With an upsurge in media interest in one of Global Affairs Canada’s obscure political reporting programs, called the GSRP (or Global Security Reporting Program), the time may be right for one of its creators and managers to recall its origins and purposes. The story is pretty mundane. It’s hardly “above-the-fold” material. Nonetheless, the program is an important component of what every foreign ministry aspires to achieve.
During the 1990s, Finance Minister Paul Martin’s austerity measures cut the budget of Foreign Affairs Canada or DFAIT, the previous name of GAC, by some 30%, and forced DFAIT to open more than 20 new diplomatic missions without new resources. The net result by 2001 was a diplomatic service with a lot of breadth and no depth. In some cases, missions abroad were incapable of performing their most basic function, namely, to report authoritatively, based on local sources, what was going on in their countries of accreditation.
After 9/11, when the Chrétien government opened the coffers for security purposes, DFAIT asked for new resources to strengthen diplomatic reporting in countries with security problems (civil wars, internal conflicts, terrorism, etc.). Treasury Board responded with a modest infusion of resources to fund 14 new positions. But, knowing DFAIT’s propensity to divert resources to other purposes, it insisted that the new money be “fenced”, inside a clear “program” that could be reviewed, with accountability on the managing directorate in DFAIT, in this case the Bureau of Security and Intelligence. The operational methods of the program were diplomatic, in other words, overt rather than covert.
It was termed the GSRP because it was “global”, emphasized the coverage of “security” issues, and was a “reporting” program. And it was so successful that additional resources were added from DFAIT, eventually doubling the number of positions abroad, and facilitating linguistic training and internal accountability mechanisms hitherto unknown to other political reporting positions.
None of this had anything to do with the creation of a foreign intelligence capability. There was never serious discussion of such an agency in my time in DFAIT. No minister wanted to own the risk, nor confront the managerial challenges. We had enough on our plates with the aftermath of 9/11. The managers of the GSRP, myself included, were never in favour of such an agency. Its advocates were in CSIS, a domestic security agency aspiring to enter the international world. Its shoddy, problematic work in the post 9/11 world (including sending Canadians abroad to detention and torture) should have robbed it of any credibility and put an end to its international pretensions.
Based on unfounded impressions of the GSRP, CSIS launched a critique of the program that has persisted for two decades, in the mistaken belief that the GSRP usurped what was their international terrain. Ironically, as perhaps only insiders would know, the GSRP works to everyone’s advantage, because GSRP reports are shared not only within GAC, but throughout the Canadian security and intelligence community, including CSIS, and at times with intelligence allies (not only the “Five Eyes”).
The program has attracted exceptional foreign service officers to fill positions abroad. They now have an impressive track record of useful reporting, based on authoritative sources of information, without allegations of diplomatic impropriety and without great risk.
Semi-informed CSIS critics often cite the GSRP contacts with Hezbollah as examples of either impropriety or dangerous behaviour. Who can tell us about the Hezbollah leadership and its aspirations except the Hezbollah leadership? Having contacts with Hezbollah is important (and when a Canadian runs into trouble in Lebanon, a Hezbollah contact might prove highly useful). When Hezbollah hosts a Canadian diplomat, the risk of difficulty is minimal and well worth the visit. And the resultant reporting, needless to say, is more credible than cribbing the columns of local newspapers.
The GSRP is a sub-set of a larger grouping of GAC officers who do political reporting abroad. Its special value-added lies in its ability to train officers and track their work, as well as to ensure quality in “deliverables”. Because these officers can’t be diverted into other duties (except to a marginal extent), they become the “specialists” in GAC that GAC cannot otherwise produce. Over time, they are expected to become the leaders in the security field that any government requires to manage the complexities of foreign policy challenges like the current conflict in Gaza.
The Globe and Mail’s reporting on the GSRP issue, as well as the Kovrig-Spavor case, has contained elements of distortion and half-truth, because it’s based on conversations with people who know little about the GSRP. The problem with this reporting isn’t exposing the GSRP to public scrutiny. I’m confident that there is little or nothing to hide. The problem is contorting the narrative on the “two Michaels” issue. True, Michael Kovrig was once a GSRP officer, charged with reporting on China and North Korea. But he was never engaged in intelligence collection. The Chinese have a diplomatic service, as well as intelligence agencies. They know the differences between the two.
Newspapers are entitled to write what they wish. But when they interview sources who are ignorant of the issues, or cite unfounded rumours or allegations, their credibility is undermined to no one’s benefit.
China detained Kovrig and Spavor as two Canadian hostages, to be exchanged for a Chinese national legitimately detained in Vancouver. No one should fall into the Chinese trap of believing that, somehow, Kovrig’s background in the GSRP had anything to do with the issue, other than his availability, having shed his diplomatic immunity when he began working for an NGO.
Newspapers are entitled to write what they wish. But when they interview sources who are ignorant of the issues, or cite unfounded rumours or allegations, their credibility is undermined to no one’s benefit. The Government would be wrong to change the GSRP based on allegations that don’t merit further comment. If changes are warranted, let them arise from the legitimate observations of supervisory agencies, both within and above GAC. This is a program that met and exceeded the expectations of its creators after 9/11 and had delivered for Canadians over the years despite its relative obscurity. It’s an example of the work that GAC can do. Let it become obscure once again.
