The Government last week paid tribute to Canadian Forces who served in the recently-concluded NATO mission in Libya. It was a welcome gesture to those who serve Canada abroad, often with little or no recognition at all. And it was consistent with the Government’s new emphasis on muscularity in foreign policy, replacing the nuanced reliance of former governments on that much-misunderstood term, ‘soft power’. Military might, they argue, makes Canada ‘punch above its weight’, to use an old slogan now part of everyday government usage.
But there was also a disquieting element of the ‘mission accomplished’ syndrome in the lavish ceremony and speeches, and especially in the Prime Minister’s statement that “our job in Libya has been done and done well.” It conjured up the Bush administration’s early pronouncements on the war in Iraq, when the initial military assaults on Baghdad were fast and successful, but left a quagmire of violence and civil unrest for which the American government was totally unprepared. That lack of thinking, planning and preparation was to cost thousands of lives and leave the Americans and others stranded in Iraq, searching desperately for an honourable exit.
The lessons for Libya are clear, and have been for several decades, in looking at conflicts around the globe, including Afghanistan: military campaigns are very rarely the end of a problem. In almost all cases, they are simply the beginning of a final resolution, inevitably leading to a new, more significant and usually more complicated and lengthy non-military phase. And in that phase, there is no substitute for the active presence of civilians well-versed in the skills of building peace and sustaining civil societies, leading to democratic governance.
And this leads inevitably to the next question for Canada. Having leaped eagerly into the military phase, even without defining a role or an end game, where is the Canadian government in the next, more decisive phase of action in Libya? The record to date is not inspiring. The Department of Foreign Affairs has almost been absent without leave, apart from lightning photo opportunities for the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Benghazi and Tripoli. After closing our embassy in Tripoli for security reasons, we appear to have avoided a diplomatic presence on the ground with the insurgents, in contrast to some of our allies. If DFAIT had continuous eyes and ears on the ground in Libya, it remains an intriguing secret.
A diplomatic presence in Benghazi would have been useful—indeed crucial—in understanding the insurgency and its leadership, which were largely unknown when the rebellion broke out. It could also have helped in defining a future role for Canada as Libyan institutions begin to take shape. It’s almost axiomatic that with a diplomatic presence, we are knowledgeable and influential, with options to explore; without it, we’re left dependant on friends and allies for information that any responsible government collects for itself.
If Foreign Affairs has been laying low, CIDA seems to have chosen the path of invisibility. Granted, it’s played its usual role of writing cheques in support of humanitarian assistance. But there seems to be nothing in terms of a strategy for longer-term institutional support, or even for assistance to UN and other organizations that are now resident in Tripoli. Even at this relatively tardy stage, some small but potentially significant Canadian steps are possible. Engagement with the Canadian-Libyan expatriate community might produce opportunities for those seeking to return temporarily to lend crucial assistance at a decisive time. Canadian-Libyans could be assigned, with a modest degree of Canadian assistance, to the new United Nations and other offices that will coordinate the mobilization of international support for re-building the country. With the interests we once had in Libya—involving thousands of Canadians who once lived and worked there—there is no shortage of talent available. Canada’s immediate interest is to make it happen, while the time is right.
The Canadian whole-of-government scorecard in the Libyan case is therefore pretty sad. If there is a reason, it might well be rooted in the disparities that now exist in Ottawa among the major departments with roles abroad. The common element in the Canadian situation is not much different than what prevails in the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other major players in the Libyan game. Simply put, the bank account is open-ended in the military phase, but when the more significant, but slightly less photogenic civilian phase begins, the purse-strings tighten.
Whatever the costs of the Libyan military operation, what is now needed is a parallel effort on the side of building and consolidating peace, without which the military expenditure was essentially wasted. Whether Foreign Affairs can manage or coordinate a major post-conflict operation in an Arab country, after years of budget reductions that have hollowed out the core foreign policy functions of the Department, remains to be seen. But if it fails, the Government will also fail on its commitments to democratic governance and freedom of religion, two of the core principles that should be fundamental to a new Libya.
In a strange statement two months ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs challenged the new Government of Libya “to fulfill its commitments to freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” He spoke as if the Libyan government had any of the capabilities to make those noble goals attainable. But unlike a military campaign, particularly one against a weak adversary, that won’t happen overnight. And it won’t happen without help. One can also visualize the conflicting pressures and influences moving in different and more destructive directions.
So, what does Canada do to support the principles of which the Minister spoke? Is the Libyan case already ‘mission accomplished’? Or is there something more coherent, long-term and strategic in the future? The Libyan situation has only just begun. The next months and weeks will determine whether Canada is punching above its weight. Right now, it’s hardly punching at all.
