where workshop speakers published on these topics. We recognize that many of these issues are still hotly-debated. In this text, I have sought to identify those issues and assertions that were notably contentious among workshop participants. Likewise, while no formal consensus was sought during the event, the recommendations presented here reflect recurrent common threads expressed by multiple (but not all) speakers.

Finally, in the months following the workshop, the public conversation shifted away from the language of “democracy assistance” and towards the closely-connected notion of “inclusive

¹ Speakers at the event included George Anderson, Patricia Atkinson, Thomas Axworthy, Nipa Banjerlee, Gabrielle Bardall, Margaret Biggs, Stephen Brown, Leslie Campbell, Thomas Carothers, Rupak Chattopadhyay, Eric Duhaime, Helaina Gaspard, Peter Kent, Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Paul La Rose-Edwards, Hélène Laverdière, Christopher MacLennan, Stéphanie Plante, Althea Maria Rivas, Morris Rosenberg, Jean-Paul Ruszkowski, Gerald J. Schmitz, Arif Virani.

governance". Additional material and research was gathered to specifically address inclusive governance to keep pace with this change and contextualize the valuable findings of the workshop in this framework. This material appears throughout the document and reflects this writer's personal perspective (i.e, the topic was not covered during the workshop).

In overview, Part I discusses the definition of inclusive governance from a policy perspective and its relationship to democracy. It asserts that 2016 is a critical juncture for re-evaluating and re-engaging to support inclusive governance abroad, due to specific global political and developmental contexts as well as shifts within this field of bilateral and multilateral policy. Following a brief overview of the recent history of Canadian policy involvement in this area since the 1980s, the report summarizes a few of the lessons-learned as discussed during the workshop.

Based on this historical and conceptual overview, Part II of the report presents a series of recommendations for renewed Canadian support in this field. Recommendations center upon the creation of a dedicated autonomous or semi-autonomous organization mandated to coordinate, implement and advocate for the promotion of inclusive governance abroad. This section identifies Canada's value-added in this area as the pillars for forward policy and lays out guiding values and approach for engagement. Viewing 'inclusion' as both a process and an outcome, it provides recommendations on integrating inclusive values into policy approach as well as identifying key areas for targeted engagement. The section provides direction on approaches to focusing Canada's investment in this area, as well as additional recommendations on specific sub-topics including women's political participation, indigenous rights and political inclusion, working deeply divided states and promoting tolerance in a sectarian age.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'GB', with a stylized, flowing script.

Gabrielle Bardall
2012 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation Scholar

Montréal, QC
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PART I. KEY CONCEPTS & BACKGROUND

What is inclusive governance? What is its connection to democracy promotion?

Inclusive governance, democracy and development are intrinsically linked. Empowering the poor and marginalized and making institutions accountable are pillars of poverty reduction and development (World Bank 2000/2001). Achieving empowerment and government accountability requires systems of inclusive governance. The mechanisms of inclusive governance reflect both 'vertical' and 'horizontal' accountability that is embodied by democratic values and practices.

Inclusive governance is sustained by both a "supply-side" and a "demand-side". The "supply" side of governance reflects horizontal accountability mechanisms that operate within the state itself, such as political, fiscal, administrative and legal mechanisms (World Bank 2005, Schedler et al. 1999, Goetz and Gaventa, 2001). "Demand-side" components of governance include vertical mechanisms of accountability that focus on enhancing the "voice and capacity of citizens (especially poor citizens) to directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials and service providers" (Malena 2004). While neither is sufficient alone, both 'supply' and 'demand' sides are essential for a healthy and inclusive system of governance.

Examples of Vertical and Horizontal Components of Inclusive Governance		
	Horizontal Accountability "Supply-side"	Vertical Accountability "Demand-side"
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Constitutional constraints, separation of powers, the legislature and legislative investigative commissions• Professional and impartial electoral management bodies• Equal opportunity electoral legal frameworks devoid of barriers to entry/including affirmative action measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Civic and voter education• Political party – inclusive platforms, constituent outreach, promoting women/indigenous/ethnic minority/youth/handicapped candidates and party leadership• Citizen participation in public policy-making
Fiscal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Formal systems of auditing and financial accounting	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Participatory budgeting• Public expenditure tracking
Administrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hierarchical reporting, norms of public sector probity, public service codes of conduct, rules and procedures regarding transparency and public oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Service delivery surveys• Citizen report cards
Legal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Corruption control agencies• Ombudsmen and the judiciary	

In the world of international aid, inclusive governance is supported in two ways. It can be

addressed as a cross-cutting principle integrated across the delivery of aid packages (e.g., citizen report cards on public services). Alternately, the explicit and direct support of inclusive governance largely falls under the area of international aid frequently characterized as “democracy assistance” or “democracy promotion” because of the reciprocal relationship between the principle of inclusivity and the practice of democratic participation. This is the terminology used during the June workshop.

Although democracy promotion may encompass a broad range of actions, from diplomacy to military intervention, in this context we interpret it to concern only those non-coercive activities undertaken with the explicit intent to “foster democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999). The actors of democracy promotion include multi-lateral, bi-lateral, quasi-state and non-state actors. Fields of intervention include but are not limited to those presented in the table above. Specific activities may include: electoral assistance and observation, political party support, constitutional and legal advising, support for the rule of law/justice sector, parliamentary strengthening, decentralization processes/federalism/local government support, civic and electoral education, security sector support and reform, assistance to trade unions and independent media (ibid).

The term ‘democracy promotion’ is value-laden. We do not presume that democracy promotion, as a field of practice, is a global good or that there are fixed best-practices to engaging in it. The terms “democracy assistance” or “democracy support” are often preferred and are used interchangeably here.

The phrase “supporting inclusive governance” reflects democratic values projected across any given political system. This comprises the inclusion of diverse and representative voices from any society or population, most particularly those most commonly excluded: people living in poverty, women, indigenous populations, people living with handicaps, youth, ethnic and religious minorities.

Why is 2016 the right time to talk about inclusion and democracy assistance as part of international aid?

Changes in the global political and development context, coupled with a critical juncture in the international democracy assistance field of practice, make 2016 a key time to re-consider Canada’s role in this field.

Embedded in the international normative framework, inclusive democracy is considered a global value transcending geographic, socio-economic and religious boundaries. Contributing national and global security as well as economic and social development, environmental protection and reducing all forms of inequality, democratic governance is a cross-cutting value of importance to any international development policy framework. Canada is called up to support inclusive governance in UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. Key challenges facing this SDG are growing inequality and a worldwide backsliding of democracy.

After decades of post-Cold War progress, the spread of democracy across the world has faltered and experienced backsliding. Semi-authoritarian regimes have proved enduring and now constitute the majority of states in the world today. The failure of the Arab Spring, the spread of terrorism and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Russia and China have offset democratic progress and created new networks of support for autocrats seeking to resist democratizing pressures from within and without. Closing spaces and increasing domestic regulations in every region of the world

increasingly limit access for outsiders seeking to support civil society. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have limited capacity and the rise in alternative funding sources from “black knight” countries and organizations allow autocrats to obtain finance without the governance conditionalities imposed by the IFIs.

Furthermore, the international field of practice of democracy assistance is facing a critical juncture for two primary reasons. First, the perceived failure of key projects in the past 15 years cast a shadow on the field as a whole. Criticism centers on Irak and Afghanistan. Conflict in South Sudan and Russia, and serious reversals in countries big and small, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, compound concern with the effectiveness of democracy promotion programs (Carothers 2016, b). , 2010 against (particularly American) democracy promotion activities has been noted for over a decade (Carothers 2006, 2010). The nature of electoral fraud and manipulation has become dramatically more sophisticated and complex than in the first decades of the third wave, requiring adapted approaches and strategies from democracy assistance practitioners.

Paralleling the crisis in democracy promotion, participatory development practices have waxed and waned in popularity since introduced by USAID and other donors over 60 years ago. In particular, the World Bank’s intensive investment in participatory approaches over the past 10-15 years is assessed as providing only moderate gains and posing complex risks, notably in terms of “civil society failure”, sustainability and social inequality. While the inclusive values of participatory development endure, implementation approaches must be reassessed.

Second, changes in the global context have moved the focus away from democracy assistance, particularly in the US, which has been a leader in this field from the outset. The rise of global terrorism has shifted American foreign policy in particular away from oft-gradual democracy assistance programs towards harder line, security-focused initiatives. In the US, problems with democracy at home have compounded this effect. International confidence in American technical leadership in elections and democracy has been deeply shaken, from confusion over the 2000 electoral recount to the Supreme Court ruling on the *Citizens United* case on political finance, to numerous political corruption scandals of the 2000s and 2010s. The rise of populism in domestic political discourse as well as legislative gridlock and failures of the criminal justice system compel Americans to focus on making democracy sustainable at home before promoting it abroad (Carothers 2016, a).

These challenges are not evidence of a failure of democracy assistance, but they do underline the need to reboot the conversation, free the discourse of normative assumptions and take a fresh look at the approach and the methods of promoting democracy abroad. The challenges are not insurmountable: the democracy promotion community is a small but substantial world marked by persistence and a shared moral commitment to democratic values. The challenges described above are interpreted differently within this community. For the challenges of the global context, failures in Irak and Afghanistan are recognized, but viewed within the framework of security activities rather than democracy assistance. Measuring democratic progress is the most inexact of sciences and within any given state, setbacks in one area (for example, more responsive electoral system or quota design) may be offset by progress in another (such as enhanced local governance structures or security sector reform), thus the importance of setting limited and realistic goals and targeting appropriate political spaces within any given regime. Closing spaces can indicate the strength of growing civil society and medias and advancements in state legal and bureaucratic structures (albeit, often for restrictive purposes). Looking broadly, while many democratic institutions are experiencing setbacks at present, citizen empowerment and public accountability are experiencing periods of historic growth. Just as democratic manipulation has become more sophisticated, so has our knowledge of engaging to promote democratic values, processes and institutions. While the fear

of terrorism is justified, international responses should include state-building to prevent radicalization.

Most significantly, the setbacks abroad and the shortcomings of our own democracies in the West need not limit engagement to promote democracy and human rights, but they should change the way in which we do so, in two ways. First, we must continually learn from our setbacks and failures and stay alert to the evolving context of democratic transitions. This implies investing the time and resources into grounding policy in research, supporting substantive evaluations of programs and breaking “practitioner silos” by ensuring that experts receive regular professional development opportunities to stay abreast in their fields and exchange experiences.

Secondly, and most importantly, we must recognize that democracy promotion is not about exporting a model but embarking on a mutual learning experience based on respect, humility and equality of actors. If the field of practice is to maintain its credibility and grow, models of democracy assistance rooted in paternalism must be abandoned in favour of collaborative approaches that emphasize inclusivity, local responsiveness and ownership, across both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Such a change would mark a profound shift within standard aid models in this area, by valuing process at equal or greater value as output. Instead of measuring project success by outcomes delivered (often by Western experts), impact can be demonstrated in capacity gained, autonomy, and initiative in local partnerships. Progress may appear slower, less showy than high-profile national election programs and the like, and potentially less measurable, but holds the promise of being deeper and more enduring.

Thus, 2016 can be a transformative moment for Canadian leadership in the field of international democracy assistance. Revisiting Canada’s approach to and investment in the area of democracy and governance support will better enable engaged actors to:

- meet Canada’s foreign policy and international development objectives;
- respond to the urgent need for governance support in post-conflict, transitional and semi-authoritarian states around the world;
- advance a Canadian vision of assistance to inclusive governance based on human, civil and political rights;
- capitalize on Canada’s expertise and talent, repatriating Canadian experts to serve Canadian foreign policy and fostering new talent in this area of international assistance.

Canadian democracy assistance at a crossroads

Canada has a long, if varied, history in the support of democracy abroad.

A seminal **1986 parliamentary foreign policy review report** led to the creation of an arms-length body, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (“**Rights & Democracy**”), in 1988. Four years later, **CIDA introduced a ‘Human Rights, Democratic Development and Good Governance’ policy division**. At this time, CIDA identified democratic governance as a cornerstone of Canadian international assistance and focused on four areas: political freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and accountable public institutions.

From the outset, **Canada consciously anchored its policy within the framework of the International Bill of Rights** (the Universal Declaration, the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights

and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). It explicitly “eschew[ed] the notion of promoting some ‘Canadian model’ of Western political ideology and institutions” (Schmitz 2013) and distanced itself from American models associated with interventionism, neo-liberal economic and/or national strategic interests (ibid). Through the 1990s and early 2000s, the sector developed gradually within CIDA, Rights & Democracy and several other arm’s length organizations, all working from modest budgets.

By 2005, based on various parliamentary and independent reviews, momentum had gathered for a substantially enhanced role for Canada in international democracy assistance. **A proposal for a new Canadian institution dedicated to this purpose** was put forward by prominent advocates, including Thomas Axworthy and Les Campbell. CIDA brought together its governance programming in a new Office for Democratic Governance (ODA) in 2006. In its first years, the Harper minority government produced an ambitious report (*Advancing Canada’s Role in International Support for Democratic Development, 2007*) recommending several new arms-length agencies, notably a Canadian foundation for democracy support with a focus on assisting multiparty democracy and emphasizing research on effective democracy development assistance. During this time, Rights & Democracy and the Parliamentary Centre submitted proposals to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID) for larger roles for themselves in the area of democracy assistance. In **2009, the government-appointed advisory panel recommended the implementation of a centre for multiparty and parliamentary democracy, with a parliamentary mandate.**

Even as momentum appeared to be building, the tide was shifting. CIDA’s ODA was closed in 2009 and DFAT’s Democracy Office was folded into the Francophonie and Commonwealth division. The Democracy Council, a forum for discussion and collaboration among Canadian democracy promotion agencies, was abandoned. There was no follow-up to the advisory panel’s recommendations on the creation of a Canadian democracy promotion agency. Rights & Democracy was dissolved and the Parliamentary Centre, the Forum of Federations, CANADEM and the International Development Research Centre saw radical cuts to their funding. Many Canadian experts left Canada to seek employment with American or international organizations. Academic and political analysts identified a shift in Canadian policy (Burron 2011, Legler 2012, Fenton 2007), noting an increasing integration of Canada’s instruments of democracy promotion with those of the US (Fenton 2009) and an ideological shift wherein “Canada is subordinating its overall approach to democracy promotion to foreign policy objectives ...[to use] democracy promotion as a rationale for advancing unrelated security objectives and commercial interests...” (Burron 2011).

Lessons from current Canadian engagement in democracy assistance

Canadian engagement in support of democracy assistance in recent years has spanned a number of fields, from promoting media independence, to political party assistance, legislative strengthening and civil society support, as well as large-scale international electoral observation missions.

Outside of domestic institutional and political struggles, Canada’s experience on the ground has paralleled that of other countries in many cases. In Afghanistan in particular, Canada sought to address the social and political dimensions of democracy, but fell short of achieving objectives in justice and security sector reforms. Most notably, efforts to promote the instruments of representative democracy have not borne fruit and Afghan elections remain largely symbolic. The Afghan experience in particular exemplifies the need to develop democracy programs based on comprehensive assessments of a socio-economic and political analysis in each country of

engagement, especially in such cases where poverty, low levels of education, pervasive access to military weaponry, and deep ethnic and social cleavages exist.

During the workshop, some speakers drew on the Afghan example to highlight a number of aspects of Canada's current/recent approach to democracy assistance. For one, some assess that the tools of Canadian democracy assistance are outdated. Electoral observation, for one, may be of limited utility and offer little information in contexts where complex cultural factors and language barriers are poorly understood by outsiders. This is a contested viewpoint with a substantial amount of professional and academic literature behind it. Others suggest that investing in independent media or many activities to promote women parliamentarians are useful but primarily serve an existing elite and should be reviewed. Finally, perception of project design and implementation play a significant role in successful outcomes, because the perception of interventionism is toxic to democracy support activities. While hard cases such as Afghanistan and Haiti are challenging, they also offer insight into paths for improvement. Democracy assistance often targets the most difficult cases and cannot be expected to return the same kinds of dividends as in less-troubled states.

A number of speakers raised the importance of the social and economic dimensions of democracy. Democracy must be viewed as an integral part of the interconnected dynamics of development. In particular, economic growth and distribution of benefits to the population, as well as food security, access to health services and education opportunities are intimately tied to functioning democratic institutions. This relationship should remain at the forefront of objectives during the design of democracy assistance programs.

PART II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTING INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE ABROAD

What is Canada's value-added in this field?

Canada has numerous areas where it brings a distinct strength to this area of international aid:

Historical and institutional:

- **Multiculturalism:** Canadian experience with various models of inclusive governance provides a basis of lived-experience. With its federal model and since the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy, Canada has progressively enhanced inclusive governance at local, provincial and federal levels. The national experience has contributed to outcomes that a critical in other societies, especially post-conflict or otherwise divided states. Notably, multiculturalism is attributed with fostering a sense of belonging, encouraging cross-cultural understanding, developing mutual respect and common values and providing a normative framework for managing difference (Fleras 2009, GoC).
- **Electoral legal frameworks and administration:** Credible and inclusive elections are at the heart of vertical and horizontal inclusiveness. Canada's record in electoral administration is one of the most respected in the world. The reputation is based on both values and institutions. Canadian elections have a unique history of inclusiveness because they are predicated on reducing barriers to access and proactively taking responsibility for registering, informing and engaging voters. The institutions governing and administering elections are recognized for their impartiality, professionalism and efficiency. Until it was curtailed in recent years following the Fair Elections Act and budget cuts, Elections Canada was integrally engaged in sharing this technical expertise abroad.
- **Parliamentary and Federal Institutions:** Canadian institutions have extensive experience working in support of stronger parliamentary federal institutions. The Parliamentary Centre supports assessment, strategic planning and training as well as research and networking channels. The Forum of Federations is an international governance organization founded by Canada to offer a learning network on governance challenges in multi-level democracies. The National Judicial Institute of Canada is involved in training judges and supporting anti-corruption programs.

Cultural:

- Diplomatic history of Canadian leadership in **negotiation and conflict mediation** is another strength in this area. Deepening inclusive governance involves overcoming internal conflicts and barriers that result in exclusion, often through facilitated dialogue, negotiation or meditation. For example, Canada has played key roles in truth and reconciliation work in Guatemala and Honduras and several Canadians have served as experts to the UN Secretary General's Standby Team of Mediation Experts.
- Democracy assistance relies on long-term, trusted relationships, both institutional and interpersonal. Canada's corps of respected and **experienced professionals** in many areas of inclusive governance are among the leading experts worldwide, many having spent decades working with the American or UN agencies in this area. CANADEM maintains a register of hundreds of technical and parliament experts.

- As a **middle-power**, Canadian aid to inclusive systems of governance may be more readily accepted by partner countries. Governance is a sensitive and sovereign field in any state. **Trust in Canadian work** in this area may be bolstered by the lack of colonial and/or imperial histories of other donor states. Likewise, Canada has consistently grounded governance assistance in human rights rather than neo-liberal economics and/or national security priorities.

Strategic partnerships:

- Canada is able to leverage unique partnerships through its memberships in both the **Francophonie** and the **Commonwealth**. Membership in both organizations commits Canada to the support of democracy and human rights. The organizations offer various channels to pursue support for inclusive governance. Within the Francophonie, these may include the Parliamentary Assembly, the Montreal-based Association of Francophone Universities and International Association of French-speaking Mayors. *Within the Commonwealth, we may look to engaging the Secretariat or accredited partner organizations.*
- Canada has played a uniquely active role in supporting democracy through **Organisation of American States (OAS)** since becoming a member, over 25 years ago. Shortly after joining as a full member, Canada was instrumental in the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, which provides support for the strengthening and consolidation of democratic processes and institutions in OAS member states (World View 2000).
- Unlike the US, Canada is a member of **International IDEA**, one of the premier international organizations supporting work in this field. In particular, IDEA's mandate to connect research with real-world experience could support a Canadian focus on research-based innovation in the field of inclusive governance.
- Canada is deeply engaged in other United Nations (such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UN Women) and provide, non-Canadian NGO, such as with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

Supporting inclusive governance abroad: A renewed Canadian engagement

Institutional Leadership

Canada is home to a number of highly-respected organizations competent and specialized in diverse sub-fields of global support to inclusive governance. Canada also channels much of its support in this area through international organizations, such as UNDP and International IDEA. Finally, Canada also funds various standalone projects through specialized (primarily American) organizations, such as NDI and IFES. Within Global Affairs, coordination and leadership for this area falls under the Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion's Democracy Unit.

The objective in defining implementation roles going forward reflects the following imperatives:

- Maximizing the strengths of existing organizations active in priority areas

- Filling institutional implementation gaps to meet priority goals
- Advocating on the international stage for inclusive governance goals

In order to achieve these goals, the Canadian government should consider creating a **dedicated, (semi-)autonomous organization with sustained core funding**. The mandate of such a body would be to coordinate, implement and advocate for the promotion of inclusive governance abroad. It may report to parliament.

There are several reasons that these functions would be best served by a distinct organization rather than undertaken by existing state or non-state agencies. With a mandate solely focused on inclusive governance, such an organization could better target programmatic responses based on multi-sector assessments of partner countries, and unite specialized expertise. It would be able to facilitate the coordination of activities among other Canadian organizations specializing in sub-fields of inclusive governance as well as with international organizations. Where programmatic priorities are identified that fall outside the mandates of existing Canadian organizations, a specialized body may directly implement activities. A dedicated body would have the time and resources required to develop programs in a researched and participatory manner, including consulting international and host country stakeholders in project design, drawing on new research and ensuring adapted evaluation tools. A distinct organization may dedicate itself to advocating the issue and raising the profile of inclusive governance, as well as invest in identifying complementary funding opportunities and specific partnerships.

An autonomous agency also has distinct structural benefits. In ensuring autonomy of its agencies, Canada can defend the rights-based ideology and build trust and respect in the countries where it engages. Organizational autonomy allows governance programs to enjoy multi-party support in Parliament. Finally, it is widely recognized that democracy assistance is a long-term investment whose impact cannot be effectively measured on a year-to-year basis, especially as it relates to evolving values of increased social and political inclusivity. It is therefore vital that the leadership of Canada's activities in this area be shielded from fluctuating political trends and political shifts in Parliament. Likewise, an independent organization with long-term funding is better able to innovate, be responsive and flexible to unique cases and take necessary program risks that are often implicit in working in governance fields.

Such an institution would differ from Rights and Democracy in several ways. First, it would emphasize coordination and rapid response by leveraging existing institutional strengths. Second, a core aspect of its mandate would be to ensure inclusive processes in the design, implementation and evaluation of programs, including drawing on research and consultation processes. It would serve as a mouthpiece for advocating inclusivity as a value across Canada's multilateral engagements and strategic partnerships in this field. Finally, it would serve as a clearinghouse for specialized expertise and innovative program initiatives in priority areas that are currently non-existent or underserved, such as electoral administration, women's inclusion, indigenous rights and multicultural governance.

Guiding values and approach

Any engagement in the area of democracy or inclusive governance should respect a number of general principles:

- **Clarity.** Policymakers need to be clear about defining the objective and the challenge, the needs and Canadian capabilities. This implies establishing priorities sub-fields of inclusive governance

as well establishing clear criteria for program and country selection (see below). We need to be flexible to respond to needs that arise and seek avenues for sustainability.

- **Rights-based:** Distinguishing it from its counterparts, the Canadian approach is based on the belief that respect for individual human rights is the foundation for any civil, political, social or economic agenda. This approach underpins an inherently holistic vision of democracy objectives and outcomes, and enables sustainable and locally-driven engagement in outcomes.
- **Diversity:** Canada's general experience in engaging with issues of inclusivity such as indigenous peoples, women's participation and multicultural communities serves as an anchor to any work abroad. While these issues are still very much current domestic policy debates, the depth of national debate and experience contribute to Canada's unique perspective on inclusive democracy.
- **Responsive, Research-based, Innovation-driven:** Recognizing that democracy assistance is an emerging and often conflicted policy-field, Canada has placed a unique emphasis on actively supporting and integrating research into democracy assistance, both in designing programs as well as contributing to global understanding and improvement of the field of democracy assistance as a whole. Likewise, past evaluations of the sector have recognized the need for continual professional development within the corps of the Canadian agencies managing democracy promotion programs, to support cutting-edge and responsive programming.
- **Multi-sectoral:** Drawing on the rights-based approach, Canada has consistently viewed democracy from a systemic perspective, rather than focus on its component parts. The emphasis on governance and long-term support to select countries is a notable advantage to the Canadian approach.
- **Financially stable, Programmatically cost-effective:** Secure, long-term financial backing is vital to trust-based, innovative and often-incremental work in the field of inclusive democracy. Canada may consider following the model of the National Endowment for Democracy, which benefits from a line-item in the annual US Congressional Budget. For example, a minimal 5-year, \$50 million commitment, renewable upon evaluation, may be envisioned. Stable core-funding is important, but innovative governance may also be cost-effective. In the past, Canada achieved important successes and gained international respect and recognition for programs that represented "barely more than a rounding error in the international assistance envelope" (Schmitz 2013). Future programs may follow a similar model, although the distinct cost implication must be noted between programs directly engage wide-scale vertical inclusiveness (i.e. community consultations, education and outreach, constituent relations, etc.) and those that emphasize horizontal, institutional strengthening programs.

Inclusion as process and outcome

Inclusivity is both a process and an outcome. To achieve the objectives of inclusive governance, we must pinpoint where inclusive processes can inform and guide programs, as well as define the nature of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'.

Regarding inclusion as a process, the importance of **local leadership and accountability to local beneficiaries** should be stressed. These are at the heart of a truly *inclusive approach to inclusive governance*. Although the recommendations were never implemented, the 2009 Advisory Panel's findings on the "absolute necessity for local ownership or authorship of democratic programming" set Canada on a valuable course. Three key areas include:

- **Inclusive program design.** To take root, governance programs require local ownership, which starts at the needs assessment and design phase. This includes local consultation and validation, a strong research basis (past country- and sectoral-experience), avoiding copy-paste programming between countries and flexibility/negotiation to harmonize project design between multiple stakeholders.
- **Inclusive program implementation.** Inclusive program implementation implies emphasizing process as well as product and involving stakeholders on the roll-out of activities, being responsive and adaptable to changing contexts. Program approaches focus on advising, coaching and mentoring rather than on direct service delivery. Responsibility for outcomes is shared.
- **Inclusive program evaluation.** Program evaluation offers opportunities for feedback from host country stakeholders. Sufficient resources should be allocated to monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation reports should be made accessible, lessons-learned should be widely shared.

Determining inclusion as an objective and an outcome of assistance programs begins by asking “*Who should be included and who is currently left out?*” Inclusive governance reflects both **descriptive (i.e., demographic) and substantive (i.e., ideological) representation**. Substantive representation based on political ideology is primarily channeled through party politics and institutionally determined by electoral system choices. Substantive representation is also tied to demographics and adapts and evolves as formerly excluded and marginalized demographics are increasingly brought into political dialogue and elected bodies (i.e., as more women are elected to office, women’s policy issues are more frequently addressed in government). As discussed above, inclusive governance operates both vertically and horizontally. Some aspects of inclusion are governed or guided by national and international laws, convention and targets. Other times, understanding exclusion is based on country-specific historical context or ethical considerations.

The table below summarizes some globally excluded and marginalized populations that may be emphasized under this umbrella, as well as examples of methods to enhance their inclusion in governance systems:

Frequently excluded groups	Sample approaches to enhance descriptive representation	Sample approaches to enhance substantive representation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Women ▪ Youth ▪ People living with handicaps ▪ Indigenous communities ▪ Religious minorities ▪ Ethnic minorities ▪ Displaced persons and refugees ▪ Linguistic or cultural minorities ▪ LGBTQ populations ▪ People living in poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Constitutional and other legal protections against discrimination ▪ Support to credible and inclusive electoral processes ▪ Support to adopt or reform electoral systems ▪ Temporary special measures and affirmative action, voluntary party quotas ▪ Removal of administrative barriers and procedural review ▪ Targeted candidate and MP trainings, sponsorship, mentorships, exchange programs ▪ Special commissions or targeted agencies to address inequality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Affinity-based parliamentary caucuses and special wings ▪ Party platform development and research ▪ Constituent outreach advising ▪ MP fact-finding missions and delegations ▪ Public debates and fora ▪ Civic education ▪ Civic advocate training ▪ Training professional media

It is also essential to discuss another critical but distinct group of ‘marginalized’ voices: political opposition. Political opposition is not excluded on the same basis as the groups listed above: they are (generally) not the victims of historic social or cultural repression and are not protected under human rights laws. However, inclusive governance implies multi-partisanship, from multi-party elections to structures of governance that allow for multi-partisan checks and balances. Where multi-partisan politics fail, the foundations of democracy and peace are threatened. Although the institutional mechanisms of democracy may be impartial, opposition groups in semi-democratic or authoritarian states face unique obstacles and barriers to gaining voice. Experience shows that if these are left unaddressed, incumbent parties may revert to *de facto* single-party governance, citizens may become disaffected and apathetic, and opposition parties increasingly reject democratic institutions and may instead pursue radical tactics of violent and non-violent regime change through extra-institutional means (Bardall 2016). Therefore, it is critical that strategies of inclusive governance incorporate provisions for addressing the roots and effects of uneven political playing fields, supporting multi-partisanship, enhancing the capacity of professional political parties and improving publically-available political information. Likewise, technical electoral assistance and professional electoral observation remain core components of assistance to inclusive governance.

Program targeting

Defining where to invest Canada's energy and resources will determine the effectiveness of its programming. There are numerous criteria that can be taken into consideration in this determination.

Regime type: Different degrees of existing political opening require different program approaches and resources. Canadian policymakers may consider targeting engagement according to specific regime type (for example: focusing on 2nd or 3rd generation hybrid states, states experiencing democratic backsliding, semi-authoritarian states looking to reform or implement recent legal provisions for inclusivity, etc.). It may explicitly exclude some states (e.g., failed states, closed authoritarian regimes, pariah states, middle-income democracies, etc.).

Subfield specializations: Canadian policy may consider enhancing existing or developing new subfields of activity. For example, established Canadian institutional expertise in the fields of federalism, parliamentary strengthening, electoral administration and observation may be bolstered. Other areas of unique strength to Canada may be developed as specific area-concentrations. Examples worthy of consideration include women's participation, indigenous rights, multiculturalism and inclusive multi-partisanship. Some subfields may be de-emphasized, such as logistical support and commodity purchases.

Historic and strategic ties: Program targeting may draw on historic and institutional ties, such as with the Commonwealth and la *Francophonie*. It may emphasize coordination with other bilateral and international states, for example by working in states where Canada has uniquely constructive ties, such as Cuba. Likewise Canada has constructive relationships with certain diasporas and a strong record of hosting out-of-country voting (ex, South Sudan and Irak) which contributes a unifying effect in engaging diasporas in peace processes. Similarly, Canada's special relationship with Syrian refugees could play a role in supporting the peace process and eventual elections.

Good-faith engagement: Political will underpins most change in democratic governance. Canada should only commit to engaging where there is credible evidence of good-faith commitment to reform and opening, either by the state or by other stakeholders in the democratic process.

Further findings

Several thematic break-out groups were held during the workshop and provided the additional findings:

❖ Women and Political Participation

Worldwide, women are the most consistently underrepresented and excluded populations in governance institutions and processes. Supporting women's public participation and political inclusion should be a critical objective of Canada's contribution to international democracy assistance, particularly in light of the current government's emphasis on feminism. We should **prioritize gender equality across all political support programs and increase targeted standalone projects in this field**. Political inclusiveness is a basic component of development, peace and justice and offers a proven return on investment. Gender equality in civic leadership results in lower levels of state corruption and greater emphasis on conflict resolution and on socio-

economic policy improving the lives of women, children and other disadvantaged groups. Themes and objectives should include:

- **Achieving and going beyond descriptive representation:** Achieving a “critical mass” of women in elected bodies remains a core goal and should remain a focus of aid investment, including supporting the appropriate design of electoral quotas. However it is also important to look beyond numbers and emphasize substantive contributions of women in public life. Examples include offering assistance programs that train and provide mentoring opportunities to women aspirants and candidates, working with women in parliament and other elected offices to design and advance their policies, establishing women’s caucuses and supporting constituents outreach. Likewise, civic and voter education activities build awareness and encourage women’s participation as voters. Technical guidance to electoral commissions lowers barriers and obstacles for women’s access to polls. Advocacy and sensitization measures call on political parties, governments and others to take necessary measures to reach the goals of their national action plans and international commitments for women’s participation in public office. Still other measures support legal reform initiatives to abolish discriminatory laws and encourage supportive legal frameworks, or to reduce violence against women in politics.
- **Beyond patriarchal institutions:** Inserting women into institutions with embedded systems of patriarchy fails to address the roots of exclusion and may reproduce the patriarchal structures that place women in subordinate positions. In designing new approaches at the country-level, a power-analysis approach should be used to identify spaces of change for women’s political participation as well as identifying opportunities where women are proactively engaging to surmount patriarchal constraints. This may reflect engaging with institutions that most frequently reproduce state-patriarchy (schools, religious institutions and media) as well as legal discriminations and systems (including electoral system design).
- **Beyond substantive representation:** Looking even further, foreign aid may engage the broader forms of politics that shape gender inequality and injustice within societies and hinder inclusive political participation. This type of approach would focus on women’s political roles during critical moments of state formation and reform, and the role of both formal and informal institutions and spaces, such as village councils, shuras, tribal structures, and associations. It would leverage the interests, incentives and ideas of different actors that shape the prospects for political inclusion and the promotion of gender equality within different spaces.
- **Gender, not “women”:** Aid should reframe patriarchy as an issue for everyone (not a “women’s issue”) and emphasize the cross-cutting importance of gender equality for other areas, especially human rights and economic development.
- **Empowerment:** We have traditionally looked at women’s political participation as an indicator of democratic health. This should change to focus on women’s political and civic empowerment as the goal in and of itself.
- **Accompanying change:** Women’s political participation often follows generational patterns and is currently undergoing a generational shift in many parts of the world (i.e., post-Communist generational shift, etc.). Similarly, major legislative changes (such as the introduction of a quota) have varying impacts over the course of time and need to be continually revisited. It is important to understand changes in the drivers of political participation between generations and over the life-span of key legislation.
- **Looking inwards to address patriarchal practices in traditional development aid:** International democracy assistance as a field of practice is a historically male-dominated

profession. Short-term electoral exigencies often conflict with longer-term gender objectives. Assistance structures, values and norms are not gender-sensitive and indirect structures of accountability for gender objectives in democracy projects often isolate and deprioritize them. Dangerous locations, long hours, frequent relocations from election to election and non-family hardship postings are real barriers to entry or advancement for women in the profession, reinforcing the cycle in the creation and implementation of policy in this area. In re-defining its engagement in this area, Canada should proactively work to redefine gender balance in the field of practice and hold democracy assistance providers accountable to meeting gender goals both in projects and in internal structures. (recommendations derived from Rivas and Bardall, November 2016).

❖ Indigenous Rights and Political Inclusion²

Long overlooked and peppered with a history of injustice and failure, the rights of indigenous peoples are an emerging area in the body of international rights and practice. Canada's indigenous peoples and other Canadian advocates of indigenous rights may contribute to supporting inclusive governance for indigenous peoples abroad by furthering all articles of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A/RES/61/295), and specifically those articles reflecting issues of governance, notably:

- Supporting the rights and institutions empowering indigenous peoples to “participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.” (Art 18)
- Assisting procedures to enable and ensure that “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them (Art 19)
- Defining approaches to maintain and strengthen distinct political, legal and cultural institutions while retaining the right to participate fully (if they so choose) in the life of the State and to identify State mechanisms for redress (Art. 5)
- Assist States to “establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.

❖ Democracy Support in Deeply Divided Societies

Security is the most important precondition for democracy. Deeply divided societies require time to heal and to recover from legacies of mistrust. They also deserve extra attention in program planning, notably:

- drawing on deep sociological approaches to understanding the historical roots of conflict

² Note : this topic was discussed outside of the workshop rather than during a session.

- emphasizing national dialogue and ownership in defining new institutions, laws and policies that address conflicted topics
- recognizing and adapting to widely varying capacity between divided states (e.g. Afghanistan v. Somalia).
- recognizing that time, not (just) money, may most needed for healing deep divisions. Well-targeted, small-scale initiatives, niche focus, managed expectations are important when working in these states.

❖ Promoting Tolerance in a Sectarian Age

Religion and politics are a famously dangerous mix. Promoting tolerance in a sectarian age is more important than ever because the religious divides are pronounced and growing form of conflictual division in many parts of the world. Modern western democracy emerged from two centuries of religious wars before European powers agreed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Lessons for peace and democracy in the modern age start with tolerance and the respect for diversity of opinion around God. Democracy is rooted in civility ('agreeing to disagree'). There must be an agreement about the 'rules of the game' in order to respect this diversity and accept defeat in turn. In some cases, religious extremism is a byproduct of poverty and failed state services, for example, in Pakistan where families often send their children to religious schools in the absence of more moderate public education. A notable challenge to promoting inclusion are states such as Saudi Arabia, that actively finance imams with intolerant messages. Programmatically, states with secular state traditions often struggle to work with faith-based organizations and to understand faith-based peace. In any circumstance, it is extremely difficult to find openings to promote tolerance in contexts of deep, faith-based divisions.

Next steps

A first step in this process is to **re-visit the extensive progress already made** towards this goal a decade ago and map the landscape of need and opportunity for future action. Specifically, Parliament should **revisit the Recommendation 15 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Report: "Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development" and the related advisory panel findings**. The review would serve to update the findings and approach outlined in the initial report of the advisory panel on the creation of a Canadian Centre for Advancing Democracy or 'Democracy Canada'.

Subsequently, a **targeted consultation process** may be triggered (such as that organized by the Institute for Research in Public Policy in 2004) in partnership with Canadian policymakers, nongovernmental institutes, universities and experts, as well as with specialized foreign organizations (in 2004, the consultation process was supported by the US-based National Democratic Institute and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, a Stockholm-based international organization of which Canada is a member). This consultation would examine options for meeting Canada's objectives in this area, including the option to create an independent, multi-party body, reporting to Parliament, with the mission to provide assistance to countries seeking to enhance democratic processes and institutions. At the time of writing (October 2016), consultations are underway.

Conclusion

Canada has a unique role to play in supporting democracy in the world. Canada's exceptional national experience and its skilled corps of experts should work on Canada's behalf towards this goal. It is time to re-establish Canada as a world leader in supporting democracy and human rights.

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