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  Taylor N. Trummel
We are pleased to present the ninth edition of the Centre for International Policy Studies’ graduate student journal *Potentia: Journal of Public and International Affairs*.

This year’s publication focuses on the theme “Navigating Power in Global Governance and International Affairs,” which speaks to the broader contemporary transformations that have reshaped the operational environment of local political actors and societal groups over the course of the past decade.

The variety of topics discussed by this year’s contributors highlight the emerging opportunities and challenges presented in the field of global governance that range from the legitimacy of non-state actors engaged in grassroots resistance movements, to what post 9/11 policy implications entail for migrant securitization, to a fundamental (re)configuration of what we conceptualize as “public space” in a world that privileges the direct and intimate connection facilitated by a social media landscape over the traditional institutional power structures that have dictated and shaped our politics.

We would like to thank our editorial board for their hard work and dedication over the past few months. Their critical insight and expertise on a vast range of political issues allowed us to produce a comprehensive publication on various contemporary topics that we hope you enjoy. Jose, Ania, Xavier, Kirill, Michael, Juan, Maryam, Stefanie, Andre, and Connor, it was a pleasure to work with you all.

Our endless gratitude goes to Rita Abrahamsen (CIPS Director), Stéphanie Plante (CIPS Program Coordinator), and Ruth Bradley-St-Cyr (CIPS Senior Editor). Without your support and guidance this publication would not have been possible.

Finally, we thank you, the reader, for your interest in *Potentia*. We hope this modest edition generates as much critical thought and discussion for you as it has for us.

Happy reading!

Anushua Nag & Sheila Mandegar
Editors-in-chief, 2018–2019

Il nous fait plaisir de présenter la neuvième édition de la revue étudiante du Centre d’études en politiques internationales, *Potentia: Revue des affaires publiques et internationales*.

La publication de cette année s’articule autour du thème suivant: « Pouvoir, gouvernance et affaires internationales ». Essentiellement, ce thème appelle à une exploration des transformations contemporaines plus larges qui ont remodelé l’environnement opérationnel des acteurs politiques locaux et des groupes sociaux au cours de la dernière décennie.

La variété des sujets abordés par les intervenants de cette année met en lumière les possibilités et les défis émergents dans le domaine de la gouvernance mondiale, allant de la légitimité des acteurs non étatiques engagés dans des mouvements de résistance à la base, aux implications politiques de l’après-11 septembre pour la sécurisation de l’immigration, à la (re)configuration fondamentale de ce que nous définissons comme « espace public » dans un monde qui favorise le lien direct et étroit facilité par les réseaux sociaux plutôt que les structures institutionnelles traditionnelles qui ont structuré et formé nos politiques publiques.

Nous aimerions remercier notre comité de rédaction pour leur travail acharné et leur dévouement au cours des derniers mois. Leur perspicacité critique et leur expertise sur une vaste gamme de questions politiques nous ont permis de produire une publication complète sur divers sujets contemporains que nous espérons que vous apprécierez. Jose, Ania, Xavier, Kirill, Michael, Juan, Maryam, Stefanie, Andre et Connor, ce fut un plaisir de travailler avec vous tous.

Nous remercions infiniment Rita Abrahamsen (directrice de la CIPS), Stéphanie Plante (coordonnatrice du programme de la CIPS) et Ruth Bradley-St-Cyr (rédactrice en chef de la CIPS), sans qui cette publication n’aurait pas été possible.

Enfin, nous tenons à remercier nos lecteurs pour l’intérêt témoigné envers *Potentia*. Nous espérons que les articles porteront à réflexion et engendreront des discussions au sujet des problèmes actuels de gouvernance internationale.

Bonne lecture!

Anushua Nag et Sheila Mandegar
Rédactrices-en-chef, 2018–2019
Anushua Nag a récemment complété sa maîtrise à l’École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa (ÉSAPI). Elle détient un baccalauréat en droit de l’Université de Montréal et un juris doctor de l’Osgoode Hall Law School. Après avoir pratiqué le droit en pratique privée, Anushua s’est tournée vers les études supérieures pour explorer davantage ses intérêts de recherche, soit les droits et libertés fondamentaux dans les domaines de l’immigration et du droit criminel. Dans son projet de maîtrise, elle s’est attardée à l’interprétation de la liberté religieuse adoptée par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’objectif de déterminer comment cette interprétation se distingue ou se rapproche de celle avancée dans la théorie du pluralisme culturel. Anushua travaille présentement au Sénat du Canada à titre d’adjointe de recherche parlementaire.

Sheila Mandegar recently completed her Master’s degree at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Carleton University. Her thesis examines how the widespread circulation of ISIS execution videos appeal to their distant spectators by theorizing how the formal qualities of their visual communicative logic shape their aesthetic form. By focusing on the aesthetic rather than merely evidentiary qualities of these beheading videos, she draws out a particular kind of transnational affective community in which the visual grammar of the violence serves as not only a collective visual memory of retributive justice for the militant group, but also functions as a discursive space that simultaneously works to promote “new norms of heroic subjectivity” for the militant subject and the audiences that it seeks to address. She (re)conceptualizes the ontological meanings of these videos as an ongoing attempt to locate the sense of self through visual narratives that are perpetually claimed, fought for, and performed through the logic of display. She currently works at the Department of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada.

José Manuel is a PhD candidate at the University of Ottawa’s School of Political Studies. His research focuses on transnational climate change governance with a focus on Latin American cities. José Manuel has collaborated in research projects with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United Nations, and the Latin American Union of Municipalities (UIM). His professional experience also includes the design and coordination of environmental cooperation projects and academic collaborations, developed during his time as International Cooperation Coordinator at the Foreignt Affairs Office of the State of Jalisco, Mexico; International Organizations Coordinator at the University of Guadalajara; as well as General Coordinator of FIDALE, a Mexican-Spanish NGO.

Ania Gruszewski est candidate à la maîtrise à l’École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa. Née à Fredericton au Nouveau Brunswick, elle a déménagé à Ottawa pour compléter des études en éthique à l’Université d’Ottawa et pour occuper un poste à la Chambre des communes. Elle a passé plusieurs années à travailler au sein du parlement canadien. Cette expérience explique son intérêt pour les politiques fédérales et internationales. En ce qui concerne ses intérêts de recherche, Anna se penche sur les grandes questions philosophiques et politiques contemporaines, telle que la question des réfugiés et de l’engagement démocratique.

Xavier Léger Guest is a recent graduate of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, and holds a BA in Political Science from McGill University. Originally from Montreal, Xavier has lived abroad for a number of years, including in the U.S. and Tunisia. His research interests include Middle East and North African politics, Canadian immigration policy, and postcolonial movements. He currently works in evaluation at Global Affairs Canada.

Kirill Abbakumov is a Master’s candidate at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the University of Calgary. His Master’s thesis focuses on post-Soviet Russian foreign policy and the role of historical national identity. As a young professional, he has held various positions with the U.S. and Canadian federal governments in Calgary and Ottawa, as well as having worked abroad in Washington D.C. and Riga, Latvia. Kirill’s hobbies include literature, cinematography, and the great outdoors.
Michael P. A. Murphy is a PhD candidate in International Relations and an Associate Fellow at the Research Unit for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning at the University of Ottawa. His research interests include theologies of the international, quantum social theory, and critical security studies. He is currently the assistant to the editor of Security Dialogue. His recent work has been published in the Journal of Political Power, the Canadian Political Science Review, the Journal of Political Science Education, the Journal of Museum Education, and Sport in Society. His research is supported by a doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Juan David Roldan est candidat à la maîtrise à l’École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa. Il détient un baccalauréat en science politique de l’Université de Montréal. Au cours de ses études, il a complété un échange à l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris (IEP), un stage à Affaires Mondiales Canada et un stage à la Délégation générale du Québec à Mexico. En ce qui concerne ses intérêts de recherche, Juan se penche sur la sociologie des institutions chargées de conduire la politique étrangère, au Canada et ailleurs dans le monde.

Maryam Saba is a Master’s candidate at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Her interest in international affairs stems from her past work in the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation in Pakistan, where she provided technical assistance for projects focusing on the facilitation of regional trade and growth of exports to the European Union. Her research interests include international trade, Canadian immigration policy, and South-East Asian politics.

Stéfanie Morris is a second-year Master’s candidate at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Previously she lived in Utah and received a Bachelor’s in Anthropology from Brigham Young University, during which time she conducted an ethnographic study in India on migration and transnational families. Her current research is on the private sponsorship of refugees in Canada. She also works at Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada as an analyst.

Andre Tokarczyk is a Master’s student at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and holds a Bachelor with Honors in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from the University of Ottawa. His primary research interests include security and defence policy. His thesis focuses on the ethical dilemmas of fighting counterinsurgencies in foreign countries and examines how the ethics of war can be applied to counterinsurgency strategies.

Connor Morris is a student at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, with an interest in peace, security, and human rights. He grew up in Newmarket before moving to Hamilton to complete his degree in political science and sociology at McMaster University.
Abstract — Globalization has led to new ways in which state diplomacy is deployed. Traditionally operated by the central State, diplomatic action in international space leaves more and more room for local governments. In particular, cities are positioning themselves as legitimate actors in the development and implementation of foreign policy. Starting from the premise that globalization has allowed the emergence of city diplomacy, this article attempts to analyze the national and international legitimacy of the role of Quebec cities in international action.

National legitimacy is derived from cities’ status as local governments. Recognized as governments, they have access to the decision-makers who make foreign policies. Moreover, this same status — which is not founded in principles of international law — allows cities to take more idealistic and radical positions. It is this tension between these two realities that allows cities to play a role in international trade, immigration and refugee issues.

At the international level, the legitimacy of cities is reflected in the universalist and inclusive spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, the diplomatic action of cities finds international legitimacy due to the provincial and federal economic spinoffs arising out of the growth of foreign investment due to globalization. Thus, cities are pushed to stand out in order to attract to their areas international investments that benefit the entire country.

Keywords: globalization; diplomatic action; municipalities; cities; national legitimacy; international legitimacy

Résumé — La mondialisation a entrainé de nouvelles manières dont la diplomatie d’un État se déploie. Traditionnellement opérée par l’État central, l’action diplomatique dans l’espace internationale laisse de plus en plus de place aux gouvernements de proximité. En l’occurrence, les villes se positionnent comme acteur légitime dans l’élaboration et l’application de la politique étrangère. En partant du postulat que la mondialisation a permis l’émergence de la diplomatie des villes, ce texte tente d’analyser la légitimité nationale et internationale du rôle des villes québécoises dans l’action internationale.

La légitimité nationale se retrouve au sein de leur statut de gouvernement de proximité. Reconnues comme gouvernement, elles ont accès aux décideurs qui élaborent les politiques étrangères. De plus, ce même statut, n’étant pas sous le droit international, permet aux villes de prendre des positions plus idéalistes et radicales. C’est par ailleurs cette tension entre ces deux réalités qui permet aux villes de jouer un rôle dans les dossiers reliés aux commerces internationaux et ceux d’immigrations et de réfugiés.

Au niveau international, la légitimité des villes se retrouve dans l’esprit universaliste et inclusif rejoignant celui de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. De plus, l’action diplomatique des villes est légitime sur le plan international dû aux retombées économiques provinciale et fédérale stimulées par la croissance des investissements étrangers dus à la mondialisation. Ainsi, les villes sont poussées à se démarquer afin d’attirer sur leur territoire des investissements internationaux bénéfiques pour tout le pays.

Mots-clés : mondialisation; action diplomatique; municipalités; villes; légitimité nationale; légitimité internationale

* Étant en deuxième de maîtrise à l’école supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa, les recherches de Louis-Philippe Duhaime s’inscrivent dans le champ de la sociologie politique et des relations internationales. Ces travaux de maîtrise portent sur les théories transnationalistes et notamment les villes comme acteurs des relations internationales. Au doctorat, ces recherches seront redirigées vers l’impact de la mondialisation sur les individus selon une perspective de dualité urbaine et régionale.

* As a graduate student at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Louis-Philippe Duhaime’s research falls within the field of political sociology and international relations. His master’s research project focuses on transnationalism theories and in particular, cities as actors in international relations. At the doctoral level, his research will be redirected towards the impact of globalization on individuals from a dual urban and regional perspective.
Introduction

La scène internationale est en constante mutation en raison de l’influence de la mondialisation. Ce nouveau contexte a permis la mise à l’avant de nombreux acteurs étatiques et non étatiques. Les pays émergents du Sud ont su faire leur place, tout comme les acteurs non étatiques tels que les réseaux terroristes, les firmes internationales et les organisations non gouvernementales (Badie, 2016).

La mondialisation a mis en place « la revanche du local » (Badie, 2016). Le politique, par définition, ne peut se mondialiser, car il est bloqué par sa souveraineté étatique. Ainsi, l’individu, ne pouvant plus compter sur l’État pour l’accompagner dans ce nouveau monde globalisé, va se tourner vers certains acteurs locaux, notamment les villes (Badie).

Suivant la même logique, Benjamin Barber dresse le postulat que les États-nations ne peuvent répondre aux enjeux transfrontaliers comme les pandémies, les crises migratoires et le terrorisme (Barber, 2013). Selon lui, les enjeux environnementaux, sociaux et économiques passent dorénavant par les villes. Les récents événements internationaux touchant le Canada, notamment les négociations de l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) ainsi que l’arrivée de vagues de réfugiés, touchent les villes de manières directes et celles-ci ne restent pas indifférentes à ces enjeux. De plus en plus, elles s’affirment sans retenue et veulent se faire entendre (Union des municipalités du Québec, 2017).

Les acteurs locaux tels que les municipalités et les villes saisissent les opportunités les invitant à agir sur la scène internationale. Ce rapport entre les villes et la diplomatie est un phénomène présent tant dans les grandes villes mondiales, que celles du Canada. La diversification des enjeux et la connexion interétatique engendrée par la mondialisation amènent les différents paliers de gouvernement à travailler ensemble dans l’élaboration et l’application de la politique étrangère (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 512).

À travers l’analyse des différents axes que prend l’action internationale des villes, cet article explorera la légitimité de l’action internationale des municipalités québécoises. Ce texte s’articulera en trois sections : d’une part, la légitimité sera exprimée par les assises théoriques sur le surjet. D’une autre part, ce texte tentera d’expliquer la légitimité des municipalités sur la scène internationale par leurs actions tant à l’échelle nationale qu’à l’échelle internationale.

Assises théoriques

Les premiers auteurs à étudier les liens entre les politiques internes dans les relations internationales sont Ernst Haas ainsi que Karl Deutsh. Leurs travaux ont principalement porté sur l’intégration régionale au travers du concept de « spillover » découlant de l’approche néo fonctionnaliste. Cette théorie accorde une importance majeure aux dynamiques internes de l’État et à leurs répercussions à l’extérieur de ceux-ci par un effet d’engrenage (Haas, 1958).

D’autres théories, plus précises, ont analysé le lien entre les politiques internes des États et les relations internationales. Peter Katzenstein et Stephen Krasner ont ainsi travaillé sur les facteurs structurels dans le développement économique. Les deux auteurs ont conclu que les États doivent analyser sur un même pied d’égalité les politiques économiques internes et externes (Putnam, 1988, p. 431).

Bien que la diplomatie des villes soit un thème relativement nouveau, quelques ouvrages de référence portant sur le sujet ont été publiés dans les dernières années. John Rennie et Yeong-Hyun Kim (1999) ont publié l’ouvrage Globalization and the City dans lequel les auteurs distinguent trois aspects importants liant la mondialisation et les villes : l’économie mondiale, la culture mondialisée ainsi que la politique mondiale. Ainsi, la mondialisation est donc le point de départ des débats théoriques concernant la restructuration urbaine.

les grandes villes dans le contexte de la mondialisation. Taylor dresse le postulat que la mondialisation engendra un déplacement du regard du monde centré sur l’État-nation vers une vision dominée par les perspectives des villes.

Saskia Sassen (2006) démontre quant à elle dans Cities in a World Economy comment certaines villes se déploient dans l’espace transnational. Au travers de diverses caractéristiques sociales telles que la politique, l’économie ainsi que les frontières culturelles, elle analyse l’impact de la mondialisation sur les villes. Elle en conclut que les dernières décennies ont transformé certaines villes en centres économiques mondiaux.


Le rôle émergent des villes dans les relations internationales prend différentes directions. Certaines de ces relations se développent en de multiples réseaux internationaux. Tel en est le cas du réseau mondial des villes, Cité et Gouvernements Locaux Unis (CGLU), qui a comme mandat « d’être la voix unifiée et le défenseur de l’autonomie locale et régionale démocratique, promouvoir ses valeurs, ses objectifs et ses intérêts, au travers de la coopération entre les gouvernements locaux » (Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis, 2017).

D’un autre côté, certaines villes comme Montréal développent leurs relations internationales au travers différents réseaux, mais agissent également sur le plan diplomatique de manière autonome. Dans le cas de l’organisation Montréal internationale, la mission principale est « d’être le moteur économique du Grand Montréal pour attirer la richesse en provenance de l’étranger tout en accélérant la réussite de ses partenaires et de ses clients » (Montréal International, 2017c). L’exemple du CGLU et de Montréal International témoigne de la réalité, ou du moins, de la volonté des villes de prendre une place dans les relations internationales.

Les chercheurs et les acteurs ont ainsi développé de manière plus concrète la diplomatie des villes. Ce nouveau rôle diplomatique des gouvernements locaux prend différentes inclinaisons dans la littérature scientifique. Cependant, ces dernières partent du même constat selon lequel la globalisation et la mondialisation ont drastiquement modifié le rôle classique des États dans les relations internationales (Viltard, 2010).

Roger Van der Plujm a défini la diplomatie des villes comme étant « les institutions et processus par lesquels les villes engagent des relations avec des acteurs sur la scène internationale, dans l’intention de s’y représenter elles-mêmes, ainsi que leurs intérêts, et réciproquement » (Viltard, p. 598). D’une autre part, le CGLU a défini la diplomatie des villes ainsi :

L’outil des gouvernements locaux et de leurs associations en vue de la promotion de la cohésion sociale, de la prévention des conflits, de la résolution des conflits et de la reconstruction post-conflit, dans le but de créer un environnement stable dans lequel les citoyens peuvent vivre ensemble dans la paix, la démocratie et la prospérité (Viltard, p. 594).

Bien que ces deux définitions, données par des acteurs académiques et des acteurs locaux, ne résument pas à elles seules l’étendue des écrits sur le sujet, elles présentent les interprétations de ces deux catégories d’acteurs. La revue de littérature démontre que plusieurs définitions existent. Les termes de représentation, d’économie, de culture, de sécurité ainsi que de démocratie sont récurrents dans la définition de la diplomatie des villes. Les définitions mentionnées plus haut témoignent des différentes formes que prend la diplomatie des villes et sont reflétées dans les différents mandats que se donnent les acteurs de ce domaine.

Bien que les définitions proposées placent la diplomatie des villes dans une optique différente selon la problématique, la définition proposée par La Porte est la plus propice pour ce texte. Ainsi, La Porte propose une définition mettant l’accent sur deux composantes : l’acteur initial de l’action diplomatique doit au minimum être institutionnalisé ainsi qu’avoir des objectifs politiques. Ainsi, les acteurs doivent avoir une volonté d’influencer les décideurs centraux dans l’élaboration et dans l’application de politiques étrangères (La Porte, 2012).

L’action diplomatique des villes est considérée comme étant une discipline émergente en relations internationales. En partant du postulat que la mondialisation a permis l’émergence de la diplomatie des villes, ce
travail tentera d’analyser la légitimité internationale et nationale du rôle des villes québécoises sur la scène internationale.

Dans le contexte de ce texte, le terme légitimité réfère à la capacité des villes québécoises d’agir sur la scène internationale, et ce, sans réelle contrainte des paliers gouvernementaux supérieurs. Cette légitimité est analysée au travers l’internationalisation des villes tant à l’échelle internationale que nationale.

**Légitimité internationale**

La légitimité internationale du concept de diplomatie des villes s’inscrit précisément sur deux niveaux : l’un sur le caractère de proximité qu’ont les villes face aux citoyens, l’autre projette la relation entre les municipalités et les citoyens dans l’espace international, plus précisément comme reflet du droit universel. De plus, la légitimité internationale repose sur les retombées économiques que génèrent les villes.

**Esprit du droit international**

Selon Anthony Papisca (2008), la légitimité des actions des collectivités locales se trouve dans « la responsabilité de protéger les droits fondamentaux internationalement reconnus des personnes vivant dans une municipalité » (p. 33). La philosophie derrière ce concept présenté par Papisca est que les villes sont mieux positionnées que les États pour répondre aux objectifs de respect des droits individuels. Ceci se retrouve sous l’appellation du Droit des villes, un concept développé par Don Mitchell. Il s’agit d’unir les droits reconnus universellement à une forme de citoyenneté universelle, primant sur la citoyenneté individuelle (Mitchell, 2003).

Suivant le droit des villes, en ce qui a trait aux questions de cohésion sociale, de cohabitation multiculturelle et de citoyenneté plurielle, chaque individu a les mêmes droits et obtient les mêmes services municipaux, peu importe son statut par rapport à l’état fédéral ou provincial. Cette logique s’explique, selon Papisca, sous l’angle de la déconstruction des frontières. L’approche entre le gouvernement central et celui des collectivités locales est différente. D’un côté, l’État, bien que souverain, agit à l’intérieur même de ses frontières en pratiquant certaines discriminations quant au statut de l’individu. D’un autre côté, outre les limites politiques, les frontières d’une communauté locale sont beaucoup plus diffuses, voire même inexistantes. Dans cette optique, l’approche des collectivités locales se rapproche beaucoup plus d’un idéal de souveraineté, où celui-ci est défini par les personnes qui y vivent dans la communauté :

La souveraineté appartient au peuple parce que chacun de ses membres jouit de droits intrinsèques, et les droits fondamentaux doivent être respectés et protégés là où les gens vivent. La vocation d’inclusion de la ville correspond à la philosophie de la législation internationale : l’égalité de tous les hommes et l’interdiction de toute forme de discrimination. (Papisca, p. 43).

Ainsi, le caractère inclusif de l’approche des collectivités locales s’inscrit dans la philosophie d’une citoyenneté universelle et non, à l’inverse, d’une citoyenneté nationale fondée sur des principes d’exclusions. Cette approche témoigne de la mise à l’avant de l’être humain et de ses droits dans l’espace universel. Selon cette perspective, les collectivités locales sont celles répondant le mieux aux besoins des individus dans le contexte de la mondialisation.

Plusieurs initiatives existantes témoignent de la prise de conscience du rôle des collectivités locales dans l’espace international. Par exemple, l’article 2 de la Charte de Montréal annonce un parallèle trouvant sa source dans l’esprit même de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme proclamée par les Nations Unies :

La dignité de l’être humain ne peut être sauvegardée sans que soient constamment et collectivement combattues la pauvreté ainsi que toutes les formes de discrimination, notamment celles fondées sur l’origine ethnique ou nationale, la couleur, l’âge, la condition sociale, l’état civil, la langue, la religion, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle ou le handicap. (Ville de Montréal, 2006)

La portée universaliste de la Charte de Montréal rejoint l’esprit de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. L’article 2 de cette Charte insiste sur le fait que tous les êtres humains sont libres et égaux, sans égard à la nationalité :
Chacun peut se prévaloir de tous les droits et de toutes les libertés proclamées dans la présente Déclaration, sans distinction aucune, notamment de race, de couleur, de sexe, de langue, de religion, d'opinion politique ou de toute autre opinion, d'origine nationale ou sociale, de fortune, de naissance ou de toute autre situation. (Ville de Montréal, 2006)

Ainsi, c’est notamment par le caractère inclusif, ne se limitant pas à la citoyenneté, que les villes sont en mesure de se rapprocher de l’idéal universel des droits et libertés. Toutefois, étant donné que les chartes telles que celle de Montréal n’ont pas de pouvoir juridique strict, et que les États sont libres ou non de respecter le droit universel, l’application du droit par les villes sur le plan international est difficile. Néanmoins, l’esprit qu’elle dégage est un atout majeur pour les citoyens des villes dans l’espace international.

**Impacts économiques**


Dans *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* de Jane Jacobs, l’auteure Jane Jacobs (1985) affirme que ce sont les villes qui sont le véritable moteur économique des états. L’auteure présente son argument au travers d’une perspective historique remettant en question les théories économiques.

Ceci se rapporte à l’apport économique rattaché à la diplomatie des villes. Les bénéfices économiques ont un impact non seulement pour la ville, mais également pour le pays, tel que le démontre Montréal International.

Créé en 1998 à la suite du sommet de l’emploi, cet organisme à but non lucratif issu d’un partenariat public-privé a pour objectif la promotion de la ville de Montréal sur les marchés internationaux afin d’attirer les investissements étrangers et l’implantation d’organisations internationales à Montréal. À ce jour, Montréal International a contribué à la mise en place de projets d’investissements directs étrangers totalisant 13.5 milliards de dollars dans le Grand Montréal (Montréal International, 2017d).

Le Bureau des relations internationales de la ville de Montréal fonctionne sous le même raisonnement. De son côté, le Bureau a comme mission le développement de réseaux de relations avec différents organismes et institutions à travers le monde. De plus, il tient à se démarquer comme lieu d’accueil d’organisations internationales (Bureau des relations internationales, 2018). Avec 64 organisations internationales qui sont installées à Montréal, ceci représente plus de 10 000 travailleurs (Montréal International, 2017b).

Brenda Parkerson et J.A Saunders ont étudié la compétition entre les différentes villes du monde au travers du « branding ». Les villes misent beaucoup sur le marketing afin d’être des destinations touristiques et ainsi attirer les entreprises et organisations étrangères (Parkerson et Saunders). Selon Yves Viltard (2010) « l’attractivité et le rayonnement de la ville dépendent de sa capacité à s’impliquer dans de multiples réseaux et construire une image de marque internationale identifiable et positive, à forte valeur symbolique » (p. 601).

Sur le plan théorique, H. V. Savitch et Paul Kantor (2002) ont développé, selon une approche comparative, une catégorisation des différentes stratégies dans l’internationalisation des villes et la valorisation de celles-ci sur les marchés internationaux. Les deux auteurs s’intéressent à la relation entre la ville et les différents paliers de gouvernement dans la mise en place de la stratégie d’internationalisation des villes face à la mondialisation. Cette démarche s’inscrit dans la volonté de comprendre comment se forment les coalitions d’acteurs menant aux développements de stratégies d’internationalisation des villes : « In a world of global economic change and regional restructuring, cities are necessarily junior partners in a development game that is strongly shaped by forces over
Les deux auteurs dressent l’hypothèse suivante : il y a une corrélation entre les politiques urbaines et l’intervention intergouvernementale afin d’attirer les investissements étrangers.


L’exemple de la candidature de la ville de Montréal pour l’acquisition du siège social d’Amazon témoigne de cette dynamique : la métropole québécoise mise sur le « buzz » de la ville afin d’attirer d’importants investissements (Lortie, 2005). Premièrement, les arguments présentés par Montréal International, les dépositaires du projet, sont basés sur les valeurs et les vibrations de la société civile, tel que le témoignent les propos de l’ex-maire, Denis Coderre :

Indéniablement, Montréal fait partie des grandes métropoles du monde et a certainement tous les atouts pour attirer un tel projet. De l’espace urbain à développer, du talent qualifié grâce à un milieu universitaire et collégial stimulant et de hauts niveaux, un quartier de l’innovation et un écosystème en pleine effervescence, une diversité culturelle et linguistique, mais aussi un milieu de vie exceptionnel et sécuritaire, sans compter une touche européenne unique en Amérique, voilà ce que nous avons à offrir et qui ne se retrouve nulle part ailleurs. (Montréal International, 2017a)

Deuxièmement, en plus de mettre l’accent sur les atouts que lui procure la société civile, tel que la culture et les valeurs véhiculées par la population, la candidature de la ville de Montréal compte sur un appui gouvernemental important. Les avantages mis de l’avant font référence aux politiques sociales et économiques mises en place par le gouvernement provincial et fédéral. Par exemple, la candidature s’appuie sur la stabilité économique et politique afin d’attirer des travailleurs qualifiés plus rapidement. C’est ainsi qu’est née une collaboration entre le gouvernement du Québec et du Canada afin de faciliter les traitements de dossiers des travailleurs issus de l’immigration. De plus, Montréal mise sur les avantages fiscaux et les faibles coûts en énergie afin de séduire Amazon. En matière d’éducation, une compétence provinciale, la ville de Montréal mise sur la diversité de son bassin de formations professionnelles dans la création de main-d’œuvre de qualité, ce qui serait un atout important pour Amazon (Lortie, 2005). Les méthodes utilisées par la ville de Montréal pour la promotion de la métropole pour l’obtention du siège social d’Amazon démontrent l’influence qu’ont les institutions politiques et la société civile. L’apport économique que procurent les villes pour la province et le pays donne une légitimité à leurs actions à l’échelle internationale.

**Légitimité nationale**

La littérature scientifique analyse la politique étrangère canadienne sous divers angles, mais ne parle que très peu du rôle des acteurs interétatiques tels que les provinces canadiennes, ainsi que des villes canadiennes. Tant du côté de l’approche réaliste et libérale des relations internationales, que l’approche transnationaliste, les différentes théories analysent les décisions prises au sommet de l’État (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 510).

Bien que dans la littérature scientifique canadienne le rôle des acteurs gouvernementaux tel que les villes joue un rôle marginal, la réalité démontre que les villes canadiennes développent une plus grande autonomie ainsi qu’une influence sur le gouvernement fédéral (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 512). James Rosenau (1990) a théorisé cette dynamique au travers de deux concepts : celui de « sovereignty bound » et « sovereignty-free » (p. 36). Selon la vision de Rosenau basée sur le fait que le monde n’est plus un système international, mais bien multicentrique, le rôle des villes sur la scène mondiale se positionne comme acteur, entre la souveraineté étatique « sovereignty bound » ainsi que les autres acteurs considérés sans souveraineté « sovereignty-free», tels...

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1 « Dans un monde en mutation économique mondiale et en restructuration régionale, les villes sont nécessairement des partenaires juniors dans un jeu de développement fortement marqué par des forces sur lesquelles elles n’ont qu’un contrôle limité. » (traduction libre)
que les multinationales, les groupes ethniques, les agences bureaucratiques, les partis politiques, les gouvernements infranationaux, les sociétés transnationales et les organisations internationales (p. 36).

Dans le cas canadien, les villes se retrouvent entre les deux catégories. Leurs statuts en tant que palier de gouvernement permettent un accès au gouvernement fédéral, incluant les ministères ayant un rôle prépondérant sur la scène mondiale. D’un autre côté, leur statut d’acteur sovereignty-free leur permet d’agir plus librement et ainsi, de prendre des positions radicales et idéalistes, car elles ne sont pas reconnues sous le droit international (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 513).

Cette dynamique est le fondement de la doctrine Gérin-Lajoie. L’un des moments marquants de la politique étrangère canadienne est la déclaration suivante de Paul Gérin Lajoie, alors vice-premier ministre, devant le corps consulaire de Montréal en 1965 : « Le Québec n’est pas souverain dans tous les domaines : il est membre d’une fédération. Mais il forme, au point de vue politique, un État. Il en possède tous les éléments : territoire, population, gouvernement autonome » (Ministère des relations internationales et francophonie, 2017a). Dans le contexte de l’époque, le Québec cherchait à affirmer juridiquement l’internationalisation de la province : La déclaration de Gérin-Lajoie met en place l’idée que pour tous les domaines qui tombent complètement ou partiellement sous la compétence provinciale, la province peut agir sur la scène internationale. D’un point de vue juridique, d’après le gouvernement québécois, la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 est imprécise quant aux relations internationales. Ainsi, le gouvernement fédéral a la compétence de conclure tout traité concernant le Canada. Cependant, en droit international, pour permettre l’application d’un traité, « il est donc d’usage que l’ordre de gouvernement responsable de mettre en œuvre le traité soit également celui qui le négocie » (Ministère des relations internationales et francophonie, 2017b). C’est en misant sur ce paradoxe que les provinces canadiennes peuvent mettre en œuvre des engagements internationaux. 50 ans plus tard, bien que l’esprit de la doctrine Gérin-Lajoie ne fasse pas consensus avec le gouvernement fédéral, elle est tout de même appliquée par le Québec, mais aussi par les autres provinces canadiennes.

L’esprit derrière la doctrine Gérin-Lajoie s’applique-t-il aux villes ? Certains éléments semblent dire que oui. Le cadre constitutionnel canadien laisse certaines ambiguïtés quant à la séparation des pouvoirs. Dû notamment à l’étallement des enjeux internationaux sous diverses compétences tant provinciales que fédérales, les municipalités se voient donc touchées directement par certains enjeux (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 513). Afin d’éviter les tensions et conflits politiques, la constitution canadienne attribue toutes « les affaires locales, comme le niveau municipal, les questions d’ordre culturel et linguistique ainsi que le domaine social et le droit civil » (Tremblay et Pelletier, 2013, p. 49) aux provinces. Ainsi, certaines décisions provinciales en matière de relations internationales ont des répercussions sur les municipalités et celles-ci sont appelées à agir en réaction au contexte.

En juin 2017, l’Assemblée nationale du Québec a adopté le projet de Loi 122 visant à reconnaître que les municipalités sont des gouvernements de proximité et à augmenter à ce titre, leur autonomie et leur pouvoir. La notion de gouvernement de proximité tel que reconnu dans le projet de loi donne la légitimité aux municipalités de prendre en charge certains dossiers découlant des relations interétatiques. Afin d’approcher la question, deux compétences fédérales en particulier seront analysées : le commerce international, ainsi que l’immigration.

**Commerce international**

Selon la constitution canadienne, le commerce international est une compétence fédérale (Tremblay et Pelletier, 2013, p. 51). Cependant, au fil des années, les délégués fédéraux ont inclus différents acteurs issus des autres paliers, notamment dans le cas des négociations pour l’ALÉNA. Dans les années 1990, dans les discussions entre le Canada, les États-Unis et le Mexique afin de développer une zone de libre marché, les premiers ministres des provinces canadiennes se sont impliqués activement afin que le gouvernement fédéral prenne en considération leur point de vue sur les différents enjeux. Le gouvernement fédéral a donc systématiquement inclus les provinces dans les négociations, afin d’obtenir des avis techniques et ainsi développer un argumentaire plus solide : « Cette situation est inévitable, car ce gouvernement ne possède pas la capacité constitutionnelle d’imposer les traités conclus dans les champs de compétences des provinces » (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2007, p. 520).
Le processus d’intégration s’est étalé jusqu’aux municipalités. La Fédération canadienne des municipalités, ayant comme vocation de représenter les gouvernements municipaux, a développé quatre principes définissant le rapport avec le gouvernement fédéral quant au commerce international : le gouvernement fédéral doit continuer à améliorer le partenariat existant entre les municipalités et le gouvernement fédéral; tenir compte des impacts des accords commerciaux sur les activités municipales; respecter les principes de la fédération canadienne des municipalités pour un commerce libre et équitable lors de négociations entourant de nouveaux accords de commerce international et finalement; et renforcer l’économie et la compétitivité du Canada en misant sur les réseaux existants et la capacité des municipalités à stimuler le commerce et attirer les investissements (Fédération canadienne des municipalités, 2017).


**Immigration et gestion des réfugiés**

Une seconde compétence où les répercussions touchent les différents paliers de gouvernement est l’immigration et la gestion des réfugiés. D’une part, l’immigration est une compétence partagée entre le gouvernement provincial et le gouvernement fédéral, et d’une autre part, la gestion des réfugiés est une compétence exclusivement fédérale (Tremblay et Pelletier, 2013, p. 51). En effet, les décisions quant aux processus d’arrivée des réfugiés relèvent du gouvernement fédéral.

Bien que les questions de sécurité nationale, défense du territoire et contrôle des frontières relèvent exclusivement du gouvernement fédéral, les provinces et municipalités jouent un rôle prédominant dans la gestion des réfugiés. Selon l’article 92 de la constitution canadienne, les provinces et les municipalités, qui sont du ressort provincial, sont responsables de la protection civile et du service de police (Tremblay et Pelletier, 2013, p. 51). Cela crée un conflit entre la prise en charge de la sécurité extérieure par le gouvernement fédéral et la sécurité intérieure, assurée par les provinces et les municipalités.

Outre le processus de sélection des individus, ce sont les villes qui se chargent de l’intégration des nouveaux arrivants, car les services aux citoyens se trouvent au sein des villes. Dans le cas de la région de l’Outaouais, 90% des immigrants sont installés dans le centre urbain de la ville de Gatineau (Ville de Gatineau, 2016). Cet impact invite les villes à revoir certaines politiques urbaines afin de faciliter l’intégration de ces nouveaux arrivants, car c’est au sein des villes que les enjeux d’intégration à court, moyen et long terme sont présents.

Les initiatives mises en place par les différents paliers visent le dialogue et la coopération. Lors de l’arrivée de plus de 40 000 réfugiés syriens en 2015 (Immigration et Citoyenneté Canada, 2017), le caucus des grandes villes du Québec (Gatineau, Laval, Longueuil, Montréal, Québec, Sherbrooke, Brossard, Drummondville, Granby, Joliette, Saint-Hyacinthe, Saint-Jérôme et Victoriaville) a mis en place un comité intergouvernemental chargé d’agir à titre de répondants entre les deux instances :

À cette occasion, les villes ont réitéré leur ferme engagement à contribuer pleinement à la réussite de cet effort collectif d’accueil, mais ont du même souffle exprimé l’urgence, à titre de gouvernements de proximité, d’être partie prenante au plan d’action. (Union des municipalités du Québec, 2017b)

Les maires des grandes villes du Québec adoptent la perspective selon laquelle leur statut en tant que gouvernement de proximité les mettent en position d’assurer une meilleure cohésion sociale, tel en témoigne le maire de la ville de Gatineau Maixme Pednaud Jobin : « La Ville de Gatineau se voit comme étant le palier le plus apte à connaître à la fois les besoins et les ressources de la communauté, la concertation et la complémentarité entre
les acteurs du milieu » (Ville de Gatineau, 2016). Subséquemment, par la connaissance de ce qui se passe sur le terrain, notamment dans la collaboration entre la ville et les organismes à but non lucratif en place, l’action des villes dans la prise en charge des réfugiés est légitime. Toutefois, ne pouvant agir seule, elle doit compter sur des appuis financiers des autres paliers de gouvernement (Ville de Gatineau, 2016).

Outre la protection par le service de police, les questions de transport en commun concernent les municipalités (Affaires municipales et occupation du territoire, 2017). Comme elles sont responsables d’offrir le service de transport, cela implique une certaine marge de manœuvre dans la mise en place des politiques. La loi 62 votée à l’Assemblée nationale du Québec vise à favoriser le respect de la neutralité religieuse de l’État. Ceci implique d’avoir le visage découvert lorsqu’un individu reçoit un service de l’État (Justice Québec, 2017). Cet exemple est intéressant par l’écart d’interprétation qu’ont les municipalités ainsi que l’État québécois sur la notion de vivre ensemble. D’un côté, le gouvernement du Québec met en place une mesure ayant pour but de faciliter l’intégration des immigrants dans la société québécoise, et d’autre, les municipalités refusent d’appliquer la Loi sous prétexte qu’ils sont les mieux placés pour cerner les politiques efficaces en matière d’intégration. Bien que la Loi soit d’origine provinciale et vise les services aux citoyens, 40% de ces services, dont la culture, les activités sportives, les transports en commun ainsi que les bibliothèques publiques proviennent des municipalités (Union des municipalités du Québec, 2017c).

Les récentes vagues de réfugiés ont démontré que les municipalités jouent un rôle majeur, non seulement dans l’élaboration des politiques, mais également dans leur application. La situation unique selon laquelle les villes québécoises évoluent au sein de la seule province canadienne partageant les compétences d’immigration avec le gouvernement fédéral permet aux villes d’entreprendre un rôle plus prononcé sur ces questions. Le statut de gouvernement proximité qu’ont les villes québécoises leur permet d’aller dans les deux directions : elles sont celles ayant l’expérience du terrain et les premières en contact avec les nouveaux arrivants en plus de travailler de manière active avec les deux autres paliers de gouvernements.

**Conclusion**

Ce texte met une base conceptuelle afin de continuer l’analyse de la diplomatie des villes. Bien que l’action internationale des villes soit considérée comme étant une discipline émergente, la revue de littérature permet de mener à la conclusion que la mondialisation contribue à l’émergence des gouvernements de proximité dans l’élaboration et l’application de la politique étrangère traditionnellement mise en place par l’État central. L’accent a été porté sur la légitimité internationale et nationale de l’action diplomatique des villes québécoises.

Premièrement, la légitimité internationale se retrouve sur deux niveaux : d’une part, les villes sont les mieux positionnées afin de respecter l’esprit derrière la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l’Homme, notamment car les services donnés sont offerts à tous les résidents d’un territoire municipal, et ce, sans distinction de nationalité. Ainsi, au sein des villes, règne un esprit universaliste et inclusif, à l’instar d’un climat d’exclusion basé sur le statut citoyen des individus envers le gouvernement provincial et fédéral.

Deuxièmement, l’action diplomatique des villes est légitime sur le plan international grâce aux retombées économiques qu’elles engendrent pour la province et le pays. La croissance des investissements étrangers pousse les villes à agir afin d’attirer sur leurs territoires, tel que le témoigne la candidature de la ville de Montréal dans le dossier du siège social de la multinationale Amazon.

La légitimité nationale de l’action diplomatique des villes se retrouve au sein de leur statut de gouvernement de proximité. Cela leur permet d’avoir accès au gouvernement fédéral et provincial et ainsi aux décideurs qui mettent en place les différentes politiques étrangères. De plus, ce même statut, n’étant pas sous le droit international, permet aux villes de prendre des positions plus idéalistes et radicales. C’est par ailleurs cette tension entre ces deux réalités qui permet aux villes de jouer un rôle dans les dossiers liés aux commerces internationaux et ceux d’immigrations et de réfugiés.
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Ideological Divergence and Issue Convergence: Explaining Paradiplomacy in Quebec

BRET MANZER*

Abstract — This article explores the role of nationalism in paradiplomacy, the phenomenon of sub-state entities engaging in international affairs. In regions characterized by strong nationalist movements, paradiplomacy is utilized by regional actors to project a minority identity distinct from that of the majority centre. Quebec has sustained the world’s most advanced case of paradiplomacy, despite wholesale alternation between two ideologically divergent parties, the sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ) and the federalist Quebec Liberal Party (QLP). This article proposes party competition for issue ownership as a causal explanation of this convergence. The central argument put forth is that regional parties are galvanized by a nationalist electorate to take stances on international relations which promote their electoral competitiveness to voters vis-à-vis rival parties. The greater the emphasis a party places on itself as the most capable “owner” of the issue of the region’s international interests, the greater its commitment to paradiplomacy will be.

Keywords: Quebec; paradiplomacy; nationalism; Parti Québécois; Quebec Liberal Party; valence theory

Résumé — Cette article explore le rôle du nationalisme dans la paradiplomatie, le phénomène des entités sub-étatiques qui s’engagent dans les affaires internationales. Dans les régions caractérisées par des mouvements nationalistes forts, la paradiplomatie est utilisée par les acteurs régionaux pour projeter une identité minoritaire distincte de celle du centre majoritaire. Le Québec offre le cas de paradiplomatie le plus avancé au monde, malgré l’alternance au pouvoir de deux partis idéologiquement divergents, le souverainiste Parti québécois (PQ) et le fédéraliste Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ). Cet article propose la compétition électorale pour la possession d’enjeu comme une explication causale de cette convergence des partis. L’argument central de cette thèse est que les partis régionaux sont galvanisés par un électorat nationaliste à prendre des positions sur les relations internationales qui favorisent leur compétitivité électorale vis-à-vis les partis rivaux. Plus un parti met l’accent sur lui-même comme “propriétaire” le plus apte à s’occuper de l’enjeu des intérêts internationaux du Québec, le plus son engagement envers la paradiplomatie sera intense.

Mots-clés : Québec; paradiplomatie; nationalisme; Parti québécois; Parti libéral du Québec; théorie de valence

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Introduction

For over fifty years, Quebec has distinguished itself as the most internationally active sub-state region* in the world (Keating, 1997; Balthazar, 1999; Balthazar, 2004; Michaud, 2006; Criekemans, 2010; Nossal, Roussel, & Paquin, 2015; etc.). Its Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie oversees dozens of offices abroad, with staff and budgetary resources surpassing all nine other Canadian provinces or fifty American states combined (Bélanger, 2002). Quebec’s international engagement — having begun with a “momentum it would never really lose” (Duran, 2016, p. 21) — is particularly striking considering that it has been sustained and expanded upon by both pro-sovereignty and pro-federalism regional parties.

Paradiplomacy,* the practice of sub-state entities engaging in international affairs (Kuznetsov, 2015), is an understudied phenomenon at the intersection of international relations and regional politics. In an international system increasingly characterized by the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors, regions are an example of the latter while possessing more characteristics of the former. Paradiplomacy may equally be conceptualized as the international dimension of regional politics. A correlation between sub-state nationalism and paradiplomacy is widely acknowledged (Lecours & Moreno, 2003; Kirkey, Paquin, & Roussel, 2016), with the most advanced cases being minority nations in multinational Western states, namely Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders and Wallonia (Bélanger, 2002; Lecours & Moreno, 2003). Keating (1999, p. 13) notes that “in those cases where regions encapsulate a sense of distinct national identity and a nation-building project, external projection is qualitatively different from those cases where it is motivated only by functional considerations.”

Research Puzzle

The observed correlation between the strength of a region’s nationalist movement and its international engagement has not developed into causal explanations. Nationalism is the single most important variable in paradiplomacy (Lecours & Moreno, 2003) and paradoxically, the literature’s most neglected (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005). We know very little about the domestic parties, elites and institutions actually responsible for the formulation and execution of regions’ international affairs. As a consequence of this gap, it remains unclear how nationalism is operationalized to provide political support for paradiplomacy (Kuznetsov, 2015). Aldecoa & Keating (1999, introduction) emphasize the “need to add political explanations [for paradiplomacy] derived from the goals and strategies of substate elites, building to promoting their region or, in some cases, preparing the way for national independence.” It has been argued even more forcefully that “paradiplomacy, at least in its most developed form, needs to be re-conceptualized through a theoretical linkage with substate nationalism” (Lecours & Moreno, 2003, p. 267).

Conventional logic would suggest that paradiplomatic activities are pursued most intensely by ruling parties in favour of sovereignty, and comparatively less so by those which are opposed. This assumption is empirically false. Pro-federalist regional parties have at times been observed to demonstrate a similar or even greater commitment to international relations than their independence-seeking rivals (Balthazar, 1999; Keating, 1999; Michaud, 2006; McHugh, 2015; Jeyabalaratnam & Paquin, 2016). This paradox is exemplified in Quebec, where a highly developed international presence has been sustained despite five decades of wholesale alternation between two ideologically divergent parties, the sovereigntist Parti Québécois (PQ) and the federalist Quebec Liberal Party (QLP).

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* Kuznetsov (2015, 22) defines a region as “the territorial and administrative unit on the first level of authority after the central government in both federal and unitary state systems.”

* How best to conceptualize sub-state international engagement has been controversial since the 1980s, when the term paradiplomacy first entered the literature. Scholars have consistently acknowledged the difficulty in agreeing on a term applicable to all cases (Duchacek, 1984, 13), given their often highly divergent characteristics across time and place. Whether a sub-state entity’s international engagement runs parallel, complimentary, or conflictual to that of the central state (Criekemans, 2009, 1) is one such consideration among multiple others. As a full overview of the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed term falls outside the focus of this article, the following terms will be used interchangeably: paradiplomacy, paradiplomatic activities, sub-state international relations, sub-state international engagement, and sub-state international affairs. For the most comprehensive analysis of paradiplomacy’s terminology debate, see Aguirre (1999).
Research Contributions, Questions, and Arguments

This article therefore seeks to address two of the most fundamental limitations to our understanding of why regions go abroad: theory building and units of analysis. Scholars have been far more successful in conceptualizing paradiplomacy’s descriptive qualities than providing theoretical explanations for its development (Bursens & Deforche, 2010; Cornago, 2010; Kuznetsov, 2015). We lack a general understanding of the conditions which determine a region’s choice of international activities (Bursens & Deforche, 2010).

Cross-national studies overlook domestic actors entirely, preferring instead to treat regions as macro-level units of analysis (see Blatter, Kreutzer, Rentol, & Thiele, 2008; Criekemans, 2009; Criekemans, 2010). A lack of micro-level analysis has two negative impacts. First, it perpetuates the incorrect impression that a region’s international motives, goals and strategies are stagnant rather than dynamic. Second and most importantly, why regions engage in paradiplomacy can only be fully understood if the domestic actors responsible for its formulation and execution are analyzed. Kuznetsov (2015, p. 107) argues that “it is reasonable to assume that a political shift on the regional level can accelerate or hamper the international activity of constituent units […] Consequently, we need to scrutinize the impact of the subnational ruling elite on regions’ aspirations and self-identification in international relations domain.”

Three interrelated research questions therefore underline this article: (1) What role does nationalism play in the paradiplomacy positions and strategies adopted by regional parties? (2) Why do ideologically divergent regional parties converge on the issue of paradiplomacy? (3) Is a greater commitment to paradiplomacy demonstrated by regional parties ideologically in favour of, or opposed to sovereignty?

I propose party competition for issue ownership as a causal explanation of Quebec’s paradiplomacy. In Quebec and other regions characterized by strong nationalist movements, paradiplomacy is utilized by regional actors to project a minority identity distinct from that of the majority centre (Conversi, 1997). The central argument I put forth is that regional parties are galvanized by a nationalist electorate to take stances on international relations which promote their electoral competitiveness to voters vis-à-vis rival parties. The greater the emphasis a party places on itself as the most capable “owner” of the region’s international interests, the greater its commitment to paradiplomacy will be. This article is therefore less interested in how regional parties converge or diverge in their execution of paradiplomacy per se, and more so in how they compete over it as a policy issue.

To this end, the article proceeds in four parts. First, the rationale underlying Quebec as a case study is discussed. Second, a literature review critically examines existing research approaches to nationalism and regional actors in paradiplomacy. Third, a theoretical framework conceptualizes paradiplomacy as a valence issue† in Quebec and proposes four prima facie hypotheses for further research. Finally, the conclusion addresses the validity concerns of this proposed approach, as well as its broader implications for the relevant bodies of literature.

Case Selection

The selection of Quebec as a case study is grounded in two interrelated considerations: the periodization of its international engagement, and its significance to the broader paradiplomacy literature. Quebec was the first region to develop a coordinated international presence in the late 1960s, which is considered a distinct historic period defined in terms of growth, dynamism, and its repercussions on the international behaviour and activities of sovereign players (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005). Catalonia and the Basque Country would follow suit in the early 1980s (Segura, 2017), while Flanders’ and Wallonia’s now extensive international activities did not begin until the mid-1990s (Lecours & Moreno, 2003).

In addition to marking the beginning of the current paradiplomatic era, Quebec was the first case to attract scholarly attention in the 1970s (Kuznetsov, 2015). This outsized focus in the literature continues to endure, with Aguirre (1992, p. 202) observing that:

* A valence issue is characterized by parties and voters demonstrating broad agreement on a desired policy goal. (Stokes, 1963; Petrocik, 1996).
Historically, the case [of] Quebec has played, throughout North American academic literature, the role of a unique and outstanding internationally ‘centrifugal’ […] paradigm inside the intensively studied field of federal political systems’ foreign policy processes.

Bélanger (2002, p. 197) situates the essence of Quebec’s distinctiveness in a global context:

In spite of certain fluctuations in its priorities […] Quebec’s paradiplomacy has been sustained for forty years by an institutionalized and coherent policy that contrasts sharply with the instability and contingency that would generally characterize similar experiments carried out elsewhere in the world.

It should be noted that conclusions drawn from this particular case are generalizable to the other minority nation mentioned, as they share key characteristics including strong nationalist movements, sustained paradiplomatic engagement, and multi-party systems composed of parties both opposed to and in favour of sovereignty.

**Literature Review**

The fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of paradiplomacy (Kuznetsov, 2015) presents both an opportunity and a challenge to our understanding of why regions go abroad. The most recent and comprehensive synthesis of paradiplomacy research, Kuznetsov’s *Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy* (2015), identifies eleven distinct — though often interrelated — research discourses on the phenomenon. This breadth across international relations and comparative subfields has unfortunately not been matched by a depth of adequate explanatory frameworks. On the contrary, the existing paradiplomacy literature is frequently self-critical of being far more successful at conceptualizing paradiplomacy’s descriptive qualities than providing theoretical explanations for its development (Bursens & Deforche, 2010; Cornago, 2010; Kuznetsov, 2015).

Of greatest relevance to this article is the nationalism dimension of paradiplomacy discourse. According to Kuznetsov (2015, p. 50), research falling under this discourse broadly perceives paradiplomacy to be a factor in understanding minority nationalist aspirations in multinational and multilingual states. The following literature review provides an overview of nationalism’s treatment as a variable in paradiplomacy literature. The strengths and weaknesses of research analyzing domestic actors in paradiplomacy is then evaluated.

**Nationalism as a Variable in Paradiplomacy**

Macro-level analysis of paradiplomacy distinguishes between its external and internal variables (Duchacek, 1984; Kuznetsov, 2015; Duran, 2016). In his seminal paradiplomacy text *The International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government* (1984), Duchacek originally conceptualizes external factors as *complex interdependence*, a term which has largely come to be replaced by *globalization*. By contrast, internal factors are described merely as *domestic issues*. This highly ambiguous conceptualization provides an early indication of the continued tendency in paradiplomacy research to overlook domestic variables and actors.

Duchacek is correct, though once again rather ambiguous, in his assertion that self-help is the prevailing goal of regions in going abroad, and that “elected subnational leaders perceive trans-border regionalism and/or global micro-diplomacy as appropriate instruments derived from and consistent with their territorial jurisdictional autonomy” (Duchacek, 1984, p. 9). The most prominent example of a regional declaration of international competences is Quebec’s Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine, named after the provincial minister of education who delivered the landmark speech in 1965. Although attributed to a Quebec Liberal Party politician, the Doctrine’s assertion that Quebec has the right to exercise international action on issues pertaining to its provincial jurisdiction has been supported by all major parties since its inception.

Duchacek’s belief that such instruments are used “in response to external opportunities or threats” (ibid.) is both problematic and incorrect, as he overlooks the possibility of sub-state diplomacy being used an international means for an *internal* end. In reality, the most active cases of paradiplomacy suggest that the opportunities and threats alluded to are more internal than external. The most salient example of the former is the need to promote a
Ideological Divergence and Issue Convergence

minority identity distinct from that of the majority centre. In this sense, one could interpret the centre of a multinational state as a threat which is perceived to be “external” by the regional periphery.

Nationalism is evidently an example of an internal variable. Keating (1999, p. 1) divides paradiplomacy’s internal motives as either economic, political, or cultural, and emphasizes that the interconnected of all three must be stressed more. Kuznetsov (2015) identifies the same three internal motives, but departs from Keating in his assertion that one dominant motive tends to distinguish itself from an otherwise substantial overlap. Furthermore, it has been argued that although nationalism is the main independent variable in the study of paradiplomacy, it is not necessarily the sole or even primary variable in empirical cases (Duran, 2016, p. 8).

Instead, we should understand nationalism to be in and of itself a composite of political, cultural and especially economic variables (ibid.). Minority nations such as Quebec and Catalonia use paradiplomacy to leverage their internal autonomy (Tavares, 2015), as it facilitates the economic, political and cultural dimensions of stateless nation-building (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005; Nossal et al., 2015; Duran, 2016). The following section analyzes research concerning the domestic actors responsible for this stateless nation-building.

The Limits of Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism has been the focus of the small body of research dedicated to domestic actors in paradiplomacy (see Lecours, 2002; Bursens & Deforche, 2008; Bursens & Deforche, 2010). The central premise of institutionalist approach is that paradiplomacy outcomes are the result of domestic actors’ preferences. Bursens & Deforche (2008, p. 27) argue these preferences directly determine the nature and intensity of a region’s international engagement, while also noting that a regional actor’s attempts to maximize its preferences may be either constrained or empowered by domestic and international variables. Although commendable in acknowledging the role of domestic actors in what is often analyzed as a purely international phenomenon, institutionalist approaches like Bursens & Deforche’s suffer from several limitations.

First, the “regional actors” referred to are often highly ambiguous, with no illustrative examples. Lecours (2002) provides a superior framework in this regard by applying historical institutionalism to an empirical case study of Wallonia. Yet Lecours still omits specific regional parties from both the theoretical framework and empirical analysis, impeding a truly micro-level analysis. Second, historical institutionalism emphasizes how actor preferences facilitate paradiplomacy, but not why actors have particular preferences. The former is useful for providing insights into the extent of a region’s international autonomy and activities, but fails to identify underlying motives for the latter.

Finally, a region’s preferences are usually framed exclusively as a response to the central government. Bursens & Deforche (2008, p. 27) hypothesize that “the more the relations between a region and the federal level are conflictual, the more the regional level will develop particular kinds of far-flung paradiplomatic activities.” While it is certainly reasonable to assume that relations with the central government may either constrain or empower a regional party’s paradiplomacy agenda, the intergovernmental relations angle (Balthazar, 1999; Keating, 1999; Bursens & Deforche, 2008; Albina, 2010; Lequesne & Paquin, 2017) overlooks the more salient dynamics of intra-periphery party competition. According to Lecours & Moreno (2003, p. 267), a focus on multi-level politics and federalism also “marginalizes the importance of nationalism in explaining the breadth, scope and intensity of a region’s international activities in [multinational states] and its absence, or lesser prominence, in [nation-states].”

It would be misleading to claim that institutionalization has not played a role in Quebec paradiplomacy. As previously discussed, the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine legitimizing Quebec’s modern paradiplomacy has become institutionalized by virtue of all major parties adhering to its tenets. According to Bélanger (2002, p. 200), the central argument of the Doctrine and its underlying rationale is that “Quebec is the political instrument of a cultural group, distinct and unique in greater North America […] the relative consistency with which this dimension of the Doctrine has been repeated by successive governments in Quebec is remarkable.”
Free Trade and Quebec Paradiplomacy

The connection between between minority nationalism, paradiplomacy and regional party politics is most effectively explored in research concerning Quebec’s cross-party support of free trade (Martin, 1995; Meadwell & Martin, 1996; Shulman, 2000). The ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 was greatly facilitated by Quebec’s political parties demonstrating unanimous endorsement (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005, p. 84). Martin (1995, p. 3) goes so far as to note that “a consensus on free trade between Quebec political parties has endured since 1988.”

Shulman (2000, p. 375) reinforces this evaluation, writing that “only in the 1980s and 1990s have free trade and continental integration become dominant themes of separatist and autonomist nationalism in Quebec.” According to both Martin and Shulman, this cross-party commitment to free trade is not coincidental. On the contrary, it is the direct result of both the PQ and QLP promoting themselves as nationalist parties, albeit with distinctively different visions of what this should entail for Quebec. Martin (1995, p. 2) provides a convincing explanation for this party convergence:

Quebec did not embrace free trade in spite of its nationalism; it endorsed free trade largely because of its nationalism. Because nationalism is the core issue of party competition in Quebec, parties define their position on secondary issues in terms of how outcomes can affect their nationalist goals [...] thus, the bipartisan consensus and the high level of support for free trade in Quebec was a consequence of the partisan pursuit of nationalist goals.

The underlying premise of Martin’s argument is that both the PQ and QLP are nationalist parties, in the sense that both promote themselves as the legitimate defenders of Quebec’s “national” interests. The parties differ mainly in whether this would be achieved through eventual sovereignty or continued autonomy, a dichotomy which he aptly characterizes as “the ‘two faces’ of Quebec nationalism” (Martin, 1995, p. 2). Shulman’s (2000, p. 369) definition of nationalism as “the promotion of the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation” is particularly beneficial because it caters to both the sovereigntist and federalist visions of Quebec nationalism. Economic integration enjoys bipartisan support in Quebec due to the perceived benefits it offers the province’s autonomy (Shulman, 2000, p. 375). Free trade is therefore a policy which exemplifies the political and economic motives of paradiplomacy. Balthazar (2004, p. 470) has characterized Quebec’s international relations as “the perpetual rediscovery of the economy by each succeeding government.”

Meadwell & Martin (1996) expand on the relationship between nationalism and free trade by analyzing how support for the latter leads to nationalist mobilization. The authors postulate a theoretical explanation for the same bipartisan consensus on free trade identified by Shulman. They argue that economic integration includes elements of identity formation and institution building, both of which act as ‘enabling conditions’ for nationalist movements to mobilize (Meadwell & Martin, 1996, p. 69). For this reason, both major parties in Quebec have supported free trade to advance their respective nationalist agendas, with the main distinction being the PQ’s belief that current economic interdependence would ease a future transition to independence. Meadwell & Martin’s theoretical explanation is somewhat constrained by their lack of clarity in explicitly stating whether bipartisan consensus for free trade predates public support, or vice versa.

Theoretical Framework

Although primarily concerned with disproving the assumed incompatibly between nationalism and free trade, Shulman, Martin and Meadwell’s contributions provide valuable insights into how and why internationally oriented issues tend to enjoy a high degree of cross-party support in Quebec; the essential importance of paradiplomacy to Quebec and its regional parties has been likened by some to “oxygen” (Nossal et al., 2015, p. 372). We are therefore presented with a strong rationale for treating paradiplomacy not simply as an international phenomenon, but as a policy issue in regional party competition.
Valence Issues and Party Competition

Valence theory postulates that certain decisive political issues are consensual, meaning that parties and voters demonstrate broad agreement over desirable policy goals (Stokes, 1963; Petrocik, 1996). Egan (2013, p. 18) stresses that goals and issues must be treated as distinct concepts in valence theory, defining an issue as “a related set of public debates about a goal — including the extent to which the goal is desirable, the policies best suited for achieving it, and the performance of the goal on those running the government, as well as how much the goal should be prioritized compared to others.” In this sense, it is not issues themselves which enjoy consensus, but their underlying goals.

Identifying the goal at the centre of the issue is the first step in determining whether an issue may be characterized as valence (Egan, 2013, p. 20). The second step involves the application of what Egan (ibid.) terms the ceteris paribus criterion: “Is there a consensus that the goal is (1) desirable and (2) the responsibility of government, all other things being equal?”

Cross-party consensus on an end goal does not necessarily mean that competing parties will demonstrate identical levels of commitment, strategies, or most importantly, policy positions (Bélanger, Nadeau, Henderson, & Hepburn, 2018, p. 20). On the contrary, a party will manipulate its positioning on the issue in an effort to differentiate itself from rival parties. This deliberate manipulation serves the purpose of demonstrating to voters that it is the most capable and legitimate defender of a particular issue — that it owns the issue (Petrocik, 1996).

Green & Jennings (2017, p. 13) add that:

[…] for a party to gain ‘ownership’ of an issue, it should be closer to the preferences of a particular issue public that cares about this issue, it should take (or have taken) a greater interests in the issue than another party and it should be recognized as the party most likely to handle the issue well and deliver on it.

The sources of pressure in issue competition may therefore be conceptualized along two distinct but interrelated dimensions: (1) the vertical dimension, in which pressure from voters forces a party to assume a stance, and (2) the horizontal dimension, in which pressure from other parties forces issue positioning. §

Paradiplomacy: A Valence Issue in Quebec Politics?

The National Question is evidently the main valence issue in Quebec politics. Although parties diverge in their preferences regarding Quebec’s constitutional future, they converge on the central objective of defending Quebec’s interests as a distinct nation (Bélanger et al., 2018, p. 24). This objective involves a complex mix of interrelated policy issues, including the economy, culture and language rights (Bélanger et al., 2018, p. 21). The National Question may therefore be considered a policy theme of issues (Guinaudeau & Persico, 2014), and given its outsized importance in Quebec politics, a super-issue (Green & Jennings, 2017).

It is reasonable to assume that paradiplomacy is a valence issue in Quebec, by virtue of its inclusion in the National Question theme. International relations has historically borne little electoral salience to Quebec’s voters or its parties (Michaud, 2006), as provincial elections tend to focus exclusively on domestic rather than international issues (Michaud, 2006, p. 380; Lecours, 2008, p. 13). A case in point, the QLP’s 1960 platform did not include international issues (Payette, 2011), despite marking the beginning of Quebec’s paradiplomatic era (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005, p. 78). Bélanger et al. (2018, p. 74) likewise observe that international issues such as supranationalism receive comparatively little attention from Quebec parties.

However, these parties do perceive international activities positively as a means of developing more regional autonomy (ibid.). Bélanger et al.’s conclusion is nearly identical to Tavares’ (2016) observation of paradiplomacy’s utility in developing and projecting an autonomous minority identity. Paradiplomacy may therefore be conceptualized as the international dimension of minority nationalism. Like the broader National

§ Given the lack of precedent in applying valence theory to paradiplomacy, this article will limit its focus to the horizontal party dimension, rather than the vertical voter dimension.
Question, paradiplomacy is a multidimensional composite of economic, cultural and political motives (Keating, 1999; Kuznetsov, 2015). In Quebec, it encompasses policies as diverse as free trade and foreign investment, the protection and promotion of Quebec’s unique culture and French language, educational exchanges, and environmental protection.

Crucially, paradiplomacy meets Egan’s (2013) two criteria for valence issues: (1) desirability of a goal, and (2) responsibility of a government. The utility of paradiplomacy for stateless nation-building holds wide appeal to Quebec’s nationalist electorate, and cuts across their divergent constitutional preferences. Voters also perceive the provincial government to be both more capable and more willing to advance Quebec’s “national” interests abroad (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005), compared to a federal government which accounts much less for Quebec’s distinctiveness.

**Prima Facie Hypotheses**

Four hypotheses may be extrapolated from applying valence theory to paradiplomacy:

**H1: Both parties take pro-paradiplomacy positions**

Although paradiplomacy receives relatively little electoral attention on its own, it becomes highly salient when conceptualized as the international dimension of the National Question. Given that the latter is a “super issue” composed of multiple policy dimensions, parties must compete on them all in order to be perceived by voters as the most legitimate “owner” of the broader National Question.

Parties converge around the most competitive position to assume: more paradiplomacy. This “ideal” position is determined by voters. Quebec’s nationalist electorate demonstrates a preference for an ever increasing international presence, due to the perception of paradiplomacy promoting Quebec’s unique interests abroad. A party must take competitive stances on these constituent issues — including paradiplomacy — as not doing so would result in the party being out-bid by rival parties (Guinaudeau & Persico, 2014; Green & Jennings, 2017). The status quo or decreasing Quebec’s international presence are therefore unviable positions for competing parties to pursue.

**H2: Parties emphasize different motives for paradiplomacy**

Both parties agree on the end goal of increasing Quebec’s international presence, but emphasize different motives for paradiplomatic action. Paradiplomacy and the National Question are both multidimensional issues underlined by the trifecta of economic, cultural and political motives (Conversi, 1997; Keating, 1999; Kuznetsov, 2015).

Which paradiplomacy motive a party chooses to emphasize is determined by how the party tends to frame Quebec nationalism in general. The QLP primarily frames paradiplomacy as economically beneficial for Quebec, because emphasizing this dimension — particularly Quebec’s trade relationship with the United States — serves to reinforce voters’ broad perceptions of the QLP as the most competent party on economic issues (Bélanger & Gélineau, 2011). Due to the perception of the PQ as the most competent defender of the French language (Bélanger et al., 2018), it places a greater emphasis on the cultural dimension of paradiplomacy, such as expanding Quebec’s engagement with France and the global Francophonie.

**H3: The federalist Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) demonstrates a greater emphasis on paradiplomacy than the sovereigntist Parti Québécois (PQ)**

Parties converge around the same broad pole of more paradiplomacy, but take slightly different positions to compete for ownership of the issue. Paradoxically, a stronger commitment is demonstrated by a federalist — not sovereigntist — party. Understanding the extent to which issue ownership changes — or not — over time may be indicative of where issue ownership originally derives from (Egan, 2013, p. 54). There are three main reasons to expect that international relations policy is “owned” by the QLP rather than the PQ.

First, the QLP benefits from ownership of the 1965 Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine. This foundational document, developed by a provincial QLP cabinet minister, marked the beginning of Quebec’s modern paradiplomatic era, legitimized its international activities, and continues to be upheld by all parties. The QLP is therefore able to claim an earlier, more enduring commitment to paradiplomacy than the PQ.
Second, Quebec’s status as the most internationally active sub-state region in the world has been achieved *within the existing federal system*. This fact allows the QLP to argue that its preference for federalism is not an impediment to Quebec’s pursuit of a strong international engagement. By contrast, the PQ’s *raison d’être* of independence not only unnecessary, it would require extremely difficult constitutional changes.

Third, Quebec’s paradiplomacy underwent an intense period of expansion in the early 2000s, under QLP premier Jean Charest. The personality of politicians has been identified as a factor in the foreign policy development of sub-state entities (Paquin & Lachapelle, 2005).

Although public opinion on issue competence is considered distinct from public opinion about leader strengths and weaknesses (Green & Jennings, 2017, p. 3), Charest’s leadership in this regard strengthened the perception of the QLP as distinctively competent to manage Quebec’s international interests (Jeyabalaratnam & Paquin, 2016). Charest’s unmatched success in promoting Quebec’s interests abroad has even been acknowledged by rival parties and elites (ibid.).

It is in the QLP’s interest to stress its commitment to paradiplomacy, as doing so almost always works in the owning party’s favour (Budge & Farlie, 1983, p. 271). There is a central debate in valence theory regarding the best strategy for a non-owning party. Budge and Farlie (ibid.) argue that it is more viable for the non-owning party to divert attention from one issue to another. For the PQ, this means emphasizing that eventual statehood would enable Quebec to have a “full” diplomatic presence in the world, rather than an existing paradiplomacy, constrained by a hostile federal government (Conversi, 1997, pp. 131–132).

Tresch, Lefevere, and Walgrave (2015) propose an alternative strategy for a non-owning party: emphasizing issues which the party *does* have a reputation of owning, thereby reinforcing voters’ perceptions of the party as the “associative owner” of an issue it is otherwise weaker on. Holian’s (2004) earlier research finds that a non-owning party may use well-crafted rhetoric to successfully ameliorate voters’ perceptions of its issue ownership. Engagement, rather than avoidance, offers the non-owning party the possibility of “stealing” an issue from the historical owning rival party. As discussed in H2, the PQ may leverage its ownership of French language protection by attempting to frame paradiplomacy ownership along cultural terms, rather than the economic terms emphasized by the QLP.

The arrival of a new party in the system acts as a catalyst for such issue trespassing and stealing (Bélanger, 2003). As Bélanger (2003, p. 553) notes, “the goal of gaining such issue ownership advantages might in turn generate battles of reputation between old and new parties.”

The QLP’s ownership of international issues was largely unchallenged during the nascent paradiplomatic era of the Quiet Revolution. However, the emergence of the PQ in 1970 galvanized the QLP to strengthen its paradiplomacy emphases, as the PQ would attempt to challenge its credibility on international issues in subsequent campaigns.

**H4: The salience of paradiplomacy to Quebec parties has increased since the 1960s**

In additional to salience across parties, paradiplomacy’s overall salience across *time* has increased. There are two reasons to support this expectation. First, the acceleration and intensification of Quebec’s international engagement since the 1960s (Kirkey et al., 2016, p. 136) has resulted in paradiplomacy’s institutionalization as a norm. Second, globalization has strengthened this institutionalization, by “internationalizing” formerly domestic policy areas such as education and environmental protection. As Green & Jennings (2017, p. 8) stress, “issues become about competence when the politics of time makes them so [and] are only valence issues when the terms of political debate and public evaluations become about management, trust, delivery and competence.”

**Conclusion**

This article has argued that analysis of paradiplomacy — particularly highly developed cases like Quebec — must account for regional parties as primary actors. A theoretical framework conceptualizing international relations as an issue in regional party competition provides four *prima facie* hypotheses for future empirical research. Operationalizing these hypotheses is, however, confronted by both theoretical and methodological concerns.
Valence theory suffers from a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes “ownership” of an issue, and equally as important, how to measure it (Green & Jennings, 2017, p. 3). As a result, it is not always possible to disentangle a party’s issue ownership from its overall popularity (ibid.). Such measurement concerns are not unique to valence theory. Paradiplomacy research is limited by a complete lack of comprehensive data sets for regional foreign policy competencies (Blatter et al., 2008, p. 469), rendering attempts to quantify the phenomenon largely unsuccessful (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 11).

For these reasons, a mixed-methods research design involving a content analysis of regional party literature and semi-structured elite interviews would be the most effective approach to testing the hypotheses. Party literature such as manifestos provides the clearest reflection of a party’s positions on an issue, as well as how these positions are communicated to voters (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001). Given that such documents rarely provide an explicit contrast between a party’s position on an issue and that of its rival parties, semi-structured interviews with party members would elucidate intra-party competition for ownership of paradiplomacy.

The proposed research agenda has implications for three separate bodies of knowledge. As discussed in the literature review, existing studies have overlooked paradiplomacy as a policy issue in regional politics. Paradiplomacy therefore represents a new issue to be analyzed within the framework of valence theory. Second, understanding the motives and strategies of regional parties advances the small but growing body of research concerning regions as non-state actors. As the most internationally active regions are minority nations, the study of sub-state nationalism must be broadened to include its compelling international angle.

References


Accumulation by Dispossession:
Neoliberal Loans and BITs Conditioning Bolivia and South Africa to Privatize Water

SYDNEY MYLES*

Abstract — This paper reviews the negative socioeconomic consequences of neoliberal debt-repayment loan policies and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) proceeding financial downfalls in postcolonial nations. Amidst this era of globalization, many corporations residing in Western, capital-exporting nations have taken advantage of flexible borders and financially weakened nations to capitalize on natural resources, such as water. In tandem, as climate change strengthens its grip on scarce natural resources in many developing nations, so do western corporations privatizing dwindling supplies in the face of high demand.

Bolivia and South Africa, the case studies in this paper, represent two of many postcolonial nations enduring the pressures to repay loans and to implement neoliberal policies, resulting in a cut to social spending and the privatization of water.

In response to the neoliberal policies, Bolivian and South African opposition groups organized a series of protests disrupting the accumulation of water and the functioning of corporate activities.

This paper concludes with the future role of grassroots resistance movements as a response to neoliberal and corporate pressure and the need to reorganize the current governing bodies of globalization.

Keywords: Neoliberalism, dispossession, postcolonialism, water, privatization, globalization, loan policies, IMF, apartheid, economics

Résumé — Cet article explore les conséquences socioéconomiques négatives des politiques de prêts de remboursement néolibérales et des traités bilatéraux d’investissement (TBI) suite à des difficultés financières dans les pays postcoloniaux. A l’ère de la mondialisation, de nombreuses entreprises résidant dans des pays occidentaux exportateurs de capitaux ont profité des frontières flexibles et des pays financièrement affaiblis pour tirer parti des ressources naturelles, telles que l’eau. Parallèlement, tandis que le changement climatique renforce la rareté des ressources naturelles dans de nombreux pays en développement, les sociétés occidentales privatissent ces ressources en déclin, malgré la forte demande.

La Bolivie et l’Afrique du Sud, les études de cas présentées dans cet article, représentent deux des nombreuses nations postcoloniales qui subissent des pressions pour rembourser leurs prêts et pour mettre en œuvre des politiques néolibérales, entraînant une réduction des dépenses sociales et la privatisation de l’eau.

En réponse aux politiques néolibérales, les groupes d’opposition boliviens et sud-africains ont organisé une série de manifestations perturbant l’accumulation d’eau et le fonctionnement des activités des entreprises.

Cet article conclut avec une discussion sur le rôle futur des mouvements de résistance populaires comme réponse à la pression néolibérale et à la nécessité de réorganiser les organes directeurs actuels de la mondialisation.

Mots-clés : Néolibalisme, dépossession, postcolonialisme, eau, privatisation, mondialisation, politiques de prêts, FMI, apartheid, économie

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Introduction

As climate change progresses, so do crises rendered by disappearing natural resources, creating a gap filled by private corporations predominantly rooted in capital-exporting nations, such as the United States and France. Ecological degradation within this anthropogenic era has disproportionately impacted developing nations. Once faced with imperialism and neoliberalism, this inequality has been furthered via privatization of natural resources. The problem this paper aims to address is how neoliberalism and privatization have increased water inaccessibility in postcolonial nations.

Developing in the postcolonial era of the 1970s, neoliberalism concentrates political economic power in the hands of the few while dispossessing goods and services from the many. Under this umbrella of neoliberalism exists trade and investment treaties that enable neoliberal policies to be fulfilled and protected in an era of globalization. These protections garnered investors access to the natural resources of host nations via various forms of consent, such as constructed implied consent entailing the acceptance of neoliberalism by the civilian population, and general treaties on legal consent allowing investors to bring host nations to private arbitration under public international law.

Neocolonial actions, exemplified by the financial and ideological control of formerly colonized nations by former colonizers, coupled with the implementation of neoliberal macroeconomic policies in developing nations facing resource scarcities has resulted in the practice of accumulation by dispossession of these resources.

To address my argument for the active role played by neoliberal macroeconomic policies in water inaccessibility, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: what role does accumulation by dispossession play in water inaccessibility under neoliberal macroeconomic policies? What is the relationship between globalization and the perpetuation of neoliberal actions? How do bilateral investment treaties protect corporations and neoliberal economies? What role do former union workers and citizen groups play in the anti-privatization/anti-globalization resistance movements? What is the future for developing nations threatened by neocolonial actions of neoliberal corporations, nations, and institutions?

Divided into four sections, this paper will first examine the theory of accumulation by dispossession and the rise of neoliberalism in a postcolonial world. The second section examines bilateral investment treaties and the importance of general consent in strengthening these treaties. These theories are followed two case studies. The first will focus on Bolivia and the neoliberal macroeconomic policies that resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment programs to address the debt crisis, resulting in the privatization of water in the city of Cochabambamba. This section will also examine the role played by the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT in securing investor protection over water sources. The BIT (bilateral investment treaty), to be discussed further, enabled foreign bodies to possess decision-making power in host nations.

A second case study on South Africa outlines the neoliberal policies put in place by Nelson Mandela’s government, known as GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution), shortly after the democratic election of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994. This economic change to the post-apartheid economy introduced prepaid water metres into the township of Alexandria and the city of Johannesburg. As well, this section examines the impact that the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project had on water scarcity, implemented shortly after GEAR. Lastly, although South Africa was not involved in a BIT with France during the privatization of water (which was carried out by Suez, the French corporation), trade policies in place at the time were still able to control South African resources.

My paper will conclude with a discussion on the future for natural resource extraction dispossessing citizens in postcolonial nations, the need for the notion of globalization to distance itself from the neoliberal ideology and practices, and the power of grassroots movements to reclaim their resources.

Accumulation by Dispossession

According to David Harvey, accumulation by dispossession has been demonstrated in “the core regions of capitalism” and consists of “colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including
Accumulation by Dispossession

natural resources); the act of taking a resource, good, or service from one group for the positive accumulation of another group. Examples include the privatization and commodification of natural resources, and the transfer of public property and social services into the private sector.

Accumulation by dispossession is an expansion of Marx’s (1973) concept of primitive accumulation. For Marx, primitive accumulation was the shift from feudalism to capitalism wherein capitalists pushed the peasantry off their land, forcing peasants to rely on the capitalist system for subsistence. Marx believed this process to have only taken place during the pre-capitalist era, as feudalism was being dismantled. However, Harvey and Rosa Luxemburg, socialist critics, note that primitive accumulation continued throughout the development of capitalism by way of different types of accumulation, and will persist for as long as capitalism exists.

For Luxemburg, an expansion of primitive accumulation was evident with imperialism. Capitalism and its need to acquire a surplus eventually led capitalists to expand beyond national borders, thus taking part in imperialism and the colonization of foreign markets. What’s more, this expansion of capitalist power and accumulation of capital resulted in foreign powers dismantling the traditional systems (many in the form of natural economies) to make way for capitalism.

For a natural economy, demands are internal, land is communal, and there is no need for a surplus. These characteristics evoke all the components that have resulted in capitalism targeting and diminishing natural economies. Colonization was the weapon used by old capitalist nations, such as France and Great Britain, for securing foreign markets and dispossessing the land and resources from the “native” populations.

For example, during the British colonization of India, the peasant economies were dismantled and Hindu landownership traditions were sacrificed for capitalist methods of accumulation. This resulted in large swaths of former peasant land being turned into private estates, forcing peasants to rely on short-term land leases, with many falling into poverty.

Foreign Loans during the Imperial Era

During the era of imperialism, the building of railroads was considered a turning point for capital accumulation, with railroads providing the possibilities of industrialization, market competition, and further dispossession of land. For example, in 1872, the Bolivian government took out its first loan from the British government to build a national railway. This loan of GBP1.7 million was the largest monetary exchange at the time, and was the beginning of Bolivia’s years of debt accumulation. Unfortunately, the railway was left incomplete due to engineering complications and lack of skilled workers. Regardless of the project’s failure, Bolivia remained contractually obliged to repay their British loan. Later neoliberalism paved the way for neocolonial relations to develop between western corporations and the colonized.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberal policies promote and reflect the interests of multinational corporations, the accumulation of capital, and the owners of private property. Neoliberalism as a theory moved beyond academic borders and into practice in the public sphere with the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Friedrich Hayek in 1974 and Milton Friedman in 1976, both economists establishing their research on neoliberal economic practices (Hayek focusing on free competition and economics in relation to society, and Friedman on stabilization policy). The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 signalled a further shift in favour of neoliberal practice, as Thatcher insisted on shrinking the British government, which dismantled unions, decreased taxes and social programs, privatized state assets, and promoted foreign investments via more flexible trade and economic policies.

This shift continued with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, which marked the beginning of Reaganomics, also referred to as “trickle-down economics,” rooted in neoliberal thinking. These policies focused on decreased taxes, restricted the power of unions, diminished government spending on social programs, and encouraged capital accumulation.
The first major test for the power of neoliberalism in securing postcolonial control in the developing world was Mexico defaulting on its debt in 1982 to 1984. The United States Treasury Department and the IMF opted to formulate debt repayment plans that would pressure recipient nations into adopting neoliberal economic approaches. Labelled as “free market fundamentalism,” these methods of debt repayment pushed for structural changes and soon became universal components to many repayment programs addressing Third World debt. The control centre of this fundamentalism is located among the major capital-exporting, or G7 states: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy.

**Constructed Consent**

Economists and politicians can only adopt neoliberal theory to an extent before these ideologies need to be legitimized by the general population. As Harvey notes, this legitimization, or “constructed consent,” can be achieved via media, corporations, institutions (especially universities), and government officials. This consent is constructed in the form of active, passive, explicit, and/or implied. However, the method of consent for accumulation by dispossession is “implied,” wherein participants give consent by simply taking part in the activity, as in the case of purchasing privatized water. Harvey posits that the construction of consent takes place as neoliberalism actively frames consent to be “natural” and necessary for a society to thrive, particularly in the sense of capitalist development.

For example, when Thatcher presented her policies to the public, the Prime Minister repeatedly evoked that there was “no alternative” to the systems being put in place to promote competition within the free market and the need to shrink the government. The denial of alternative and the ensuing consent from subordinate classes is necessary for the successful implementation of a political order, such as neoliberalism. Gill outlines that this consent is needed in order for the adequate functioning of neoliberalism “inside” and “outside” a nation.

Upper class consent was easier to obtain, simply due to the wealth that the upper classes would presumably accumulate with the practice of neoliberal theory. For the lower classes, however, consent was obtained via more manipulative practices by governments, institutions, and corporations since many citizens recognized that the results of neoliberal policies would not only negatively impact marginalized populations, but closely resemble practices witnessed during the colonial era.

**The Unevenness of Neoliberalism**

This consent was gathered from the general population by the government with promises such as lowered taxes and the management of inflation. Although these promises were upheld after the implementation of neoliberalism, the face value of these actions obscured the underlying effects that were detrimental to the poor and minority communities. This unevenness embedded in neoliberalism that favoured the wealthy resulted in an increase in unemployment, environmental degradation, poor labour practices, poor quality public healthcare, and poor quality of life on a global scale.

During Reagan’s administration, for example, unemployment rose to 7.5% from 5.6% (1979), and throughout Thatcher’s reign, unemployment soared above 10%. For Patrick Bond, neoliberalism coincided with Marx’s claims on capitalism, wherein some sectors would flourish as others declined.

The case studies used in this paper of Bolivia and South Africa will further illustrate the repercussions of neoliberalism. What is highlighted with these case studies is the importance that a left-wing government plays in postcolonial nations dependent on the existence of unions, social welfare, and community groups in establishing higher qualities of life. The welfare state assisted those most vulnerable who were otherwise unable to afford an adequate quality of life. Hence, the implementation of neoliberal practices that weakened these welfare and union services also took away the sustenance for most of the nation.

As Harvey illustrates, unions represent collectivity and the perpetuation of ‘big government’, protecting workers and addressing issues such as increased wages, improved working conditions, and subsidized health care. The resources provided by the ‘big government’ policies (i.e., infrastructure subsidies and employment) were the targets for neoliberal restructuring, which was demonstrated through the practice of accumulation by dispossession.
The dismantling of these social resources and adoption of neoliberalist practices provides a breeding ground for civilian resistance in developing countries.

For the privatization measures associated with accumulation by dispossession, national governments privatized natural resources and services, which further degraded the environment and widened the gap between the rich and the poor. This unevenness of neoliberalism was directly perpetuated by actions associated with globalization and the universal spread of neoliberal ideologies across time and space.

Neoliberalism and Globalization

For J.A. Scholte, “liberalization” and “westernization” have been used in coordination with neoliberal ideologies to define globalization. Globalization is widely associated with the opening of borders, free trade, deregulation, and privatization practices witnessed under neoliberal economic policies. The onset of globalization marked the liberalization and westernization under neoliberal principles.

The projection of these ideologies, such as liberalization, is systematically encouraged to utilize the power of globalization to instill a “new constitutionalism” and the framework of neoliberalism to be attached to developmentalism. This idea of developmentalism concludes that the development of a nation was bound to economic growth and industrialization. As accumulation by dispossession confirms, this neoliberal framework for globalization benefits and privileges the capital-exporting nations and corporations holding the reins of power in developing and more vulnerable nations. Many anti-globalization movements, according to Scholte, are closely linked to anti-neoliberal and anti-privatization movements, as demonstrated in Bolivia and South Africa in response to the privatization of water.

Scholte makes a similar argument for the “westernization” component to globalization. Presently, westernization has been demonstrated to play a major role in globalization via the influence of Western-ideas and policies in accelerating the spread of market-based capitalism, urbanism, and the replacing of traditional practices (drawing parallels with Luxemburg’s claims to the imperial elimination of natural economies). As well, scholars have characterized Westernization-globalization as being closely linked to colonization practices, wherein “development” is discussed in terms of modernizing under the influence and control of western nations and enterprises.

The connection between the rise of neoliberal globalization and accumulation by dispossession is the individualization and privatization of natural resources and state services. As illustrated with the case study of water, after loan conditions were put into place, corporations pressured individuals to pay for water rather than the resource remaining a public good.

Andy Higginbottom draws parallels with both Harvey and Bond, explaining that the development of neoliberalism in Latin American economies with the progression of globalization has resulted in an increase in the expression of dependency theory among these states. The dependency theory outlines that the rich and developed nations (known as the “core”) exploited the resources and services of the less developed nations (known as the “periphery”) to a point where the periphery became dependent on the core for growth.

The increase in extraction of natural resources by foreign private firms and neoliberal practices adopted by the Latin American governments has left Latin America more dependent on foreign investment. Higginbottom reflects that neoliberal policies are strengthened with protection protocols for corporations provided by bilateral investment treaties, which are enforced by both national and supranational governing bodies.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were designed to protect corporate investments in developing, postcolonial nations. As one of the leading experts in the field of BITs, Gus Van Harten (2005) writes that the Geneva Convention of 1927 was the starting point for a winning party to be awarded compensation via arbitration for settling wrongdoing by the host nation under trade agreements, a process that demonstrated the potential for cross-border treaties.
The 1927 Geneva Convention had strict guidelines wherein the winning party was obligated to adhere to the national laws in place by the state involved in the specific case. This requirement was altered, however, with the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1958 (also known as the New York Convention). Awards now only had to be compliant with the state in which arbitration was taking place, rather than compliant to the laws of the host state being required to pay out the awards.

In 1965, under the World Bank, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created to protect the power of BITs by providing guidelines and increased arbitration opportunities for foreign investors. ICSID was created at the same time as independence was being awarded to previously colonized nations, and capital-exporting nations (many of which were former colonizers) developed mistrust for postcolonial nations and wanted treaties put in place to protect western investments.

Schreiber similarly notes that arbitration is detrimental to the recipient state governments that are forced to hire expensive legal representation as well as to pay the awards owed to the investors upon settlement. These actions became possible with the creation of ICSID allowing for the inclusion of “general consent” to be included in the treaties. BITs provide investors with the opportunity to bring public disputes to private arbitrators, which may eventually lead governments to alter legislation and judicial proceedings to meet the claims awarded to the investors. BITs only allow for investors to file claims; host states are not entitled to file a claim against an investor via BITs.

**General Consent**

This notion of “general consent” is a primary component of the strength and protection attributed to corporations via BITs. General consent is active consent that allows for investors to be guaranteed the opportunity to go to private arbitration and for host states being accused of wrongdoing to be liable for paying awards. Redfern and Hunter refer to general consent as being flexible and convenient, similar to a blank cheque. Nations sign BITs containing a general consent clause as a way to protect the foreign investors were a problem to arise in the host nation.

BITs protect the investors from any action taken at any level of government in the host state, also allowing the home state of the investor to seek compensation for legislation in the host state that may be detrimental to the investment. Also mentioned by Schreiber are “umbrella clauses,” which are similar to general consent. With an umbrella clause, an investor can attach various claims to a single BIT case, including unrelated contract disputes, to add further pressure on the state to settle. Furthermore, this forces the government of the host state to succumb to the will of the investors, epitomizing the coercive power of neoliberalism.

A bigger problem with BITs is that many foreign investors have aligned themselves (politically and economically) with capital-exporting nations and institutions to secure positions of power within the developed states. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan were the most popular capital-exporting states to include BITs within trade agreements with non-capital-exporting states. More importantly, the ICSID (a World Bank subsidiary) regulates BITs and accompanying arbitration practices and is primarily controlled by capital-exporting nations.

The capital-exporting nations mentioned above were among the top donors to the World Bank in 2010. This relationship further demonstrates the unevenness of neoliberalism and its advantage towards benefiting the wealthy, developed nations. The inherent power wielded by these capital-exporting nations against the governments of developing, debt-ridden nations demonstrates institutionalized neocolonial actions via accumulation by dispossession. The case study on Bolivia further examines this unevenness in neoliberalism and trade treaties with the privatization of water in the city of Cochabamba.

**Case Study: Bolivia**

**Bolivian Economic Policies**

Bolivia’s accumulation of debt and subsequent borrowing from foreign nations and institutions eventually led to one of the most significant national debt crises to arise in the 1980s. At the peak of the crisis, the value of the Bolivian peso dropped by 50% and hyperinflation rose to 14,000%, primarily as a result of President Reagan’s War
on Drugs, which criminalized Bolivia’s primary export: coca. To address the hyperinflation problem, Jeffrey Sachs, an American economist, was commissioned to devise new economic policies that would reduce the size of the Bolivian government and open the economy to foreign investors.

Sachs developed the New Economic Plan, which was labelled as Decree D.S. 21060, or D.S. 21060 for short. This policy included over two hundred economic changes for Bolivia, all ranging from cutting taxes, de-unionizing, dismantling social programs, opening the Bolivian markets to foreign investors, and privatizing natural resources, especially water.

As the years progressed following the implementation of D.S. 21060, many union workers and rural farmers suffered a sharp decline in employment opportunities, with about 350,000 Bolivians eventually turning to the illegal coca industry to acquire a relatively stable income. Due to the ensuing lack of opportunities available under the D.S. 21060 economy, many turned to the drug trade and informal economy. By the later half of the 1980s, the drug trade had amounted to about US$2 billion worth of Bolivian exports, although it is important to note that there are limited available and accurate statistics on this account. Experts theorize that the illegal drug market in Bolivia aided in supporting the nation after the financial damage accrued under the stabilization policy implemented by Sachs. To mitigate these economic losses, the Bolivian government not only continued to implement D.S. 21060, but accepted more IMF/World Bank loans funneled via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).

**SAPs and De-Unionization**

The World Bank and IMF created SAPs with the distinct intention of providing underdeveloped nations short-term economic support to jump-start their economies, which was meant to enable these nations to continue to repay their loans. Drawing parallels with D.S. 21060, the SAPs were designed via the ideological components of neoliberalism. The SAPs promoted the privatization of resources, shrunk government-funded social programs, decreased taxes, and opened trade borders, and increased the control of capital-exporting nations within underdeveloped nations.

One of the most detrimental results from D.S. 21060 and SAPs was the dismantling of unions and agricultural organizations throughout Bolivia. Unions were one of the major threats to neoliberalism. As the SAPs were implemented in 1985, the unionized labour sectors, particularly shipping, mining and agriculture, began to breakdown. Lake Titicaca, for example, was a major shipping port for minerals from Bolivia to the Latin American and international markets. However, Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), one of the state-owned mines, cut workers’ benefits including subsidized education and health care to a point wherein the port was forced to shut-down, playing a detrimental role in the nearby mines reliant on the port for exporting goods.

The closure of the COMIBOL mine resulted in a drop in employees from 27,000 workers to 3,000 workers between 1985 and 1993. The opening of trade barriers resulted in agriculturalists shutting down their farms because of their inability to compete with cheap imported goods. After these major sectors were dismantled, between 1981 and 1993, about 64% of the Bolivian population had to turn to precarious work, mainly in the city centres, as an avenue to obtaining an income. Housing assistance was cut by 77% from the government budget, while education subsidies decreased by 39%, leading to almost two-thirds of the total population falling below the poverty line. By 2003, Bolivian debt had reached an estimated US$5 billion.

**Water Privatization in Cochabamba**

Prior to the initial privatization of water in Cochabamba, citizen opposition groups created organizations to fight against de-unionization. Fabrilés (Federation of Factory Workers in Cochabamba) existed for factory union workers before the implementation of D.S. 21060 and the SAPs in order to provide workers with adequate health care, better working hours, safe working conditions, and standardized wages. As employment protection and unions began to disappear, many members of Fabrilés created the Comité de Defensa del Agua y la Economía Familiar (CODAEC; Committee in Defense of Water and the Family Economy) and Pueblo en Marcha (People on the Move).

Oscar Olivera (2004), one of the union leaders who organized the protests, notes that CODAEC was created with the intention of elevating the importance of the protests by indicating that the fight was to defend water as a personified entity while the corporations treated water as a commodity. This difference of ideas existed in large part
because of the spiritual components to natural resources present among the Indigenous beliefs of Native Bolivians. In short, the importance of water to the Bolivian population (with the total population to be about 63% self-proclaimed Indigenous) is not solely for sustenance, but spiritual purposes, as well. This valuation of the resource was one of the reasons for opposition groups to go up in arms against the D.S. 21060, and in 1999, on November 4th and 5th, CODAEC initiated protests by way of roadblocks on major transportation arteries.

In the small town of Vinto, outside Cochabamba, protestors caused such a disruption to the highways going in and out of the city that police were dispatched and armed with rubber bullets and tear gas. At the close of 1999, the first privatized water bills were distributed, spurring even more turmoil in Cochabamba and surrounding areas. In February of the following year, protest leaders from CODAEC scheduled a meeting with the Bolivian government to discuss a freeze on water prices until a more affordable solution could be formulated.

In March 2000, CODAEC arranged a city-wide referendum calling for the renationalization of Cochabamba’s water. Fifty-thousand citizens voted, with 96% of those citizens demanding for the cancelation of Bechtel’s private contract to Cochabamba’s water. The Bolivian government ignored the referendum, but eventually cancelled its contract with Bechtel due to the magnitude of social disruption.

**Bolivia BIT**

At the time of water privatization in Cochabamba by Bechtel, an American company, no United States–Bolivia BIT agreement existed. In order to secure BIT protection, Bechtel divided itself into three Dutch holding companies, since there existed a Netherlands–Bolivia BIT agreement (signed in 1996). The BIT was signed with the existence of the umbrella clause with expressed consent given by the Bolivian government. There were no exceptions provided to address public health and environment degradation or public policy conditions focusing on historical and cultural circumstances.

Among these divisions, Bechtel remained the majority shareholder in the firm and since BIT regulation allowed for corporations to be protected under BITs of different nationalities, this action, known as “forum shopping,” was deemed legal. The partition took place shortly after privatization and public protests surged. When Bolivia canceled their contract with Bechtel, this opened the Bolivian government to being taken to private arbitration for wrongdoing under the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT clause. The table in the Appendix at the end of this paper illustrate the proceedings that took place during private arbitration.

As demonstrated in this table, the public uprisings that took place in Cochabamba immediately following the signing of the forty-year water and sewage contract with Bechtel directly resulted in the termination of the contract. Bechtel opted to protect itself from losing its investment in Bolivia by immediately entering in concessions with the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT.

The claim was settled in 2006 and all financial awards were voided due to the Bolivian public uprisings and Cochabamba state of emergency. Bechtel stated in a press release on January 19th, 2006, that the settlement took place in part because of the protests, and “not because of any act done or not done by the international shareholders of Aguas del Tunari…” After the settlement, the Bolivian government officially left the ICSID on May 2, 2007 and terminated the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT in 2009. The neocolonial influences present in Bolivia during the privatization of water share commonalities with South Africa’s experience over the privatization of water.

**Case Study: South Africa**

During apartheid, the racialized population was forced to live in townships. Townships were over-populated subdivisions with little to no access to necessary resources, such as water and sewage services. Of the resources that were available, they were mainly communal and serviced multiple families within a single housing-block, which the government had the power to shut off or subject to a price increase.

During the 1970s, the South African banking sectors witnessed a boom due to the internationalization of the mining sector, with Nedbank and Volkskas Bank entering the international markets with the strong value of
Accumulation by Dispossession

This economic boom preceded the eventual bullish markets experienced by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange from 1982 to 1984. However, this boom collapsed in 1999 when private debt represented 70% of the GDP. Just before this collapse, in 1998, funds allocated to basic needs redirected from the ANC to address “corporate welfare” via the Department of Trade and Industry. Many experts believe that the new economic policies put in place in 1996 (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution policy; GEAR) were a contributing factor to the collapse of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

GEAR

The National Party was the far-right political party that held federal office in South Africa from 1924 until World War II, (and then again from 1948 to 1994) and implemented the apartheid era of racial segregation. During its reign, the National Party government incurred substantial debt from constant borrowing from international institutions to industrialize and develop South Africa. As a result, the new ANC government was left with a mountain of debt when Mandela took office in 1994, at an estimated US$245 billion. In an attempt to address this debt crisis, the Mandela government continued to borrow from the IMF and World Bank, which conditioned South Africa to adhere to neoliberal conditions in order to receive the borrowed funds.

Margaret C. Lee argues that when the ANC adopted the new macroeconomic policy of GEAR in 1996, the South African government made foreign investment a priority over domestic resource accessibility. The development of neoliberalism and globalization furthered the push for financial liberalization in developing countries, especially nations drowning in foreign debt. Though the expansion into foreign markets can be beneficial to developing nations, Lee recommends for nations to develop their social and economic sectors domestically, in order to make them less vulnerable to manipulation and dependence from foreign investors.

In 2001, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that developing nations that extensively liberalized their finances, including opening trade barriers and entering foreign investment treaties, were systemically unstable and susceptible to crises.

From 1993–2001, the number of black South Africans living below the poverty line increased from 50% to 62%. In 1998, the United Nations Panel on Water outlined that the resource should be paid for because it represents a commodity rather than a good that should be free. This notion was echoed by the ANC’s water minister at the time, Kader Asmal, who refused to support any actions that would allow access to free water because, “The provision of such free water has financial implication for local government...”

According to Bond, about half of South Africa’s water supply is used by the commercial agriculture industry dominated by the white farmers. About 12% of water was dedicated to household use, with more than 6% used for maintaining gardens and pools on properties within predominantly wealthy, white neighbourhoods, with less than a tenth of that 12% being consumed by racialized South Africans.

In the earliest years of GEAR, rather than growing the country’s wealth and potential, data demonstrated that the neoliberal economic policy depreciated the South African economy. For example, from 1996 to 1998, annual GDP growth dropped from 3.2% to 1.7% to 0.1%, which went against GEAR projections for GDP to fluctuate from 3.5% to 2.9% to 3.8%, respectively. As for job loss, between the same years, 71,000, 126,000, and 186,000 jobs were lost after GEAR was implemented. This is in comparison to GEAR’s estimated gain in employment from 126,000 jobs to 252,000 jobs, to 246,000 jobs.

The 1996 census demonstrated that the wealthiest 10% of the South African population earned 50% of national income, while the poorest 40% of the population earned nearly 3% of the income. The Minister of Social Development at the time, Zola Skweyiya, claimed that the wealthy were inadvertently becoming wealthier as the poor were becoming poorer. Due to budget cuts to the federal welfare program, about 13.8 million citizens were disqualified from the limited social services, leaving these communities reliant on corporate-owned services or to find their own means for survival. These inherent gaps created by GEAR in the welfare state created a crisis that was soon taken advantage of by corporations eager to privatize South Africa’s resources.
Prepaid Water Metres

The French company Suez, via its subsidiary “Johannesburg Water,” acquired the contract for the water in Johannesburg and surrounding townships under the new privatization policies beginning in 2001. Immediately following the signing of the contract, water prices increased by 55% and those black South Africans living in townships were forced to purchase prepaid water metres in order to access a formerly subsidized resource.

The citizens obligated to rely on the prepaid system were required to purchase a prepaid card or key in order to access the water in their township. Once their card or key ran out of funds, citizens were no longer able to obtain water. The use of prepaid keys allowed the corporation to track where, when, and how much water was being extracted, as well as giving Suez the ability to cut-off services and raise prices at any time.

Antina von Schnitzler finds accumulation by dispossession practices to be directly linked with the privatization of water and the subsequent installation of prepaid water metres. Under neoliberalism, basic needs such as water were turned into commodities that were profitable for corporations. To obtain the consent for the prepaid water metre project, especially following successful protests took place after the pilot project, Johannesburg Water marketed the project to be a measure of water conservation and sustainability.

Johannesburg Water attempted to install eye-catching billboards and taxi advertisements promoting the benefits for the water metres and privatization in general. These methods go hand-in-hand with what was described by Harvey as “constructed consent.” To obtain explicit consent for the installation of water metres, Johannesburg Water sent consultants to collect signatures from township residences. Those who refused to give their consent were subjected to poor quality services and more frequent service cut-offs.

Lesotho Highlands Water Project

One of the largest water projects on the continent, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) reroutes water from four major rivers in Lesotho: Senqunyae, Malibamatso, Matsoku, and Senqu; and incorporates the Vaal River in South Africa, which services Johannesburg and surrounding cities and townships. Established in 1998, the project continually experienced criticism from environmentalists, scientists, and human rights activists since the LHWP has destroyed ecosystems and increased water scarcity within villages along the rerouted waterways. Citizens were forced to relinquish their land for the project, while others experienced the negative geographical impacts of the dam via water shortages and soil erosion.

As well, the LHWP officials only provided civilians in the area of the dam with minimal compensation, and neglected to provide jobs within the construction sector of the project. In the early years of the project, household income in the northeastern mountain region dropped by a rate of more than 65%, disproportionately impacting women, children, and the elderly.

Having received a US$110 million loan from the World Bank, the LHWP moves billions of cubic volumes of water, much of which is lost upon entering apartheid-era pipelines that the South African government has failed to maintain. An estimated 40% of water is lost due to pipe leaks.

Township of Alexandria

Just outside Johannesburg, the township of Alexandria was victim to “apartheid-capitalist underdevelopment,” lacking education, amenities, and commerce opportunities to raise the standards of living. Municipal water prices in Alexandria rose by 35% from 1995 to 1998, yet amidst this time frame, citizens experienced a record number of water shut-offs. Municipal water prices rose by 35% from 1995 to 1998. For example, in 1997, 8,126 households experienced frequent water shut-offs, with shut-offs continuing into 1998.

South African Resistance to Suez

This surge in water prices resulted in many citizens being unable to afford water, as well as citizens boycotting their water bills out of protest, thus resulting in frequent water shut-offs from January to April 2000 by Suez. Protests in South Africa were founded by different societal groups from those in Bolivia. In the case of Bolivia, former union
workers were essential in not only building infrastructure but in organizing the “Water War” protests, since these union workers already had a strong web of communications formed among themselves. Resistance movements in South Africa, on the other hand, were formed by community groups, family units, and church groups, using the same methods of cooperation initially formed in resistance toward Apartheid during colonial times. Those with experience in anti-apartheid protests were able to give valuable insight in the best route for protests but were not necessarily the leaders in forming protest organizations.

Suez proceeded to hire a private security firm, commonly referred to as the “Red Ants,” to evict people from their homes due to lack of water payment. By 2007, nearly 2 million people were evicted from their homes in Johannesburg for a combination of not being able to feasibly pay their water bills and not paying their bills out of protest. Johannesburg city councilor, Trevor Ngwane, was at the forefront of leading people to boycott Suez water under his organization called Operation Valumanzi (“Water for All”). Ngwane was eventually asked to relinquish his seat in the ANC.

In 2005, legal action was taken against Johannesburg Water and the City of Johannesburg in the form of a class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs claimed that black South African communities were forced to purchase prepaid water metres and to pay for their water up front, in comparison to the white communities of the city and neighbouring suburbs, who were required to pay for their water services at the end of their billing cycle.

The plaintiffs also noted that black citizens experienced far more water shut-offs than white citizens, even after the pre-purchasing of the service. As well, the ratio of accessible water to households was detrimentally skewed, with dozens of township households relying on a single standpipe, while on the other hand, white communities were entitled to an easily accessible water supply not only to maintain their large homes, but vast landscaping and swimming pools. The case was presented by the citizens to represent post-apartheid unconstitutional racism.

The case was victorious at the South Gauteng High Court, but was overruled at the national Constitutional Court after the crown appealed the ruling by the provincial court. The tribunal claimed that under constitutional policies, it was not the state’s responsibility to provide water services on demand to each person. Although the lawsuit was lost at the Constitutional Court, the win at the provincial court coupled with countless protests and boycotts eventually resulted in Suez being evicted from Johannesburg in 2006.

South Africa BIT

The France–South Africa BIT was terminated before Suez secured the contract to privatize Johannesburg’s water. According to UNCTAD 2013 data, twenty-six out of forty-nine listed South African BITs have been signed but are not in force, fourteen BITs have been enforced, and nine BITs have been terminated. Interestingly, all nine of the BITs terminated by South Africa were with OECD nations and all were signed during the post-apartheid ANC government.

France–South Africa BIT was signed in 1995 and terminated in 1997, however, non-BIT agreements still existed between France and South Africa for a decade after termination, which was demonstrated through the privatization of water in Johannesburg. The initial agreement was for ten years but was unilaterally terminated after only two years.

In accordance to a WTO seminar in September 2012, as of 2008, the South African government noted the constitutional discrepancies among BITs. According to Deputy Director General of the International Trade and Economic Development department under the Department of Trade and Industry within the South African government, Xavier Carmin, the South African government commissioned independent firms to assess the requirements outlined in BITs. The problematic components such as exploitation, investor power, transferring of funds, unfair treatment, and lack of coherence in arbitration practices all make investments riskier for the host nation.

As a result, in 2010, South Africa opted to not renew preexisting BITs signed at the brink of independence in 1994 and did not sign on to any new BITs; the last BIT to be signed was with Zimbabwe in 2009. As well, South
Africa has made a commitment to create investment treaties that provide more protection for the state and are consistent among all foreign investors.

Conclusion

As this paper demonstrates, the development of neoliberalism and utilization of this economic theory through debt repayment loans and BITs targeted developing economies and furthered imperial attitudes. As outlined by Luxemburg during the imperial era, the colonizing powers dismantled natural economies for the growth of capitalism and left the colonized to struggle to survive in comparison to the small wealthy social strata.

Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession was put in practice as natural resources were privatized and placed in control of corporations. The privatization of water then changed the distribution practices so that wealth and resources shifted from being accessible by all to available to the few. The role of BITs strengthened corporate control by protecting foreign direct investments in the volatile economies of developing nations. Although neoliberal macroeconomic policies and BITs gave the capital-exporting nations the ability to advance capital accumulation, the resistance movements carried out by the citizens illustrates the power of the masses when faced with inequality.

The Future

For investment treaties, non-OECD nations have developed trading institutions outside the regulatory scope of IMF/World Bank. BRICSAM, a collection of rapidly developing countries and alliances consisting of Brazil, Russia, China, India, South African, ASEAN, and Mexico, have created mutual and reciprocal trading policies, promoting cooperation rather than monopolization, outlined in ICSID agreements.

However, as Antkiewicz and Whalley outline, a major setback for non-ICSID trade relations include the struggle for the diverse nations under BRICSAM to collectively agree on trade policies. As well, many BRICSAM nations remain heavily dependent on OECD nations for investment and non-ICSID arbitration is still in its infancy and is weakly enforced.

On the micro level, Bond suggests the need for “climate justice,” wherein actors work from below to shift the current capitalistic/fossil fuel-reliant system to a more sustainable system known as “eco-socialism.” Rather than establishing a climate plan that attempts to “save the earth,” climate justice aims to target specific ecological problems within extraction sites, for example, the tar sands in Canada, oil fields in Latin America, coal factories in Russia and the United Kingdom, and mining in South Africa. Similar to Klein’s “Blockadia,” climate justice puts the power of change in the hands of the citizens being most negatively impacted by extraction practices.

Resistance movements against neoliberalism can be seen as a step towards a more inclusive and equal globalization. Scholte reports that there are different versions of globalization to be considered, other than the “neoliberalized” globalization witnessed today. Western neoliberal institutions promoting globalization under neocolonial practices and accumulation by dispossession have made it difficult for alternative “globalizations” to thrive.

Scholars repeatedly note that this component of globalization is not the only option, but is the option that has been furthered by neoliberal governments and financial institutions that have held both the economic and political power within the international community. For the future, scholars discuss an inclusive globalization that promotes cultural and economic equality, heterogeneity, and preserved traditions.

Resistance movements in Bolivia and South Africa against the privatization of water, as well as climate justice Blockadia practices outlined by Bond and Klein, demonstrates the push for a new globalization, or at least alternative globalizations. Since the control of a neoliberal globalization is in the hands of governments, institutions, and corporations, those who have not and are not benefitting from neoliberalism can be the only ones to carry out change.
References


Appendix

**Known BIT claims against CAP states**
(as at 19 August 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Year initiated</th>
<th>Relevant treaty and arbitration rules</th>
<th>Claimant and sector</th>
<th>Host state measure</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Aguas del Tunari</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Net-Bol BIT</td>
<td>Claimant ADT was Bolivian company, owned by series of Dutch companies, in turn owned by U.S. firm Bechtel.</td>
<td>Various acts and omissions of Bolivia concerning the concession agreement, alleged to have breached the BIT.</td>
<td>Claim settled in early 2006. Both claimant and Bolivia agreed to drop financial claims against the other and that the concession was terminated only because of the civil unrest and the state of emergency in Cochabamba and not because of any act done or not done by the international shareholders of Aguas del Tunari. The settlement followed the extensive public pressure on Bechtel to withdraw BIT claims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Filed under ICSID Rules.

Claim arose from 1999 concession contract between ADT and Bolivia’s Superintendant of Water for exclusive delivery of water and sewage services for city of Cochabamba over 40-year period. The city’s water system was previously run by the state agency SEMAPA.

At time of the concession, 20% of shares in ADT were divided among four Bolivian companies, 25% were owned by Uruguay company Riverstar International, and 55% were owned by Cayman Islands-based International Water which was 100% owned by U.S. firm Bechtel.

The concession contract was subject of public controversy and criticism by citizens’ groups from at least the time it was signed until its termination in 2000 following a major escalation of public protests. A concern of citizens’ groups was that the concession would make illegal the existing communal water systems, previously autonomous of SEMAPA, on which many of the city’s inhabitants relied.

Great hardship was also caused by substantial increase in rates that were implemented shortly under the concession.

ADT was aware of and engaged in the public debate from shortly after the initiation of the concession. Notably, after the concession and controversy began, the Cayman Islands company International Water was “migrated” to Luxembourg and its ownership was transferred to a Dutch company in turn owned (via other Dutch companies) by Bechtel and (apparently) the UK firm Edison. The insertion of this Dutch holding company into the ownership chain for the concession contract allowed for a claim to be brought under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.

Tribunal found jurisdiction. Tribunal allowed claim under Netherlands-Bolivia BIT despite forum-shopping by Bechtel via the corporate reorganization that followed mounting public controversy over the concession. It concluded that the corporate re-organization did not breach the concession contract and that it was not necessary to order production of documents regarding alleged misrepresentations by Bechtel. In a detailed analysis,

the Tribunal also concluded that there was sufficient control of ADT by the relevant Dutch holding companies to allow the BIT claim.

Dissenting opinion by arbitrator Almeida-Semerena would have dismissed the claim on the basis that the corporate reorganization took place after another proposal to insert a Dutch holding company into the corporate structure had been rejected by Bolivian authorities. This indicated deception or misrepresentation on the issue of the nationality of the investors under the concession agreement.

Tribunal also rejected a petition by non-governmental organizations to participate in the proceeding on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to do so without the consent of the disputing parties.


Abstract — The European Union (EU) presents an intriguing case-study for examining the normative and empirical degree of the securitization of immigration in the post-9/11 context. The following paper uses the Copenhagen school of security studies to argue that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the securitization of immigration (through direct and indirect elite speech acts) has legitimized exclusionary policies and practices, thereby constituting a “new (cultural) racism.” This new cultural racism acts as a justification against immigration. My argument will be presented in three parts. The first outlines how elite direct and indirect speech acts create an “immigration-as-a-cultural-threat discourse” that constitutes a “new racism.” The second analyzes how the securitization of immigration discourse has been implemented through legal and institutional practices, including in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), the Dublin Convention, and various border security practices. The final section examines the significance of 9/11 in connecting perceived Muslim immigrants to terrorism, thus constructing a discourse that identifies immigration with a direct threat to European identity and social cohesion.

Keywords: Securitization, immigration; Copenhagen school; elite speech; new cultural racism; Muslim immigrants; identity; social cohesion

Résumé — L’Union européenne (UE) présente une étude de cas intrigante pour examiner la portée normative et empirique de la sécurisation de l’immigration dans le contexte de l’après-11 septembre. L’article utilise l’école de pensée de Copenhague pour les études sur la sécurité pour affirmer qu’à la suite des attentats du 11 septembre, la sécurisation de l’immigration (par des discours directs et indirects de la part d’élites) a légitimé les politiques et pratiques d’exclusion, menant ainsi à une « nouvelle forme de racisme (culturel). » Ce nouveau racisme culturel justifie les politiques anti-immigratoires. Mon argument sera présenté en trois parties. La première partie souligne comment les discours directs et indirects de la part d’élites créent un discours caractérisant l’immigration comme « une menace culturelle », ce qui constitue du « nouveau racisme. » La seconde partie analyse la manière dont la sécurisation du discours sur l’immigration a été mise en œuvre par des pratiques juridiques et institutionnelles, y compris dans la Convention d’application de l’Accord de Schengen, la Convention de Dublin et diverses pratiques de sécurité frontalière. La dernière partie examine l’importance du 11 septembre dans l’établissement de liens entre les immigrants musulmans et le terrorisme, construisant ainsi un discours qui caractérise l’immigration comme une menace directe à l’identité européenne et à la cohésion sociale.

Mots-clés : Sécurisation; immigration; école de pensée de Copenhague; discours des élites; nouveau racisme culturel; immigrants musulmans; identité; cohésion sociale.

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Introduction

In a world characterized by the increasing interconnectedness of states and the expansive movement of persons across borders, our current political climate continues to construct a binary between the Global North and the Global South. Images of tyranny, disorder and chaos in the South are juxtaposed to values of liberty, stability and justice in the North. This paper examines how the notion of threat and insecurity, embodied in the image of the immigrant from the South, is recognized as an existential threat to the political, economic, and social stability of Northern host countries, with a particular focus on the European Union (EU). Certain developments in the twenty-first century have contributed to the “securitization” of migration in the EU, to include discourses constructed by politicians and policymakers, and subsequent policies and practices. Migration into the EU has become a new source of anxiety and insecurity for many European communities (Waever, 1993, p. 3), and is believed to be one of the root causes of socioeconomic and societal problems in many European states (Huysmans, 1995, p. 20).

Questions about the securitization of immigration continue to stir perennial debate among scholars of various disciplines in the social sciences. It therefore bears great importance to, first and foremost, define what is meant by “securitization.” The act of securitizing something involves the transformation of traditionally non-security issues (or low politics), such as international migration, to matters of urgent security affairs (or high politics), and is arguably a direct consequence of securitizing speeches by state and public officials (Waever, 1995, p. 23). Securitization refers to a “perception of an existent threat to the ability of a nationally bounded society to maintain and reproduce itself” (Faist, 2004, p. 3). Academic literature in International Relations (IR) and international law over the past decade or so has underscored pressing concerns about newly emergent security issues including, but not limited to, international terrorism, ethno-national conflict, environmental degradation, organized crime, and unauthorized migration (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Immigration in the twenty-first century has therefore departed from an economic or humanitarian issue and quickly evolved into being defined as one of the most critical security concerns.

The discourse constructed around immigration mobilizes great support from political communities and gives the state legitimacy to “protect” its citizens from foreign threats. This then justifies the particular migration control policies that would have otherwise been deemed illegitimate (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24–25). Much of the literature about the securitization of immigration points to the distinction between the different levels of political discourse and practice, which offers a useful basis of analysis because in any political system, political parties and organizations concerned with mobilizing support from the electorate will frame and select particular social demands for state action (Poggi, 1990, p. 138). Framing involves the “construction of certain questions as legitimate objects of social concern, requiring public action of a certain kind,” (Boswell, 2007, p. 592) and provides a plausible narrative that can be confirmed with existing knowledge about a particular phenomenon. Framing also fills in considerable knowledge gaps with additional, often dramatized, information about a particular issue. Securitization is therefore a powerful means of framing issues around immigration (Boswell, 2007, p. 592).

Although there exists a myriad of reasoning to explain and comprehend the securitization of immigration in the twenty-first century, this paper argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States left a powerful legacy of anti-immigration discourse, legislation and security practices that specifically target perceived Muslim communities. More recently, the election of

Donald Trump has further “crystallized anti-Muslim prejudices” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 8) by explicitly calling for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the hell is going on” (NBC News, 2016). Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Northern League, claimed that “centuries of history risk disappearing if Islamization, which up until now has been underestimated, gains the upper hand [in Italy]” (Balmer, 2018). Whether 9/11 dramatically changed the way the EU shaped its immigration policies, or whether they merely exacerbated pre-existing anti-immigration rhetoric is still up for debate. What is certain, however, is that the perceived revival of Islam as a threat to European cultural homogeneity in the “age of terror” has framed Muslim immigrants in Western industrialized states as the new “suspect community,” leading to their systematic targeting by immigration legislation and control practices (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 716). This paper uses a constructivist lens, influenced by the Copenhagen school of security
studies, to argue that in the post-9/11 era, the securitization of immigration, through discourse and indirect elite speech acts, legitimizes exclusionary immigration policies and practices and constitutes a “new racism.” This new racism further acts as a strong justification against immigration.

My argument will be three-fold. First, I outline how direct and indirect speech acts by political leaders and the news media effectively create an “immigration-as-a-cultural-threat discourse” that Maggie Ibrahim rightfully calls “new racism.” Both the securitization of immigration and the new racism converge as cultural essentialist justifications of anti-Muslim immigration policies and practices. Second, I analyze how the securitization of immigration discourse continues to be implemented through legal and institutional practices, including in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), the Dublin Convention, and various biometric border control practices. Third, I examine the significance of 9/11 in connecting perceived Muslim immigration to terrorism and constructing a powerful discourse around immigration as a direct threat to European cultural cohesion and identity.

Part One: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

In 1983 Barry Buzan, a core figure of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, argued that the orthodox use of the term “security” to refer principally to survival of individual sovereign states and the military issues they faced was inadequate (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). Buzan and his colleagues therefore developed a framework that placed human agency and moral choice at the centre of security policies. This essentially highlighted the importance of actors in constructing issues, individuals, or groups of individuals as security threats. The Copenhagen School provides an important tool for our understanding of securitization today, where a political elite speaker can transform an issue from “low” to “high” politics by using direct and indirect speech acts in order to “justify the adoption of “emergency” measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics” (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). This section uses the Copenhagen School to develop a theoretical framework to analyse securitization practices implemented by the European Union between 1992 and 2000, where the Maastricht Treaty brought immigration under the jurisdiction of the EU, and between 2001 and 2006, thus enabling sufficient data collection of the various border control practices after 9/11. This will be done in two parts. The first outlines the process of securitization, which entails the transformation of an issue from “low” politics to a matter of “high” politics. This will be complemented with an examination of how elite speakers use indirect speech acts to justify securitization of immigration mechanisms. The second part will constitute an analysis of how the securitization of immigration constitutes a “new racism,” how racism acts as a structural facilitating condition for securitization, and how this relates to Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era.

Securitization

To securitize an issue is to frame a traditionally non-security issue, like immigration, as one needing a state or regional body to urgently respond in a way that protects the integrity of its territory. Weaver described securitization as a “speech act” where, by using security-related language, political elites seek to convince their audience of “a special claim to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Waever, 1995, p. 55). Once political elites have securitized a particular issue, “it becomes ‘common sense’ that it is a threat” (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 716). Political elites can therefore shape the securitization discourse to include what they deem to be an imminent threat to society. The process of securitization can also be paralleled to that of a “moral panic” in which the media amplifies a social issue, “providing the principal means by which an issue or group is spoken about” (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 718). Broadening the security agenda to encompass non-military issues has therefore meant that immigration is increasingly examined, evaluated and framed through a security perspective (Togral, 2011, p. 224). Through the process of securitization, immigration has become linked to economic and political issues, thereby justifying exclusionary policies and practices. It therefore becomes important to understand how discourses are used to securitize social issues, thus transforming them into matters of “high” politics.

Discourses give meaning to social and political realities so that individuals, states, and regional bodies are able to make sense of themselves, each other and the world in which they live. A discourse is a “cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object” that frames that object in a particular way thus determining the “possibilities for action in relation to it” (Epstein, 2008, p. 10). Powerful discourses matter the most
because they radically shape the information a community receives and how it responds to it. The securitization discourse is constructed by linguistic narratives used by political elites and is perpetuated by the news media. For this reason, a closer look at the relationship between power and knowledge is useful in understanding how members of the political elite frame certain issues, how the electorate receives this information or “common knowledge,” and how this affects the general securitization discourse. Michel Foucault (1980) eloquently articulates the nexus between power and knowledge in the following:

In a society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth that operate through and on the basis of this association. We are [thus] subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. (p. 93)

Foucault placed power within discourse, emphasizing not on what power is, but on what it does. The production of truth by political elites serves as the creation of knowledge through discourse and is an instrumental exercise of power. Discourse of this sort legitimizes certain individuals to represent the “truth,” in this case about the threatening nature of immigration. The securitization of immigration can be analyzed as a discourse through which relations of power are exercised (Ibrahim, 2005). “Truth” produced in this way translates into immigration policies and procedures.

Although discourses and direct speech acts constitute an important component of the securitization process, Eroukhmanoff (2018) rightfully asserts that, especially in the post-9/11 political climate, speech acts can be indirect, leading to the indirect securitization of immigration (p. 6). Indirect securitization comes from “covert security grammar where securitizing actors avoid labelling the issue as a threat, for fear of saying something gauche and be subsequently chastised” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 6). Oftentimes, elite speakers are wary of being labelled as overtly racist, especially since securitizing religious minorities is a blatant form of hate speech. The process of indirect securitization therefore highlights the link between the securitization of minority religious and/or ethnic groups and racism, significantly how “security is intertwined with racist construction” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 7). Eroukhmanoff invokes Searle’s philosophy of language to assert that a lack of direct securitization, via direct speech acts, does not equate to a complete absence of securitization (p. 13). According to Searle (1979), the meaning behind a world or a phrase is partly comprised by how the speaker seeks to have the hearer respond to the speech act. An indirect speech act is therefore an act “in which the speaker may utter a sentence and mean what she/he says and also mean another illocution with a different propositional content” (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 164). Ultimately, a speaker can mean more than what he/she explicitly says, which might not be openly communicated in the first instance.

The Securitization of Immigration as “New Racism”

In her thought-provoking analysis of racism, Maggie Ibrahim (2005) reveals how discourses about the securitization of immigration are constructed around the belief cultural difference leads to social breakdown (p. 164). Immigration discourses reveal a cultural essentialist explanation for social issues, “while structural deficiencies such as racial discrimination in employment, education, housing and other social services, the lack of political rights for long-term residents, and patriarchy have been left untouched” (Toğral, 2011, p. 229). Immigrants are perceived as disruptive to the “communal harmony” and “cultural homogeneity” of the host country and are considered a threat to Society (Karyotis, 2007, p. 9). The threat to identity is particularly important to many communities who believe that migrants will erode the unique social fabric that make them a distinct political community. This fear stems from a socially constructed fear that immigrants can and will potentially alter the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition of the host country, a fear perpetuated by the high birth rates of several migrant groups. Only through an examination of the transformation of racism into a “new racism,” from an emphasis on biological superiority to an emphasis on cultural difference, can one understand both the discourse that paints immigrants as a cultural threat and the policies that integrate and institutionalize this discourse into tangible immigration measures implemented across the EU.
“New racism” implies that racism has moved beyond differences of biological composition to unassailable cultural differences that are perceived to be threatening to the social fabric of the EU. “New racism” encompasses two mutually constitutive parts: first, the belief that human beings have a natural, biological tendency to form social units of people who share similar values and are somehow inherently different from outsiders (Barker, 1981, p. 128). Second, at the very core is the fear of the “other,” mirroring Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” article that asserts cultural difference as the root cause of conflict “between nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). Culturalist discourses demarcating cultural difference create and recreate the “us” versus “them” dichotomy, “positioning the migrant as the ‘cultural other’ and shaping the migrant’s relation to society in a conflictual way” (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p. 29). Central to “new racism” in the post-9/11 era is the work of Edward Said who argued that dualist discourses create “the self” and “the other” binary “in order to justify and naturalize some structured patterns of domination and exploitation” (Said, 1978). Views expressed by John Major, Britain’s Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, about “creating a strong perimeter fence around Europe,” (Bainbridge et al., 1994, p. 422) echoes this dichotomy and continues to characterize EU’s immigration policies. For the EU, the establishment of a fully integrated union with one cohesive, homogenous European identity necessitates the exclusion of foreign migrants. The notion of EU citizens stemmed from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), whose treaty pushed for the free movement of coal and steel workers (Maas, 2007, p. 17). The Treaty of Rome then extended mobility rights to a wider category of workers and specified, in greater detail, how these supranational rights would be realized. These rights form the basis of EU citizenship today and distinguishes between those groups entitled to the rights of EU citizens from those who are not, namely Third Country Nationals (TCN) in EU member states.

Defining immigrants as “others” securitizes them and is a form of “new racism,” replacing racial differences with cultural ones reproduces “justification for the subordination and exclusion of certain groups of people” (Togral, 2011, p. 224). The securitization of immigration must be understood within a framework of race and race-relations in order to “explain the overt and insidious ways that non-white populations, and most notably their bodies, are read and treated as threatening and violent” (Moffette & Vadasaria, 2016, p. 295). States develop systems of justice and rights to protect their society, and to ensure its security and stability. In bringing with them different cultural values, languages, and identities, immigrants are seen as bringing an imbalance to the nation, as a threat to the existing way of life. By this logic, it becomes necessary to preserve one’s own culture by excluding other migrant cultural groups. This rationale, its discourse and practice, should and must be understood as blatant racism against migrant populations (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 166). As Spears explicitly puts it, new racism “is still racism in that in functions to maintain racial hierarchies of oppression” (Spears, 1999). In the post-9/11 era, Islamophobia is racialized because religious affiliation is perceived as a right of birth (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 718). Islamophobia “constructs the distinctiveness of Islam and its representatives on the basis of belief and practice rather than supposed biological or somatic characteristics.” As a result, visible Muslims in particular become targeted and excluded from the political rights of the host state. Indeed, as Miles and Brown (2003) contend, framing Islamophobia as a form of racism facilitates the inaccurate treatment of all Muslims as a homogenous ethnic minority group. However, the treatment of Muslims as such has become prevalent after September 2001, thus linking Islam and terrorism with each other.

The Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of “security” provides an effective theoretical tool for the analysis of the securitization of EU immigration policies and practices between 1992 and 2006. As illustrated, the securitization of immigration, essentially transforms an issue from “low” to “high” politics. Political elites use discourse and indirect speech acts to construct an image of a dangerous immigrant who threatens the cultural homogeneity of their respective societies. The securitization of immigration in this manner, one that attributes “threat” to cultural difference, constitutes a “new racism” that further acts as a structural condition that facilitates securitization.

**Part Two: The Securitization of EU Immigration Policies and Practices**

The securitization of immigration discourse, which constitutes a “new racism,” has been institutionalized across the European Union. The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, sought to create a single market that was...
envisaged in the European Economic Community Treaty of 1957 by abolishing any control member states had on the movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The SEA established a borderless economic region within Western Europe (Single European Act, 1986). Despite having direct implications for immigration, the SEA failed to include the specific provisions for visas and the status of TCNs recommended by the European Commission.\(^4\) The 1985 Schengen Agreement filled this gap by asserting external border controls and cooperation pertaining to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, which were seen as necessary due to the lack of internal border checks. The Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, then, unequivocally linked immigration to terrorism, transnational crime and border control, and detailed how to fight illegal immigration and how to regulate the intake of asylum seekers (Huysmans, 2006, p. 756). This move strengthened the immigration–security nexus that projected strict visa requirements, cooperation in visa matters, deportation and readmission, and the imposition of carrier penalties to both regular and irregular immigrants indiscriminately (Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement [CISA], 1990). The Dublin Convention accompanied this Convention and specified the distribution of responsibilities for asylum seekers who had managed to enter the territory of a signatory member state. It essentially signified a shift from the universal responsibility to protect immigrants, enshrined in the Geneva Convention, to an emphasis on tightening border controls and reducing the number of entry options (Lavenex, 2001, p. 97). These highly relevant and important treaties underscore that even before 1992 the securitization of immigration, its discourses, policies and practices, was well underway.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty brought all immigration affairs into the regional jurisdiction of the newly established European Union and systematically securitized immigrants in two profound ways. First, it neglected to provide meaningful mechanisms for the ways in which immigration issues would be overseen at the judicial and supra-national levels. Second, it conflated immigration with matters pertaining to illegal migration, fraud, organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking (Schlentz, 2010, p. 9). This is explicitly mentioned in Article K. 1 of Title VI of the Community Pillar, which lists immigration as a matter of “common concern” (Treaty on European Union, 1992). These concerns have also trickled into institutionalized immigration practices in both the Trevi and Schengen groups (Schlentz, 2010, p. 9).

Despite this, EU policymakers noticed yet another gap in how the Maastricht Treaty dealt with the single market and how intergovernmental cooperation handled immigration matters. The Amsterdam Treaty therefore followed in 1997 and de-linked immigration from questions of organized crime (Bigo, 2005, p. 74), while concurrently systematizing the immigration–security nexus through the Area of Freedom, Security and Freedom (AFSJ) “in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combatting of crime” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). This move inadvertently strengthened the link between immigration and security concerns, giving the European Court of Justice (ECJ) greater jurisprudence on matters pertaining to Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty (Geddes, 2008, p. 124). The securitization of immigration is therefore part of a larger security continuum that was introduced before Maastricht and actualized in the Amsterdam Treaty that systematically codified the immigration–security nexus in the AFSJ (Schlentz, 2010, p. 10). It is important to acknowledge the contents of each treaty because they constitute the foundation of contemporary EU identity, policies and practices. For example, although immigration issues were moved to the Community Pillar, usually only requiring majority voting, matters pertaining to the Schengen area are still incorporated into the legal framework of the EU, needing a unanimous decision at the European Council and a consultation procedure with the European Parliament. Moreover, member states are also given the opportunity to introduce proposals for new immigration issues, a right previously granted only to the European Commission. This enabled them to hold significant control over immigration policies (Schlentz, 2010, p. 10).

The Europeanization of immigration and the security logic that went with it, stemming from the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, manifested itself in several border security practices that include the collection of personal data on TCNs. Although the focus of this paper is limited to 2006, these practices exist in the present day and continue to be expanded and developed to include the latest security technologies. The term “border security,” rather than border control, has become ubiquitous even before the 9/11 attacks with elite discourses and indirect speech acts creating a direct link between immigration and crime. EU immigration policies have engulfed the essence of this securitization discourse, thereby embodying the perception that border security is the only
mechanism of protecting EU citizens and reducing potential attacks on EU territory. It is important to note that this logic also lies at the centre of the EU counter-terrorism strategy. Enhancing border security is believed to hinge on avant-garde security technologies, principally those using biometric features in passports, visas, residence permits and identity documents, and the development and expansion of an EU-wide information system (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 32). However, biometric data on every TCN, temporary or otherwise, will not necessarily equate to a decline in criminal and terrorist activities. In fact, evidence thus far has proven that terrorists and transnational criminals almost always cross borders legally and use legitimate identification cards and passports in their host countries. The individuals that carried out the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, for instance, were equipped with either valid or expired US visas, and had valid residence permits or identification cards (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 33). The connection between criminality and/or terrorism and immigration is dubious; the ways in which the EU seeks to develop and enhance their border security is unsustainable, counter-productive and, most importantly, a clear reflection of the new racist discourse that perpetuates and facilitates the securitization of immigration.

The Schengen Information System (SIS), established under the 1990 Schengen Convention, is one example of EU efforts to develop and maintain border security. SIS started operating in 1995 and contains data on individuals wanted for “arrest or extradition, missing persons, stolen vehicles, firearms and other objects, and on third-country nations to be refused entry into the Schengen area” (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 37). Information stored in this database is also used to control the movement of persons at external borders. in a member state’s territory, or when issuing visas and resident permits. After much disagreement and negotiation between various EU member states, the final version of SIS, adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2000, spelled out the collection and processing of three types of biometric data: a) on asylum seekers, b) on aliens apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and, c) on aliens found illegally present in a member state (Council of the European Union, 2003a). Because biometric data is very specific, it has the ability to link personal information to a particular individual. Biometric data can be used to confirm someone’s identity (one-to-one search) and to identify someone (one-to-many searches; Baldaccini, 2008, p. 37). This kind of technology transforms the nature of SIS from a mere database used for border security purposes to one that can, and often is, used to “fish” and create a suspect population from persons who make up the database. Such practices have serious implications on individuals wrongfully identified and convicted with criminal or terrorist activities, especially because authorities have the tendency to “overestimate the reliability of biometrics” (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 38). Although SIS had information on both immigrant and crime-related activities, it was primarily used to identify TCNs who should be denied entry into the Schengen area. At the beginning of 2007, SIS had data on 900,000 people, 750,000 of whom were TCNs reported for non-admission (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 39). The end of 2008 saw the establishment of SIS II, which used even better information technology to collect wider and newer categories of data on persons entering the Schengen area. New features of SIS II, particularly after September 11, included storing photographs and fingerprints of individuals as part of the EU counter-terrorism mechanism. Presently, the SIS is used by 27 states, three of whom (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) are not members of the EU. The prevalence of the securitization of immigration in the EU transforms the purpose of SIS and SIS II from a tool used for border control to one that investigates and reports crime and terrorism.

**Part Three: The Significance of 9/11**

Although the 9/11 attacks on the United States left an important legacy on the war on terror, it is important to note that the securitization of immigration, and its influence in policymaking and enforcement in the EU, existed before 2001. Immigration has historically been perceived as a potential economic, social, or security threat to the receiving society. As this paper has illustrated, the securitization discourse and the immigration–security nexus, which constitute a “new racism,” equates cultural difference with the disintegration of a homogenous society. For example, in 1975, the Trevi Group was established as an intergovernmental effort to curb internal security issues, including terrorism within member states. Authorities form the

Ministries of Home Affairs, the police, and internal security services of member states met twice a year to strategize ways to combat internal security threats. The Trevi had four working groups within it, and shared information and resources on terrorist activities, exchanged scientific and technological information on police work and training, and cooperated on civil aviation security, nuclear safety, and ways to handle natural disasters (Karyotis,
The Trevi group, along with its duties and activities, was an important precursor to the Schengen Agreements and the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. However, this is not to say that 9/11 had no implications for the securitization of immigration in the EU and elsewhere. If anything, the attacks exacerbated, strengthened and legitimized exclusionary immigration policies and practices, thereby contributing to a “new racism” that identifies cultural difference as the primary cause of threat and conflict.

Immigration after the Second World War was considered necessary for the economic reconstruction of war-torn European economies. The success of ECSC was facilitated in part by the easy and free movement of coal and steel workers between signatory states. Nevertheless, developments after this period, including the 1970s oil crisis and its effects on global capitalism, the rise of neo-liberal policies and the decline of the welfare state, and the emergence of the EU’s single market, resulted in calls by EU political elites to strengthen the Union’s borders (Huysmans, 2006, p. 21). Bigo (2002) argues that the securitization of immigration replaced the communist threat in Europe with an alleged threat of the immigrant (p. 63). This, in turn, worked to secure the power of the state as the sole provider of security via strict immigration regulations and controls. The attacks of September 11, and those in Madrid and London, not only intensified the securitization of immigration, it also justified practices pertaining to the migration–security nexus in the EU (Togral, 2011, p. 225). The Visa Information System (VIS), for example, was established as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Ministers of the Home Affairs and Justice Council decided to tighten procedures of the issuance of visas and made recommendations for the Commissions to institute a network where member states can exchange information about the issue of visas (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 41). The VIS essentially collects and stores fingerprints and other biometric data of all TCNs applying for short-term visas in the Schengen area.

9/11 also linked immigration to terrorism; immigrants became a threat to both the culture and identity of the host state and to the lives of the populations in that territory. In effect, 9/11 dramatized “a publicly convenient link between international migration and security” (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). EU rhetoric around immigrants after the attacks underscored policies of exclusion for non-European citizens and a “return to more restrictive immigration and asylum policies.” Before September 11, the EU worked towards the Europeanization of immigration, with the Commission asking the Council and the Parliament to reassess the “zero immigration” policy that had previously been in place. The Commission specifically stated: “channels for legal immigration to the Union should be made available to labor migrants” (European Commission, 2000). It also noted that the “declining and ageing populations in Europe,” and the racism and xenophobia primarily directed to immigrants could benefit from immigration because “while immigration will never be a solution itself to the problems of the labor market, migrants can make a positive contribution to the labor market, to economic growth and to the sustainability of social protection programs” (European Commission, 2000). After the attacks, the EU resorted to more restrictive and conservative immigration laws that altered existing policies on family reunification and the extension of long-term status to TCNs (Karyotis, 2007, p. 7). Furthermore, the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of September 20, 2001 encouraged the Commission to reappraise its previous policies on immigration and asylum seekers and, as a response, the Commission drafted a working paper on December 5, 2001 urging states to “scrupulously and rigorously” apply the exclusionary clauses contained in Article 1(F) of the Geneva Convention (European Commission, 2001). It also provided member states with the legal tools of rejecting entry to TCNs for reasons such as public policy or domestic security (Karyotis, 2007, p. 7). The working paper painted, explicitly and implicitly, immigrants as potential terrorists and threats to the national security of the state and the human security of its citizens.

There have been two prominent ways of framing immigration in Europe even before the 9/11 attacks. First, EU member states have been primarily concerned with the uncontrolled entry points into the region: the fear that there was an overwhelming sea of immigrants, either regular or irregular, who were “invading” European territory. Second, member states tend to focus on the social and economic impact of immigration, including the abuse of welfare and social services, and the fear that migrants will take jobs away from EU citizens. States have responded to this economic and social “threat” by tightening the criteria for visa applications, carrier sanctions and border controls, and curtailing overstay through detention and deportation (Boswell, 2007, p. 595). Indeed, while these measures were in place well before 9/11, it is important to note that the attacks on the World Trade Center exacerbated an already anti-immigration discourse and practice in the EU.
Conclusion

Indeed, the 9/11 terror attacks opened up a number of opportunities to link migration to terrorism, and systematically legitimated policies and practices to enhance migration control; however, they did not create the securitization discourse. Rather, the attacks exacerbated and reinforced a pre-existing rhetoric and narrative of the migration–security nexus. This securitization and “othering” of the migrant is a manifestation of a new form of cultural racism that perceives cultural differences at the ultimate threat to the social fabric of a particular community. Securitizing immigrants because they pose a “cultural” threat to the identity of the receiving state is inherently racist and discriminatory, and is a discourse constructed by policymakers and perpetuated by the media. Foundations of this discourse can be traced back to even before the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties that strengthened the legal authority of the EU bodies on matters pertaining to immigration. The Dublin Convention and the SIS were then actual manifestations of this discourse that put it into legal practice with the use of various information technologies to collect biometric data on immigrants wanting entry into the Schengen area. 9/11 correlated the image of the migrant with two imminent “dangers:” as a threat to the cultural homogeneity and identity of the receiving country, and as a threat to the physical livelihood of its citizens. These attacks, and the subsequent attacks in Madrid, Berlin, and London, continue to further the securitization of immigration discourse and enhance already existing policies and practices that systematically excluded TCNs from entry, and identified them as threats to the security and stability of the region.

Indeed, Europe’s geopolitical location has left the region open to all kinds of security threats and concerns. However, sweeping and overarching policies and legislations that link immigration to terrorism, particularly after 9/11, and restrict immigration to populations that “look” suspicious is an unsustainable and an incredibly discriminatory way of securing the region’s borders. In effect, harsher, indiscriminate immigration and “counter-terrorism” policies only perpetuate the radicalization of both TCNs and EU citizens into participating in violent activities against the particular member state. The EU must therefore reassess their immigration policy to not only include ethical considerations and human rights of TCNs, but also to simultaneously establish a sustainable security agenda.

References


Examining Alternative Knowledge Production: Transnational alternative policy groups in the Global North and South

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Abstract — Transnational alternative policy groups (TAPGs) are alternative think tanks that mobilize knowledge into social movements and community action. These social movement actors may hold vast potential in correcting inequalities that have, arguably, been prominent during the recent wave of neoliberalism. However, the study of TAPGs is new and thus they are only recently emerging within academic literature. Here, the author contributes to literature on TAPGs, by comparing two TAPGs, from the Global North and South respectively, in order to explore their potential as social movement actors situated within a neoliberal hegemonic global system.

Keywords: Knowledge production; TAPGs; social movements; alternative knowledge; neoliberalism.


Mots-clés : Production de connaissances; GPAT; mouvements sociaux; connaissances alternatives; néolibéralisme.

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Introduction

In Postscript on the Societies of Control, Gilles Deleuze spins a new take on the Foucauldian concept of the “disciplinary society.” Deleuze states that, following the disciplinary society that existed pre-World War II, we are living in a “society of control.” According to Deleuze, we are living in a society where our orientations towards control and freedom have functioned to create a new world of increased surveillance and “a widespread progressive introduction of a new system of domination” (Deleuze, 1992). Perhaps nowhere is that system of domination more strongly felt than within the current paradigm of neoliberal capitalism, one that is rigidly programmed and enforced through overarching institutions of global governance and economic globalization.

In this paper, I critically engage with the emergence of transnational alternative policy groups (TAPGs) — alternative think tanks that exist as actors within civil society to challenge unequal and hegemonic knowledge systems. This is done using critical theory to posit that, neoliberal capitalism, a breed of capitalism that has become entrenched within global governance since the economic crisis of the 1970s, is a hegemonic social imaginary, with TAPGs producing a counter-hegemonic imaginary. I therefore identify how TAPGs are situated within broader, longstanding struggles of global justice, which are often organized around a dialectic of “hegemonic initiatives from above and counter-hegemonic agency from below” (Cox & Nilsen, 2014). I focus on two TAPGs, the International Forum on Globalization (IFG) and Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), which are situated in the United States and India, respectively. Through comparing these groups’ production of alternative knowledge, I examine how TAPGs are countering the programmed seduction of neoliberal capitalist ideology.

This paper is divided into seven sections. In section 1, I theoretically explore the processes of knowledge production. Section 2 discusses how neoliberal capitalism is entrenched as a hegemonic social imaginary. In section 3, I discuss the organisational framework and emergence contexts of IFG and PRIA. In sections 4 and 5, I analyze one IFG and one PRIA program, followed by some overall comparisons in section 6, with section 7 concluding the paper. Overall, it is found that although TAPGs within the Global North and South are each positioning themselves to produce counter-hegemonic imaginaries to neoliberal capitalism, they must find ways to evolve within the current paradigm of economic globalization in order to catalyse a political shift.

Processes of Knowledge Production

In his 1981 paper, New Social Movements, Habermas theorized that, although the social movements emerging out of Europe in the 1960s appeared unique at the time, “these new movements were to be viewed as largely “defensive” reactions to economic and political interference in everyday life... a colonisation of the ‘lifeworld’” (Edwards, 2009). For Habermas, this colonization of individual livelihoods, in the course of capitalist modernization, necessitated a new kind of social movement in response to such growing inequalities. From Habermas’ writings, we learn that social movement knowledge has been found to be a vital component of emancipatory politics. The writings of Habermas, in this light, could seen as a critical theory approach to the processes of knowledge production. Critical theory has, since its inception, had a revolutionary mindset — Max Horkheimer, arguably one of the first critical theorists, and heavily influenced by the writings of Marx, argued that the “capitalist form of commodity production….had ultimately become an obstacle to human progress and was driving human kind towards a new barbarism” (Wellmer, 2014). Indeed, what distinguishes critical theory from traditional forms of social theory is that “critical theory conceives of itself as par and parcel of a struggle for an association of liberated human beings” (ibid.). The real possibility of such an association rests the necessity of a struggle.

This is where knowledge production becomes of high calibre. My main argument within this paper is that TAPGs are oriented towards producing knowledge. As such, they may hold incredible potential in producing the visions and policies necessary to signal a political shift. The critique and mobilization of instrumental reason has been seen, by many scholars, as a decisive element for the diagnosis of society. Robert Cox is particularly lauded for his contributions in theorizing knowledge processes. Cox emphasized that civilizations produce “collective

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1 In his book, Discipline and Punish, Foucault states that discipline is a mechanism of power that regulates the behaviour of individuals through complex systems of surveillance. The term “disciplinary society” refers to the origins of disciplinary institutions like schools and prisons.
understandings, an entrenched ‘common sense’ in the Gramscian usage of fragmented values and beliefs that conform to a given social order” (Mittleman, 2016). His ideas elucidate the term “global governance” by theorizing how knowledge is created and contested in the global political economy (ibid.).

Stephen Gill enters this dialogue by positioning the role of neoliberalism as a hegemony to knowledge production. According to Stephen Gill, power is “complicated, dense, and pervasive.” It cannot simply be posed in terms of legislation and constitution. Gill finds that the “system of power” takes more of a pyramid form, especially when speaking to the “neoliberalization of truths” (Gill, 1995). The neoliberalization of truths refers to how the programming of legitimized truths has major implications to the world we live in today. For scholars like Ken Booth, sovereignty is disintegrating: “States are less able to perform their traditional functions [and] global factors increasingly impinge on all decisions made by governments” (cited in Lipschutz, 1992).

As I will show in further sections, these changes are largely the result of neoliberal capitalist ideology entrenched at the global level. Resulting from these changes, what we are increasingly seeing is the growing presence of a global civil society, which comprises of TAPGs like IFG and PRIA (Kadirbeyoglu et al., 2017). Especially in developing countries, governments are offloading responsibility to civil society organizations, or civil society organizations are emerging because of delivery gaps within national governments.

The Neoliberalization of Knowledge Production

The free-market ideologies of neoliberal capitalism have been incredibly pervasive within the international arena, often as the dominant rationalization for economic globalization. According to Peck and Tickell (2002), “neoliberalism has provided a kind of operating framework or ‘ideological software’ for competitive globalization, inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of state restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts.” There have been three main policy cycles of neoliberal capitalism from the 1970s to the 1990s. The first cycle consisted of the “experimental proto-neoliberalisms” of the 1970s, this was followed by the Reaganomics of the 1980s, and the Washington Consensus of the 1990s (ibid.). The endurance of neoliberal capitalism throughout the three policy cycles demonstrate that, despite the flaws in its first two cycles, neoliberal capitalism is self-sustaining due to its constant mutations. In its current policy cycle, neoliberal capitalism is normalized and inaccessible, shifting all power to the technocratic elite in government. Things that were once hotly debated, such as trade policy or interest rates, are now left to the “higher-ups.”

However, there has been growing dissent regarding neoliberal capitalism, especially since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which was the direct result of the political and economic shifts of the neoliberal era. The crisis has led to a growing realization that global capitalism could be a highly unstable and crisis-ridden system. Neoliberal capitalism appealed to individual desires to betterment — the idea of the market, for neoliberal supporters, was to make the individual freer as the market gave agency (ibid.). Yet, since the crisis, the implementation of austerity measures has now long been part of the “neoliberal repertoire.” These measures often included the “fiscal purge” of the social state, deriving from a base neoliberal motive “to roll back the frontiers of the state” (Peck, 2012). Yet, with the social state reduced, when financial crises did occur, some nations were hit harder than others and inequalities between and within nations became more pronounced.

Unfortunately, after decades of reinventing itself, neoliberal capitalism has positioned itself to be above reproach. One of the most critical aspects of the current policy cycle of neoliberal capitalism is that it is punitive. Peck calls our current policy cycle “deep neoliberalism” as it has the controversial title of being a “regulatory project” or “regime” (Peck & Tickell, 2002). It is this punitive characteristic that, even in the face of repeated financial crises, manages to erode “pockets of political and institutional resistance to neoliberal hegemony” (ibid.).

Positioning the Role of TAPGs

TAPGs can be positioned to expose internal contractions in the system, but as I will show in the sections below, in the battle for knowledge production, neoliberal policy groups are currently much more cohesive than alternative policy groups. This “sparse networking” of TAPGs is largely due to resource disparities, “as well as a hierarchal mode of organization that makes elite integration common practice” (Carroll, 2016b). These structural constraints
may be part of the reason that TAPGs are currently operating the way they do: only around 2.3% of TAPGs define their knowledge production as anti-capitalist (Sapinski, 2016).

The mobilization of TAPGs in the South — that were formed due to a mobilization of counter-thought — and the ability of some TAPGs in the South to form strategic linkages with TAPGs in the Global North and South, as will be elaborated further below, show that globalization has created a discursive space that allows for marginalized actors from the South to engage with the current academic literature and produce counter-narratives. However, as articulated by Habermas, a critical theorist who focused on the social transformations of Western societies, the “indissoluble tension between capitalism and democracy generate an “irresistible inner dynamic,” which disfavours the life-world as the site of communicative rationality and democratic self-determination” (Wellmer, 2014). Due to the pervasive neoliberalization of knowledge on a systemic level, it is difficult for TAPGs to gain traction and produce revolutionary change.

Emergence Contexts and Organizational Frameworks of IFG and PRIA

IFG was founded in 1994, shortly after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, in the wake of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which preceded the World Trade Organization (WTO; Coburn, 2016). When NAFTA was signed in 1993, “jobs were displaced in every state and major industry in the United States, with two thirds of lost jobs being from the manufacturing sector” (Scott & Ratner, 2005). In opposition to NAFTA, IFG emerged as a North–South “research, advocacy, and action organization focused on the impacts of dominant economic and geopolitical policies” (International Forum on Globalization, 2018).

Over time, IFG transformed from a “top-heavy” organization of high-profile thinkers into a knowledge producing organization comprising of “leading activists, economists, scholars, and researchers” from the international Left (Coburn, 2016). A small-scale organization, IFG seems to get its funding from independent donations and charitable foundations; this allows them more freedom in what they choose to address (International Forum on Globalization, 2018). However, as a result of a recent funding crisis in the wake of 2008, IFG is active on only two programmatic fronts (Coburn, 2016). This is not uncommon for alternative policy groups. As stated by J.P. Sapinski (2016), “in the best of times, alternative policy groups are challenged by the disjuncture between the counter-hegemonic aspects of their work and the predominant priorities of funding institutions.” Due to their own divergent interests, many foundations and other funding channels have no interest in funding the “counter-hegemony.”

IFG core programs are addressed primarily at the structural inequalities within the United States, strategizing and producing interventions concerning geopolitics and class that are arguably pronounced within the USA. According to IFG Executive Director Victor Menotti, the main strategy of the IFG is “listening about what the needs are of groups on the ground…to strengthen them, to build power with other constituencies to speak truth to power, to find platforms to speak to power — to make informed appeals for change” (Coburn, 2016).

There has been plenty of scholarship on the multiple inequalities in the United States. In Desmond’s article, The Eviction Economy, he talked about how poverty in the United States is not an “unintended consequence” but a direct by-product of an exploitative culture in the present economy that ultimately reaps from and systematically constructs the poverty of its surplus population2 (Desmond, 2016). Another article by Laura Pulido exposed intersections of environmental racism and racial capitalism within the poisoning of water in Flint, Michigan — stating that the Flint disaster was ultimately the result “of the local state acting within the context of neoliberalism” (Pulido, 2016). And who could forget Martin Luther King Jr’s last presidential address to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which he began with, “There are forty million poor people here, and one day we must ask the question, ‘Why are there forty million poor people in America?’” (cited in LaMothe, 2015).

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2 Referring to Marx’s idea of “reserved army of labour” in Chapter 25 of Das Kapital
The other TAPG I focus on, PRIA, was established in 1982 and advocates and contributes to domestic strategies of national economic management. Unlike IFG, the emergence of PRIA was not in response to a specific policy or event. Rather, PRIA seems to have emerged in response to gaps in national governance, working with the government to build capacity in areas tied to social welfare and the improvement of livelihoods. This is evident in the 2016 annual report, where PRIA talks about its role in “making democracy work for all” in an “increasingly uncertain world” where there is “growing, visible and troubling inequality — of wealth, income, opportunity, access to basic services, [and] well-being” (PRIA, 2016).

PRIA prides itself on being the pioneer of participatory research. On their website, PRIA finds that, “in bringing about social change among the marginalised in India… it is PRIA’s experience that promoting inclusive development requires enabling poor and marginalised citizens to be aware of their rights and responsibilities” (PRIA, 2010). Nationally based, PRIA has field offices in eight states, with linkages with 3000 NGOs, to help deliver its programmes (ibid.). It calls itself an “international centre for learning and promotion of participation and democratic governance,” with key initiatives focusing on capacity building, knowledge building, participatory research, and citizen-centric development. PRIA has five core programmes: Youth in Democracy, The Dignity of My Labour, Engaged Citizens, Responsive City, #morethanjustbrides, and Child Friendly Smart Mandalas.

A fundamental difference in PRIAs organizational framework is its focus on gender-equality and its additional capacity as a training institute. While IFG is mainly focused on raising awareness, PRIA states its mission is to improve the capacities and functioning of government institutions, “rather than merely pin-pointing the [weaknesses]” (ibid.). While IFG exposes through knowledge, PRIA does not “whistleblow,” but use knowledge to build local capacity. For instance, established in 2005, the PRIA International Academy is the “intellectual arm of PRIA” and provides courses for mid-level development professionals: “informal adult learners who have an interest in development issues; and fresh graduates searching for a career in the development sector” (PRIA 2010).

Analysis of IFG Plutonomy and Climate Program

This program levels the blame of United States’ paralysis of climate policy on an “increasingly few, stupendously wealthy plutocrats,” who suffocate “traditional democratic expressions” like collective bargaining rights and clean air protections” (International Forum on Globalization, 2018). To fight this “neo-feudalism,” IFG has recently used the Plutonomy program to target two American carbon billionaires, Charles and David Koch (ibid.). In its 2012 Report, Faces Behind a Global Crisis, that was prepared for United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC’s) Doha Climate Change Conference, also known as COP 18, IFG states that the objective of the report is to “inform more global awareness and increase public pressure on the US actors stopping solutions to today’s climate crisis” (Hellberg et al., 2012). The report picks from an earlier December 2011 report, Outing the Oligarchy, that was published for COP 17 in Durban, South Africa that also names the Koch Brothers for their undue influence on climate policy.

The report addresses two known gaps in finding a climate change solution: the lack of public awareness of the ultra-wealthy and the absence of understanding how the Koch brothers’ actions have global impacts. In this latest report, IFG mentions how the US was called out for being the “spoiler of progress” during negotiations of several environmental groups, activists, and elected officials during COP 17 in Durban (Hellberg et al., 2012). As well, during the 2012 global talks in Bonn and Bangkok, despite a backdrop of high global emissions and increasing extreme weather events, commitment to reduce emissions from majorly industrialised countries continued to be largely absent (ibid.).

Through repeated interactions with the UNFCCC, an international environmental treaty, the IFG Plutonomy and Climate program is waging what Carroll and Ratner (2010) called a “war of position.” By flipping the script and disseminating counter-knowledge, IFG “shifts the balance of forces, opening space for radical alternatives and

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3 COP stands for ‘Conference of the Parties.’ UNFCCC’s COPs are international climate change conferences that occur annually.

4 It was additionally mentioned in the report that the US had also experienced “historic heat, deepening drought, epic floods, and new “Superstorms,” such as Sandy.
articulating dissenting groups into a system of alliances capable of contesting bourgeois hegemony” (ibid.). To gather the most support from the general public, the Plutonomy and Climate Program, uses “naming and shaming,” a popular strategy that has been used by nongovernmental organizations, news media, and international organizations. This strategy is generally effective to highlight the undue influence of the Koch Brothers, who, like other power players, tend to operate through “shadow governance.” Nonetheless, although Plutonomy and Climate is commended for its proactive engagement with international institutions, the program has low impact in producing change due to some pitfalls associated with the shaming strategy and minimal programmatic response to the issue at hand.

As noted by Taebi and Safari (2017), the shaming strategy has been used frequently against major corporations regarding their production of greenhouse gases. However, this strategy does not necessarily lead to compliance, especially when institutions cannot follow-up the shaming with penalties or legally imposed duties. As corporations are often closely tied to states, shaming strategies, when acted on by international institutions, can lead to a “race to the bottom,” with standards meant to enforce climate change regulations deteriorating to appease climate-negligent corporations (ibid.). Although shaming is a good method to increase public awareness, it does little to attack the structures that allow elites like the Koch Brothers to have so much influence.

It is becoming increasingly hard for civil society organizations, like IFG, to make a mark on these elite groups, especially if they are small organizations with insecure funding. Within the Plutonomy and Climate Program, IFG is facing a “funding paradox.” On the one hand, organizations that have minimal funding needs are at an advantage because they have freedom of press. For the Plutonomy and Climate Program, this means being able to publicly shame certain power players, or whistleblower harmful practices. However, in order to reach a wider audience and continue to develop relevant programmes and outputs, procuring funding becomes more appealing. Many TAPGs are facing the challenge of “having to do more, given the challenges and opportunities just reviewed, with less” (Sapinski, 2016). For alternative policy groups like IFG, this may make it seem that they must be dependent on some of the very institutions in the system they want to critique.

This paradoxical scenario is itself a symptom of neoliberal capitalism. Often termed the “neoliberalization of civil society,” civil society organizations themselves become gatekeepers for national and global governance, often preventing “more radical and exceptional ideas” from being disseminated into the public sphere (ibid.). Although global civil society is growing and TAPGs continue to emerge, they face a hostile funding environment and compete for resources. As well, donor priorities are constantly shifting. For bilateral donors, “the political, strategic, personnel, and economic factors that influence funding decisions are always changing, bringing inevitable shifts in funding levels among countries, programme areas, and recipient organizations” (Parks, 2008). This causes fluctuations in funding for those CSO’s that qualify for funding.

Considering that the odds are stacked against programmes like Plutonomy and Climate, starting a dialogue and engaging with the UNFCCC at least keeps the conversation going. However, to stay relevant, this programme must rely more on solidarity networks. Building solidarity relationships are key to producing counter-hegemonic blocs more capable of weathering the neoliberalization of civil society and actively fighting against the hegemonic elite. Solidarity-building ought to be characteristic of TAPGs, as they are transnational in nature, but this is not always the case. Regarding Plutonomy and Climate, tracking and exposing the corruption of private money through a handful of reports is little more than a smear campaign and does little to revert the global paralysis in climate change policy.

One of IFG’s greatest successes was through solidarity networking. During the 1999 Battle in Seattle, IFG teach-ins armed activists with critical analyses of capitalist globalization. In January 1999, the City of Seattle was selected to host the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference. On the weekend, just prior to the WTO meeting, IFG held a two-day teach-in at Benaroya Hall in downtown Seattle. This teach-in focused on how countries could maintain autonomy in the face of globalization. As described by Paul Hawken (2000), who provides a first-hand account of the Battle in Seattle: “More than 2,500 people from around the world attended. A similar number were turned away. It was an extravagant display of research, intelligence, and concern, expressed by scholars, diplomats, writers, academics, fishermen, scientists, farmers, geneticists, businesspeople, and lawyers.”
Prior to the teach-in, individual CSOs had been issuing papers and communiqués but they were almost entirely ignored by the WTO (ibid.). Yet, this direct engagement with local activists catalyzed one of the largest protests ever seen in Seattle, that may have demonstrated “what it takes to create real and meaningful change” (Engler, 2008). Engler articulates that, today, as a result of civil society movements like the Battle in Seattle, “trade talks at the WTO are in shambles, sister institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are now shrivelled versions of their once-imposing selves, and the ideology of neoliberal corporate globalization is under intense fire” (ibid.).

**Analysis of PRIA Engaged Citizens, Responsive City (ECRC) Program**

While the IFG Plutonomy and Climate program targets the “global,” PRIA’s ECRC program builds the “local.” ECRC is a four-year long intervention supported by the European Union that focuses on “strengthening civil society of the urban poor to participate in planning and monitoring of sanitation services” (PRIA, 2010). This intervention is in response to the rapid urbanization occurring within India that is straining local services. In order to lessen the strain, ECRC advocates for civil society, so they can be included as stakeholders in the planning and monitoring of civic services. Their main strategy is bridging “practitioner and scientific knowledge, creating dialogical engagements that empower marginalized people” (Carroll, 2016a).

Currently, civil society in urban India is largely fragmented along lines of caste, class, and gender. For instance, middle-class India “does not appreciate the contribution of the urban poor; rather they see the as the main cause for the unsanitary conditions in cities” (ibid.). This is where ECRC comes in. ECRC is a capacity-building program, designed to facilitate engagement between the urban poor and municipalities, to improve service delivery and meet the needs of the rising urban population. Currently, the proposed project, which will be implemented from 2016–2019, runs across three cities in India — Ajmer in Rajasthan, Jhansi in Uttar Pradesh, and Muzaffarpur in Bihar — and uses capacity-building services to enable the urban poor to be more active citizens and increase their standing in community planning meetings. ECRC, like other PRIA programmes, is gender-mainstreamed. Thus, one of the target groups are front-line women sanitation workers and one of their specific objectives is to empower these workers to realise the “dignity of their labour” (ibid.).

In a 2017 report titled *Engaged Citizens, Responsive Cities: Stories of Change*, success stories from the ECRC project are documented. Some actions that the project took are highlighted in the report: "engaging the urban poor, organising them through Settlement Improvement Committees (SICs) in each informal settlement, [and] training young women and men SIC members to take leadership” (PRIA, 2017). By mobilizing the demands of the citizens, it is found that their municipalities are becoming more responsive to their needs. One case they mention is that of Bijoli, a settlement populated largely by tribal inhabitants. Although the community of Bijoli was skeptical of the formation of a SIC, once they were assured of the project’s sustainable approach, they came together to from a SIC comprised of eight men, six women, and nine youth (PRIA, 2017). The members had success in having the community hand-pump repaired and advocated collectively for improvement to drain systems and the need for roads in the settlement. In May 2017, their bargaining with officials had some degree of success, as construction of a road and drains commenced (ibid.). Their sense of achievement and self-belief instilled in them the desire to oversee the development of their community and tackle future community issues together.

As part of ECRC, PRIA collaborated with the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) to organize a daylong National Conference titled “Social Innovations for Improving Urban Sanitation: Lessons for Scaling-up” in New Delhi. This collaboration was part of a larger collaboration between PRIA and CPR, as well as twelve non-government and not-for-profit organizations. The conference thus served to increase the knowledge capacity for CSOs, as PRIA and CPR worked to collate information from multiple initiatives to “identify patterns that link challenges to solutions across regions.” Asides from these local solidarity networks and conferences, as of now, the EU has funded 410, 912 euros for the ECRC project (PRIA, 2010).

As mentioned, PRIA stated in its 2016 annual report that it seeks to make “democracy work for all” in a world of “growing, visible, and troubling inequality” of wealth, opportunity and well-being (PRIA, 2016). When this goal is analysed within the frame of ECRC, initially I found that PRIAs approach was too subdued. While
ECRC tries to empower vulnerable urban populations and increase their self-confidence, they do not up the ante when the state does not appear to address local demands. Where was the ECRC shame campaign against the Municipal Corporation that kept delaying building infrastructure in this disinvested community?

However, the question, as well analyzing ECRC, becomes more complicated when we consider that ECRC’s main objective may have been more about increasing the self-confidence and resilience of vulnerable urban communities than campaigning against government officials. This can be viewed as a strategic choice, given the current funding crisis that has affected many TAPGs. Compounded with the lack of founding, TAPGs face a “crisis of imagination” that restricts formulating counter-hegemonic imaginaries. Kastuv Bandyopadhyay, the Director of Society for PRIA, states: “This paradigm needs to change, and all these decisions [that] resulted in the food crisis or environmental crisis or economic crisis combined is a governance crisis; it’s a global governance crisis” (Carroll, 2016a). For PRIA, who are aware of the issues with the current paradigm of global governance, improving local capacity inherently works against a neoliberal form of individualism (ibid.). While this may be a more passive form of resistance, the ECRC is commended for strengthening 250 organizations and training 5000 women and youth (PRIA, 2017).

**Overall Comparisons**

The Plutonomy and Climate program revealed a weakness of TAPGs in North America: their reluctance to form solidarity networks. This reluctance is indeed symptomatic for most TAPGs within the Global North. According to Carroll and Sapinski (2013), TAPGs in the Global North, like IFG, tend to operate on more of a marginal level than other TAPGs. Carroll and Sapinski did a thorough study of 16 TAPGs including IFG and PRIA, situating how central they work in a network of 3977 INGOs. Generally, TAPGs in the Global South are much more “extroverted” than TAPGs in the Global North, forming South–South and North–South linkages while North-based TAPGs may be hesitant to work with those in the South and refrain from working closely with other CSOs in the Global North (Sapinski, 2016). However, these traits are not set in stone, especially in the case of IFG.

For IFG, its more reclusive tendencies as of late are a stark contrast to its role in the 1999 Battle in Seattle and has resulted in its programs having considerably less impact. Carroll and Sapinski (2013) have theorized that there has been a “fissure” in the global networks, which are currently more factionalized than they were in the 1990s likely due to the impact of the neoliberalization of civil society. However, these so-called “fissures” only necessitate that TAPGs like IFG reinvent themselves or perish. Despite its reputation as a leading educational and research organization, IFG almost folded recently due to a lack of funding and thus had to severely reduce its programmatic front (Coburn, 2016). If IFG had been better equipped through the years with strategic alliances, this may not have been the case.

On the other hand, TAPGs operating from a localized standpoint, especially Global South TAPGs like PRIA, have seen more modest alternative knowledge programming “due to difficulties from moving from subalternity to counter-hegemony” (ibid.). The reluctance for North–South partnership on the part of Global North TAPGs is partly to blame. In the absence of these linkages, TAPGs like PRIA must rely on external funding. PRIA sought funding from the EU for its ECRC program. While the ECRC program had its merits, aligning with the EU meant being less creative with the programming as “funders increasingly target specific programs and insist upon measurable impact” (Sapinski, 2016).

The North/South distinction is part of neoliberal capitalism’s dominant narrative of purposeful exclusion that tilt global markets against the South. According to Gita Sen, the General Coordinator for Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, another Global South based TAPG, the North/South distinction continues to create issues within civil society: “You look at the inequalities, exclusions, marginalizations. Some of them are identity-based exclusions … that’s why seminars, workshops with allies are important — that’s how you create the counter-story. We have to be actually talking to each other” (Coburn, 2016).
Concluding Remarks

Although both the IFG and PRIA program analyzed above are far from perfect, the gains they have made and the strategies they have used show how TAPGs can play a key role in shrinking the social space of the elite. For IFG’s Plutonomy and Climate program, engaging with the UNFCCC global climate change discussions was a “war of position.” Tracking “Koch Cash,” or the undue influence of “private money,” started a dialogue that used the ‘Doha Deadlock’ to expose the true nature of climate change paralysis amongst global governance institutions. The publications disseminated as part of the Plutonomy and Climate program were counter-hegemonic imaginaries — alternative visions and policies to globalization that were more “sustainable for people and the planet” (International Forum on Globalization, 2018).

PRIA, on the other hand, has truly cultivated a strong network with other CSOs that has helped it to deliver grassroots programs that are in-tune with local concerns. In the ECRC project, PRIA’s strong background in participatory research helped it connect better to the urban poor population its project sought to help. While PRIA operates on more constraints than IFG due to being managed by external funders, its focus on South–South solidarity networks is integral to an alternative post-colonial imaginary of the Global South, while its focus on fostering equitable democracy is a passive resistance to a system that is built on unequal development.

Nonetheless, analysis of Plutonomy and Climate and ECRC have demonstrated the impact of the fragmented relationships between Global North and Global South TAPGs. This fragmentation has led to a less cohesive counter-hegemonic front that has led to many TAPGs struggling for survival in an environment that is ultimately set against them — amidst hostile funding environments and having to be complicit within a system they are trying to critique. Part of the issue is a reluctance on the part of Global North TAPGs to align with TAPGs in the Global South due to a continued dichotomy of North/South. This dichotomy has proven to be the undoing of a unified counter-hegemonic front, as TAPGs continue to operate as fragile, small pockets of resistance. A cohesive form of intellectual leadership is necessary to rebuild movements and structures of resistance so that the ends of alternative knowledge can be utilized towards a justice-based globalism.
References


Abstract — This article argues that Green Militarization, the use of military and paramilitary actors in the pursuit of conservation (Lunstrum, 2014), is most effective with the involvement of local communities as one instrument in combating environmental issues. The arguments used to demonstrate this emphasize the great dependence humans have on endangered species and their environment, the aid locals can provide to conservation operations, and the risk of human settlements being encroached if conservation is effective without local involvement. This paper will offer examples of effective conservation programs in West Bengal and Nepal. Militarized conservation programs based on the ideas of coexistence and respect of all species not only benefit the region and its non-human species, but also lead to improved human conditions.

Keywords: Conservation; green militarization; coexistence; local involvement; environmental degradation; endangered species; anthropocene; security.

Résumé — Cet article soutient que la militarisation verte, l’utilisation d’acteurs militaires et paramilitaires dans la poursuite de la conservation (Lunstrum, 2014), est plus efficace lorsqu’elle implique les communautés locales en tant qu’instrument de lutte contre les défis environnementaux. Les arguments utilisés pour démontrer cette affirmation mettent en évidence la grande dépendance des humains vis-à-vis les espèces menacées et leur environnement, l’aide que les populations locales peuvent apporter aux opérations de conservation et le risque que les établissements humains soient affectés si la conservation est efficace en l’absence de participation locale. Cet article offrira des exemples de programmes de conservation efficaces au Bengale-Occidental et au Népal. Les programmes de conservation militarisés fondés sur les idées de la coexistence et du respect de toutes les espèces profitent non seulement à la région et à ses espèces non humaines, mais mènent également à de meilleures conditions humaines.

Mots-clés : Conservation; militarisation verte; coexistence; participation locale; dégradation de l’environnement; espèces en voie de disparition; anthropocène; sécurité.

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Introduction

The world is currently facing negative effects of climate change, including a rise in extinction and ecosystem destruction. To put biodiversity loss into perspective, “human activity has increased the extinction rate by at least 100 times compared to the natural rate” (Biodiversity, n.d.). With a decline in biodiversity, humans are exposed to food insecurity, vulnerability to natural disasters, energy insecurity, and a lack of access to clean water; as a result of these exposures, security scholars explore and critique the techniques used to combat and prevent climate change’s negative impacts. Conservation is an important means to protect species threatened by climate change. Green Militarization is a method of conservation using military and paramilitary actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships (Lunstrum, 2014). National armies play a key role in conservation programs in countries such as Guatemala, Columbia, Nepal, Indonesia, South Africa and Botswana (Lunstrum, 2014). The relationship between conservation and military is not new but has experienced a major shift in its history. Changes in militarized conservation programs have been attributed to technological advancements, as well as a rise in participatory approaches with the direct involvement of human communities. Large investments have been made in the field of Green Militarization: the European Commission provided over 30 million euros to the Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1988 to 2015 (Marijnen, 2017); the United States government granted US$24 million to fund a “global system of regional wildlife enforcement networks” in South Africa; and Google donated US$5 million to the World Wildlife Fund for surveillance drones in sites of commercialized poaching (Lunstrum, 2014).

Basis for Local Involvement in Green Militarization

Acknowledged by few scholars, there is a lack of research on the effectiveness of Green Militarization, what makes it successful, and how it impacts surrounding human settlements. This paper argues that Green Militarization, whether or not it is better than any other conservation method, can only be effective with the support of local human communities. The argument in favour of military involvement in conservation emerges from the concept of the state monopoly over violence; “the state alone has the right to use or authorize the use of physical force” (Munro, 2013). Poaching is an ungoverned form of violence against the state’s natural resources and therefore a state solution through the use of military is a consistent means to combat poaching. The following paper will outline the methods and evidence to show that local involvement is necessary for Green Militarization to be successful. First the article will discuss how local populations are the most dependent on conservation territory, how military units and locals can work together effectively, as well as the consequences of Green Militarization programs without local populations’ involvement. Next, the paper will offer an explanation of a theoretical framework based on First Nations’ thought, followed by a literature review, a case study on Nepal and West Bengal, and a personal analysis on militarized conservation.

In the case of conservation programs failing, the surrounding human communities are one of the main actors negatively affected. Locals can face high levels of insecurity including unemployment, food insecurity, and possible forced migration. The dependence local communities have on their environment can be illustrated by the benefits they receive when successful conservation programs are implemented. Bajracharya et al. (2008) noted institutional and infrastructure development, improved water resources, as well as higher levels of health and sanitation in various projects around the world. In terms of employment opportunities, locals have observed the emergence of ecotourism, including safaris, tours or hotels. Thapa et al. (2013) report that new forms of ecotourism promote investment into conservation strategies as well as encourage the locals to support the programs in the region; the support comes from the economic opportunities the tourists bring to the region, leading to higher employment opportunities and growth in the economy. It should be noted that surrounding populations do not always encourage conservation programs in order to stabilize biodiversity but perhaps to secure economic or political objectives (Chicchon, 2000). The point of conservation should be focused on creating societies that are stable in coexistence, leading to the recognition of all actors’ objectives. Human settlements are extremely reliant on their natural environment and this is illustrated by the large impact successful conservation programs have on societies.

In general, the more dependence a community has on something the more they will want to protect it. Kharel and Fanindra Raj (2012, p. 27) state that locals know that “overexploitation, poaching and illegal collection
of any taxa will ultimately threaten its survival.” Humans are dependent on the environment in which they live and in recognizing this, we will ultimately become more secure. Chicchon (2000, p. 1368) recognizes the importance conservation plays in locals’ security stating that “rural peoples are and should be allies of biodiversity conservation not only because it is a basic human right but because they are the ones who have the most to lose if the resources they depend on are depleted.” By observing the intertwined securities that exist in conservation programs, it is clear that a secure environment results in healthier and more stable human communities. All species intensely rely on their local environments for security; so, human settlements should be considered main actors in any local projects based on environmental protection. Because of interconnected dependencies participatory militarized conservation projects can improve the lives of multiple species, simultaneously. To further the argument of humans needing to recognize their dependence on the environment and other species, we need to question what will happen without this awareness. It may be that a Green Militarization program is effective in a specific region, but what will happen if the region’s human population continues to disrespect local endangered species? The species may increase but due to the lack of appreciation from the local human population, it is very likely that the endangered species’ population will decrease repeatedly. Involvement of the local community is crucial due to the large impact their lack of consideration of endangered species can have on the vulnerable group’s rejuvenation.

In most Green Militarization programs, the parks are patrolled by humans armed with guns, searchlights, and radio systems (Martin, 2006). The parks are guarded 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with the intensity of a military mission. Although the direct military protection could instill fear in poachers, deterring them from any illegal activity, poaching persists in areas lacking local support. Local involvement can take many different forms including offering intelligence, voluntary patrolling of protected areas, and actual employment. Because of the amount local communities have at stake in protecting their environment, Green Militarization receives a large amount of assistance from the residents. The first feature that local communities offer military units is intelligence. Martin (2006) states that “local people around the park appreciate the department’s activities for the community and will thus report potential rhino poachers entering Gorumara.” In this specific region, Martin (2006) also claims that rhino poaching has been completely eliminated because of the locals’ freely given intelligence. Acharya and Kandel (2012) offer the analogy that the “communities are acting as watch dogs for law enforcements processes and moral supports to enforcement authorities.” Due to the locals’ intelligence, the deaths of endangered species or the exploitation of resources can be prevented, due to early arrests and stable security.

The second component that locals offer militarized conservation units is watching the exterior of the protected areas voluntarily. Although the locals do not gain any financial compensation for their work, individuals will act as patrollers in order to help the military units (Martin, 2006). This leads to further protection as they have workers on the inside and volunteers on the outside working hard in order to safeguard the park. While the locals patrol the protected areas, they offer aid in removing any traps, turning over illegal firearms as well as facilitating operations against poachers (Acharya & Kandel, 2012). The act of locals patrolling leads to greater amounts of individuals protecting the park, helping to increase endangered species’ populations and reduce any exploitation of resources in the territory. Without the help of locals, Green Military operations would be ineffective in gathering intelligence on local criminals, dismantling traps where the animals roam outside of the protected areas, as well as having large numbers of employees.

Another factor of conservation that needs to be recognized is the growth and expansion that appears if the program is successful. Once a species’ population experiences an increase in numbers, the amount of territory and resources that are needed also rise. The perspective and involvement of local communities is thereby crucial because species will expand into the surrounding human-dominated territory. If the conservation in a specific area is successful, the surrounding human populations can experience livestock depredation, crop damage and physical injuries from the increasing populations of megafauna (Bajracharya et al., 2008). Because of the need to protect endangered species, the local communities need to understand the complexity of coexistence. Bajracharya et al. (2008) as well as Thapa et al. (2013) recognize compensation as the easiest way to reduce conflict between human and the protected species. The disturbances that can appear from the expansion of conservation projects need to be prepared for. Any damage that the communities experience should be paid for, alleviating any harm done to individuals, crops or livestock. Thapa et al. (2013) suggest an “incentive structure associated with the conservation,” leveling out the cost-benefit ratio of having a conservation program close to human settlements. Another option is
to allow the locals greater access to the parks’ resources. By granting locals access to the park, it promotes greater coexistence and support of the projects. Some of the incentives that can be offered to the local settlements include thatch grass collection, providing dead woods free of cost, conservation education, and a buffer zone program (Kharel et al., 2012). All four of these incentives allow the local community greater involvement as well as understanding of the militarized conservation. By advocating for their engagement, locals will appreciate and respect the project, leading to more involvement and support. Local human settlements are affected by conservation projects and by recognizing and preparing for this through compensation and greater access to resources, there will be more involvement, work, and support that the locals give to the project.

**Theoretical Framework**

The theory used in the following paper comes from the teachings of the Canadian First Nations. These teachings have been passed on for hundreds of years and were discredited during colonization. Not only do they allow for a conservation method centered on local populations but they also acknowledge the interdependence humans have on their surroundings. Canada has diverse Indigenous groups and it is important to recognize that worldviews across Indigenous groups are varied. In a process of reconciliation and healing with Canadian Indigenous peoples, it is important to acknowledge how valuable these ideas are, and how they should be adopted in a connection to the environment; Indigenous beliefs should not be exploited but shared in an appropriate manner.

Although Indigenous worldviews vary across Canada, a core principle of many groups is the idea of interconnectedness. Because of this interconnectedness, humans are not meant to dominate all other species but act as a part of “the Great Sacred Circle — the circle of relationships” (Abel, Sioui, & Brierley, 2000). Many Indigenous circle societies in Canada recognized the “fundamental and sacred unity of all things created” (Abel et al., 2000). A growing idea is that of the Medicine Wheel which “represents harmony and connections and is considered a major symbol of peaceful interaction among all living beings on Earth” (Native American Medicine Wheel, n.d.).

A large part of the Medicine Wheel idea comes from the circular structures found in Earth’s natural environment. The circular structure of the wheel can be found in the changing of seasons, the spinning of the Earth, and the dependence each species has on one another. This symbol is used by some Indigenous peoples to display a “cyclical nature of all relationships and interactions,” recognizing that “Everything in the universe is part of a single whole” (Native American Medicine Wheel, n.d.). In a relational context the Medicine Wheel believes that there are consequences for every action and in understanding these repercussions humans can care for their surroundings better (Wenger, 2010). In separating communities (human or non-human), a disruption occurs in the balance of the circle and all beings involved are affected (Wenger, 2010).

Adopting these teachings in the conversation of how to protect other species allows for a disengagement from an anthropocentric perspective. It should not be possible to talk about the protection of other species while viewing the world centered on humans. Using the Medicine Wheel and Cyclical beliefs of some First Nations peoples allows for a focus on balance, coexistence, and responsibility. Transferring these teachings to a discussion on conservation instructs humans to respect the rights of all beings while recognizing the importance of diversity. The First Nations teach of the large impact species have on one another, obligating humans to protect and act in respect of other species.

**Literature Review**

The literature on the topic of Green Militarization is very contested due to the lack of research and unclear findings. All of the articles surveyed call for an increase in research and most scholars, including Duffy (2014) and Lunstrum (2014), agree that the current findings are unclear. However, even without a large amount of research completed, some scholars do not believe Green Militarization is an effective form of conservation (Duffy, 2014; Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016). It is argued that this type of conservation does not directly fight the underlying causes of resource depletion and poaching, such as international trade systems and wildlife commodification, resulting in the discrediting of the field. Specifically, Lunstrum (2014), as well as Duffy (2014) give an introduction to Green Militarization: its justifications, consequences, and its role in national and global institutions. Marijnen (2017) as well as Marijnen and Verweijen (2016) discuss the business of Green Militarization, in terms of the role of...

Green Militarization should continue to be researched, but with a focus on involvement of local communities in militarized conservation. The important gap that the scholars previously mentioned did not discuss is the role surrounding communities can play in these projects. Kharel (2012), Martin (2006), Bajracharya et al. (2008), as well as Thapa et al. (2013) look at the successes of Green Militarization in Nepal and the role local populations had in achieving that success. Following, Acharya and Kandel (2012) and Chicchon (2000) offer realistic roles that locals can have in militarized conservation, such as patrolling and offering intelligence. This paper will fill gaps in the current literature by incorporating a holistic theoretical framework that takes into account the impacts of involvement on the community itself, and the necessity of a societal shift in surrounding human settlements. Whether Green Militarization is the best form of conservation or not, this paper will argue that militarized conservation can only be successful with the involvement of surrounding human communities. The definition of success in a Green Militarization context is found in this paper’s Theoretical Framework: building societies and conservation programs assembled on coexistence and alliance, furthering the recognition of each actors’ objectives.

Local involvement in Green Militarization can help address many of the critiques found in the literature. One of the main critiques that have been made in regards to militarized conservation is that scholars believe it is dangerous to militarize the conversation on biodiversity. Duffy (2014) found that 90% of major armed conflicts have taken place in countries that contain biodiversity hotspots. Because of this, she questions whether conservation should also become a place of war when there are already high chances of conflict appearing. Duffy (2014) explains that she believes it is problematic to intersect conservation with war and conflict. An example she offers is the use of the political norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This term appeared in the early 2000s and mainly refers to humanitarian intervention, encouraging states to intervene when evidence of human rights violations appear. As an example of international intervention in the form of conservation, foreign mercenaries have been utilized in conservation programs such as French mercenaries in the Central African Republic protecting elephant populations (Lunstrum, 2014). Similar to the questions of intervention to save human lives, R2P can become problematic in conservation because it is unclear which species and resources should be seen as needing intervention and whether or not conservation should be militarized. Duffy problematizes the use of R2P as she believes actors “enter into conservation areas willing to engage in deadly force, and what follows is an inevitable cycle of militarization” (Duffy, 2014). It is clear that militarized conservation alone does not bring an end to poaching and so violence continues to appear. Also, in maintaining a Medicine Wheel mindset R2P is an invalid reasoning for Green Militarization due to its promotion of human exceptionalism. There needs to be a societal shift on the importance of biodiversity and the protection of resources, rather than a simple military solution. Without a change in the way humans live, sustainability and coexistence cannot appear. The Indigenous Medicine Wheel, as a theoretical framework, furthers this argument as it is a way of life for circle societies, not only a strategy of control over violence.

As a further critique, Green Militarization creates a binary of poacher versus ranger (Duffy, 2014; Marijnen, 2017). The poacher is viewed as a secretive and evil actor, whereas the ranger is seen as a protector and hero. Duffy (2014) believes that because of the creation of a simple image of an evil poacher, a military approach is seen as a necessity in order to combat a secretive and unknown actor. She discusses the use of a shoot-to-kill tactic where the heavily armed poacher is killed on site. The life of the poacher is seen as unimportant because of the negative images that surround them. It is important to recognize that situations are much more complex than a simple binary. For instance, a person may become a poacher in order to feed their family, send their child to school, etc. There is not simplicity in the image of an individual and in order to support military operations, the recognition of individual agency is a necessity (Marijnen, 2017). Duffy (2014) offers the shoot-to-kill tactic as an example where it is not used as a defence mechanism but as a preventive measure in the face of the death of an endangered animal. In this sort of scenario, it should be noted that the poacher that is murdered has their own life and story. Perhaps their murder now leaves an entire family behind without economic security. This topic is extremely complex and Duffy
is accurate in critiquing this binary. Fortunately, with the involvement of local communities in conservation programs there would be stronger economic stability resulting in less of a necessity to poach. Local communities would also aid in preventing a shoot-to-kill scenario from ever happening with their help in providing intelligence and patrolling. The locals help to create preventive measures and the shoot-to-kill mechanism would be a last resort. The ensuing paper will offer a case study, followed by an analysis.

Case Study of Nepal and West Bengal

Nepal and West Bengal have been recognized as some of the most successful forms of militarized conservation, exemplifying coexistence and the involvement of local populations. Offering the case study of Nepal and West Bengal allows an analysis on the effective protection of resources and species, followed by the benefits local communities have experienced from the conservation programs.

West Bengal has experienced a gradual increase in rhino population since the introduction of local involvement in their militarized conservation; a rhino has not been poached since 1996 and the numbers have risen from a low of 26 to over 100 in 2006 (Martin, 2006), with recent numbers suggesting a population of 250 (Singh, 2015). Although other forms of poaching exist in the area, rhino poaching has been eliminated in the park of Gorumara. Most of the success in eliminating rhino-poaching has been due to the intelligence offered by local communities (Martin, 2006). Due to the large importance the conservation program plays in the stability of the locals’ livelihoods, they help in any way that they can. In the specific part of Gorumara in Bengal, the tactics of patrol, compensation to villagers for wildlife damage, and intelligence from the locals are directly linked to the success of their wildlife protection. Although the military units work hard in protecting the area, the locals and employers of the territory also work together in order to eliminate illegal activity (Martin, 2006).

In the specific case of Nepal, Kharel et al. (2012, p. 28) recognize that the “anti-poaching units are mainly successful due to the involvement of local communities.” Nepal began rhino anti-poaching tactics when the beginning of democracy appeared in the country in the 1950s with the initiation of several programmes including translocations of rhinos, armies with as many as 130 armed men, and the creation of sanctuaries (Thapa et al., 2013). By the late 1960s the rhino population had declined to below 100, creating an extremely threatened species even with the appearance of militarized conservation. With the population still vulnerable the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation created a nationwide programme in 2007 with the goal of gaining a political commitment to the protection of the species: Operation Unicornis (Thapa et al., 2013). Operation Unicornis allowed for a community-based intelligence network, projects centered on “community stewardship,” as well as the creation of “community-led anti-poaching teams” (Thapa et al., 2013). In the specific case of Nepal, “community stewardship” appeared through forestry projects which allowed locals to ecologically restore the corridors inhabited by the protected rhinos (Thapa et al., 2013). Thapa et al. (2013) state that “During the 5 years since the community-led anti-poaching units were established to patrol, and to protect wildlife in the corridors, there has been no evidence of poaching of rhinoceros in the Khata and Laljhadi corridors, despite heavy poaching in the protected areas.” The protected areas have also experienced a reduction in the depletion of natural resources, a regeneration of trees on degraded land and increased wildlife (Bajracharya et al., 2008). Fortunately, the surrounding human settlements have also benefited with a study finding that 78% of local residents surveyed reported that “basic infrastructure such as drinking water, trails, bridges and health facilities had improved following the conservation intervention”; 81.6% also reported the belief that economic opportunities had increased in the community (Bajracharya et al., 2008). Although livestock depredation was found to be an issue involved in these conservation tactics, it was found that 64–66% of local populations did not view livestock depredation as a serious issue (Bajracharya et al., 2008). The case of Nepal allows for an analysis of the effectiveness of Green Militarization before and after the involvement of the local community.

For both cases, it is important to understand the role of the poachers in relation to local communities. Even if a poacher is killed as a last resort in militarized conservation areas, their death could lead to distrust, and a decrease in local support of the conservation program (Lunstrum, 2014). In this sort of scenario, the military operation will then lose access to intelligence and voluntary troops on the ground. This emphasizes the importance that these conservation programs play in the life of the surrounding community. Fortunately, if the community lays great
importance on the species or resources, as displayed through the case studies of Nepal and West Bengal, individuals will not want to jeopardize the conservation project with poaching or resource exploitation; decreasing the potential of locals being killed in the protected areas. Clearly, the case studies of Nepal and West Bengal display the benefits biodiversity and human societies experience from participatory militarization conservation.

**Alternative Perspectives on Conservation Policies**

The Indigenous Medicine Wheel offers an interesting perspective on conservation because it creates a disconnect from the mainstream idea that humans are superior to non-human animals. The Medicine Wheel allows for a form of conservation built on coexistence, teamwork and tolerance. Humans are one actor in a much larger ecosystem and this point needs to be reiterated. In terms of coexistence, humans should dismantle their paternalistic strategy of conservation and act as a partner and ally to endangered species. By involving military operations in the conservation dialogue, we are encouraging humans to fight for biodiversity and environmental stability, advocating for work away from an anthropocentric mindset. I found that scholars questioned whether or not humans should risk their lives for other species. Similar to Green Militarization, humanitarian intervention asks whether or not some citizens should risk their lives for other citizens. I believe that this hierarchy should not exist. Of course, restrictions are crucial in the dialogue of intervention but as humans we have a responsibility to guard the land that we have previously destroyed as exemplified by the examples of West Bengal and Nepal. On the other hand, R2P is important to discuss because states can act out of their own self-interest in the name of humanitarian intervention or Green Militarization. International actors can encourage militarized conservation in order to gain access to resources, such as oil. Comparable to humanitarian intervention, these international interests need to be recognized and combated with the involvement of local communities. Although local actors can also act out of self-interest, as mentioned earlier, they also hold a high level of dependence on the resources. As a result, even if they act out of self-interest, their survival is dependent on the health of the environment; giving them a much higher level of responsibility.

Studying West Bengal and Nepal confirmed the amount of work local communities do in their regional conservation projects. This work included patrolling, offering intelligence as well as acting as “watch dogs” for law enforcement. I believe that part of the reason Green Militarization does not work without community support is because in order to make drastic changes, societal changes are needed. In these specific scenarios, the locals were able to collaborate with the military while offering support to the conservation programs. By appreciating and taking part in this process, locals gained an even stronger tie to their surrounding environment.

The Indigenous Medicine Wheel as well as modern-day social justice movements justify why humans should act as an ally to endangered species. Movements centered on the elimination of distinctions between humans (i.e., racism, sexism, ableism), combined with Medicine Wheel and cyclical knowledge enforce the need for further empathy between groups unknown to each other. Exemplified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN member states recognized the importance of equality and liberty, connecting to the Medicine Wheel’s traits of interdependence and coexistence. With modern-day social justice movements finally recognizing the importance of all humans, the Medicine Wheel’s teachings argue for the recognition of all species. Different humans offer different things; just as diverse species offer different things to the world. Humans often forget that they are animals as well and as history has taught us time and time again, one group ruling over all others simply does not work. Conservation and the involvement of locals in protecting endangered species asks humans to reassess our current involvement in the lives of other species.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have argued that Green Militarization can only be effective with the support and involvement of surrounding human settlements. More research on environmental sociology is crucial in the context of Green Militarization. How does local environmental sociology change with the implementation of militarized conservation? Do residents only recognize the necessity of a healthy environment in regards to their own survival or do they generally change their mindset to become more appreciative of the environment? Additional research could include analyzing their use of language, artistic communities and cultural ceremonies that display elements of
environmental sociology. This paper first recognized that locals were the actors most affected by instability in the environmental region. Locals depend on these specific areas for basic needs such as food and water, as well as income and employment. With a decline in the ecosystem’s health, the appearance of insecurity also appears in the human settlements. Next, I displayed the effectiveness of local involvement in patrolling and guarding specific areas. Finally, I explained that if Green Militarization were to be successful on its own, the resources and megafauna would expand and roam into the human settlements leading to unwanted conflict. In order to prevent and prepare for these scenarios, a strong relationship between the locals and military unit is a necessity.

The definition of security continues to be broadened with an emphasis now being placed on protecting ourselves from the consequences of climate change appearing in the form of mass extinction, resource depletion, loss of biodiversity, etc. In order to combat these types of issues, we need to have strong and effective conservation strategies. As an approach to issues caused by climate change, the shift and increasing use of Green Militarization needs to be analyzed. In the future, local involvement needs to be highlighted in militarized conservation programs in order to combat the elimination of megafauna and essential resources, which is crucial to the security of human and non-human species alike.
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Twitter and Institutional Change: 
Insights from Populist and Pluralist Discourses in Venezuela

ADRIANA FARIAS

Abstract — Should we take tweets from politicians seriously? This paper argues that tweets sent out from the accounts of the top political actors are important because they are framed within a worldview that looks to support or challenge the legitimacy of an institutional order. As Twitter provides a direct connection between the speaker and mass audiences, it offers political leaders a platform to articulate a worldview, justify democratic or undemocratic strategies for competition, and mobilize support across frontiers to influence the perception of power structures. The relationship between discourse and institutional legitimacy is especially important in systems like Venezuela’s where authoritarian and democratic practices coexist, meaning that the legitimacy of institutions largely depends on the agency of key actors in influencing the perception of what is considered to be democratic. Therefore, this study carries out a content analysis of the tweets of the opposition and incumbent Venezuelan leaders. The results show that the incumbent’s discourse was predominantly framed within a populist worldview, which perceives politics as a zero-sum struggle between the people and a conspiring global elite, such that the incumbent’s infringements on democratic procedures were justified as an effort for emancipation from global oppressors. The opposition articulated a pluralist discourse that defended electoral competition, understood as the way to resolve the various interests and goals of a heterogeneous society, and therefore resorted to democratic strategies to challenge the incumbent’s power. Given the unprecedented reach of social media, this study highlights the extent to which Twitter contributes to materialize an interpretation of power structures, and how political elites use it to influence the legitimacy of an institutional order.

Résumé — Devrions-nous prendre au sérieux les tweets des politiciens? Cet article soutient que les tweets envoyés à partir des comptes des principaux acteurs politiques sont importants, car ils sont ancrés dans une vision du monde qui appuie ou qui remet en question la légitimité d’un ordre institutionnel. Puisque Twitter permet un lien direct entre un individu et le grand public, il offre aux dirigeants politiques une plateforme pour articuler une vision du monde, justifier des stratégies démocratiques ou antidémocratiques et mobiliser un soutien au-delà des frontières pour influencer la perception des structures de pouvoir. La relation entre discours et légitimité institutionnelle est particulièrement importante dans des systèmes, comme celui du Venezuela, où coexistent des pratiques autoritaires et démocratiques, ce qui implique que la légitimité des institutions dépend largement de l’influence exercée par les principaux acteurs sur ce qui est considéré comme démocratique. Ainsi, cet article analyse le contenu des tweets de l’opposition et des dirigeants en place au Venezuela. Les résultats démontrent que le discours des dirigeants en place a été dominé par une vision du monde populist, qui conçoit la politique comme une lutte à somme nulle entre le peuple et une élite mondiale conspiratrice, de sorte à justifier les violations des procédures démocratiques. L’opposition a formulé un discours pluraliste qui défendait la concurrence électorale, considérée comme le moyen de résoudre les divers intérêts et objectifs d’une société hétérogène, et a donc eu recours à des stratégies démocratiques pour contester le pouvoir des dirigeants en place. Compte tenu de la portée sans précédent des médias sociaux, cette étude démontre à quel point Twitter contribue à matérialiser une interprétation des structures du pouvoir et comment les élites politiques l’utilisent pour influencer la

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Keywords: Discourse; Twitter, populism; hybrid regimes.

Mots-clés: Discours; Twitter; populisme; régimes hybrides.
Introduction

Social media is increasingly shaping public opinion and influencing the perception that mass audiences have on power structures. In Venezuela’s five major cities, the Internet is the third most used method of accessing news, after cable and open-signal television: 70% of people in low-income urban areas spend more than half an hour online daily to look for news, mostly on Facebook and Twitter (Nalvarte, 2016). In light of Venezuela’s reliance on social media for news and political communications, this research project analyses the tweets of political elites (defined as decision-makers with the ability to significantly influence political competition) during three electoral campaign periods to explore if and how they use Twitter as a tool to mobilize support. Many authors (Corrales, 2015; Hawkins, 2015; Weyland, 2013) have discussed the impact of Hugo Chávez’s discourse on the erosion of Venezuela’s democracy. Known for his charismatic appeal to the pueblo, these authors suggest that Chávez pioneered the use of Twitter to disseminate a populist discourse that polarized Venezuelan politics and prevented the kind of consensus needed for democratic governance. The direct connection between the speaker and mass audiences through social media lends itself to the populist logic: as the interpreter of the people’s will, the leader claims to be entitled to bypass the allegedly obsolete democratic procedures that interfere with true representation (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017). In sum, this study suggests that analysing the tweets of political elites is effective in identifying the forces leading to institutional change, especially in hybrid systems like Venezuela’s, where the institutions are contested, and ultimately depend on the ability of political leaders to harness popular support to legitimize their worldview.

To explore the legacy of Chávez’s populist discourse, and its relationship to Venezuela’s democracy, this research carries out a content analysis of the Twitter communications of leaders of competing political groups. Populist and pluralist discursive elements in the politicians’ Twitter communications are compared and quantified to identify patterns in the types of discourse and frequencies at which they are used. A populist discourse here refers to politics as a cosmic struggle between a conspiring elite and the people, whom the speaker claims to represent. Pluralist discourse underlines support for a plural society where the various interests and goals are resolved through electoral competition. When comparing these discursive patterns with the authoritarian shift of the Venezuelan system, the findings suggest that a populist discourse is compatible with undemocratic practices while a pluralist discourse is compatible with electoral strategies. The relationship between the types of discourse, strategies for competing for power, and institutional change explored in this research underscores the importance of a politician’s Twitter feed. Tweets work similarly to other forms of official communication, to: prompt, justify, and legitimize the politician’s truth claims.

Literature Review

Despite the numerous structural and agency-based definitions of populism (Di Tella, 1997; Germani, 1978; Malloy, 1977; Roberts, 2003; Weyland, 2001, 2004, 2013), this research looks at the discursive dimension of populism in order explore the relationship between language and institutional change. This discursive definition captures the underlying logic of populism given that the agency of political actors are ultimately motivated by the articulation of a worldview (Hawkins, 2010, p. 49). In this sense, economic policies, organizational structures or historical moments are all consequences of a type of discourse, which can take on particular manifestations within the context of a populist worldview (Hawkins, 2010, p. 40). Moreover, a populist discourse here will be more concretely defined as a worldview that perceives history as a Manichean struggle between Good, identified with the will of the people, and Evil, a conspiring elite that has subverted this will (Hawkins, 2009, 2010, 2015).

Within this perspective, Mudde (2004, p. 543) understands populism as a “thin-centered ideology,” characterized by a Manichean outlook that understands politics as the expression of the people’s will, which is fundamentally moralistic rather than programmatic. As such, populism is distinguished from two other “thin-centered” ideologies. Elitism — the mirror-image of populism, advocates for politics as an expression of the views of a moral elite, instead of the amoral people; — and pluralism — a more democratic perspective, rejects the homogeneity of populism and elitism, and sees society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with often fundamentally different views and wishes (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). These broad categories will be the basis for classifying the discursive patterns of competing groups in Venezuela. Even though these types of discourse
The type of discourse that predominates in the communications of key actors reflects their view of the system, which translates into the mechanisms they use to influence institutional development. Some scholars contest the link between a populist discourse and any form of government — they see populism as ontological since its meaning is not found in any political or ideological content, but in a particular mode of articulation of whatever social, political or ideological content (Laclau, qtd. in Howarth, 2015, p. 153; Mudde, 2004). Other scholars contend that institutional changes have been established with the use of a populist discourse (Hawkins, 2015; Weyland, 2013). For them, the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Venezuela is related to the use of an increasingly populist discourse that villainizes the political opposition and polarizes society, ultimately distorting electoral competition (Corrales, 2015; Hawkins, 2010, 2015; Weyland, 2013).

Furthermore, by suggesting that processes are theorized and justified by the careful use of language and rhetoric, Rodner (2016) argues that discourse consolidates collective meaning and becomes the basis of institutions (p. 629). In other words, as discourse articulates a worldview, it provides a normative benchmark to interpret the moral basis of the legitimacy of the system. This second group of scholars offer the theoretical foundation for this paper: the type of discourse is attuned to a particular strategy for political competition, especially in hybrid regimes where populist and pluralist worldviews contest over the legitimacy of the system, which ultimately impact the country’s institutional development.

Through the case of Chavismo, much has been said about how competitive authoritarian governments tilt the playing field in their favour and distort democratic institutions (Corrales, 2015; Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010; Penfold-Becerra, 2007). However, not enough attention has been given to how opposition groups challenge an increasingly authoritarian and populist government. Schedler (2006) suggests that in hybrid systems, the opposition has to manage the tension between acknowledging the unfairness of the system on one hand (which discourages voters who already mistrust the system) and on the other, successfully articulating a movement that mobilizes voters and allows for their forces to grow. Studies on Venezuela’s hybrid system suggest that throughout the years, despite increased authoritarian abuses, a large segment of opposition forces that have favoured such electoral strategy ended up enjoying electoral victories (Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Cannon, 2014; Hawkins, 2015). Analyzing the actual rhetorical strategies of incumbent and opposition groups at the peak of electoral contestation informs how opposition groups manage this tension, and whether they sustain a discourse that looks to restore democratic legitimacy.

Method

Building on the methodology of studies which have identified populist discourses on social media platforms (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Engesser, 2017; Waisbro & Amado, 2017), this research identifies the presence of a populist discourse on Twitter, and suggests a method to contrast it with another type of discourse, pluralism. This research uses a qualitative content analysis to explore how the discourses of the political elites compare to each other, and how they relate to institutional changes. Precisely, it examines the tweets of incumbent and opposition politicians during three electoral moments: the presidential election that elected Nicolás Maduro (2013), the municipal elections that favoured a majority of Chavista mayors (2013), and the parliamentary elections that gave the opposition a historic electoral advantage (2015). Although these elections pertain to different levels of government, they are comparable as each were moments of intense competition where the legitimacy of the system was deeply questioned. Since the presidential election was tainted by unresolved fraud claims, the opposition framed the following 2013 municipal elections and 2015 parliamentary elections as plebiscites against Maduro who distorted the institutional order to further consolidate power (Asociación de Fondo de Pensiones, 2015; Meza, 2013).

To compare the discursive strategies, the study focuses on the tweets of three top decision-making politicians: president Nicolás Maduro (@NicolasMaduro), two-time opposition presidential candidate and governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles (@hcapriles), and former mayor of a Caracas municipality and primary presidential candidate who then became the regime’s most prominent political prisoner, Leopoldo López.
The politicians selected for this study are recognized as the leaders within their own groups, and their leadership has gained a national scope through elections. In addition, their Twitter accounts are amongst the most influential accounts of politicians in the country based on the number of followers and tweeting activity. Given their leadership, this study suggests that the type of discourse found in their communications is representative of the overall strategy of each group, and as such, their tweets highlight the way political elites look to influence the system through the articulation of different worldviews. Furthermore, these political actors are selected following the logic of Mill’s Most Similar and Most Different Systems Design (Skocpol & Somers, 1980, p. 183).

The communications of opposition and incumbent politicians test for the presence of two distinctive types of discourses — populist and pluralist — and follows the Method of Difference, while the communications of two opposition politicians with a presumably similar discursive strategy are selected based on the Method of Agreement, indicating the presence of a type of discourse that can be attributed to a broader strategy of the opposition group.

All the tweets sent out by the identified accounts in the month-long electoral campaign preceding each of the three elections are compiled into a database (see Appendix A for a summary of the sample). In order to categorize the content of the politician’s tweets, the discourse, as a multidimensional variable, is broken down into three dimensions reflecting their respective themes. The first dimension encompasses the speaker’s vision of society. Here, the populist discourse has a dualistic vision and is characterized by the following themes: the presence of a Manichean logic, the belief in politics as a zero-sum struggle between two homogenous groups, and the association of good with a single political project (Hawkins, 2009; Engesser et al., 2017). By contrast, the pluralist discourse has a heterogeneous vision of society, thus, an understanding of society as a collection of different views and wishes (Mudde, 2004, p. 544), an appeal to diversity of ideas within nationhood, and reference to national unity around an inclusionary political project.

The second dimension refers to the speaker’s perspective on policy issues. Here, the populist discourse is moralistic: as the good is always identified with the will of the people, policy decisions are made based on normative justifications rather than official socioeconomic indicators. Moreover, public officials, instead of being criticized for their performance or track record, are attacked for their character traits. On the other hand, the pluralist discourse has a programmatic perspective on issues, such that policy issues are discussed based on indicators and numbers, and assessed in terms of successes or inefficiencies (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

The third dimension looks at the speaker’s stance towards the system. The populist discourse exhibits an “anything-goes-attitude” towards decision-making processes. This is because formal procedures are seen as obstacles for realizing the will of the people (Hawkins, 2010, p. 36) — for example, calls to action using military vocabulary. Paying attention to collocations — word associations that are representative of a recurrent message in the communication (Armony & Armony, 2005, p. 38) — is important for the classification process. In the Venezuelan case, where political competition is intense and the rules of the game are unclear, words such as “offensive,” “revolution” and “fight” in a tweet, which may allude to an “anything-goes attitude,” are not necessarily indicators of a populist discourse for the third dimension. If the words “election” or “votes” are also included in the tweet, it is categorized pluralist because ultimately it reflects an observance to the democratic process. However, if military jargon is used as a call to action without reference to electoral competition, the tweet is categorized as populist since the populist discourse alerts that what is at stake is the people’s sovereignty, which is to be defended at any cost, even the infringement of democratic norms. Once all tweets are categorized and coded, this holistic content analysis yields a numerical representation of the types of discourse that predominated the communications of each politician across each election.

**Results and Discussion**

A total of 1,198 tweets were coded based on the three-dimensioned rubric, which yielded 3,594 observations (each tweet yields an observation for each of the three dimensions). After extracting the 2,208 observations that were not classified as populist or pluralist (61%), the content analysis found a total of 1,386 observations with discursive themes (39%). The analysis of results that follows is based on these observations only in order to systematically compare observations with the presence of pluralist and populist themes relative to each other. Out of the 1,386
observations, 1,033 were classified as pluralist (74%) and 355 as populist (26%) for incumbent and opposition politicians combined.

**The Incumbent’s Divide and Rule Discourse**

The study found that the incumbent’s Twitter communications contained a larger proportion of populist themes relative to pluralist ones. Out of 326 tweets collected from Nicolas Maduro’s account (@NicolasMaduro), the content analysis identified 377 observations with discursive themes: 204 were classified as populist, and 173 as pluralist. Out of this pool of observations, Maduro’s communications across the three elections were 54% populist and 46% pluralist. In addition, 13 tweets were found to contain populist elements across all three dimensions. When looking at the distribution of populist and pluralist themes across each election, the content analysis sheds light on the trends of Maduro’s predominantly populist discourse on Twitter (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Proportion of types of discourse per election at each dimension (for data see Appendix B).

Figure 1 shows, for the first dimension, which refers the speaker’s view of society, Maduro’s discursive tweets contained almost only populist themes. This indicates an evident belief in a politics as a zero-sum game in which political opponents are considered existential threats that are to be defeated (see Figure 2). For the second dimension, the speaker’s perspective on issues, Maduro’s discursive themes vary. While they are mostly populist for the Municipal election, during the Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Maduro takes on a more programmatic approach when discussing public policy issues. However, when looking at the third dimension, which refers to the speaker’s attitude towards the system, there is a steady increase of a populist worldview at each election, which matches the authoritarian surge in Venezuela since 2013.

Figure 2. A sample tweet from @NicolasMaduro during the 2013 presidential election: “I call on you to respect different ideas, to true democracy, and to defeat with reason the intolerance and discrimination of right-wingers.”

Only for the first election, the 2013 presidential election, Maduro’s discourse was found to favour a pluralist view of the system. A pluralist discourse across this dimension indicates the belief in the legitimacy of a democratic process. This suggests that in 2013, the discourse of actors ultimately reified Venezuela’s system as Competitive Authoritarian (Levistky & Way, 2002). The incumbent demonstrated a belief in elections as the mechanism that legitimizes authority, while the opposition also saw them as the way to challenge the incumbent’s abuses. The reason for Maduro’s emphasis on elections could be because the 2013 presidential elections were held only five weeks after Chávez’s death was announced, on March 5th. Right before his death, Chávez had named Maduro as his political successor and had called on his supporters to vote for him (Hernández, 2012). Still, during this electoral campaign, Maduro’s communications emulated Chávez’s populist discourse, which underscores a view that juxtaposes intolerance for political dissidence and acknowledgement of democratic legitimacy (see Figure 3). While
there was constant allusion to the electoral process, there was also a recurrent use of military jargon ("commander," “battle,” “offensive,” “on-guard!”), showcasing the war-like dialectic that further antagonizes political competition.

Over time, Maduro’s communications show a shift in attitude towards the system. The study found that the presence of populist themes across the third dimension increases with each election. By the time of the Parliamentary election in 2015, the study found that populist themes dominated Maduro’s discursive communications. His use of the hashtag #PaLaAsambleaComoSea, “ToTheAssemblyNoMatterHow,” conveys explicitly the belief that conquering seats in the assembly merits the use of any means. This “anything goes” attitude fits in within the populist worldview that places political competition as an existential struggle for the defense of the patria against a global elite. This escalation of populist themes across the third dimension in the incumbent’s communications is in line with the institutional shift from Competitive Authoritarianism to Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela (Corrales, 2015). The 2015 parliamentary election saw an unprecedented abuse of state power to the incumbent’s advantage: the partisan National Electoral Council denied registration to nine opposition parties, gerrymandered districts, and denied access to opposition candidates to public media, while PSUV candidates were built through official broadcasts and special programs (Alarcón, Álvarez, & Hidalgo, 2016, p. 24). This irreverence towards the democratic system also coincides with a decrease in public support for the incumbent. By 2015, Maduro’s approval rating was found to be under 25%, according to the survey-research firm Datanalisis (Alarcón et al., 2016, p. 28).

Based on the study’s finding, this research argues that Maduro’s tweets point to a strategy of divide and rule, as the use of a populist discourse across three dimensions looks to disarticulate the opposition and legitimize authoritarian practices. A populist discourse treats political opponents not as adversaries but as profound threats, as “enemies of the people” who are to be defeated and marginalized. This logic turns politics into struggles of “us against them,” which negates the possibility of dialogue or the compromise that characterizes democratic life (Weyland, 2013, p. 21). This research argues that promoting an understanding of politics as a moral conspiracy against the people raises society’s tolerance to authoritarian abuses of power (Romero-Rodriguez & Gadea, 2015, p. 103). Furthermore, a discourse that shows an ambiguous relationship to democracy looks to break up the opposition’s electoral efforts, as it fosters disagreements over whether they should compete on an uneven playing field (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, p. 32).
The Opposition’s Democratic Conviction

For opposition politicians, the study found a larger proportion of pluralist themes relative to populist ones. Out of 374 tweets that López (@LeopoldoLopez) sent out, 442 discursive themes were identified: 384 pluralist themes and 60 populist themes — for a total of 86% pluralist and 14% populist. Out of 498 tweets sent out from Capriles’ (@hcapriles) account, 567 discursive themes were identified: 476 pluralist themes and 91 populist— for a total similar to that of Lopez, 84% pluralist and 16% populist. The study found four tweets that contained all pluralist discursive dimensions, all of which were sent from the opposition politicians’ Twitter accounts. When looking at the distribution of populist and pluralist themes across each election, the content analysis sheds light on the patterns of the opposition’s predominantly pluralist discourse on Twitter (see Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4. Proportion of types of discourse per election at each dimension for López’s tweets (for data see Appendix B).

Figure 5. Proportion of types of discourse per election at each dimension for Capriles’ tweets (for data see Appendix B).

The findings show that the communications of the opposition vary across the first and second dimension. It is clear that the opposition’s discursive communications contain almost all pluralist themes across the third dimension, which demonstrates their commitment to democratic competition. A message that is conveyed through the discursive communications of the opposition is an effort to denounce authoritarian abuses and question the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency after fraud claims in the 2013 Presidential election were never resolved, but without undermining the significance of electoral competition. Both López and Capriles’ managed to communicate in their tweets that the playing field was stacked against them, but that they should still play. The words “election,” “democracy,” and “vote” were more frequent in the opposition’s tweets. Moreover, close to the electoral moment, the opposition’s tweets also looked to communicate logistical information to voters. Ultimately, this content analysis reveals the opposition’s commitment to electoral competition during the period studied here. Although a period of tension surrounded the opposition’s decision to call the 2013 presidential elections a fraud, which Maduro claimed to have won with 1.8% difference (Cannon, 2014, p. 62), that same year the opposition decided to redeem the electoral route by participating in the municipal elections. Both López and Capriles travelled around the country to campaign with the opposition’s municipal candidates. This indicates cohesion among the opposition leadership and a willingness of different sectors of the opposition to share a cohesive message under the flag of democracy.

It is important to note that the study found a predominance among the discursive tweets of populist discourse for López in the first two dimensions during the 2015 municipal election. This may have to do with the
fact that his wife Lilian Tintori — also a political activist — began to manage his account (Forelle, Howard, Monroy-Hernández, & Savage, 2015), which explains a drop in his activity after the 2013 municipal election. Tintori and the team that handled López account starting in 2014 may have biased the discourse that characterized him for the previous elections. Still 60% of the discursive themes were found in the third dimension and were all pluralist, which shows that López’s Twitter account during this electoral period was still used for logistical efforts and to mobilize voters. Ultimately, confirming the notion that regardless of the actual speaker, the opposition communications showcase a concerted effort to challenge the incumbent through electoral means.

With a prevalence of pluralist themes across the first dimension in Capriles’ communications, this research argues that his discourse looks to contrast the incumbent’s dualistic notion with the idea of society as a collection of heterogeneous interests. For the second dimension, the study also found a larger proportion of pluralist discursive themes relative to populist ones. With the looming economic crisis, the opposition framed the elections as a plebiscite against Maduro’s economic mismanagement. Both Capriles and López brought attention to the state of the economy, using indicators and making assessments of policy decisions in their communications on. Here, the opposition’s communications favoured a programmatic pluralist discourse while still including populist themes in the way the incumbent was antagonized and villainized for his performance in office.

**Can Challengers Disprove the Populist Myth?**

Based on the content analysis, this research argues that the opposition’s discourse demonstrates a strategy of competition that could be summed up as an effort to “unite and vote.” When playing on an uneven playing field, the opposition has looked to build an electoral force with an inclusive discourse that counters the incumbent’s intolerance, exposes his abuse of power, and hopes to defeat an undemocratic opponent through electoral means. While the opposition’s electoral success in the 2015 Parliamentary election cannot be attributed to Twitter, it is safe to say that their decision to participate in an unfair election, with a communication strategy focused on the economic crisis gave the opposition significant increase in their electoral legitimacy, domestically and internationally.

The study of the Twitter communications of López and Capriles show how they manage the inherent tension of acquiring power through electoral means in an unfair system. That is, López and Capriles actively mobilize voters into an election that they openly believe will favour Maduro (see Figure 6). Therefore, the findings suggest that the discourse of the opposition calls for the re-establishment of democratic competition by participating in unfair elections, which coincides with the opposition gaining electoral legitimacy. Although the opposition’s discourse remained pluralist, and their strategies electoral, the 2013 losses show how the absence of tangible pay-offs introduces conflict over the effectiveness of an electoral strategy (Hawkins, 2016; Zariski, 1986). However, the opposition stuck to their pluralist discourse with a programmatic agenda for the 2015 parliamentary election and consolidated an electoral victory (see Figure 7). Knowing the authoritarian trend that increasingly shapes Maduro’s administration and the intention of the opposition to participate in elections, the results of the elections mentioned here provide a posteriori control to test the correlation between the type of discourse, strategies for political competition, and institutional changes.

Figure 6. A sample tweet from @leopoldolopez during the 2015 parliamentary election: “If history will say anything about you @NicolasMaduro, it will be of your cowardice. Of your fear to lose power. A power, which I affirm, you stole!”
Figure 7. A sample tweet from @hcapriles during the 2015 municipal election: “Our Venezuela will close 2015 with almost 80% income poverty, the most important reason to vote for a change.”

Do Tweets Matter?

Observing the discourse of Venezuela’s top leadership on social media reveals the worldview that frames their strategies for contesting power, which in turn, influences the legitimacy of institutions. The findings of this study point to an authoritarian incumbent that articulates a moralistic discourse under a Manichean logic in an effort to legitimize the use of any means to stay in power. Meanwhile, the opposition’s pluralist discourse shows the willingness to compete under the existing unfair system, at the same time that it looks to compete over the rules of the game by denouncing the incumbent’s abuses. In this sense, Twitter communications clearly illustrate the dynamics that shape competition in hybrid systems. According to Schedler’s (2006), elections in hybrid systems are comprised of two meta-games: the incumbent’s game of authoritarian manipulation in which the opposition chooses to compete, and the game of institutional reform, in which the opposition seeks to dismantle nondemocratic restrictions that choke their struggle for votes (p. 13). These two meta-games are evident in the tweets of Maduro, López, and Capriles, as they look to reify their interpretation of the power dynamics, and mobilize support around their perceived best strategy for contesting power.

The findings from the three elections suggest that, in terms of their view towards the system (coded under the third discursive dimension), the opposition leadership maintained a pluralist discourse while the incumbent’s populist discourse intensified with each election. Considering that Maduro’s authoritarian abuses intensified while the opposition gained some electoral legitimacy, these discursive trends reveal that a populist discourse is coherent with authoritarian practices and a pluralist discourse encourages democratic competition. Furthermore, it shows the way in which two opposite worldviews defend different political realities and therefore look to mobilize support for different institutional frameworks. Essentially, this study shows that Tweets do matter because they manifest the normative view of decision-makers who influence the rules of competition. Considering the reach that Twitter has, these official communications give political elites the power to influence, prompt, and legitimize institutions.

This research also emphasizes the extent to which Twitter offers a unique platform to study discursive strategies because, even if fragmented, tweets are a manifestation of the speaker’s worldview. Broader inferences can be made from the findings in Twitter communications since online communicational patterns have been found to reflect similar patterns to offline communication models (Calvo, 2015; Morales, Borondo, Losada, & Benito, 2015). Finally, this study redeems the informational liberalization aspect of social media, especially when it affords already established politicians an outlet to influence public opinion that has been otherwise denied through censorship.

Contributions and Limitations of the Content Analysis

Overall, the results of this study confirm the presence of a populist discourse in the incumbent’s communications on Twitter and propose a way to quantify populism as a discursive concept (Hawkins, 2010; De La Torre, 2010; Knight, 1998). The breakdown of the notion of discourse into three dimensions allowed for the study to capture the different themes that constitute a populist discourse. The findings also show that a populist discourse tends to be represented in a fragmented way on social media, much like Engesser (2017) suggests.
Nonetheless, a few limitations should be noted. First, this analysis is based on the results from one coder, a double-blind coding could have further reduced risk of bias in coding. Second, seeing that Twitter accounts are often time managed by a political communications team, any future content analysis studies should be supplemented by a study of the informal political dynamics, in order to place the 150 characters into a broader context of political competition. Still, this study provides insightful results and proposes the use of the pluralist discourse to address the following gap in the literature: the need for a benchmark concept to compare populism against, in order to fully formulate it as a concept.

A second round of blind coding would refine the analysis of the relationship between discourse and strategies for competition. In particular, the analysis could distinguish between observations of pluralist discourse that look to denounce abuses from those that look to campaign for elections. Determining the timing and the frequency of these communications could inform on how the opposition manages the tension between competing in the existing system and competing over the rules of the game. In addition, a round of manifest coding could identify the frequency of key words at each election, such as democracy, in order to measure the extent to which the speaker views democratic competition as legitimate. This could address an important limitation of this study: that the entire population of tweets were not found to have any discursive themes. Including additional politicians and coders would also increase the robustness of the findings.

**Conclusion**

This study has looked at the discourses of incumbent and opposition leaders around election time in order to shed light on the overall dynamics of competition in hybrid systems. The findings suggest that Twitter communications can reflect the worldviews and stances on the legitimacy of the system of the political elite. This contestation over the rules of the game among the top political leadership reflects the democratic fragility in hybrid systems. The Venezuelan case studied here has demonstrated how a polarizing rhetoric affects democratic governance, suggesting that discourse has an impact on the legitimacy of institutions.

The study shows that, much like Chávez, the incumbent’s discursive communications were predominantly populist, reflecting an understanding of politics as a zero-sum game. With this, Maduro’s populist discourse looks to problematize previous structures of power to legitimize his authoritarian practices. In addition to demonstrating the institutional legacy of Chávez’s populist rhetoric, this study shows how democratizing agents in undemocratic settings contest hegemonic truth claims. The case of the Venezuelan opposition also informs on potential responses to populist discourses: while Maduro has increased his authoritarian practices to tilt the playing field in his favour, electoral support has shifted in favour of the opposition, which suggests that the Maduro’s populist discourse is compatible with authoritarian practices and the opposition pluralist discourse is compatible with electoral strategies.

All in all, this study exposes the importance that Twitter has in conveying worldviews that have a real impact in the institutional development particularly within hybrid systems. Tweets have the power to prompt, justify, and respond to a particular strategy for political competition that defends an interpretation of power structures.
## Appendix A

Table 1. Electoral Days and Actual Dates

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15-Mar</td>
<td>08-Nov</td>
<td>06-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16-Mar</td>
<td>09-Nov</td>
<td>07-Nov</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>17-Mar</td>
<td>10-Nov</td>
<td>08-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>18-Mar</td>
<td>11-Nov</td>
<td>09-Nov</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>19-Mar</td>
<td>12-Nov</td>
<td>10-Nov</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>20-Mar</td>
<td>13-Nov</td>
<td>11-Nov</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>21-Mar</td>
<td>14-Nov</td>
<td>12-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>22-Mar</td>
<td>15-Nov</td>
<td>13-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>23-Mar</td>
<td>16-Nov</td>
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<td>15-Nov</td>
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<td>25-Mar</td>
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<td>26-Mar</td>
<td>19-Nov</td>
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<td>28-Mar</td>
<td>21-Nov</td>
<td>19-Nov</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>29-Mar</td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
<td>20-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>30-Mar</td>
<td>23-Nov</td>
<td>21-Nov</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31-Mar</td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>01-Apr</td>
<td>25-Nov</td>
<td>23-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>02-Apr</td>
<td>26-Nov</td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
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<td>03-Apr</td>
<td>27-Nov</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>04-Apr</td>
<td>28-Nov</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>05-Apr</td>
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<td>09-Apr</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13-Apr</td>
<td>07-Dec</td>
<td>05-Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>14-Apr</td>
<td>08-Dec</td>
<td>06-Dec</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2. Twitter Accounts and Number of Tweets included for each Sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample: March 15 – April 14, 2013</td>
<td>Sample: November 8 – December 8, 2013</td>
<td>Sample: November 6 – December 6, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maduro</td>
<td>159 Tweets</td>
<td>75 Tweets</td>
<td>92 Tweets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>López</td>
<td>96 Tweets</td>
<td>239 Tweets</td>
<td>39 Tweets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capriles</td>
<td>122 Tweets</td>
<td>235 Tweets</td>
<td>141 Tweets</td>
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</table>
Appendix B: Master Table

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<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Maduro</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopoldo Lopez</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Capriles</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dimensions:

1. **Vision of society**: for the populist discourse this means a zero-sum struggle between two homogenous group — one good and one evil — and for the pluralist discourse, a heterogeneous vision of society consisting of a collection of different views and wishes.

2. **Perspective on policy issues**: the populist discourse is moralistic, meaning that policy decisions have a normative justification, while the pluralist discourse has a programmatic perspective on issues, such that policy issues are discussed based on indicators and numbers, and assessed in terms of successes or inefficiencies.

3. **Stance towards the system**: the populist discourse exhibits an “anything-goes-attitude” towards decision-making processes with a disregard for democratic procedures, which the pluralist discourse defends.
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AFP (Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones). (2015, December 5). Venezuela a elecciones parlamentarias con visos de plesbiscito [Venezuela goes to parliamentary elections in semblance to a plebiscite]. El Universal Cartagena.


De La Rosa, A. (2013, April 3). Capriles: Cada acto de corrupción de los enchufados tiene que ser más votos [Capriles: Each corruption episode of the plugged-in have to turn into more votes]. El Universal.


Espinoza, O. (2013, November 22). Capriles: 15 años en el poder y ahora se dan cuenta del desastre económico. [Capriles: 15 years in power and now they notice the economic mess]. El Universal.


Hernández, A. (2012, December 2). Chávez llama a votar por Maduro si queda inhabilitado para gobernar [Chávez calls on you to vote for Maduro if he is unable to govern]. El Universal.


Este país necesita unirse

...


The Creation of a Contemporary Estonian Identity: Multilateral Organizations as an Advocate for Ethnic Minorities

TAYLOR N. TRUMMEL∗

Abstract — With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and subsequent independence of Estonia, the power-holding ethnic Russians suddenly found themselves as outcast minorities within the borders of this Baltic country. Various legal and social measures taken by Estonia to reassert its cultural history and political power marginalized c in the country. In creating a modern state, Estonia’s interest to identify with the European community prompted its effort to join the European Union. Such motivation pushed the nation toward multilateral negotiations to comply with requirements of international standards for the fair treatment of minorities. In this paper, an analysis of the implications of historical narratives in identity formation and minority marginalization offers a lens to examine the power of multilateral organizations in providing oversight and incentives to newly independent states. This oversight can be perceived to be in humanitarian interest, but should also be considered for its economic and geopolitical interests. Estonia’s citizenship laws, European identity, and stateless persons provide a case study for such historical analysis.

Keywords: Identity politics; ethnic minorities; nation building; multilateral organizations.


Mots-clés : Politique d’identité; minorités ethniques; construction de nation; organisations multilatérales.

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The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a radical change in national and political dynamics of Eastern Europe. Newly independent nations formed as states reemerged and reestablished their borders. These divisions were rooted in cultural, political, and historical differences. Upon the drawing of new boundaries, it became possible for previously cohesive ethnic groups to become a minority group in a new state. This was demonstrated most vividly in the case of Estonia, as it reestablished its eastern border with Russia along the city of Narva. Ethnic Russians who had established a home in Soviet Estonia, effectively became aliens with the arrival of Estonian independence. During this shift, they became marginalized and excluded from social, political, and economic institutions of the country. The creation of modern Estonia was preempted by the reestablishment of Estonian political and cultural order. This opportunity to reclaim its identity also offered Estonia the chance to reaffirm itself as a European nation. Through the creation of historical narratives, states wield great power in establishing national identity and status within their borders. Such nationalistic narratives and their resulting policies hold the potential of creating an irreparable cultural divide. When this occurs, multilateral international organizations are able to provide a voice for discriminated minority groups. In the case of Estonia, the period following its independence provides an example of minority group abuses and how the collective historical record influenced that outcome. This paper provides historical analysis necessary in establishing solid understanding of contemporary Baltic history, while a subsequent examination of influence held by the European Union suggests that multilateral organizations can utilize incentives to encourage the protection of minorities.

In introducing the complexities and effects of shifting borders on a population, Narva and Ivangorod provide a unique opportunity to examine the region along the reestablished Estonian and Russian border. The cities of Narva and Ivangorod, Estonian and Russian cities respectively, continue to be the hub of ethnic Estonian and ethnic Russian relations. Once united under the Soviet Union, the two cities have been divided since 1991 by the reemergence of the border. It was during the occupation by the Soviet Union that Narva underwent militaristic attacks, killing or exiling many Estonian residents (Laitin, 1998, p. 3). The city’s infrastructure was rebuilt and it became a Russian-speaking metropolitan center. During the Soviet Era, Ivangorod and Narva created a single labour market. Their connectedness was exacerbated by the fact that both cities shared a water collection and purification system, and its citizens worked, lived, attended school, shopped, and went about daily chores by commuting between the two communities (Windows, 2007). The two towns had a technical administrative border, but it was usually ignored, as both were part of the Soviet Union, and had no internal legal borders. Despite this historical exchange, the two cities remain culturally divided. Even with a lack of significant difference, there was a perception of cultural barriers between the city’s Estonian and Russian inhabitants (Windows, 2007). Perceptions of cultural distance are not only limited to Narva and Ivangorod. Since Estonia’s independence, the perceptions of cultural difference were amplified and the inhabitants of the two cities were no longer the sister cities they were before. Under two distinct governments today, the inhabitants of each city are socialized differently, and both Russians and Estonians remain their own version of history created by each state’s national narrative.

Nationalism is cultivated in a carefully designed national narrative. A historical perspective of the “story of our nation” incites the perceptions and frameworks of nationalism. In a recently independent state, establishing a national framework is a natural first step. Outlining the standards of who belongs and who does not is fundamental to the imagined political community (Anderson, 1991, pp. 5–7). A form of socialization, the national narrative is a culturally accepted story of how the state came to be and is an important construct to the national culture. From nationalism, a collective national identity emerges. This identity is rooted in similar interpretations of a historical, political, cultural, and economic reality (Made, 2003). Nationalism is a powerful social force that can equally unite as it can divide. In order to understand the roots of the Estonian national narrative, it is essential to be familiar with Estonian history to understand how the nation’s contemporary narrative came to be.

Beginning in the Middle Ages, early markets established trading villages at ports circling the Baltic Sea included the land of modern day Estonia. In the 14th century, participation in the Hanseatic League, or Hansa, trade guild evoked a membership to a proto-state institution (Mandeville, 1990, pp. 26–27). The Hansa legacy was crafted by the establishment of interdependent towns and villages along the Baltic coast for maritime trade (Davies, 1996). The reciprocity and kinship of the League served to develop the first origins of a Baltic identity. Even today though, the collective identity in the Baltic Sea region can be referred to as New Hansa. With a pr"ideful legacy, identifying as Hanseatic evokes sentiments of belonging to a multinational community based on shared values and priorities.
from the Northern Atlantic to the Gulf of Finland (Davies, 1996). Based on relatively similar history, culture, and languages, New Hansa is a prevalent theme across northeastern Europe. However, it can lend to supranational narratives of history, marginalizing some historical disputes in the region (Hackman, 2003). This connection to the medieval Hanseatic League was once a source of European identity and later became a foundational basis for the interest to move to European Union membership, augmenting Estonia’s ties to a common European identity. This historical participation in European exchange and commerce was also used as a justification for membership in the European Union, NATO, and Western Alliance.

Narrowing the historical focus to Estonia proper, the small northern nation faced an oppressing series of events in the 20th century, which lead to the development of its contemporary national narrative. In modern history, the state has been stricken by conquest and exploitation until later espoused by triumph. The interplay between an Estonian, European, Baltic, and Russian culture have shaped a complicated identity that itself changes from region to region of this small country. While the history of conquest leaves a legacy of heritage in the eyes of some, it is also arguably a plague on traditional Estonian customs to others. Today, Estonian officials continue to walk a fine line between outright condemnation of previous occupations versus embracing their influences. The national narrative of recent history is the product of a nationalistic agenda with international concerns. With interest in embracing its European identity and fortifying its eastern border with Russia, Estonia has embraced a European-centric identity in its interpretation of the 20th century history.

The history of oppression and occupation in Estonia begins with its subjugation by the Swedish and Russian Empires since the 17th and 18th centuries respectively. Its unstoppable flow has continued towards the end of World War I, when the occupying German empire subjugated the entire northeastern Baltic region under its control. By the interwar period, Estonia underwent significant change. Having ousted the German empire occupants, Estonian culture experienced a transformation in the 1930s. One example of the shift from German influence is seen in the text material published throughout the country. Estonian literature began to be translated from and for English, French, and Nordic languages rather than German (Made, 2003). While Germany left traces and memories of occupation for many Estonians, the Soviet Union in the east was expanding its sphere of influence. The year 1940 was characterized by the rising domination of the Soviets. Enacting mutual assistance pacts under coercion, the Soviet Union secured the rights to establish military bases in Estonia and the neighbouring Baltic states (Gerner & Stefan, 1993). By the summer of 1940, the government of Estonia had been ousted, and the President imprisoned in Siberia while the Soviet military took power in Estonia (Petrov, 2008). During the same time the Red Army carried out mass repressions and an all-out occupation was underway in Estonia. From one occupation to the next, an overwhelming majority of Estonians opposed to the occupying powers. While today, the German heritage and its link to Hanseatic trade is celebrated in Estonian history, the legacy of the Soviet Union has not been remembered fondly despite both nation’s role in occupying Estonia (Made, 2003).

In contrast to the German legacy, Estonians have worked to build a stringent divide between Russia and Estonia (Made, 2003). Sitting at the crossroads between Europe and Russia, Estonia has economically utilized both trade from the west and the east, however it has not been so open culturally. Estonia has benefitted from maintaining a healthy relationship in both directions, but despite this, the Russian legacy has been pushed to the fringes. Estonians have used historical, cultural, and even genetic evidence to support their claim for a wholesome European identification as opposed to Russians (Schwartz, 2006, p. 10). Others have used Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations” as a framework to establish Estonia as squarely within the Western Christian region, emphasizing the border between them and the Orthodox region to the east (Schwartz, 2006, p. 10). This difference in religious beliefs, despite Estonia not being an especially religious state, was one form of Russophobia that persisted, with ancient relics of Russia’s occupation being termed as scars of religious occupation.

Another form of Estonian resistance to Russian heritage is the disapproval of popular Russian Orthodox religion in the country. Despite the centuries-old influence of the Russian Orthodox Church prior to European occupations, Estonia was historically a Protestant country. the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn symbolizes one such example of the opposition to Russification. Considered a centerpiece in the skyline of the city and promoted for tourism today, the cathedral faced proposals for demolition in the twentieth century because of the perception that it represented religious occupation by Russia (Plan to pull down the Orthodox Cathedral, n.d.).
Originally built in 1890 during the occupation of the Russian Empire, the church sits at the centre of Toompea hill in Tallinn, the location of many of modern Estonian government buildings. In 1928, a bill for its demolition was proposed by four members of the Estonian government and expected to pass relatively quickly and easily. However, many national minorities, Orthodox religious groups, architects, artists, and academics opposed the bill, resulting in the bill's failure and the preservation of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral to this day (Plan, 2014). As relics of the past were under debate, political and social boundaries continued to be challenged as well.

The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact alienated much of the Estonian elite from the country while encouraging the immigration of Russians towards the Baltic coast, determining that the Baltics fell within the sphere of influence of Russia (Kirby, 1996). Enticed by new industrial work and administrative jobs, the Soviet Russian population responded enthusiastically. With an influx of Russian migrants, the hegemony of the ethnic Estonian population diminished. While in 1934, the ethnic Estonian population proportion hovered at 88%, it soon reduced to 61.5% (Bernier, 2001). Not only had Estonian statehood been squandered, but the population’s strength in numbers was declining with the rapid increase of ethnic Russians in the area. With this new and growing demographic of Soviet citizens the use of the Estonian language was discouraged and replaced by the Russian language. Though many Estonians continued to use their native tongue, the linguistic Russification was prevalent in the public sphere. It became required to know Russian to hold most jobs. The combination of quick immigration and permeation of the Russian language lead to an imbalanced linguistic community in Estonia. There was a high level of bilingualism in the native population and an unwavering unilingualism in the ethnic Russian population (Bernier, 2001). Though quickly reversed after independence, the proliferation of the Russian language in Estonia is still visible and audible today. The effects of the migration and imbalance of language remain as a source of conflict in Estonia. In the celebration of independence in 1991, the newly independent country was quick to embrace Estonian culture and in turn ignored ethnic Russian minorities, with language serving an important function in the formation of the contemporary Estonian identity.

After many decades of oppression, the Estonian people were able to reassert the strength of their traditional language, culture, and political values in the process of creating their contemporary society. Nationalizing efforts were demonstrated in a variety of mediums. Perhaps the two of the most critical ones were the definitions and official use of the Estonian language; and of the legal status of citizenship. Unlike several other post-Soviet states such as Armenia, Lithuania, and Slovenia where the ethnic population was largely homogenous, Estonian demographics were of a much more mixed heritage (Bernier, 2001). The measures taken by the Estonian government in the early 1990s were negligent to its prevalent ethnic Russian population.

The years of occupation have been perceived in Estonia as a historical injustice. Upon achieving its independence in 1991, the country steadily began to reverse Russian influence within its borders. Estonia’s new government was motivated to reclaim its national narrative and wrest control of the state after decades of Russian imposition and violation. This motivation stirred emotional debate among the population as interests competed to protect national heritage and restore justice while the perceived traces of Russian occupation continued to live on in the country (Greene, 2010). By deciding to adopt restrictive citizenship policies and strict language requirements, the Estonian government alienated a large portion of its Russian population. Estonia reenacted its Citizenship Act of 1938, which granted citizenship and legal Estonian identity to those with pre-Soviet Estonian heritage and their descendants a legal Estonian identity. However, for any citizen who did not fall into this category, their legal identity became those of “undetermined citizenship,” a term that remains unclearly defined in law (Nelson, 2015). In some cases, this alienated group of predominantly ethnic Russians now found themselves as foreigners on land that they may have called home for the past 50 years. The citizenship policies enacted by Estonia were unlike any other laws adopted by newly independent Eastern European nations, an important aspect that led to the marginalization of ethnic Russians in Estonia today. For those who did not meet the citizenship criteria, which at the time was about one third of the population, Estonia offered a naturalization process (Bernier, 2001).

The naturalization process consisted of several parts and evolved over the post-independence years. In 1995, Estonia introduced language and civics exams (Laitin, 1998, p. 6). To obtain citizenship, a fluent understanding of the Estonian language was critical. This made it incredibly difficult for ethnic Russians to acquire Estonian
citizenship. The strict requirements of Estonian language translated to “cultural capital,” which can be presented in many forms, but perhaps the most powerful is that of linguistic capital. This language capital, defined as fluency in a language which is used by groups who possess economic, social, cultural, and political power, gave Estonians a strong advantage over ethnic Russians (Craith, 2007). These early laws resulted in a largely homogenous, officially recognized citizenry which was not an accurate reflection of the real Estonian population (Bernier, 2001).

The inability to acquire legal recognition was damaging to the minority group’s status. Ethnic Russians could not hold a political status without citizenship. Furthermore, they were severed from social and economic benefits granted by the government. In the parliamentary elections of 1992, ethnic Russians did not occupy a single seat despite accounting for 30% of the population. Three years later, only six of 101 parliamentary seats were held by the minority group (Bernier, 2001). Estonians asserted control through the legal parameters established in the distribution of work. Non-citizens specifically could not hold certain state or public service jobs. In addition to limiting the government and economic opportunities, non-citizens did not have claims to large land redistribution measures that occurred after independence. In distributing property and land, even ethnic Russians who achieved naturalized citizenship faced continued discrimination (Bernier, 2001). Investigations conducted by groups such as Amnesty International found that linguistic minorities experienced considerable discrimination within Estonia (Siegel, 2017). Ethnic Russians were effectively foreigners without the means to communicate or bolster representation. However, the effects of new Estonian law did not go unnoticed by the international community.

Numerous multilateral organizations were aware of Estonia’s nation building agenda. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe, and the European Union took note of the changes occurring within Estonia. Russian representatives to these organizations persistently raised the issue of human rights violations occurring in the newly independent Baltic states, with significant attention on Estonia given its high proportion of ethnic Russian population (Koort, 2014). As Estonia joined the OSCE, a body committed to preventing conflicts in majority and minority relationships, the High Commissioner reported on the minority abuses of Estonia within two years of its declaration of independence. It was concluded that the majority group had taken measures to ensure a “privileged position” in society (Bernier, 2001). Such measures were not only disruptive to the internal organization in Estonia, but also potentially dangerous for Estonia’s relationship with Russia. The discriminatory measures contributed to poverty, powerlessness, and ultimately resentment of the party in power (Gurr, 2000). The repression by the Estonian government had the potential to ignite ethnopolitical conflict. It was suggested that Estonia make improvements to the status of its ethnic Russians to promote a peaceful, cohesive state. Records show that the High Commissioner was reflective of the historical significance of this relationship in Estonia and made suggestions to Estonian government that outlined a plan to integrate noncitizens by their demonstration of commitment to Estonian society. Prompting more lenient requirements of Estonian language and other measures to make citizenship acquisition possible for many minorities, the High Commissioner held that citizenship should be a matter of inclusion rather than exclusion of those who would otherwise be stateless individuals (Bernier, 2001).

From the perspective of ethnic Russians, the framework for citizenship established by post-Soviet Estonia was challenging to their livelihood in the country. In an interview, a woman who had lived in Estonia since 1985 described:

In the political life of the country, I do not have any voice; on the labour market — only low-paid jobs. In order to fill out documents and communicate with public administration, I need to turn to a translator and pay fees…. As a stateless person, I do not feel like a full-fledged member of society. As a stateless person, I have difficulties related to travel. (Evas, 2016)

In describing her aspirations to participate in Estonian society, she stated:

I consider Estonia my home and want to live in this country, I also want to speak Estonian fluently … [Stateless] people living in this country for more than 20 years have a close link and permanent connection with this country and society … I really wanted to become an Estonian citizen and applied twice, but language courses are very expensive and the chance of passing the language exam is zero. I think that with the legislation and requirements today, I will never be able
to receive Estonian citizenship. If I had had a right to receive Estonian citizenship in the 1990s and escape my current status of stateless, I would have been able to achieve more in my life. I think, even now, if I could acquire Estonian citizenship, my life in Estonia would improve. (Evas, 2016)

Today, most stateless persons in Estonia describe aspirations to join Estonian society, but struggle with the requirements to do so. The ability to speak Estonian has been a frequently cited reason for the inability to naturalize. In another interview, a respondent who had been living in Estonia for more than 50 years stated:

We [stateless individuals born in Estonia] have proved with our lives [working, paying taxes, contributing to the development of society] that we are part of this society. I have intensively tried to pass the Estonian citizenship exam. I try every two years or so to make a new application and try to pass the language exam … I have passed the citizenship exam, but I repeatedly fail to pass the language test. (Evas, 2016)

Stateless persons in Estonia have frequently expressed sentiments surrounding powerlessness and hopelessness. Furthermore, the vast majority of those who participated in the survey conducted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees indicated a strong interest to participate more fully in Estonian society. In another survey studying stateless individual’s’ interest in integration within Estonian society, an Assimilation Index was created as a means to measure the minority’s attitudes. Controlling for social factors, the study found Estonian-living Russians expressed significant interest in assimilation, scoring with one the greatest openness to assimilation scores. Interestingly, it was found that Estonian-living ethnic Russians have a 13% greater chance than neighbouring Latvian-living ethnic Russians to express willingness to assimilate (Laitin, 1998, pp. 201–216). With international organizations alerted of the situation, pressure from the European community has become persistent.

Nevertheless the interests in ameliorating the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia may not have been entirely rooted in humanitarian causes. Since 1985, President of the European Commission, Jacques Dolores of France, envisioned the reunification of Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Davies, 1996). He presented the Single European Act (SEA), with a focus on abolishing the barriers to trade and mobility on the continent. The SEA prompted further legislation to unify Europe financially, politically, and socially. A unified European identity was beginning to form after the previously war-torn, conquered, and divided nations began to integrate, with Western Europe paving the way. The agenda of the SEA enabled the effective work of the European Economic Commission, which began to confer membership to several European states and extended an associate status to Estonia by 1991 (Davies, 1996). Its integrated nature confronted new and distinct challenges. “Euroregions” began to form in an effort to adapt to these challenges, to include the region of the Baltics. These regions included groups such as the Baltic Assembly, the Nordic-Baltic Eight, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The Scandinavian countries also took initiative in launching discussions on economic co-operation between the Baltic Sea states to build mutually beneficial economic ties (Davies, 1996). While improving the mistreatment of minorities in Estonia may be an admirable initiative, multilateral institutions also had economic and geopolitical interest in integrating Estonia. Therefore, the involvement of multilateral organizations in Estonia is not solely humanitarian or uniquely for the benefit of Estonia.

With an enticing economic opportunity in joining the newly formed European Union after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 1993, Estonia’s mistreatment of its minorities became an issue to the greater EU community. Estonia began to face mounting pressure to comply with European and international standards. As established by the Maastricht Treaty, not only was a common economic policy required, but standard security, justice, immigration, and foreign policies also had to align with European Union standards (Davies, 1996). In addition to the framework it exalted, the Treaty also officially recognized the three Baltic nations, signalling a symbolic gesture in terms of Estonia’s European identity. While the revamped European Union sought to integrate Europe, the citizens of Estonia were impressed by the recovery of economic prosperity in Western Europe and found an interest in identifying with a collective Europe (Davies, 1996). To unite the European continent, including former Soviet republics, served to assert the dominance of capitalism, democracy, and Western institutions in the eyes of the West after the decades long battle with communism and the Soviet Union. As a result, the integration of Estonia into Europe was an objective pursued with a specific geopolitical interest.
Moving forward with European integration, the Council of Europe, an organization focused on human rights issues and the establishment of fair democracy in Europe, started to voice concern with Estonia’s early actions of exclusion of its Russian minority. Considering that no country has ever joined the European Union without first joining the Council of Europe, this added an additional layer of international pressure for the Estonian government. In particular, the Council of Europe was concerned with the country’s citizenship laws. Their report indicated that since 1992, Estonia had made improvements to the landscape of their naturalization process, but that it still presented concerns. These concerns were rooted in various obstacles, such as language, civics tests, and cost, which continued to create difficulty for non-ethnic Estonians to naturalize (Bernier, 2001). Estonia was advised to accelerate the incorporation of Russian minorities into the citizenry. The concerns of the Council of Europe were echoed by the European Union. However, by 1997 the European Union invited Estonia to the accession negotiations despite lingering social inequality issues (Bungs, 1998).

Given the international pressure applied by European institutions, Estonia took steps to ease the naturalization process. By 1998 not only were the civic and language tests made easier to pass, they also dismissed the written language requirement for those born before January 1, 1930 (Bernier, 2001). Language training was increased and the cost of naturalization was reduced. Continually reminded by the incentives of EU membership, Estonia continued to make minor improvements to the citizenship acquisition process for its ethnic Russian minority. By 2000, Estonian President Lennart Meri was arguing in favour of the requirements asserted by the European Union (Bernier, 2001). The desire of Euro-integration presented yet another opportunity for the reconfiguration of Estonian identity. Despite modifications to the citizenship requirements, many Russians have stated that their ability to integrate into Estonian society has worsened since the 1990s as the effort to reduce the use of the Russian language has continued (Greene, 2010).

Public opinion indicates some of the cultural barriers that still exist in Estonia. In a 2016 survey conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), 61% of respondents indicated that they had some degree of a negative perception of “persons with undetermined citizenship.” To this same point, 38% reported a neutral perception, while 0% indicated any degree of a positive perception (Evas, 2016). This opinion is detrimental to the stateless population, as either statistic indicates unfavourable, or at best, apathetic attitudes towards the Russian minority. While this perception exists, the Estonian population indicates a favourable interest in solving the issue. In responding to the question of responsibility for the issue of statelessness, the UNHCR survey indicated that 93% of respondents judged it to be a problem of the whole Estonian society and that the state must take on more active measures to solve the situation. Furthermore, 93% of respondents indicated that the problem of statelessness in Estonia is a situation that cannot be solved without more active involvement of international organizations (Evas, 2016).

Today, the issue of statelessness persons in Estonia persists. This has led Estonia to further relax its citizenship laws in 2015, offering automatic citizenship to children born to stateless parents in Estonia (Griffiths, 2017). In their review of Estonian human rights abuses, the U.S. Department of State reported that 77,926 stateless residents remained in the country as of 2017 (U.S. Department of State, 2017). Despite this, the State Department maintained that there are no major human rights abuses within the country, minimizing the experiences of the Russian minority group. Furthermore, the former President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, stated in an interview that he doesn’t “see what people are complaining about.” He continued by describing the treatment of ethnic Russians in contrast to the treatment of Estonians deported to Siberia and enforcement of Russian language laws on Estonians during the years of Soviet occupation (Greene, 2010). From another Estonian perspective, the membership to the United Nations since 1991 and ratification of the principals of the UN human rights conventions signalled the country’s commitment to human rights. Furthermore, the state attests to its position as an observer in the UN Human Rights Council (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Most recently, Estonia has adopted the Estonia 2020 initiative, to compliment the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. This economic, social, and political vision is determined to improve on aspects of Estonia’s state. In addressing inclusivity and minorities, ethnic Russians were not specifically referenced for fear that identifying them specifically would marginalize other groups. Rather, the effort to meet this group’s interests fell into the EU’s requirement to improve “social inclusion,” while Estonian officials have opposed any special effort to aid the group specifically (Lesley, 2014, p. 4).
Although the cultural differences between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians remain prominent, the barriers built after the fall of the Soviet Union have eroded from where they once reached. With accession to the Europe Union in 2004, Estonia improved upon its treatment of the country’s minority groups in an effort to meet demands of the European community. The case of Estonia provides an example of a state’s ability to foster an identity that draws from history, language, and geopolitical interests. However, such a process may result in the marginalization of minority groups who express aspirations to assimilate into the new state. Under the current system, stateless persons in Estonia express sentiments of powerlessness, while their legal status limits their economic, political, and social opportunities to assimilate. While multilateral institutions such as the European Union have applied pressure on Estonia to improve upon its treatment of minorities, these international actors also exhibited motivation by political and economic incentives. Incorporating into the broader European community was not solely in the interest of Estonia, nor was advocating for the Russian minority solely in the interest of the Russian minority. Rather, coalescing the identity of a unified, humane European community after the decades of war, occupations, and injustices served to reform the European continent’s image. This case of history provides an example of the importance of oversight by multilateral organizations and proposes an awareness of the factors that motivate international intervention.
References


