Some of you may be familiar with the popular Netflix series entitled the Three Body Problem which is described on the company’s site as a “Mind-bending, Cerebral, Sci-Fi Mystery”. It is based on a trilogy by the Chinese writer Liu Cixin. I can attest to the enchanting weirdness of the tale which revolves around a core problem in orbital mechanics, namely that it is much more difficult to calculate the gravitational interaction among three celestial bodies compared to only two.
I felt the three-body problem was an apt metaphor to use in describing current efforts at the United Nations to address a long-standing goal of the international community – the prevention of an arms race in outer space or PAROS. The three bodies being China, Russia and the United States, and the fact that these leading space powers have been at odds over space security for many years.
While PAROS has been an item on the UN General Assembly’s agenda since 1981, as well on the agreed agenda of the 65 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, it is fair to say that little has been accomplished after nearly a half century of consideration. While many believed that the PAROS item was ripe for action within the Conference on Disarmament, the differing views on other items of the CD’s agenda coupled with the de facto veto every member of that forum possesses has meant that no official work on PAROS has occurred since the mid-1990s.
In lieu of actual negotiations, a variety of discussion forums have been used to address the PAROS issue – the current one being the Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS that began deliberations in 2025 and is mandated to report out to the General Assembly in 2028. The third session of the OEWG was held in Geneva in July and a fourth session is slated to occur in November. This diplomatic process is currently the best hope for the international community to do something to improve the security situation in outer space.
Regrettably, just as the exploitation of outer space is growing exponentially with 16,000 active satellites in orbit providing a vast array of services; the security situation in this vital, if fragile, environment is deteriorating at a rapid pace. The announcement in September by the US Space Force that it has deployed “space control weapons” in orbit brings into high relief a concern about the “weaponization of space” that has been simmering for some time. It is difficult to assess how this open admission by the US will affect the interaction with Russia and China which Washington has long accused of deploying co-orbital space weapons.
The proceedings to date of the OEWG have generally been constructive although access to these meetings by non-governmental stakeholders is still contested (with two prominent Western NGOs being rejected by Russia at the last session). To summarize the nature of interventions, there is a broad convergence as to what are the threats to spacecraft; some overlaps as to remedial measures, but a deep disagreement as to what status any eventual measures should have – with China and Russia wanting legally binding status and the US and partners favouring politically binding measures at this stage.
The priority threats are acknowledged to be any debris-generating destructive anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), followed by non-kinetic weapons that could disrupt or damage a satellite without blowing it up and the specific risk of co-orbital ASATs which could maneuver close to another satellite via so-called rendezvous or proximity operations (RPOs). The further wrinkle here is that such operations can serve benign ends such as on-orbit refueling or repair.
The measures proposed to deal with these threats include a ban on direct ascent ASAT missile tests (as championed by the US and partners) versus a more political measure of endorsing a “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (championed by Russia and its partners). Many delegations also stressed the utility of agreeing on a common standard for RPOs, that would require that any such operation involving another state’s spacecraft be only undertaken with the prior notification and consent of that other state.
The prospects for agreeing on any measure of restraint remains contingent on overcoming the gap amongst the leading space powers on the key question as to whether any measure should be legally binding or just politically binding on states. China and Russia have long insisted on the necessity for a legally binding instrument for PAROS (and introduced their own draft treaty back in 2008). The United States and its allies have argued that voluntary, politically binding transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) represent the most practical steps at this stage without ruling out that such measures might eventually be incorporated into legally binding agreements. Although at times this debate takes on a quasi- theological character, it remains a major stumbling block over which the protagonists of each camp have shown little flexibility.
The impetus to overcoming this impasse may lie with the states of the Global South which were noticeably active in this most recent session of the working group. States such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and South Africa stressed that any armed conflict in outer space would have devastating consequences for their development plans and urged early action on tangible measures. Although many in the Global South also prefer legally binding instruments, they have demonstrated greater willingness to embrace politically binding measures in the first instance.
These states alongside the private sector and civil society stakeholders will need to maintain pressure on the dominant space powers to encourage restraint and push for agreement on cooperative security measures. There may be scope here for an “Ottawa process” like initiative whereby concerned states convene a negotiating conference of their own if the consensus UN forum fails to produce significant results. Global well-being is increasingly dependent on safeguarding outer space for peaceful purposes in line with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The international community may lose patience with the protracted quarrels of the three protagonists and take some action on their own.
And finally for those curious about the TV mini-series, a second season of the Three Body Problem will air later this year.
Paul Meyer recently spoke at the CPG/CIPS Conference held on October 2nd, titled “Canada and the Middle Power Challenge“.
