For many years, the world viewed the Taliban as a terrorist group whose agenda was limited to Afghanistan. The prevailing assumption was that the Taliban fought Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces with the intention of re-establishing themselves as an Islamic political power within Afghanistan. Many also believed that the group had learned from the failures of its 1990s regime and would shift away from its harsh and repressive policies toward a more moderate approach. Throughout the Doha process, the Taliban actively reinforced this image, repeatedly insisting—in their engagements with foreign diplomats and the media—that they would not return to the severe and coercive practices of the 1990s. This carefully managed narrative fostered the notion of a “Taliban 2.0,” implying that the group had reformed and evolved into a more modernized and moderate organization.
However, the developments following their return to power in Kabul proved otherwise. In this analysis, I will examine the Taliban’s evolution from a local insurgency into a network operating within the broader ecosystem of global terrorism, with a particular focus on the past two decades. I will explain why the world’s expectations were ultimately proven wrong and analyze the implications of this evolution for international security.
From Local Insurgency to Rising Force
The Taliban movement was officially announced in 1994 as the “Islamic Movement of the Taliban.” In its early phase, the group emerged with the stated goal of addressing insecurity and lawlessness by defeating the various commanders who represented different Mujahideen factions and were engaged in violent competition in Kandahar and surrounding provinces. Pakistan’s role in supporting the group during its formative stages cannot be denied. At the same time, the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul and his Minister of Defence, Ahmad Shah Massoud, also offered support, as neither considered the Taliban—initially formed with a local agenda—to be a rival.
Instead, the government in Kabul—preoccupied with fighting its rivals such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Junbesh-e Milli-ye Islami, and Abdul Ali Mazari’s Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, while also struggling to extend its control over Kabul and surrounding provinces—viewed the emergence of the Taliban as an opportunity. The government sought to use the group against its opponents and against those commanders who either refused to obey Kabul or whose affiliations were seen as liabilities.
Pursuit of National Dominance
After the Taliban secured control over Kandahar and the surrounding provinces, the group quickly demonstrated a clear ambition to expand westward. By 1995, the Taliban had advanced across much of western Afghanistan, positioning themselves to capture the strategic transit city of Herat. Seizing Herat offered the group not only a major political and economic hub but also direct access to the borders of Iran and Central Asia—significantly expanding their geographic reach and strategic leverage.
Once they consolidated control in Herat, the Taliban began to reveal their broader ambition to dominate the entire country, even by confronting the forces of President Professor Rabbani and Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. In September 1996, the Taliban seized Kabul after pushing government forces out of the capital. By then, it had become clear that their objective was national control.
By late 2001, when the United States launched its Global War on Terror (GWOT) against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, the Taliban controlled the majority of the country. Even after their regime collapsed in 2001, the Taliban—with support from regional and global terrorist networks as well as backing from countries such as Pakistan—managed to rebuild their presence across much of Afghanistan and continued fighting Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces.
Integration into the Global Jihadist Network
Before seizing Kabul, the Taliban expanded into territories where Al Qaeda and other regional terrorist organizations had been given sanctuary by Mujahideen factions that opposed the Taliban. As the Taliban consolidated control over these areas, Al Qaeda and other groups began to view the movement not as a rival but as a strategic partner aligned with their extremist ideology. Consequently, Al Qaeda chose not to resist the Taliban; instead, it actively supported the group’s expansion across the country.
There were also reports that some Taliban ideologues, including Ustad Mohammad Yaser, initiated contacts with Al Qaeda weeks before the group captured Nangarhar, offering assurances that Al Qaeda would remain safe and protected if the Taliban succeeded in taking control of the territories where they had previously been sheltered.
However, the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was fundamentally different from their takeover in 1996. Unlike the earlier period, the group had, over the preceding two decades, benefited from the support, guidance, and operational partnership of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and Ansarullah. These groups had fought alongside the Taliban against Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces.
Many of these regional terrorist organizations—whose primary objectives included fighting their own states or regimes, such as Pakistani groups focused on Kashmir—joined the battlefield in Afghanistan under a unified framework: fighting their “primary enemy,” as defined by al-Qaeda. As a result, the so-called victory of August 2021 was not the Taliban’s victory alone. It was a collective victory for all the groups that participated in the fight against the Afghan government and population, as well as U.S. and NATO forces.
Contrary to international expectations, the Taliban proved both unable—and unwilling—to sever their ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups that had played a significant role in their military success. During the years of the so-called “jihad” against Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces, the Taliban gradually evolved into an integral component of the global terrorist ecosystem led by al-Qaeda. Reports also indicate that some Taliban fighters were deployed to the Middle East and various African countries, where they received advanced training and took part in conflicts on behalf of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.This strategy aimed to cultivate a new generation of Jihadists with dual or multiple allegiances.
According to the UN Security Council Monitoring Team’s 36th report, the Taliban has effectively become an enabler of global terrorism, providing shelter, support, and operational space to al-Qaeda, AQIS, and other affiliated terrorist groups.
This evolution also undermines international counterterrorism efforts. The Taliban’s return to power, alongside its support for extremist groups, challenges two decades of GWOT strategies aimed at containing terrorism. It strengthens recruitment pipelines, reinforces jihadist narratives, and increases risks to diplomatic, humanitarian, and civilian targets. Moreover, it provides strategic leverage for state and non-state actors seeking to use Afghanistan as a platform for hybrid threats, and regional destabilization.
In conclusion, the Taliban’s transformation is not only a national or regional concern—it represents a significant global security challenge, requiring the international community to rethink engagement strategies, counterterrorism policies, and regional cooperation to address the renewed threat emanating from Afghanistan.
Ajmal Obaid Abidy is a counter-terrorism and intelligence expert with extensive experience in confronting global security threats. As Deputy Director General for Operations (DDO) at National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghanistan’s primary intelligence agency, he led counter-terrorism campaigns against groups including Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban, while developing deep expertise on more than 20 terrorist organizations across South and Central Asia and the Middle East. In this role, he advised senior policymakers and directed complex intelligence and security operations at the highest levels. He currently serves as a National Security Instructor at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute and holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Management from Royal Roads University in British Columbia.
