Below is a copy of the contents of the following Government of Canada webpage as it appeared on May 8, 2012: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/wwa/igcsis/cert2009-eng.aspx.
Click here to return to the menu of the Archive of CSIS Inspector General Annual Certificate reports.
Submitted to the Minister of Public Safety pursuant to Subsection 33(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
Note: This is the text of the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s 2009 Certificate made public in May 2010 pursuant to a request under Canada’s Access to Information Act.
(The 2009 Certificate was classified TOP SECRET when submitted to the Minister of Public Safety in November 2009. The symbol [*] represents classified information removed from the document.)
Introduction
Section 33 (2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) requires that I submit to you a Certificate stating the extent to which I am satisfied with the Director’s Annual Report. It also requires that I state whether, in my opinion, the Service has done anything in the course of its operational activities, in the time period covered by the Annual Report, which is not authorized by the Act, has contravened any Ministerial Directions, or has involved the unreasonable or unnecessary use of its powers. The mandate and functions of the Inspector General are described in an appendix to this Certificate.
This is my sixth Certificate that I am submitting since my appointment in 2003. It is, however, my second Certificate for you as Minister. You may recall that last year I provided you with background information on the role and raison d’être of the Inspector General. While I will not provide such detail again this year, I do believe that it is important to re-iterate that this Office was created, in large part, to provide independent assurance to the Minister to support Ministerial responsibility for CSIS. The office carries out internal, and at the same time, independent reviews of CSIS for you.
The internal dimension means that there is a direct reporting relationship to you, similar to that between you and other public office holders in your portfolio. Consequently, the Inspector General works in concert with, not in opposition to, the Director of CSIS. This also means that the Inspector General can be directly tasked by you to carry out reviews or studies of CSIS and this authority was engaged by your predecessor with respect to an examination of a CSIS managerial review.
The independent facet of the Inspector General’s function means that the Inspector General’s judgements or review results are not subject to direction or control by CSIS, your Deputy Minister, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), or even, with all due respect, you as Minister. It also means that great care is taken to ensure that the Inspector General is in no way part of the decision-making process affecting such matters as targets, warrants, and section 16 requests for assistance. When the Inspector General or her staff reviews something, it is de novo, for the first time without any stake in how the matter was initially decided. The independence of the work is what lends to the office value and credibility for you, as Minister, in what is submitted and reported to you.
To provide you with this independent perspective and assurance about the work of CSIS, the office undertakes a variety of review activities, which I will report on in more detail in the following pages.
Building Awareness
In keeping with my established approach, I have sought and obtained briefings on several matters from the senior executive at CSIS Headquarters and the associated operational branches and have undertaken and completed one-day visits to all regions of CSIS, in order to meet with regional management and select investigators. All of these visits this past year were held in the regional offices except one which was held in the Quebec district office in Quebec City. I also met with the Directors’ General and their management teams of three operational branches at Headquarters, including International Region (IR), International Terrorism Branch (ITB) and Middle East and Africa Branch (MEA).
These occasions provide an opportunity for open communication and enhance mutual understanding and trust in the working relationship. I am able to have in-depth discussions with front-line managers and staff, and receive briefings in my support role for your Ministerial responsibility. These visits give me a first hand view into the daily operational work of employees of the Service, their environment, and the challenges that they face. This component of my work also provides me with an avenue to pursue my efforts, on your behalf, to continue to strengthen an organizational culture of compliance within the Service, which I view as an important dimension of my work and which is underscored by the CSIS Act. Consistent with this objective, my office also provided briefings on the roles and responsibilities of the Inspector General to all entry Intelligence Officers Training Courses, the most recent of which I personally attended.
I noted from my visits to the regions that most of the offices now have fewer vacancies and many of the positions are staffed with new recruits. The increased resources are welcomed but the Service is faced with the continuing and arguably growing challenge of the changing demographic with a workforce comprised of a sizable number of new recruits, some with many language skills and impressive academic credentials, but still learning the trade. Advances and increased sophistication in communications technology is a continuing concern to the Service at the operational level in terms of the challenges they represent to their investigative capabilities. Your introduction of Bill C47: Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act was welcomed by CSIS as a very positive step and when brought into force will mitigate some of these challenges.
Outreach
It terms of outreach to the international security intelligence review community, I met this year with representatives from three close allies including representatives of the New Zealand Government who are reviewing their security intelligence legal framework; a representative of the Australian security intelligence community and members of the United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee. These meetings assist me in keeping abreast of international developments and issues of common concern. For example, the Australian representative advised me of interesting agreed upon changes to the Australian Inspector General of Intelligence Act whereby the Prime Minister can approve an inquiry by the Inspector General into intelligence and security issues in government departments and agencies beyond the Security and Intelligence agencies for which the Inspector General has responsibility.
Also, while conducting a review of the CSIS [*] Station [*] I met with [*] with whom I discussed, generally, intelligence liaison and the threat environment in the region.
My office participated in the annual Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies 2009 Conference (CASIS) which was held in Ottawa. This provided a very good training opportunity for my staff to benefit from discussions and presentations of academics, experts and practitioners both international and Canadian.
The office also participates in the Review Agency Forum, an informal body of federal review agencies including SIRC, the Office of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment and the RCMP Public Complaints Committee. This forum is a means, in part, to discuss best practices and issues held in common by review agencies at the federal level.
The Office
To assist me in carrying out my duties as Inspector General I have a staff of eight. Since my appointment as Inspector General I have taken several steps to ensure that the limited resources at my disposal can efficiently and effectively assist me in meeting my mandate. The measures that I have taken include:
- One EX position was eliminated to devote more resources to review work;
- Greater rigour has been inserted into the development and implementation of the annual review plan, adding an increased focus of review work on the core activities of CSIS and those activities that involve intrusive powers;
- A methodological reference manual for ongoing guidance to experienced staff and for training new staff has been developed and standardized methodologies for review work, to the extent possible, have been established;
- Secure electronic systems have been improved internally to expedite transmission of electronic data and facilitate communication amongst staff; and
- Direct access has been granted by CSIS to OIG staff to electronic information data bases at CSIS.
These actions have had a positive impact both on the quality and the quantity of the review work but it should be underscored that the nature of review work is in many ways an exercise in risk management. It is not possible to review all operational activities of CSIS. The size of the samples reviewed is largely governed by the resources available. The sample of activities reviewed must be large enough by review standards to be conclusive to fulfill the mandate and support Ministerial accountability.
Relationship
As always, I wish to note that I place the utmost importance on maintaining a healthy working relationship with CSIS, at all levels of contact, while at the same time making clear, and respecting our separate and distinct roles in the national security system. Review work requires a delicate balance. On the one hand, if the reviewer is, or appears to be too close to the reviewed organization, this can diminish the value and relevance of the work. On the other hand if the relationship is adversarial this could compromise the functioning of the office and the ability to support your Ministerial accountability. The reality is that both CSIS and my office share the mutual objective of working to continuously improve the effectiveness of CSIS operations while enhancing democratic accountability. I can state again this year, without reservation, that is what both parties have strived to do during this period of reporting.
Certification
Minister, let me begin by stating the following:
In respect of all the reports and information that I, and my Office, have obtained and reviewed and of all the discussions held, and subject to the concerns raised below, I am as satisfied as I can be with the Director’s Annual Report to you on the Service’s operational activities for the period 2008-2009. In that respect, it is my opinion that the Service has not acted beyond the framework of its statutory authority, has not contravened any Ministerial Directions, and has not exercised its powers unreasonably or unnecessarily.
In order to ensure that every statement in the Director’s section 33 (1) Report is fully supported and documented, the office reviews all the pertinent information and intelligence collected and retained by the Service. At a minimum, this involves the ‘facting’ intelligence reports on which each statement in the report is based. This baseline is supplemented by exchanges of questions and answers in writing, by discussions, briefings and interviews. The extent of the Inspector General’s satisfaction, as set out in the Certificate, is based on this comprehensive process of validation.
My Certification process is based not only on the Director’s Report dated August 24, 2009 but also on reviews of CSIS operational activities and monitoring of compliance with CSIS operational policy conducted during the annual reporting period. This year, the following reviews were completed:
1. Reviews of a sample of:
- warrant acquisitions,
- targets, and
- human source operations
2. Review of the Prairie Region
3. Review of a Foreign Station [*]
4. Review of CSIS Cooperation with the Communications Security Establishment Canada
5. Review of the CSIS Investigation [*]
6. Review of the CSIS Investigation [*]
7. Review of the CSIS Investigation [*]
During the past year I also received comprehensive briefings from CSIS personnel on:
1. [*]
2. Security Certificate Process under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
3. Scientific and Technical Services Role in the Execution of Warrant Powers
All these activities contribute to my ability to offer you, with some degree of confidence, the assurances that you require to support your accountability for CSIS.
General comments
With respect to the Director’s Report, you will recall that he indicated to you that he was reporting in accordance with the requirements set out in the Ministerial Direction on Operations in place until October 2008 and those revised as of that date. I have determined that the letter complies with section 33 (1) of the CSIS Act and with Ministerial Direction reporting requirements as set out in the revised Ministerial Direction on Operations approved by your predecessor on October 29, 2008. While I have determined that the report does meet these requirements, the Report did not fully and accurately meet the reporting requirements set out in the Ministerial Directions in place until October 29, 2008. My concerns in this regard and on other points of accuracy were conveyed in a letter to the Director dated November 2, 2009. I understand that a letter will be prepared by the Director for you addressing these concerns. If you wish additional information detailing these points of content and accuracy, I would be pleased to provide it to you.
As Inspector General, I am also responsible pursuant to the CSIS Act for reviewing the operational activities of the Service and for identifying areas where operational activity has not been in compliance with the operational policies of the Service. As noted above, each year the office completes a number of reviews of Service operational activities. These reviews most often overlap the Director’s reporting period by a few months, but to ensure the office does not interfere with ongoing operations, the review period does not equate exactly with the fiscal year to which the Director is reporting. The results of these reviews are shared with CSIS and action, in most instances, is taken by the Service to respond to compliance issues and to correct errors with the objective of strengthening processes and accuracy.
I define non-compliance as a non-adherence to the rules, procedures, principles and guidelines set out in operational policy, without any qualification as to the degree of significance of such non-compliance. While some instances are termed administrative or clerical errors by some individuals in an effort to minimize their import, this approach is overly simplistic and potentially risky for the credibility of the organization. Individual errors could have significant implications for Service investigations and potentially individual civil liberties. In addition, the significance or impact of any given act of non-compliance often can only be assessed at some point in the future after subsequent developments. For this reason, I judge that it is far more appropriate to report all cases of non-compliance to operational policy without importing any pre-judgments as to importance. I have determined that it is through this approach that I am best able to support you in your Ministerial responsibility for CSIS.
Changing Policy Environment
This past year has witnessed a significant change in the policy environment for CSIS, both in terms of Ministerial Directions and changes in internal operational policies. Both will have an impact on CSIS operations and on the review work of my office. As you are aware, a Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities for 2008-2009 was issued in July 2008; a new Ministerial Direction on Operations was issued in October 2008; and a Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Agencies was issued in May 2009. Also during the past year, the Deputy Director, Operations (DDO) has issued a large number of Directives which take precedence over existing policy or provide direction on new procedures in the interim until policy is revised. These DDO Directives are developed and issued much more quickly than standard operational policy documents. I have identified delays in policy development in previous certificates as a major concern and I must raise this issue again this year with a qualifier. The issuance of DDO Directives has provided a form of operational policy relatively quickly to implement not only the new Ministerial Direction on Operations but also recent judicial and quasi-judicial decisions.
Two significant changes in the Ministerial Direction on Operations will be monitored closely by this office on your behalf, both in terms of CSIS operational policy development and actual operations. These include:
1. the principle of linking the level of risk of an operation to an appropriate level of decision maker; and
2. the replacement of a number of explicit requirements for consultation with and notification to you as Minister with a requirement, based on a risk assessment, to notify you when the Director determines that there is a potential for an activity to have an adverse impact on Canadian interests.
The shift to a risk-based decision-making framework could be beneficial in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness, but will have implications at all levels in the Service, as policies are amended to reflect this principle. It will place greater responsibilities on middle managers who will require training and expertise to ensure that these increased responsibilities are exercised appropriately.
Areas of concern
The reviews conducted by the office this year have identified again a substantially larger number of instances of non-compliance with CSIS operational policy than noted in my five previous Certificates. There was also a notable increase in the number of errors identified in CSIS records. These instances of non-compliance and errors are not isolated to one program or one set of processes. They do appear in key core activities of the Service [*]. I am unable to offer you an explanation for this continuing year-over-year increase, suffice to say the number of non-compliance issues and the number of errors identified continue to increase each year and are a very real concern that merits attention.
A second area of concern, which I referenced earlier, and on which I will provide more detail below, is the length of time taken to develop or amend operational policies to reflect changing requirements and operational activities of the Service. This issue is evident in a number of areas. As I have expressed in my previous Certificates, I view a sound, up-to-date operational policy framework as essential to the functioning of the Service, particularly given the more strategic focus of the revised Ministerial Directions and the general shift to delegate decision making downwards in the organization. This is even more pressing in light of the ongoing changes to the nature of operational activities in response to the threat environment [*]. The creation of several DDO Directives, developed quickly on an ad hoc basis, fills some aspects of this gap and reflects progress on this issue. I continue to hold the view however that, without an established policy framework to offer direction and guidance, actions can be taken with the best of intentions that ultimately are not only inconsistent with the intent of the Ministerial Directions but also may result in negative consequences.
Director’s Annual Report 2008-2009
As I have noted, the office completes a thorough validation of the Director’s Report to you. This validation identified a number of points of accuracy and unfulfilled requirements for reporting under the previous Ministerial Direction on Operations. I understand that these points will be addressed in a letter to you from the Director.
Compliance Statement 2008-2009
On July 27, 2009, the Director wrote to me with a Compliance Statement for 2008-2009 in which he identified 28 cases where employees were found to be in non-compliance. This is the largest number of compliance issues identified by a Director in my six years as Inspector General. One of these instances implicated section 19 of the CSIS Act . Section 19 of the CSIS Act sets out the grounds on which disclosure of information is authorized. [*] None of the instances of non-compliance reported by the Director were deemed to require investigation further to section 20 of the CSIS Act . I am satisfied that the Service has taken the appropriate measures in each case.
Review Work
[*]
[*] For this reason, I am quite concerned with the findings identified through our review [*]. In addition, the Director, in his July 27, 2009 letter to me referenced above, identified 26 instances of non-compliance with operational policy [*].
The Review [*] by the office identified more than 30 instances of non-compliance with operational policy and more than 40 errors in operational reporting, and in [*] files. An additional 26 instances of non-compliance with policy as well as errors with [*] were also found in three other Reviews including: the Regional Review, the Review of the CSIS Investigation [*] and the Review of the CSIS Investigation [*].
Compliance Issues
[*] The non-compliance issues identified in the Reviews undertaken by the office this year cover a broad range of issues. [*] were responsible for the largest number of non-compliance instances and in the four Reviews identified above, accounted for 37 instances of non-compliance. [*]
Other areas of non-compliance [*] identified through the Reviews include: [*]. I will address the matters of [*] in more detail below.
With regard to [*]. Eight instances of this non-compliance with policy were identified through the review work. In two of these cases, the Service had identified the non-compliance in advance of the review by the office and took corrective measures when they themselves had identified the situation. The Service has undertaken corrective measures in all other instances. In my previous Certificate I noted one instance falling within this category. The increased number of occurrences identified this year is disconcerting.
Compliance issues [*] also accounted for the majority of the instances of non-compliance in the Director’s Compliance Statement for 2008-2009 which I have referenced above. These included: [*]
[*] is an issue identified both in the review work of my office as well as in the Director’s letter. [*]
Action has been taken by the Service to address compliance issues in this sector but I find the yearly increasing instances of non-compliance to be worrisome. Greater diligence in adherence to operational policy is required, [*].
Errors
The increasing rate of errors in reporting [*] is deeply concerning. This concern relates to both the number of errors and the nature of these errors, which are found [*] in operational reporting. These errors are not only confined to date inaccuracies but also relate to matters of such significance [*]. In reviews undertaken by the office, 18 such errors were identified [*]. In addition there were 25 [*].
The potential negative consequences that errors of this type could have on Service investigations and on individuals affected by the use of Service information cannot be overstated. Accuracy in assessments [*] is essential if the Service is to make use of the information it collects in a fair and balanced manner. Once errors regarding [*] information are introduced into operational reporting, they have the potential to result in decisions that are based on inaccurate information. Such errors could negatively affect the Service’s own internal decision-making processes; decisions taken by the Service’s foreign and domestic partners (in the event the information is shared); or judicial proceedings. Moreover, when errors of this nature come to light, they have a highly detrimental effect on the Service’s credibility both with Canadians, the judicial system and with other intelligence agencies. Owing to the ramifications of such errors, greater rigour in the writing, review and approval of operational reports is necessary.
Warrant Acquisition
The Service recognizes that the warrant acquisition process is a key tool to support their functions. With regard to acquisition of warrants, I can report this year that the review work by the office did not identify any instances of non-compliance with operational policy, but unfortunately the rate of errors continues to be troubling.
In my 2007 Certificate I noted my concern with the [*] and in my 2008 Certificate, I noted [*]
Action Taken
I can advise you Minister that I have observed that CSIS executive have demonstrated a serious commitment to address the problems with the warrant application process. Revised procedures for warrant acquisition were published in June 2008, revised guidelines for the preparation of case briefs were developed and a new training regime has been offered since September 2008. In October 2008, increased quality control measures were inserted into the warrant application process in response to a review conducted by the office in 2008. As part of the Warrant Acquisition Review conducted by the office this past year, one warrant application was reviewed that had been processed after these new measures had been implemented. The office found no errors or concerns with this warrant application. While one error free application does not suggest a trend, I will say that this is a positive indicator that the measures that have been put in place are producing effective results.
Note Worthy
Given the attention that has been given this past year to exchanging information with foreign agencies which have poor human rights records, [*].The information that was supplied to the Court was supported by CSIS records together with sufficient contextual information along with corroborating information to allow the Court to apply appropriate weight to the information from the foreign agency.
Considering the intrusive investigative authorities provided by warrants and the implications of these authorities on the civil liberties and privacy interests of individuals, the Service’s acquisition and execution of warrant powers is an area I will continue to closely monitor for you.
Validation of Compliance
Last year, as reported in my Certificate, occasions arose where it was impossible to validate whether certain authorities had been delegated or that appropriate measures had been taken, as documentation was not available or had not been created (i.e. decisions reported to have been communicated orally). As a review body, documentation is required to validate compliance. In the absence of such documentation, I can only provide you with negative assurances. As opposed to three instances noted in my previous Certificate, none were identified this past year. I am hopeful that this is a sign that the Service has recognized the value of documenting decisions and actions that have been taken, particularly when these decisions are tied to a policy requirement or when the documentation would provide confirmation that an activity was undertaken with authority and in line with policy.
An Interesting Example
[*]
Information Management
As I have previously underscored, the life-blood of security intelligence organization is information and, for this reason, our review work looks at how information is managed by the Service. The importance that I have accorded to this function is reflective of the Ministerial Direction on Operations which requires the Service to ensure adequate and consistent handling of information about Canadians when collecting, storing and disclosing information.
Information management, as articulated in the Ministerial Direction, has many facets: accuracy in recording the information collected, how the information is retained and stored, how easily it is retrieved, who it is shared with and under what conditions. In my Certificates for the past three years, I have highlighted several problems with information handling by the Service. I must report that the matter of information management by the Service, and the accuracy of information, continue to be a significant area of concern.
Accuracy
Accurate information is fundamental for the Service to function well. Accuracy of reporting persists as an issue, whether it is something as simple as inaccurate dates, which were identified in the conduct of five reviews this past year or more substantive inaccuracies. These inaccuracies appear not only in administrative files but also in operational reporting. When these errors are identified, the Service responds by making corrections; however, given the increasing number of errors identified, there is clearly a need for more to be done to ensure that authors of documents are committed to ensuring accuracy and supervisors are held accountable for that accuracy. There is one example which I would like to raise with you which describes to some extent the problem.
Illustrative Example
[*]
These errors were significant for several reasons:
- First, the sheer volume of errors is of concern. It stands to reason, however, that since my office reviewed only a sample, there may be many more errors of this type that have not yet been identified.
- Second, these errors were widespread emanating from a majority of operational branches.
- Finally, these reports, taken individually, made it appear [*].
I can assure you Minister, that once this issue was identified, the Service did view this matter as extremely serious and took steps to identify the causes. Their review identified the root cause to be linked to 2005/2006 changes to the electronic system which was further compounded by other system adjustments. The Service has taken steps to respond to these findings and have indicated that they will remain alert to this issue and make corrections when similar errors are identified.
The significance of this issue should not be minimized as errors of this nature can be as damaging to the Service as instances of non-compliance. Service operations depend upon the accurate reporting of information, and errors in operational reporting, such as those identified, can have a negative impact on Service operations and the organization’s credibility as a whole.
Sharing of Information
Another critical function of information management conducted by the Service is the sharing of information with other agencies and under what conditions this occurs. Records Tracking Codes are used to track operational information exchanged between CSIS and external organizations both domestic and foreign. As you are aware, the sharing of information with other organizations, and how this information is ultimately used, has given rise to some controversy and has been subject to comments both from Commissions of Inquiry as well as the judiciary. Service personnel who disclose or receive information and intelligence are responsible for recording and tracking their exchanges in operational reports. Reviews by my office this year again identified a higher number of reports regarding exchanges of information which did not include tracking codes. Approximately 25% of the reports missing Record Tracking Codes were identified in the context of the office’s review of the [*]; however, responsibility for these instances of non-compliance does not rest with that [*].
[*]
The Service recognizes the value of Records Tracking Codes and did make the required corrections when the errors were identified. The Service has advised that it now has modified [*] to ensure that the Records Tracking Code field is a mandatory field. This modification is encouraging and I hope that future reporting to you will be more positive on this issue.
In the interest of ensuring that records of exchanges of information are accurate and complete, the Service should consider amending operational policy to clearly direct that information confirming [*] is recorded in their database.
CSIS Station Abroad
In my previous two Certificates, I discussed issues with the use of the [*] system at the [*] Office and the [*] Office. The [*] system is a correspondence and activity management/tracking tool used by CSIS Stations abroad to record all [*] activities undertaken by [*]. [*] is responsible for sending all [*] entries to CSIS Headquarters on a monthly basis to be placed on the Headquarters’ [*] database. The [*] system is considered by the Service to be a corporate record and, as such, should be accurate. The reviews of Stations abroad have consistently identified discrepancies between the [*] databases at HQ and Stations abroad. This effectively casts doubt on the reliability of the HQ [*] records.
With regard to the Foreign Station [*], the Service corrected the variance identified through our review. While it is recognized that the [*] system is primarily designed as an office automation system principally for CSIS stations abroad, I continue to be concerned with the reliability of the records in the HQ [*] database – a corporate system. The Service has indicated that steps have been taken to increase verification of the accuracy of the data, however apart from citing possible human error, the Service is unable to identify or explain the cause of the discrepancies. As I noted last year, given the importance being placed on [*] activities, [*] and the increased foreign posture, it is important that effective measures be put in place to ensure that the information contained in this corporate system is reliable.
Gaps in policy framework
I find myself again this year being very concerned about delays in developing, updating and implementing operational policy. Operational policies are one of the cornerstones to governance of the activities of CSIS. They implement legislation, Ministerial Directions and court decisions, thereby providing a framework within which both staff and management conduct operational work and establish standards for measuring compliance. As the threat environment changes and CSIS activities enter new and more challenging situations, it is essential that the policy framework accurately reflects the requirements of this work and provides current and relevant direction to staff.
As I noted previously, this past year has seen an increasing number of DDO Directives which address some urgent requirements for policy changes or clarifications. These were made easily accessible to CSIS staff and linked to the operational policy framework [*]. The creation of these Directives implicitly recognizes that internal operational policy changes take time. The Directives are a helpful short term patch but should not be seen as a permanent means to correct an ongoing problem. A very clear need exists to speed up the process of developing standard operational polices and to incorporate into the process an effective and efficient means for inserting amendments. The changing nature of the work for which CSIS is responsible requires this adaptive flexibility in its policy development. Two examples which underscore the need for revised operational policy include:
1.[*]; and
2.[*].
The latter policy is essentially designed to manage [*] and does not address the new realities of the work of the Service. I have repeatedly identified this as a concern in my previous Certificates and annually, for at least three years, have been advised that the policy is under review.
New Circumstances
During the coming year it will be important to monitor internal operational policies against the revised Ministerial Directions and ensure that activities are conducted as required and reflect the risk-based approach to operational activities as set out in the Ministerial Direction on Operations. Operational activities and the policies guiding them that I believe will require particularly close monitoring by the Inspector General, on your behalf, relate to changes in the Ministerial Directions which no longer explicitly require your involvement or notification. Two examples include:
1.[*]; and
2.[*].
Both of these activities potentially have serious implications for Canada and although there is no longer explicit Ministerial involvement in these activities, I believe it is important that you be aware of the nature and extent of these activities.
Collection of Foreign Intelligence
This past year, the office did not conduct a review of foreign intelligence collection by the Service. In the past, reviews of this activity have been completed once every two years and it is my intention to complete a review on this subject during the upcoming year. As you are aware, section 16 of the CSIS Act requires the Service to limit its collection of foreign intelligence to within Canada, as distinct from security intelligence which can be collected anywhere. [*]
Conclusions
As I complete my sixth year in office as Inspector General, I can assure you, Minister, with some degree of confidence, that I believe CSIS exercises its duties and functions within the legislatively provided framework of authority in a professional and effective manner. The experience of six years in office has given me an appreciation of the scope of investigative efforts and the diversity of operations and the challenges they present. I am confident in the high quality of the review work of my office and I am encouraged by the responsiveness of the Service to the issues identified.
This year CSIS marked its 25th anniversary, an achievement for any organization. With 25 years of experience has come a maturity. There is a more evident willingness to confront issues and mistakes, acknowledge them, make corrections and adjustments and learn from them. I continue to be impressed by the calibre of employees, increasingly more representative of the demographic and geographic diversity of Canada, their dedication and their commitment to serving Canada and Canadians. Theirs are not easy tasks and much of their work is not readily understood and often not fully appreciated. The work of the Service, much like review work, can be quite challenging but is ultimately always rewarding.
CSIS, although now at the 25 year mark, continues to grow and take on new activities to support the government in these changing times. For these very reasons, I know it can continue to benefit from independent assessment, review and observations which are essential for any organization but particularly for one which, by its very nature, must work primarily in secret. I believe this office fulfills that role in providing an independent source of support for your Ministerial responsibility for CSIS. I am confident that the observations of this office have and can continue to assist CSIS as it moves forward in supporting Canada in a world where, unfortunately, threats to the security of Canada are very evident.