Diplomatic efforts towards the goal of preventing an arms race in space are floundering as leading space powers opt for confrontation over cooperation.
The importance of outer space in terms of the continued operations in that environment free from threats of attack or harmful interference is ever more salient for our world. The exponential growth in satellites providing a wide array of services crucial to global security and well-being is striking. One is challenged these days to provide an accurate figure for active satellites orbiting the planet as the figure from one data base is instantly overtaken by the total presented by another. Notably this rapid growth is largely a product of private sector activity. In contrast, global governance for space, to the extent that it exists, is a monopoly of states and vulnerable to the vagaries of relations.
Regrettably, this surge of activity in outer space is coinciding with a nadir in the level of cooperation amongst leading space powers. Although objectively it would be in the interests of all spacefaring states to cooperate to ensure the continued safe and secure utilisation of outer space, the current situation is fraught with tension and mistrust. For over 40 years the UN has sought to prevent an arms race in outer space, but besides the repeated declarations that this remains a common goal there is scant evidence of serious efforts to ensure it.
Almost from the start in 1981 that the “Prevention of an Arms race in Outer Space” (PAROS) item was added to the agenda of the UN General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, member states have held contending views as to how best to make progress on outer space security. The development of space weapons including anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) demonstrated that the legal regime of the Outer Space Treaty was insufficient to ensure that the peace was kept in outer space and that “further measures” were required. This broad consensus however quickly broke down over what form such additional measures should take.
One camp led by China and Russia although including Brazil, India, and Indonesia, favours legally binding agreements to supplement the Outer Space Treaty. They argue that only legal agreements will have the authority to ensure compliance. Political measures might be complements to a legal instrument, but could never substitute for one.
The other camp led by the United States and its allies argue that it is best to develop politically binding measures, such as Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs). Adherents of this approach argue that the negotiation of a legally binding agreement would take too long and would flounder over issues of definition and verification. In their view, settling on a set of practical measures would be a quicker means of agreeing on the “rules of the road” for state-conducted space operations.
This broad consensus however quickly broke down over what form such additional measures should take.
This argument over the best diplomatic path to take to prevent armed conflict in space has gone on for decades without a resolution. After a long hiatus in the testing of destructive ASATs, a series of these tests were conducted by China in 2007, the US in 2008, India in 2019 and Russia in 2021. All contributing to the alarming problem of debris in low earth orbit that threatens safe operation. The space arms race is escalating at the very time when self-interested restraint would be in order.
The last two years has witnessed a new approach to the diplomacy of space security. On the basis of a UK diplomatic initiative the UN General Assembly authorized an Open-Ended Working Group on “Reducing Space Threats”. This OEWG met for four sessions in 2022 and 2023 with its final session concluding on September 1. Unfortunately, the group was not able to agree on a final report and even the usual procedural report was rejected principally at the insistence of Russia. The Russian delegate in his final statement was practically gleeful in highlighting the failure of the OEWG, a failure that his delegation was largely responsible for.
Supporters of the OEWG signalled that they would like to extend this process via a new authorizing resolution. Canada was one of 34 states supporting a joint statement which voiced appreciation for the OEWG process “which has inspired open, substantive, interactive and enlightening discussions pertaining to outer space security”. The statement indicated that the legally and politically binding approaches were not mutually exclusive and that a follow-up process to the OEWG would be useful.
The subsequent session of UNGA’s First Committee witnessed a UK led resolution that provided for a continuation of the OEWG during 2025-2026. A Russian initiated resolution raised the ante by calling for an OEWG with a four year mandate from 2024.
When the dust settled on the voting, the UK resolution was adopted with 166 in favour, 9 opposed and 5 abstentions, versus a record of 122 yes 49 no and 7 abstentions for the Russian resolution. An unwillingness to compromise yielded two competing processes tasking resources and the patience of stakeholders eager for signs of cooperation rather than conflict.
Many in civil society and the private sector support an inter-governmental discussion of space security, but not if it only serves as a platform for the opposing camps to talk past one another. The Committee’s outcome however cumbersome may provide a way forward. After years of increasingly heated debate the time has come to recognize that neither the legal or political camp is going to prevail over the other. The two new processes could undertake a division of labour: one to develop a set of TCBMs supporting greater transparency in outer space and the other to elaborate a legally binding instrument to prevent armed conflict in outer space and reinforce the Outer Space Treaty. Even this Solomonic conclusion may not be easy to bring about, but it will be preferable to continuing the adversarial and unproductive debate over which diplomatic road to take to realize the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.
This blog is based on a presentation for the Canadian Pugwash Group-Centre for International Policy Studies Conference on “Security Challenges of Emerging Technologies”, held at the University of Ottawa, October 20, 2023