This November marks ten years since the Peace Accord between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was ratified by the Colombian Congress and became a binding legal document. The moment was far from the celebratory finish one might have imagined. The original Accord, negotiated and agreed upon by the parties in Havana only months earlier, under the watchful eye of the international community, was rejected in a national referendum that October. Just weeks after the conclusion of the peace talks, 50.2% of Colombians voted “no” to the agreement already on the table, sending shockwaves across the country and among those on the outside who have long struggled to understand the intricacies of Colombia’s conflict. This setback led to the agreement being sent back for a new round of modifications before finally being ratified by Congress in November 2016.
The rejection of the original agreement by such a narrow margin illustrates the deep polarization that has characterized Colombian society on how a conflict that lasted more than five decades and affected millions of lives is perceived. “That rejection, unfortunately, left a mark in our collective subconscious and introduced a degree of skepticism toward the work of the new transitional justice institutions from the outset,” a Magistrate of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) explains to me. On the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Peace Accord, I am speaking with Colombian judges and human rights defenders to understand where Colombia stands 10 years later, how the special tribunal has carried out its mandate, and whether victims’ pursuit of justice has materialised.
Colombia’s transitional justice (TJ) model is widely regarded as one of the most innovative in contemporary peacebuilding literature, grounded in a vision that promised not only peace but transformation, a reimagining of justice centered on victims, gender equality, rural development, and structural change. Its architecture includes 3 key institutions. The first is the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission, whose mandate concluded in 2020 with a final report that shed light on the causes of a conflict in which 80% of the victims were non-combatant civilians and issued a series of recommendations for non-repetition. Complementing the Commission’s truth-seeking mandate is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace tribunal, which works to establish accountability for the most serious crimes through eleven macro-cases that collectively address violence and crimes committed by all parties – from FARC, to paramilitaries, to state security forces. Finally, the Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing is mandated to investigate approximately 137,000 missing-persons cases.
The 10-year trajectory of the Peace Accord has been marked by many ups and downs. Yet one constant has defined Colombia’s implementation path: attitudes toward the agreement and its TJ institutions have dominated national political life. They have shaped electoral campaigns across the ideological spectrum and helped candidates win, and lose, presidential races. In 2018, Iván Duque, an opponent of the accord and leader of the “no” camp, won the presidency, and support for peace processes weakened. In 2022, Gustavo Petro ascended to power on a pro-peace platform, pledging to open negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the largest remaining rebel group. Yet persistent violence challenged Petro’s “Total Peace” agenda, and he concluded his term with limited progress as both old and emerging threats to peace resurfaced.
It was therefore unsurprising that public debates over peace and TJ were central to this year’s presidential campaign, which resulted in the election of the far-right candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella. De la Espriella has been outspoken in his criticism of the 2016 accord and has threatened to close the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. He rejects Petro’s “Total Peace” policy and vows to govern with an “iron fist,” signaling a return to the political climate that preceded Petro’s administration. “There is fear in communities, particularly in territories that largely supported the left-wing, pro-peace candidate Iván Cepeda,” explains Ximena Idrobo Obando, a feminist and human rights defender in Nariño. “We seem to be entering a new transition, one unfolding within the larger transition that began in 2016. Unfortunately, this one feels like a transition toward war rather than peace,” she concludes.
Colombians have lived through similar cycles before. Under Duque, the establishment of the SJP was delayed for two years as his government sought to weaken its mandate. The Constitutional Court pushed back, upholding Congress’s rejection of Duque’s objections and compelling the government to accept a TJ system it had not favored. Although criticism has come from every direction, including, and most importantly, from victims and victims’ organizations who do not want to see justice delayed any further, the advances made are real and offer grounds for hope. Since its establishment, JEP has opened eleven macro-cases, issued milestone restorative sentences in macro-cases 01 and 03, and advanced an innovative model of reparative justice that has drawn admiration outside Colombia.
Colombia’s transitional justice is sustained by a committed community of judges, human rights lawyers and activists, victims’ organizations, and victims themselves (around 350,000 victims are accredited with SJP) who continue to demand truth and accountability. They work tirelessly to uncover the painful realities of a half-century long conflict, deliver justice, and help society heal. “We must defend the Peace Accord and the TJ institutions the same way we defend our Constitution,” reflects Ximena Idrobo Obando. The bravery and resilience of these women and men, JEP judges, their support staff, human rights defenders, victims’ lawyers, and above all the victims whose lives were irrevocably altered, are profoundly inspiring. There is determination in their voices and in their eyes: a commitment to safeguarding the advances achieved to date and to pursuing a vision of transitional justice that does more than impose criminal sanctions; one that is capable of transforming society from within.
Undoubtedly, the De la Espriella government will test Colombia’s TJ institutions once again. Canada and other international partners can contribute by continuing their support for the implementation of peace processes and by speaking out to safeguard the integrity of the SJP and uphold the spirit of the Peace Accord for the benefit of all Colombians.
Safo Musta is a doctoral student in the International Development program at the University of Ottawa. Her research examines the transformative character of Colombia’s transitional justice model through a feminist institutionalist lens. She developed close ties to Colombia during her 2022 MA fieldwork on Canada’s role in peacebuilding, conducted near the Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo (CIDER) at the University of the Andes. In 2026, she returns to CIDER to conduct interviews in Bogotá and several territories on the implementation of peace processes. This series of blogs draws on the narratives gathered through those field interviews.
Read the blog in Spanish here.
