If a state believes possessing nuclear weapons — or relying on those of allies — provides safety, then it may be less inclined to consider other options even if nuclear deterrence is extraordinarily dangerous.
The arguments for retaining nuclear weapons are manyfold. Among them: They have not been detonated in war since 1945; and therefore, they have proved their mettle. While there may be risks of inadvertent or accidental launch, these can be contained with proper command and control. The world is an ugly neighbourhood, and the threat of unacceptable consequences posed by a nuclear weapon response guarantees our safety from aggressors.
But does nuclear deterrence work?
The short answer is that we don’t know because the claims and counterclaims about effectiveness are inherently complex, making it difficult to agree definitively. Were conflicts between nuclear armed states inhibited by their mutual possession of nuclear weapons? This may seem plausible, but we also suspect that overwhelming conventional capabilities and the lessons of previous wars may have been instrumental. We also know India and Pakistan (both nuclear armed states) have gone to war against one another without touching their nuclear arsenals.
Some kinds of deterrence may have worked, but this isn’t evidence that nuclear deterrence, which relies on rational actors, is bullet-proof. Yet, that level of assurance is required, given the global disaster that could result if nuclear deterrence ever failed. The current example of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a good test case. Has NATO not intervened directly in the conflict (so far) for fear of escalation to nuclear war? If so, why was “indirect” support for Ukraine by NATO members (provision of weapons including longer-range missiles, permission to strike into Russia, aid through satellite targeting, placement and training of troops on borders, expansion of the alliance into Finland and Sweden) insufficient provocation to Vladimir Putin? Or, on the other hand, did NATO’s nuclear self-deterrence encourage (or enable) Putin to invade Ukraine in the first place? All countries involved within the parameters of the conflict now walk on eggshells, uncertain about how dangerous one misstep might be. Is this security?
In How Useful Are Nuclear Weapons in Practice? Case-Study: The War in Ukraine (2024), Tom Sauer makes a convincing case to show that
“Apart from deterring an attack against the vital interests of a state, nuclear weapons do not seem to provide many benefits. And even with respect to deterring an attack against the vital interests of a state, it is unclear to what extent nuclear deterrence works.”
What’s missing in the conversation, given the existential danger of escalation leading to a nuclear event and even to all-out nuclear war, is the package of substitute arrangements that might replace nuclear deterrence with something safer. There are choices. As Bernard Brodie remarked in 1946, the chief purpose of the military need not be that of winning wars, but could instead be to avert them.
An uncomfortable truth is that there is no likelihood that we will eliminate nuclear weapons by just yearning for a weapons-free culture of peace. And if there is to be international rule of law for the immediate future, there will need to be some kind of agreed enforcement, monitoring, verification and policing capability. Some of the institutional framework already in position can transition well for these ends, but new systems, agreements and guarantees will be required also. We can simultaneously reduce weapons in arsenals while we advocate for nuclear weapon abolition, and as we adopt bilateral and multilateral security agreements consistent with UN Charter-based collective measures. One mechanism doesn’t preclude the others. We may seem far from this currently, but that doesn’t devalue the mission, nor diminish its urgency.
The armaments problem involves weapons already in wide circulation and those in the planning stages, the arms racing and modernization that results, and the profiteering this implies. But as important are the postures those weapons we retain are put to, and whether they are perceived by rivals as provocation or primarily defensive.
Retired UK Commander Robert Green (a prominent advocate for nuclear weapons abolition) has argued that conventional firepower using precision-guided weapons is safer than nuclear deterrence. But the necessary “transition to non-provocative defence will only be feasible if taken in stages. The crucial first shift is to denuclearise security strategies, by temporarily replacing nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence.”
The common security replacement for relying on deterrence (including nuclear deterrence) was formulated in the heat of the Cold War and remains a template we can still work from today. As proposed in the Palme Commission Report of 1982, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, “All states, even the most powerful, are dependent in the end upon the good sense and restraint of other nations. Even ideological and political opponents have a shared interest in survival.” Common security would both provide a “downward spiral” remedy for the arms race and avoid the security dilemma (where making your own country safer can threaten the safety of others.) Therefore we should not be increasing military spending to best potential rivals. This is an endless, pointless and wasteful chore. We should instead deploy conflict resolution measures that reduce the tensions that lead to war.
Decades ago, peace and conflict scholars such as Sverre Lodgaard argued “the best way of pushing nuclear weapons back to rear positions and down to a minimum level may be to develop alternative means of defence.” Non-provocative, conventional defence “is easier to achieve than complete disarmament, because the military will not be eliminated.” This approach would still remove certain weapon types that have “distinctly offensive characteristics” (including nuclear weapons), but other military placements must necessarily be unambiguously non-threatening overall.
The consequent reduced need for military hardware or for the amassing of troops along borders will thereby contribute to the disarmament project as well. To effect change in security arrangements in this direction, many governments and political leaders will need to be convinced that these measures are not just fine ideas from another era, but credible and feasible possibilities that make the world a safer place, today. And therefore, that they merit immediate attention.
