By Benjamin Zyla, Madison Fillmore and Katelyn Cassin
After Mark Carney’s special address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the idea of a “middle power” has gained renewed attention in Canada. It was also mentioned several times at the Munich Security Conference in February. In his speech in Switzerland, Carney warned that the rules-based international order, on which middle powers depend for safety and influence, faces serious challenges. Since these states lack sufficient capacity to act alone, they should work together to support existing multilateral institutions and establish new ones.
The term “middle power” has a long-standing history in Canada, but also abroad. In the post-World War II period, Canadian leaders and diplomats intentionally asserted a distinguished international role for Canada, grounded in its “middle” position within the international hierarchy. Middle powers are not suspected of domination, as great powers might be, yet, unlike small powers, they possess the capacity to lead on specific international issues. Accordingly, Canada’s pursuit of foreign policy rooted in a self-identified middle-power status has consistently been associated with self-interest and the projection of power.
Moreover, middle powers are generally regarded as actively engaged on the international stage, assuming prominent roles in mediation, multilateralism, and offering leadership in specialized diplomatic domains. Canada has upheld this role and its international reputation in the post-World War II period, although less so during the Harper and Trudeau Jr. years.
The concept of “Middlepowermanship” has historically been closely linked with the liberal international order. Much of the discourse concerning middle powers characterizes them as “enlightened”, committed to leveraging their structural position to uphold a rights-based, rules-based, cooperative world order. This portrayal of Canada as a “benevolent” state is well-known to Canadians. However, defining middle powers as inherently supportive of the liberal world order today presents significant challenges and is becoming less relevant and more unhelpful.
First, it has resulted in a Western bias that arbitrarily excludes middle-ranked states such as South Africa and Türkiye, which are highly engaged internationally but diverge from or contest some aspects of the liberal world order. Second, the historical record of Western middle powers, such as Canada, shows that their support for liberal internationalism has always been mixed, tending to be offered only when it is in their interest. Third, to the extent that it ever fully existed, the liberal world order is under serious strain, increasingly disregarded by great powers.
Mark Carney recognized the hypocrisy. He called it a “pleasant fiction” and remarked that “we understood the story of the international rules-based order was partly false, with the strongest exempting themselves when it suited them, and trade rules enforced unevenly. We also knew that international law was applied with different levels of strictness depending on the accused or the victim’s identity.” This acknowledgment likely resonated with other middle-powers, such as Indonesia, Türkiye, and South Africa, which have previously expressed similar sentiments.
Both the World Economic Forum and the Munich Security Conference Report clearly acknowledge that the United States has relinquished its leadership role within the liberal global order and has now emerged as one of its principal challengers. Marco Rubio’s address in Munich is further testimony to this observation.
However, as liberal hegemony is no longer guaranteed, this situation creates new political opportunities for middle powers to act as intermediaries or connectors among diverse groups of actors, thereby promoting cooperation across various value systems and governance frameworks. Middle powers are well-positioned to lead in addressing armed conflicts, hyper-globalization, climate change, pandemics, and mass migration, which transcend borders and require multilateral approaches.
Waning U.S. leadership also necessitates that middle powers become more pragmatic and recognize that interests are increasingly diverse, while not every political or economic partner will share Canada’s values.
Adopting the principled pragmatism envisioned by Mark Carney will require a shift in Canada’s foreign relations, which in recent decades has prioritized its relationship with “like-minded” allies – especially the U.S. – over sustained engagement with the rest of the world. That needs to change, and fast.
Meeting this moment also requires more than rhetoric. Middle power pragmatism necessitates meticulous and strategic policy planning, complemented by well-structured and adequately funded foreign ministries. The persistent budget cuts in Canada’s public service, including at Global Affairs Canada, are misdirected. Ultimately, a revitalized middle-power engagement will demand additional funding, innovative ideas, and a new cadre of highly trained foreign service officers.
As great powers increasingly avoid multilateral institutions and pursue ad-hoc “dealmaking,” why not embrace middle power cooperation?
Benjamin Zyla is full professor at the University of Ottawa. Madison Fillmore is a PhD candidate at the University of Ottawa. Katelyn Cassin is Assistant professor at Özyegin University in Istanbul, Türkiye.
