Dueling Diplomacy on Outer Space Security

Dueling Diplomacy on Outer Space Security
SpaceX Falcon Heavy Landing. Photo by SpaceX on Unsplash.

At first glance outer space security appears to command universal support at the UN General Assembly. Each year since 1981 the General Assembly adopts a resolution with near universal support on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS). The resolution warns of the dire threat to international security any such arms race would pose, and calls for the negotiation of “further measures” to consolidate and reinforce the existing legal regime of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and to enhance its effectiveness. 


While we can applaud this consensus policy stance by the international community on the way forward to improve space security there remains the problem that states disagree on what these “further measures” should consist of and what form they should take. This disagreement has bedeviled space security diplomacy for about as long as the PAROS resolution has been calling for further action. The division of opinion has been on a largely East West basis – Russia and China leading one camp and the United States leading another.

The Sino-Russian position favours a legally-binding treaty that would prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against space objects (a draft of this treaty has been on the table at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since 2008). The US and its allies, in contrast, support at this stage, politically binding Transparency and Confidence Building Measures as the most practical means of enhancing space security. They also have criticized the Sino-Russian treaty as lacking workable definitions, verification provisions and ignoring the threat from terrestrial based anti-satellite weapons or ASATs. 

China and Russia rebut this criticism, noting that a verification protocol could be added later,  once the core principles were agreed upon, and that the prohibition on the use of force against space objects would effectively counter any terrestrial ASAT threat.

Significantly, however, China and Russia have continued to insist that their draft treaty be negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament which operates on a strict consensus basis that effectively gives each of its members a de facto veto over decisions. Due to this procedure, and differing priorities amongst its members, the Conference has not been able to agree and implement a program of work since 1996. This paralysis has meant that the Sino-Russian treaty has not received any sustained consideration. 

Much to the concern of outer space stakeholders, the last few years have witnessed a resumption of destructive ASAT testing: by China in 2007, the US in 2008, India in 2019 and Russia in 2021. These tests involved sending a missile to intercept and destroy on impact a defunct satellite. All such tests produce more or less debris, some of which can be long lasting and pose a danger to space operations for decades to come. 

The resumption of ASAT testing coincided with a sharp deterioration of relations between the leading space powers of the US, China and Russia, occasioned by the war in Ukraine, and has generated sharp accusations that the other side is bent on “weaponizing” outer space.  The US has been active in calling out what it perceives as nefarious counter-space capabilities on the part of China and Russia, although it was the United States under the Trump Administration that was first to characterize outer space as a “war-fighting domain” and which established a “Space Force” as a new branch of its armed forces.

A salient example of the mistrust current among leading space powers is the accusation the US made this spring that Russia has developed a nuclear weapon for deployment into space. Any such deployment would be a flagrant violation of the Outer Space Treaty (which prohibits the deployment in orbit of any weapon of mass destruction) and Moscow of course denied any intention to do this. This April, Washington attempted to engage the UN Security Council and have it adopt a resolution reaffirming the legal ban on nuclear weapons in outer space. Russia viewed this initiative as a hostile act and vetoed the resolution when it came up for a vote. This occurred after Russia attempted, unsuccessfully, to amend the prohibition to exclude all weapons in outer space, which goes beyond the existing text of the treaty and, despite its popularity in some quarters, is currently opposed by the US. The episode underscored the ugly state of relations between Russia and the US which complicates making progress on space security as well as wider security files.

Having been thwarted in the Security Council, the US and its partners returned to the issue at this October’s session of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. They put forward a resolution, “Weapons of mass destruction in outer space”, which inter alia reaffirmed the obligation of all state parties to the Outer Space Treaty to comply with the ban on deploying WMD in orbit. As with the earlier episode, Russia introduced amendments to the resolution seeking a ban as well on “any other kinds of weapons”, thus once again applying pressure to the American position of limiting the prohibition to WMD. The Russian amendments were rejected after the Committee heard a statement from the co-sponsors of the resolution that warned the Russian amendments would materially alter the nature of the draft resolution and that if these amendments passed, the co-sponsors would withdraw their support. The amendments were subsequently defeated on a vote of 41 yes, 66 no and 49 abstentions while the resolution was adopted on a vote of 159-5-6, with only Russia, Iran, Syria, North Korea and Fiji(!) opposing. In explanations of the vote, the US and Russian representatives exchanged sharp critiques of each other’s conduct with respect to the consultations held on the draft resolution. 

To the many stakeholders within, and outside, governments concerned with the security of space operations, the continuing sparring between leading space powers is disappointing. Scoring points against opponents during UN proceedings is no substitute for the cooperation necessary to preserve space for peaceful purposes. 

Related Articles

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

The CIPS Blog is written only by subject-matter experts. 

 

CIPS blogs are protected by the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

 


 

[custom-twitter-feeds]