Does Article 5 Still Work for Poland? NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats

Does Article 5 Still Work for Poland? NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats
Celebrating Poland's 20 years in NATO. Photo by Marek Studzinski on Unsplash.

Poland was one of the countries warning the Western world about growing Russian imperialism. They supported the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Georgia in 2008 during Russia’s attack, and later Ukraine again in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea and the onset of hybrid war in Donbas. However, it was the events that took place in February 2022 that truly shook Poland. Russia’s attack on Ukraine triggered profound changes in the perception of security in Eastern Europe. In this context, the role of NATO, particularly Article 5, became the subject of intense discussion. Is NATO, an alliance created to ensure collective defence, adequately prepared for modern threats such as hybrid warfare?


The fall of the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe began a new era. In the 1990s, many former Eastern Bloc countries sought security guarantees that NATO could provide, leading to the alliance’s expansion. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined in 1999, followed by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2004. NATO’s expansion aimed to foster stability and security in the region and strengthen ties between former Eastern Bloc states and the West. 

However, Russia sees NATO’s expansion as a threat to its influence, a view expressed in 2021 by its Foreign Minister Lavrov, who practically demanded the withdrawal of allied forces from NATO’s eastern flank, which would return NATO’s border to its 1997 position. Just over a year later, Russia launched a brutal attack on Ukraine. Due to these events, 59% of Poles currently believe that an armed attack by Russia on NATO countries is possible within the next 3-8 years. In light of these events, countries on NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, are increasingly beginning to reflect on the interpretation of Article 5.

Hybrid warfare as a new model of aggression

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states as follows:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

But what exactly does ‘armed attack’ mean? Russia’s attack on Donbas and Luhansk in 2014 highlighted the challenges in clearly defining what constitutes an armed attack on a country. The Russian assault on Donbas and Luhansk is often described by many experts as an example of hybrid warfare. In this context, Russia’s approach is described as “a truly synchronized whole-of-government approach to warfare,” where the lines between war and peace have become increasingly blurred. 

This type of conflict strategy was outlined by Russian General Gerasimov in 2013. The Gerasimov Doctrine, often cited in discussions of modern warfare, integrates a range of hybrid tactics, including informational, psychological, political, economic, and energy-related strategies. These methods are typically used either to replace direct military action or to set the stage for it, with the aim of undermining an adversary’s defence capabilities or incapacitating their ability to respond effectively. The subsequent phase may involve a high-intensity military conflict, characterized by the deployment of advanced weaponry, yet still supported by hybrid measures designed to erode the opponent’s defence. This can include cyberattacks, kinetic sabotage, and psychological or informational operations. 

The attack on Ukraine has raised concerns among countries on NATO’s eastern flank. Countries like Estonia (with 25.6% of the population of Russian descent) and Latvia (where Russians make up 26.9%) are more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns and attempts at political destabilization. However, Poland is also becoming a target for similar hybrid tactics that fit the definition of hybrid warfare as described by Gerasimov. 

In cyberspace, the Polish Commander of the Cyberspace Defense Component, General Molenda, describes the current situation as a continuous, ongoing conflict. Belarusian and Russian special services are creating migration channels for migrants from the Global South, who are then used instrumentally to increase migration pressure on the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Russian borders. Russia is also building a network of spies carrying out acts of sabotage within Poland, leading to the closure of the Russian consulate in Poznań. All of these actions are being directed at Poland as part of a hybrid attack, but do they meet NATO’s criteria for an armed attack?

Article 5, solidarity or political decision?

In addition to the problem of defining an attack, another issue is the unclear definition of assistance to the attacked country and the lack of an automated process for providing help, as well as the difficulty in defining the nature of such help.

On November 15, 2022, a Russian-produced missile struck a village near the Polish-Ukrainian border. On the same day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, relying on Ukrainian military reports, declared that there was no doubt the missile had not been launched by Ukrainian forces. However, the Polish investigation officially concluded that it was a missile launched by Ukrainian air defence. Nevertheless, this situation sparked a discussion: What if this missile had been officially recognized as Russian? Would it automatically mean NATO’s involvement in the war?

After the explosion in Przewodów, former U.S. Army Commander in Europe General Ben Hodges wrote on X that NATO’s Article 5 does not function automatically. Indeed, Article 5 does not obligate member states to deploy military assets if an ally is attacked. It only commits them to some form of response, which may involve imposing sanctions or sending assistance in the form of military equipment, without directly engaging in the conflict.

Poland is undoubtedly a beneficiary of NATO membership. Over 90% of Poles would vote to remain in NATO; 90% of Poles consider NATO to be an essential or very important element of national security, and more than 80% believe that NATO membership reduces the likelihood of an attack by another country on Poland.  However, the increasing uncertainty about how Article 5 applies in hybrid warfare has led to a debate on whether NATO needs to adjust to these new types of aggression.

This blog is part of the ‘NATO’s Eastern Flank’ series. Find all of the blogs here.

Learn more about the upcoming conference NATO’s Eastern Flank: Challenges and Implications in the Context of the Ukraine War.

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