Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine highlights Russia’s military capabilities and widespread violations of international law, especially war crimes. However, it hides the fact that Russia behaves differently in different regions. In the Arctic, hybrid tactics represent the norm and recent developments in Svalbard illustrate this tendency. At the same time, we are observing a shift in Arctic governance, with Russia pulling away from an approach that emphasized Arctic states’ predominance in Arctic affairs.
Hybrid campaign in Svalbard
Svalbard is an archipelago in the high Arctic and Norway has sovereignty over Svalbard. However, the 1920 Svalbard treaty gives rights to nationals of contracting parties on the territory, including equal rights to fish and hunt, liberty of access, equal treatment as far as property rights are concerned as well as freedom to conduct scientific investigations.
We recently observed a more active stance of Russia towards Svalbard, with a propensity to test the limits of the Svalbard treaty and launch confrontational initiatives. Russia is ramping up informational campaigns on the archipelago. For example, Russian entities and nationals have hoisted a soviet flag in two settlements on Svalbard. Other demonstrations were organized by Russian nationals living in Svalbard, sometimes parading with a all-terrain vehicle previously owned by the Norwegian Armed Forces. By analyzing a Russian state-funded press outlet (TASS), we can also assess that Russian coverage of Svalbard has recently changed. For example, about 60% of English-language articles from TASS reporting on Svalbard were mentioning Norwegian sovereignty over or presence in Svalbard before 2023. This number has dropped to 21% for articles published from January 2023 to June 2024: the strategy seems to describe Russian presence in Svalbard without referring to Norway.
Hybrid threats are not limited to disinformation or informational campaigns. As highlighted by Evans and Østhagen, the Norwegian naval academy has already warned that Russian fishing vessels in Norwegian waters are often linked to intelligence gathering missions led by the Russian state. We add to this list that subsea cables connecting Svalbard to the Norwegian mainland were severed by Russian vessels in 2021 and 2022.
We can also add to this list that Russia and Norway disagree on the interpretations of key clauses of the Svalbard treaty. One of these disputes has to do with what type of science can be undertaken by contracting parties in Svalbard, with Norway arguing only natural science can be approved while Russia defends the idea that natural and social sciences initiatives can be implemented by contracting parties. While other nations have also defended the Russian position (including China), Russia announced that it will go ahead with the construction of a science station that could benefit BRICS countries. The science station has the ambition to focus both on natural and social sciences, running counter to the position of the Norwegian government.
Moreover, the emergence of this last threat embodies a more profound shift in Arctic geopolitics, away from the predominance of Arctic states.
A divided Arctic
This last initiative is a sign of a shift in regional governance. Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Arctic states agreed that they should play a predominant role in Arctic governance, with non-Arctic states relegated to secondary roles. The Ilulissat declaration, signed in 2008 by the 5 Arctic coastal states, is an example of such position: the declaration was a message sent to the European Union in particular to shoot down the idea of crafting an new Arctic treaty based on the Antarctica treaty. These same 5 Arctic states also initiated in 2015 the discussion and negotiations that led to a moratorium on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. The role of observer granted to non-Arctic states at the Arctic Council represents another example of providing a subordinated and marginal presence to states not based in the region.
Arctic solidarity has of course eroded with the blatant violations of international law by Russia since 2022.
Arctic solidarity has of course eroded with the blatant violations of international law by Russia since 2022. The subsequent Western sanctions made Russia look elsewhere for Arctic cooperation. Since then, we observed proposals and initiatives from Russia running counter to the previous Arctic predominance position. Russia and China have signed partnership agreements, from building infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route to new joint patrols. At the same time, Russia is launching initiatives to act as alternatives to similar ones launch by other Arctic states. The new science station in Svalbard is one example, while Russia’s plan to build an alternative to the Global Seed Vault (based in Svalbard) in the Russian Arctic is another one. In both cases, the objective is to attract non-Arctic states (especially BRICS countries). In particular, Russia is looking to expand Arctic scientific cooperation with India in the years to come.
Hence, while activities at the Arctic Council resumed among all 8 Arctic states, Russian actions hint at a different orientation, one where the Russian state is carving space to develop concurrent initiatives to the other 7 Arctic states. Time will tell if this move proved to be a Russian attempt at gaining leverage in its relations with other Arctic states or if this reorientation is durable. The intensification of Russian hybrid campaigns in Svalbard indicates the latter is more likely.
