Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Sweden and Finland, long-standing militarily neutral and non-aligned states, swiftly applied for NATO membership. How can such a quick shift be understood? The research Catherine Hoeffler and I conducted within a larger project on policy elites’ preferences in European states on the eve of the war in Ukraine (2020-2022) and which was published in Contemporary Security Policy, might provide some answers to this puzzle. 

In order to better understand the tension between elite and public opinion on neutrality, we conducted twenty-four interviews across the institutional spectrum in Austria, Serbia, and Sweden. We sought both their personal opinions and institutional views about the following questions. Firstly, we sought to understand the views of governing elites in militarily neutral and non-aligned states regarding closer cooperation with NATO, including potential membership. Secondly, we explored how these elites perceive public opinion on these issues. Thirdly, we examined how they navigate the tensions between their own preferences and those of the public, and what impacts this has on their policy communication.

While it is challenging to make definitive generalizations without a fully representative sample, we asked our interlocutors to share with us institutional views and our research unveils intriguing insights. Surprisingly, a common phenomenon emerged in these neutral and non-aligned states: based on our interviews, many policy elites harbor Atlanticist preferences but are cautious about openly expressing their inclination towards closer NATO cooperation or even membership in public discourse, due to potential public opposition. We term this phenomenon “crypto-Atlanticism,” where “crypto” originates from the Greek word “kryptos,” meaning “hidden.”

In 2020-2022, governing elites in all three countries displayed a preference for cooperation and, in some cases, membership in the Atlantic alliance. This Atlanticist inclination can be attributed to their nuanced understanding of their countries’ evolving defense environment, needs, and policies, as well as their integration within Euro-Atlantic structures. What is even more interesting is that they refrained from openly communicating this preference to the general public, as they perceived public commitment to neutrality/non-alignment policies in all three countries. 

Depending on the strength of the Atlanticist preferences and the inclination to openly communicate them (see Table 1), we identified variations of crypto-Atlanticism between countries and over time. This variation is contingent upon the intensity of the elites’ Atlanticism and their level of restraint in publicly expressing their preferences.

Table 1: Types of crypto-Atlanticism 

Overall, Sweden’s elites (the upper left quadrant) exhibit a strong inclination towards Atlanticism, but the extent of its “cryptic” nature has diminished over time. During the Cold War, Sweden displayed intense crypto-Atlanticism, secretly cooperating with NATO while publicly criticizing it. However, post-2014, the “crypto” aspect softened as elites increasingly engaged in discussions about NATO membership. The 2014 crisis in Ukraine sparked a public debate in Sweden regarding potential NATO membership, gradually shifting public opinion, especially after the 2022 invasion.

In Austria (the upper right quadrant) the policy elites we interviewed shared similar preferences for much closer ties to NATO. However, in contrast to Sweden, they exhibit a significantly stronger restraint in communicating these preferences to the public. Our interviews revealed that many policymakers have a strong affinity for Atlanticism and argue that a neutrality policy is no longer viable. They often view public opinion as emotional and uninformed, acknowledging it as a significant obstacle to policy change. Due to the general public’s disapproval of NATO and military alliances, Austrian policymakers tend to withhold their Atlanticist preferences and maintain a low profile regarding their extensive practical cooperation with the Western alliance. This did not seem to change even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Crypto-Atlanticism in Serbia (the lower right quadrant) shows an equally strong degree of concealment but less intense Atlanticist preferences than in Austria or Sweden. This is due to the persisting anti-NATO sentiment, stemming from the memory of the 1999 NATO bombing and NATO’s perceived role in the secession of Kosovo. In Serbia, less than 10 percent of people support membership, and the war in Ukraine has not changed this. The policy elites we interviewed adopt a pragmatic and less emotional approach to cooperation with NATO, expressing that even membership is not taboo, albeit only in private. The overwhelmingly negative public sentiment towards NATO leads to significant reluctance among policymakers to discuss ongoing modes of cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) or full membership. As in Austria, the war in Ukraine did not change this picture in Serbia.

Our insight sheds light on previously understudied commonalities and variations among neutral and non-aligned states. They reveal how elites in these states handle the gap between elite and public opinion in foreign policy-making through strategic framing and suppressing controversial issues. This highlights how certain geopolitical inclinations are embedded in policy elites’ preferences, even if not openly discussed publicly. The phenomenon challenges the belief that foreign policy-making is fully insulated from public opinion. While public discourse sets boundaries, like NATO membership, our study shows practical cooperation with NATO can proceed discreetly without much public awareness.

This phenomenon necessitates further research into the interaction between strategic cultures, backstage discourses, and elite practices, and their connection to broader political culture and public opinion. These inquiries have implications beyond policy outputs; they also raise normative questions. Concealing controversial policies from public view raises dilemmas about transparency, accountability, public oversight, and democratic control over foreign and security policy. Our findings may illuminate scenarios where policy elites pursue such policies without widespread public approval or support.

Future research should further empirically probe our empirical insights in the observed three states and explore this phenomenon in other unexamined neutral countries. While we can speculate on similar occurrences in other European militarily-neutral states, empirical investigation is necessary. Evaluating the impact of the Ukrainian war on the willingness of crypto-Atlanticists in these countries to reveal their preferences would be intriguing. Ethnographic research could uncover how crypto-Atlanticist elites shape messaging to obscure their countries’ NATO ties, with attention to the “audience cost” of openly articulating geopolitical preferences. Finally, future studies might also explore comparable instances of foreign and security policies that are concealed from the public eye out of concern about public opposition beyond neutral and non-aligned states. 

This blog is part of the ‘NATO’s Eastern Flank’ series. Find all of the blogs here.

Learn more about the related conference NATO’s Eastern Flank: Challenges and Implications in the Context of the Ukraine War.