Israel’s recent attack on Iran was a militarily impressive feat. While much about the mission will remain secret for many years, some information is trickling out which permits an evaluation of what was accomplished, how it was done and, most importantly, what it means.
Based on open sources, here is our conjecture. It must be stressed, however, that we have no “inside information;” these are our guesses, though informed ones, we hope.
First of all, what was accomplished?
According to Israeli Army Radio (a usually reliable source), the strike destroyed all of Iran’s strategic air defence capabilities; its Russian-made long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, along with their long-range radar detection capabilities. Essentially, Iran is now left only with short-range air defence batteries of local Iranian models. The primary damage to the air defence batteries occurred around Tehran and western Iran. This means the Iranian capital has been left exposed and vulnerable, while western Iran, the area from which Iran launched ballistic missile attacks toward Israel, can also now be struck with relative impunity.
According to unnamed IDF sources, Iran has lost a substantial part of its strategic air defence capabilities for the next two to three years. Russia will be unable to supply replacement air defence systems quickly due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, and it will take Iran significant time to manufacture new systems of their own model. Future Israeli attacks, should they happen, will therefore meet much less resistance. This means that Israel enjoys what is known in air power terms as Air Dominance – they can come and go.
According to open sources, Iran’s existing long-range ballistic missile stocks were not damaged, but Iran’s ability to produce more was. Iran will have to husband its existing stocks of such weapons more carefully than it might have otherwise.
Second, how did they do it?
Based on what we know about Israel’s Air Force, we can speculate that at least some of the aircraft involved would have had to refuel in mid-air at least once to complete this mission. Israel has 14 air-to-air refueling aircraft. Assuming all of them were operational (very rare) and based on standard practices, these tankers could have supported the fighters that needed refueling on their way to and from Iran, and the electronic warfare and other support aircraft also involved.
Of course, another country could have supplied additional aircraft, either electronic warfare or tankers. Were that the case, the most likely countries are the US and/or Saudi Arabia, though neither is ever likely to admit it. While we may never know, it seems to us unlikely that only Israeli aircraft were involved in this mission; they likely had help from someone.
Moreover, Israel would have had to deploy resources capable of rescuing downed pilots deep inside Iran. This is known as Combat Search and Rescue (SAR). No Air Force would dream of sending pilots deep into hostile territory without deploying an ability to rescue them if need be. Israel has well-developed combat SAR capabilities, but they are dedicated to rescuing pilots which are downed close to home, in operations over Syria and Lebanon, for example. If the combat SAR for this mission was Israeli, it would have to have been deployed near Iran, which suggests cooperation, once again with the US and/or a Persian Gulf country, or air-to-air refueling to allow these assets to loiter near Iran for rapid use if necessary.
Finally, what does it mean?
For Iran, this means that a significant part of their defences have been stripped and Tehran must think very carefully before attacking Israel again. Tehran will also have to reflect on the fact that they launched literally hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, and barely hit anything (and nothing of value, we are told), while Israel surgically and precisely took apart Iran’s defences and damaged its missile production capabilities over the course of a few hours without losing a single aircraft. No wonder the Iranians are taking their time before deciding whether to respond.
For Israel, impressive though this was, even a cursory examination suggests that Israel could not have acted entirely alone. Someone helped them, most likely the US and maybe a Gulf country. Moreover, Israel waited to reply to the Iranian missile attack of October 1 until additional missile defence batteries and other systems arrived from the US in case Iran struck back. And, of course, all of the aircraft involved, and most of the weapons they carried, were produced in the US.
Israel’s dependence on the US is of note in that the Biden Administration had made it very clear that it would not accept Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities or vital economic targets (fearing that such strikes would escalate the conflict). Whatever one may think of these positions, the fact that Israel appears to have accepted them, despite real pressures to launch attacks on nuclear and economic targets, indicates that America can, indeed, use its military assistance to have a decisive influence over Israel, when Washington decides to do so.
Hon. Laurie Hawn, PC, CD is a former CF-18 Squadron Commander, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.
Peter Jones is a Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Previously, he served 14 years in the Public Service with Global Affairs Canada and the Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office
David Jurkowski is the former Commander of the RCAF’s Tactical Fighter Training Squadron; Commander of a Fighter Wing; and, Commander of Fighter Group (Canada’s fighter force). He also served as Chief of Staff, Joint Operations of the Canadian Armed Forces.
