Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabagh: The Next Step

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabagh: The Next Step

In 2020, a war took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan, resulting in several thousand casualties. The 44-day war ended with an Azeri military victory over Armenia and the capture of an important part of Nagorno-Karabagh. Following a ceasefire and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers, the rest of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh remained under local Armenian administration. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new military offensive to retake the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabagh, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. Although in violation of the 2020 ceasefire, the operation was designed to take over the region while Russia remained bogged down in Ukraine and mainly uninterested in fulfilling its mandate as peace guarantors of the 2020 accords. After a swift Azerbaijani military victory over Armenian separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabagh 120,000 ethnic Armenians fled, fearing for their lives. They started a difficult journey through mountainous roads in harsh conditions, resulting in some deaths.  A United Nations mission has found that fewer than 100 Armenians remain to this day in Nagorno-Karabagh.


The scale and swiftness of this ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Rather than being driven by mass murders, the situation was the result of years of mistrust and fear between the two ethnic communities. If some cases of potential war crimes, including extrajudicial killings and the destruction of heritage sites and civilian properties, were documented during the 2023 military operation, the ethnic cleansing was mostly the result of a horrible choice ethnic Armenians had to make in the chaos of Azerbaijan’s military operation. Like in the case of the 1995 ethnic cleansing in Krajina, extreme fear of violent reprisals based on recent conflicts and atrocities committed against local minorities following the conquest of an ethnic enclave resulted in a unique cleansing process driven by the anticipation of violence rather than mass violence. Armenian minorities (un)willfully chose to leave their homes rather than risking living under Azerbaijan rule and its oppressive regime. Although some argue about the definition of the expression “forcibly displaced”, one cannot deny that Armenians from Nagorno-Karabagh felt threatened enough to leave their lives behind knowing very well that they would probably never come back to their ancestral land.

Even with the promise of the Azeri government to treat Armenians as proper Azerbaijan citizens with all their rights, the local Armenian population felt safer to leave everything behind, abandon their homeland, and travel across the mountains for days rather than trusting the Aliyev regime. The lack of international support, the failure of Russian peacekeepers to upkeep their mandate, and the recent blockade of the Lachin corridor all contribute to the extreme anxiety profoundly anchored in years of ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azeris.  

Overall, without a direct intervention of Western forces, one is left wondering how Armenians could safely return to the region, manage to voice their will for self-determination, and reestablish relationships with the local Azeri population that was also violently displaced in the 1990s.

 

What solutions are possible?

The lack of international intervention following the 2020 war as well as the lack of protection of the Armenian minority in Karabagh have created the conditions for a long-lasting ethnic cleansing process Although the Azerbaijan government has guaranteed the safe return of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabagh as Azeri citizens, coming back to the status quo ante bellum appears almost impossible. Even with some form of international guarantees, ethnic Armenians’ distrust toward Azerbaijan appears impossible to address. First, as ethnic minorities, they fear potential violence and ethnic hatred from security forces as well as newly relocated local citizens. Years of ethnic tensions in the region have now drastically transformed the relationships between Azeris and Armenians. Secondly, Azerbaijan remains far from a functional liberal democracy, adopting a very repressive approach against opposition forces and journalists in general. The rule of law that in theory could support the protection of Armenians remains institutionally weak, even maybe non-existent. Furthermore, the Aliyev government has proven unwilling to protect Armenians in Karabagh during the blockade of the Lachin corridor. Before the 2023 military operation to retake Nagorno-Karabagh, the Azeri government imposed a blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road to reach the Armenian enclave after the 2020 ceasefire agreement. The Azeri claimed that the checkpoint was aimed at addressing security-related problems such as the transfer of military material. Such military action was in direct violation of the 2020 Russian-brokered peace, and further violated the rights on the Armenian minority. The region suffered a de facto blockade, starving the Armenian population and denying them the right to survive in the Karabagh for several months.

Overall, without a direct intervention of Western forces, one is left wondering how Armenians could safely return to the region, manage to voice their will for self-determination, and reestablish relationships with the local Azeri population that was also violently displaced in the 1990s.

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An upcoming war in Southern Armenia?

The lack of international reactions and involvement after the 2020 war and the 2023 military operation has emboldened the Azeri government. The fear of an extension of the military conflict to Armenia appears possible with the alliance between Baku and Ankara willing to connect both countries and occupy southern Armenia (Syunik Province). The military occupation of the Zangezur corridor would create a land bridge between the newly controlled Nagorno-Karabagh and the Nakhchivan, an Azeri exclave bordering Turkey and Armenia. The international community has certainly not done enough to deter Azerbaijan from targeting the corridor, reinforcing the prospect of another ethnic cleansing, and have not made abundantly clear that war of conquest and war as a tool of diplomacy have been prohibited by the UN charter. Although certain countries have started to voice concerns about such military action, few concrete initiatives have been put forward in the vacuum left by the failure of Russian peacekeepers. While the world focuses on Ukraine, and now Gaza, the South Caucasus region remains in the shadows, as well as the fate of Armenians. With a growing rift between Moscow and Yerevan, the situation appears ripe for Western European countries to assume a bigger role in the South Caucasus.

Policy recommendations

  • Impose potential sanctions on Azerbaijan if the country violates Armenia’s territorial integrity or impedes the safe return of the Armenian population in Azerbaijan.
  • Make sure that the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are addressed to prevent a new wave of conflict in Southern Armenia and the potential illegal occupation of the Syunik Province.
  • Ensure that historic heritage sites, national symbols, and religious sites, including monasteries and villages, are not ransacked, and destroyed by the Azerbaijan administration. Overall, protecting Armenian history in the Karabagh and creating the conditions for Armenians to return in the future.
  • Continue providing humanitarian help and support for the 120,000 displaced ethnic Armenians in Armenia. In the last four years, those refugees have suffered through two wars and a 9-month blockade resulting in extensive physical and psychological harm.

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