The war in Ukraine has strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation, but it has also revealed the power of domestic dynamics to destabilize the alliance. Slovakia’s “pro-Russian turn” under Prime Minister Robert Fico and Germany’s ambivalent approach to the Ukraine war under Chancellor Olaf Scholz offer two distinct examples of how strategic culture and political pragmatism intersect to influence NATO’s Eastern Flank. While the surface-level narratives of alignment with Russia or hesitation in supporting Ukraine dominate public discourse, the deeper challenges lie in the historical and cultural undercurrents that shape these decisions.
In Slovakia, Fico’s rhetoric does not reflect a genuine allegiance to Moscow but an instrumentalization of long-standing cultural divides for political gain, exacerbating societal polarization and leaving the country and its partners vulnerable to greater risks. Meanwhile, Germany’s Zeitenwende reveals a struggle to reconcile its post-war pacifist traditions with the demands of collective defence. Scholz’s precarious balancing act—dubbed “Scholzing”—highlights the difficulties of navigating ideological divisions within Germany’s strategic culture while meeting NATO commitments.
Both cases illuminate broader risks to NATO’s cohesion. As cultural contestation and structural inadequacies weaken member states’ ability to present a united front, the alliance faces the challenge of better understanding the domestic politics and strategic culture of its members—and their power to undermine NATO from within.
SLOVAKIA’S “PRO-RUSSIAN TURN” ISN’T THE REAL THREAT
Public debate over Slovakia’s foreign policy has fixated on its “pro-Russian turn” under the new Fico government, particularly following the withdrawal of aid to Ukraine, appearances on Russian television, and a recently announced state visit to Moscow. However, a closer look reveals that this turn is neither pro-Russian nor is it a real turn. Rather, it reflects Fico’s alignment with a broader subculture within Slovakia that has long been surfacing and disappearing from public discourse. It is not the symbolic handshake with Putin that poses the real danger, but the instrumentalization of these domestic divides and their implications for the Eastern Flank.
To understand these divides, we need to take a closer look at Slovakia’s strategic culture. Elsewhere, we traced its make-up to two enduring subcultures, integrationists and autonomists, that have historically been in flux. The integrationists view NATO and the European Union (EU) as safeguards against the shadow of Communism, embracing Western liberal values and multilateral cooperation. Autonomists, on the other hand, perceive the West as indifferent to Slovakia’s struggles, casting Russia as a protector and defender of conservative values. These narratives, rooted in historical events from 19th-century nation-building to the Cold War, foster skepticism toward military engagement and Western liberalism. Fico’s policies tap into autonomist sentiments, not for reasons of ideology, but rather political pragmatism. His rhetoric reflects existing public frustrations with the liberal West rather than genuine alignment with Moscow. This continuity explains why his policies are less surprising than they appear.
The true risks, however, lie in what such rhetoric does to Slovakia’s social fabric. By exploiting cultural divides, Fico exacerbates polarization, leaving society fragmented and vulnerable. In such an environment, extremism thrives. Slovakia’s susceptibility to pro-Russian propaganda, combined with such societal strain, creates fertile ground for more radical leaders who could jeopardize Slovakia’s NATO commitments. Regionally, Fico’s alignment with Viktor Orbán signals the potential emergence of a bloc within NATO. Ostensibly pacifist, this coalition prioritizes sovereignty and national identity over alliance unity, threatening NATO’s organizational culture. If such sentiments gain broader support and become institutionalized, they could create a domino effect, weakening the alliance from within.
While the historical flux of the subcultures offers some comfort, the question remains: how long can Slovakia’s cultural flux hold before the society implodes?
SCHOLZING GERMAN DEFENCE POLICY
Scholz’s efforts to position himself as the “peace chancellor” through dialogue with Vladimir Putin and delays on aid to Ukraine to avoid escalation reveal a precarious balancing act. His engagement with Putin has drawn criticism as pandering to far-left and far-right NATO skeptics, reflecting the recent electoral gains of these groups in East Germany. This approach underscores tensions within German strategic culture, traditionally pacifist but now evolving under the pressures of the Ukraine war and the Zeitenwende.
Scholz has counterbalanced this narrative with symbolic gestures, like visiting Kyiv, and substantive actions, such as ensuring Germany remains Ukraine’s leading European supporter. However, this contradictory behaviour —sometimes termed “Scholzing”— highlights his attempt to unite Germany’s pro-NATO majority with more skeptical factions for apparent electoral gain, a strategy hindered by more fundamental ideological incompatibilities. Divisions rooted in Germany’s historical memory of WWII and the Cold War exacerbate these challenges. While the political center supports Ukraine, the far left and right remain anchored in an unconditional pacifism which implies de-facto support for Moscow, further complicating Scholz’s efforts.
Despite Germany’s strong aid to Ukraine, questions persist about its ability to meet its defence commitments under the Zeitenwende, including the new NATO force model. Germany would need an additional 25,000 troops to meet NATO requirements, alongside a wartime strength of 460,000 personnel—a stark increase from the Bundeswehr’s current 203,000. Achieving this would challenge the 4+2 Treaty on German reunification and likely necessitate reinstating conscription, a politically sensitive move. Scholz has avoided addressing these structural challenges facing the Bundeswehr, focusing instead on merely reaching existing nominal troop targets.
Looking ahead, Scholz’s leadership faces uncertainty with the 2025 elections approaching. A post-Scholz government, potentially led by the transatlanticist CDU’s Friedrich Merz may assuage some concerns. Yet, defence procurement remains slow and strategically fragmented, leaving doubts about Germany’s ability to credibly deter Russian threats. As German intelligence head Bruno Kahl has warned, NATO deterrence is losing credibility without stronger commitments. The stakes are high: insufficient action from Germany could undermine NATO’s collective security at a time when unity against Russian aggression is critical.
Current foreign policy in Slovakia and Germany illustrate the profound influence of strategic culture on NATO’s cohesion and effectiveness. While Fico’s governance highlights the risks of domestic cultural divides being exploited for political gain, Germany’s “Scholzing” underscores the challenges of reconciling pacifist traditions with the realities of collective defence. Both cases reveal how internal contestation within member states can undermine alliance unity, creating vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. As NATO navigates an increasingly volatile security environment, a deeper understanding of its members’ strategic cultures is essential to strengthening internal cohesion, addressing domestic fragilities, and ensuring a united front against external threats.
