Just over a century ago, Ze’ev Jabotinski wrote two short articles which examined how the Arab population of Palestine would react to the creation of a Jewish majority there. Jabotinski led a branch of the Zionist movement, the Revisionists, who were engaged in a bitter dispute with the mainstream of Zionism over how to deal with the opposition of the Arab majority of Palestine to the goal of creating a Jewish majority. The mainstream officially took the view that the Arabs would welcome Jewish immigration, once they (the Arabs) understood its economic benefits. Jabotinski rejected this and proposed that the Jews must create an “Iron Wall” of military power so formidable that the Arabs would be forced to accept a Jewish majority in Palestine.
Jabotinski’s reasoning was thus:
There can be no voluntary agreement between ourselves and the Palestine Arabs…. Every native population, civilised or not, regards its lands as its national home, of which it is the sole master, and it wants to retain that mastery always; it will refuse to admit not only new masters but, even new partners or collaborators…. This is equally true of the Arabs. Our Peace-mongers are trying to persuade us that the Arabs are either fools, whom we can deceive by masking our real aims, or that they are corrupt and can be bribed to abandon to us their claim to priority in Palestine, in return for cultural and economic advantages. I repudiate this conception of the Palestinian Arabs…. (A)s long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of getting rid of us, they will refuse to give up this hope in return for either kind words or for bread and butter, because they are not a rabble, but a living people. And when a living people yields in matters of such a vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can make no breach in the iron wall. Not till then will they drop their extremist leaders, whose watchword is “Never!” And the leadership will pass to the moderate groups, who will approach us with a proposal that we should both agree to mutual concessions. Then we may expect them to discuss honestly practical questions, such as a guarantee against Arab displacement, or equal rights for Arab citizen, or Arab national integrity.
Mainstream Zionist leaders, like David Ben Gurion, publicly repudiated Jabotinski. They knew that the British, who then controlled Palestine, would not accept Jabotinski’s view and that Zionism had to portray itself as wanting nothing more than to live in harmony with the Arab majority of Palestine. Behind the scenes, they agreed with Jabotinski.
As Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has written, the “Iron Wall” became the basis of Israel’s deterrent strategy towards the Arabs. It has become more than that; the sure and certain knowledge that Israel will exact much more than an eye for an eye in response to any provocation became a foundation of Israel’s psychological ability to live in a hostile environment.
This may explain the ferocity of Israel’s response to the savage terror attack of October 7. The deaths of 1,200 Israelis in the attack dented ordinary Israelis’ faith in the strength of the Iron Wall. The deaths of over 40,000 Palestinians and the destruction of most of Gaza is a disproportionate response, but, for many Israelis, it is an act of re-establishing the psychological barrier of the Iron Wall. As cited recently in the New York Times,
“Events like the killing of Sinwar express something very deep in the Israeli psyche,” said Micha Goodman, an Israeli philosopher and writer on Israeli identity. “It highlights the longstanding Zionist view, which goes back to Jabotinsky and other early Zionist thinkers, that there will only be peace when our enemies lose hope that the Jewish state won’t exist.”
The question arises, however, as to whether, after a century, the Iron Wall remains a valid concept on which to base Israel’s approach to deterrence.
First expounded in an age when there was no Jewish State, when Jews were alone in the world, when they were a minority in the land they wished to proclaim as their home, and when there seemed no prospect of acceptance of the idea of Israel, the Iron Wall was meant to convince Arabs that there was no hope of ever defeating Zionism by force of arms.
Today, Israel is by far the most powerful and prosperous nation in the Middle East. It has the seemingly unconditional backing of the most powerful nation the world has ever known. But something far more important has also changed. Many Arabs do accept that Israel is not going away. A large part of the Palestinians are ready to make peace, in return for their own state. Peace treaties have been signed with immediate neighbours and with more distant countries in the region. The prospect of recognition by even Saudi Arabia was in the offing.
In this sense, Jabotinski’s conditions for talks had, at least partially been met – at least some of the Arabs were ready “to discuss honestly practical questions.” As originally put forward, however, the Iron Wall concept makes no fine distinctions. It did not define an end state when certain objectives would have been met, even partially. It speaks only of the need to react to any attack with overwhelming force until some future day when all of Israel’s enemies, however defined, would accept Israel’s existence on Israel’s terms.
Perhaps this made sense when the Jews of Palestine were a minority and seemingly all of their neighbors were opposed, but it does not make sense today. This was the logic behind Prime Minister Rabin’s courageous decision to enter into talks with the PLO and Israel’s neighbors – make peace with moderate Arabs who accept Israel’s existence, including compromises over land, in order to enlist them in a coalition against those who still do not accept Israel.
The continued rigid application of the Iron Wall today can only be appreciated today as an exercise in maintaining a state of conflict as a cover for the continued expansion of Israel; an excuse. Until ALL enemies accept Israel, real compromises and peace agreements cannot be made with ANY of them, if that entails “giving up” the dream of an expanded Israel. It is a recipe for endless conflict.
A century ago, the early leaders of Zionism put forward a strategy of deterrence which was, arguably, fit for its time. Today, however, it is not.
A century ago, the early leaders of Zionism put forward a strategy of deterrence which was, arguably, fit for its time. Today, however, it is not. A more nuanced strategy is required to take account of the fact that Israel’s position has changed, as have those of many of its neighbors. Failure to make this change risks Israel’s ability to make and sustain a peace with those in the region willing to accept it. This failure also alienates ever larger groups of young people in the West (including young Jews in the West) who will ultimately decide in the decades to come whether Israel continues to enjoy crucial support.
The Iron Wall was a defensive strategy to give Israel time by keeping out its enemies while it built itself. But that phase of Israel’s history is over. Today, the Iron Wall risks becoming a Wall behind which a certain version of Israel will retreat, lashing out disproportionately at anyone perceived to be a threat, while pursuing a strategy of territorial expansion which will deprive it of regional neighbors willing to accept it, and, eventually, of Western support as well.