Below is a copy of the contents of the following Government of Canada webpage as it appeared on May 8, 2012: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/wwa/igcsis/cert2004-eng.aspx.

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Submitted to:

Minister of Public Safety And Emergency Preparedness (Solicitor General of Canada) pursuant to Subsection 33(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

Note: This is the text of the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s 2004 Certificate made public in 2005 pursuant to a request under Canada’s Access to Information Act
(The 2004 Certificate was classified TOP SECRET when submitted to the Solicitor General of Canada in November 2004)
(The symbol [––] represents classified information removed from the document.)

Introduction

Section 33 (2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act requires that I submit to you a certificate stating the extent to which I am satisfied with the Director’s Annual Report to you. It also requires that I state whether, in my opinion, the Service has done anything in the course of its operational activities, in the time period covered by the Annual Report, which is not authorized by the Act, has contravened any Ministerial Directions, or has involved the unreasonable or unnecessary use of its powers. For ease of reference, the mandate and functions of the Inspector General are described in an appendix to this Certificate.

This is my first Certificate as I was appointed to the position of Inspector General of CSIS on 1 December 2003 following a twenty-eight year career in the former Portfolio of the Solicitor General. Over the past year I have devoted myself to deepening my knowledge of security intelligence operations and of CSIS. This learning included briefings with the senior executive at Headquarters as well as with operational branches and visits to all the regions to fully appreciate field operations. Earlier this year, greater knowledge of intelligence review in the international context was developed through visits from Lord Brown, the UK Intelligence Services Commissioner while he was in Ottawa, a meeting with members of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee during their North American visit and attendance at a conference in Berlin that dealt with comparative models of democratic oversight. More recently I was invited by my American counterparts to participate in an International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference that they hosted in Washington.

Now with a year’s experience as Inspector General, I am convinced that the approach of my predecessor as Inspector General was entirely sound and has formed the basis for a renewed and healthy relationship with CSIS. He maintained the importance of working constructively with CSIS in the search for continuing enhancements to ensure the lawful execution of the Service’s statutory mandate. For my part, I consider it a priority to maintain a healthy working relationship with CSIS at all levels of contact, while at the same time always making clear and respecting our separate and distinct roles in the national security system. I believe that we must work together in finding solutions in search of continuous improvement of the effectiveness of CSIS operations while enhancing democratic accountability. I am committed to ensuring that you, as Minister, are informed of any matters of non-compliance by the Service. Indeed, I think it of particular value for you to be apprised of those areas where non-compliance has been identified, even though they may be few in number, and corrective action may already been taken. My raison d’être is to support your Ministerial responsibility for CSIS.

Directors’s Annual Report

The Director’s section 33 (1) Annual Report has, over the past couple of years, been transformed from a quite lengthy document to a more focussed letter from the Director to the Minister. The Report now highlights the principal operational activities of the past year; more detailed operational information is contained in the Branch accountability reports held at Headquarters. In order to ensure that every statement in the section 33 (1) Report is fully supported by fact, my Office reviews all relevant information and intelligence collected and retained by the Service. At a minimum, this involves examining Branch accountability reports and the ‘facting’ intelligence reports on which they are based. The extent of the Inspector General’s satisfaction as set out in the Certificate is based on the validation of all of this documentation.

Certification

In respect of all the reports and information that I, and my Office, have reviewed and of all the discussions held, and subject to the issues below, I am as satisfied as I can be with the Director’s Annual Report to you on the Service’s operational activities for the period 2003-2004. In my opinion, the Service has not acted beyond the framework of its statutory authority, has not contravened any Ministerial Directions, and has not exercised its powers unreasonably or unnecessarily.

In addition to the validation of the Director’s report to you of 28 May 2004, this Certification is based on our reviews of CSIS operational activities and our monitoring of compliance with CSIS policy for the annual reporting period, which consisted of:

1. reviews of a selected sample of warrants and targets as well as of human source case management;
2. a study of CSIS foreign relations;
3. a review of CSIS assistance to Foreign Affairs and National Defence in the collection of foreign intelligence in Canada; and
4. comprehensive CSIS briefings on:

a. the former Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC),
b. Scientific and Technical Services,
c. Counter Intelligence [––],
d. Security Certificate Process pursuant to the Refugee and Immigration Protection Act, and
e. Political Interference – [––].

Issues

1. In August, 2004, the Director reported to me five incidents of non-compliance with operational policy for 2003-2004. I have reviewed each of these incidents and I am satisfied that the Service took the appropriate corrective actions in each incident. In carrying out my review, however, I did note that some non- compliance incidents had occurred in one particular region for each of the last three years. This may not be indicative of any particular problem but it does merit attention to ensure that the Service continues its development as a highly skilled and effective resource of government.

2. During the course of our review work and validation process, we uncovered issues that required further discussion with the Service. I am satisfied that these have been appropriately dealt with by the Service. For example, CSIS was very attentive to correcting errors to the Director’s Annual Report that had been identified by my staff, primarily in some of the statistical data.

3. [––] As you know, the Service’s primary statutory mandate is related to the four security threats defined in s. 2 of the Act, specifically, under s. 12, to the collection, analysis, retention and reporting to the Government of information and intelligence related to these threats. The Act is silent as to the locus of this activity; the Service maintains that these duties and functions are not limited to Canada and that it is empowered to operate extraterritorially in pursuit of its mandate. I believe that Canada is well served by this activity.

With respect to foreign intelligence [1], however, the Service may undertake the collection of information or intelligence, only insofar as its assistance in this collection has been requested in writing by the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These duties and functions are explicitly stipulated in the Act to be within Canada.

4. The collection of foreign intelligence is not subject to the same statutory thresholds in the Act with respect to the collection and retention of security intelligence, e.g. collection only to the extent it is strictly necessary; investigation of only those activities where there is a reasonable suspicion of a statutorily defined security threat.

As a consequence, there exists the potential risk of collecting and retaining information or intelligence where the security intelligence thresholds have not been met, i.e. under the guise of its being foreign intelligence. I have not seen any instances of this, but it is essential that s. 16 activities are reviewed and monitored in order to support you, the Minister, in your Ministerial responsibility for CSIS.

Similarly, security intelligence investigative activity abroad runs the potential risk of infringing the statutory stipulation to collect foreign intelligence only within Canada. Again, I have not seen any cases where such infringements have occurred. Nonetheless, I believe that [––], prudence dictates that the Inspector General should annually examine these activities.

5. Finally, the Inspector General is afforded by the Act very broad access to information held by the Service and is entitled to receive all such information from the Director and CSIS employees that the Inspector General deems necessary for the performance of the duties and functions of the Inspector General with the exception of confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.

CSIS has continued to respect these statutory provisions since I took office.

Nonetheless, I have become concerned about the delays I have witnessed in CSIS affording access to me and my staff to information, reports, responses and explanations. I have no reason to believe that such delays are occasioned by anything other than administrative inefficiencies and heavy workloads. Nonetheless, these delays, I believe could function as a tacit limitation to the statutory entitlement to access that is attributed to the Inspector General by the Act.

I have discussed these concerns with the Director and Senior Management of the service and have received assurance of their full attention and cooperation to address the issue of delays. Over the coming year it will be one of my priorities to continue work with the Service to address and successfully resolve my concern here.

Conclusions

After my first year in Office as Inspector General of CSIS, I have concluded that the Service exercises its duties and functions with a commendable degree of professionalism that serves Canadians well indeed. I have made a special point in my discussions and briefings at CSIS Headquarters and in the field to meet and talk to as many individuals as possible. I have come away from these meetings with a very favourable impression of the competence, dedication and commitment of Service employees at all levels and at varying lengths of service. Most of all I have been struck by the integrity with which the organization and its staff meet its mandate; its workforce is one of its great assets. I look forward to working with CSIS and its people in a constructive partnership to continue to enhance the lawful execution of its vital mandate and to support your Ministerial responsibility and accountability.

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[1] “Foreign intelligence” is defined in s. 16 of the CSIS Act as relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign state or group of foreign states and any person who is not a Canadian citizen, not a permanent resident and not a federally or provincially incorporated corporation.